CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A006200070001-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 28, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 27, 1962
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A006200070001-5.pdf1.14 MB
Body: 
~rwn /~SlT Approved For Regis! R5/S! T9T00975A 2200070001-5 25X1 27 January 1962 Copy No. 25X1 JCS, State Dept. reviews completed Approved For ReleasVMM5/913 1~9T00975AO06200070001-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200070001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200070001-5 Eappruveu ror `7 se cuusiuzi 10 :..w-rcur i V I UU i 1Eauwicuuu i uuu i -Z 27 January 1962 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. OAS: Punta del Este Conference. (Page i) 2. Laos: Enemy threat to Nam Tha increases. (Page it) 3. Congo-UN: U Thant warns Adoula not to make martyr of Gizenga. (Page tit) 25X1 5. USSR: Moscow rejects US-UK proposal to merge test ban with general disarmament negotiations. (Page iv) 6. West Germany - Spain - Portugal: Defense Minister Strauss tells Salazar Bonn is still interested in air bases in Spain. (Page iv) IN 9. Iran. Bakhtiar's, departure from country removes rallying point for opposition elements. (Page v) 10. UK-Kenya: British defense officials expect to lose base rights after Kenyan independence. (Page vi) 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79T009 5A006200070001-5 ' d F R 2003/05/16 CIA RDP79T00 75A200070001 5 25X1 A pprove or ase : - - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 27 January 1962 DAILY BRIEF 0 Ell *OAS: Conference delegations appear to have reached general agreement that the Castro regime should be ex- cluded from the OAS on grounds that its system of govern- ment is incompatible with the organization's principles. The legal basis and timing of Cuba's exclusion is providing a basis for considerable controversy, however, with Brazil apparently pressing most strongly for prolonging the process. By a vote of two thirds of the 21 OAS members, the present foreign ministers' conference could convert itself into a special inter-American conference which some members believe would be competent to amend the OAS charter to ex- clude the present Cuban Government from future OAS meet- ings. The strong interest of most Latin Americans in legal questions, however, may lead even strongly anti-Castro del- egations to seek an interim period for legal consultations be- fore amending the OAS charter, Members of the Communist party of Uruguay, leftist- 25X1 oriented labor unions, and pro-Cuba committees are I Ito go out on the streets o on- tevideo without awaiting further orders, as soon as they hear that measures have been taken against Cuba at the meeting in Punta del Este. The first assigned task is said to be to set fire to the US Embassy. Pro-Castro groups staged a success- ful demonstration in Montevideo on 2,3 January with an estimated 25X1 25X1 II 25X1 attendance of 12,000. AN Approvor Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79975A006200070001-5 Ssu-mao N ,A REMMA /M-no-1- S, , , - ~_. ~._.._~ NAMiTHAyM M1ong Sa Ban/Houei i~'' B x ~ LUANCf P -- VIENTIANE Bon Hin Hoop r GOVERNMENT Forces r- KONG LE - PATHET LAO 1 ' KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS ROAD I 0 50 100 TRAIL STATUTE MILES one 0 Nong Khai A Approximate r- Tchepp nakhet Muong Phin SAVANNAKHE`f Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200070001-5 27 Jan 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page I 25X1 Laos: I ~he tactical situation at Nam Tha in northwest- ern E-aos is-aeteriorating, according to a MAAG report of 26 January. One of the two government infantry battalions in the area has been overrun by enemy forces estimated at four battalions. Phourni is planning to airlift a relief bat- talion to NN31m Tha from Pakse, in southern Laos, beginning y 27 January \s,~Aief MAAG, recounting the series of reverses suffered .this month by government forces after attempting advances into enemy-held territory in northern and central Laos, notes that Phoumi's troops have been forced to withdrawin each case after putting up no more than token resistance. He warns that if Phoumi continues to push against sensitive enemy spots, his troops will be routed. Chief MAAG notes that the Lao army--both officers and men--suffers from an almost path- ological fear of North Vietnamese troops, and, despite im- provements since the cease-fire last May, continues to have serious weaknesses, especially in leadership and motivati ---r-4 Phoumi, on 26 January, said he was considering an appeal to e UN--after first informing the Geneva conference--for help against the buildup of North Vietnamese strength in Laos and the worsening military situation. Vientiane, meanwhile, has reported the Nam Tha situation to the ICC as a cease-fire violation and requested an investigation. Phourni, who has re- ceived support from the King and the. cabinet for his stand against relinquishing the defense and interior posts in a coali- tion government, feels that the Communists areresorting to 25X1 i ar. ssure in an effort to regain the political initiative m Uit re in LaOO 27 Jan 62 DAILY BRIEF 11 Z*1 oved For Release 2003/05/16 CIA-RDP79TOOE175AO06200070001-5 L N ONE 25X1 Approved For R 75AW200070001-5 Congo-UX: /)Acting UN Secretary General Thant has warned 25X1 Adoula not to niMe a martyr of Gizenga. Thant is concerned that if Gizenga were killed the USSR would have a strong case to support its demand for an immediate Security Council meet- i T1 Ma fnnla 1k)Tr%anr%,tt7 Anna nr%+ ha-wrAn a a+-rr%n ncicAn nt Chic Hmp The USSR on 25 January called for a council meeting "as soon as possible" to consider the failure of the UN to remove all mercenaries from Katanga. The American delegation believes that a meeting at this time would merely provide a forum for a Soviet attack on the secretary general. Britain, which holds thp rn"npil rp.Qidimne fhi.Q mnnth indicaterl it will he slow in -3 -1- 25X any meetingi L::~ (Backup, Pa 27 Jan 62 DAILY BRIEF iii 9S x 1 25X1 Approved For R ease 2003/05/16 .CIA- RDP79T00 75A200070001-5 j II 25X1 USSR: Although Moscow had previously urged that the test ban question be solved "interdependently" with general and complete disarmament, the USSR now has rejected the US-UK proposal to merge the current test ban negotiations with the .broader disarmament negotiations scheduled to be- gin in Geneva on 14 March. At the 26 January session of the test ban talks Soviet delegate Tsarapkin read a govern- ment statement which insisted on continuing the three-power talks in their present form. Tsarapkin also insisted that the test ban conference participants should negotiate on the basis of the Soviet proposal for a ban on atmospheric, outer space, and underwater tests, using national detection means for control purposes, with a moratorium. on underground tests. The Soviet turnabout is probably designed to maneuver .the West into a position where Moscow's propaganda could blame the US for a breakdown of the talks. In the event of a rupture the USSR may seek formal UN approval of its pro- posal for a ban on tests without any international. controls. Soviet leaders may also calculate that the impasse over the question of continuing negotiations will lead to a resumption of US tests in the atmosphere, which would provide a pretext for the USSR to claim. that it had no choice but to continue with its own nuclear testing. The Soviet Government is on record with.frequent warnings that US underground tests and plans for 25X1 atmospheric tests leave the USSR free to resume testing in the interests of its security. West Germany - Spain - Portugal: The US Embassy in Lisbon has learned from a reliable source that West German Defense Minister Strauss, on a recent unpublicized visit to Lisbon,. told Prime Minister Salazar and Army Minister Mario Silva that Bonn has a continuing interest in obtaining air bases in Spain. Early in 1960 an attempt by West Germany to negotiate 27 Jan 62 DAILY BRIEF iv I Approved For Re ease 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T0097 A006200070001-5 25X1 ~. for . these and other facilities - was abandoned when there were unfavorable repercussions in Britain and other-NATO coun- tries. Strauss suggestedthat Portuguese officials might wish to emphasize to Spain the importance of such air bases to the defense of the Iberian Peninsula. Lisbon has budgeted funds to acquire land for a base at Beja in southeastern Portugal which, according to a 1960 agreement, will be shared with the German Air Force. Bonn has agreedto divide the cost of constructing -the base, scheduled to be completekduring 1964. F the university and to screen out politically undesirable StUA.,+.11 Iran: (A~t. General Timur Bakhtiar at the Shah's request left fr-an for Western Europe on 26 January. Hisabsencefrom the country removes a rallying point for those of the opposition who are looking for a strongman. The Shah has ordered Major General Pakravan, chief of the National Intelligence and Secu- rity Organization (SAVAK), to remove from his organization those officers known to be proteges of Bakhtiar, its former chief. Im- posing strict security measures in the wake of the recent riots at Tehran University, the Amini government has closed the insti- tution temporarily and has accepted the resignation of the chan- cellor and his top aides. The government intends to reorganize 27 Jan 62 DAILY BRIEF v Approved For Rflease 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79TOO975 006200070001-?5Xl ................ - ~ 25X1 25X1 Approved For R~ease 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79TOOl 75A'Mlt2OOO7OOOl-5 2bX1 UK-Kenya,WBritish plans for future expansion or im- provement of bases in Kenya have been suspended.because defense officials expect that the United Kingdom will not be able to retain base rights after Kenya becomes independent. The British Army uses the Kenya headquarters for a stra- tegic reserve of some 5,000 men for support of the British position in the Persian Gulf and East Africa. Kenya is. also the site of important air base and some naval facilities. A constitutional conference starting in London on 14 February will probably fix a date for independenc@,_,jvhich the Colonial Office hopes will not be before early. 196 I I 27 Jan 62 DAILY BRIEF vi 25X1 25X1 Ap ved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00t 200070001-5 doula's Plans for Gizenga T Gizengass personal safety may well be in danger from con acts between pro- and anti-Gizengist factions. On 26 January pro-Gizengists demonstrated outside the US Embassy, apparently reacting to rumors that Gizenga had been killed. US Ambassador Gullion believes that Adoula personally is de- termined to adhere to the legal forms in his effort to punish 5X1 and exclude Gizenga from public life, but that a long "Lumumba- like" captivity- -which Adoula apparently envisages--presents obvious dangers. Gizenga now is being held in a military camp after being turned over by the UN to Congolese authorities-- at his own request. Gullion says Adoula has instructed Surete Chief Nendaka to see that "no harm was to come to Gizenga" and that he was to see no one "who might cause him trouble:' The pro-Gizengist radicals fear and distrust Nendaka, and Min- ister of Int for Gbenye recently tried unsuccessfully to have 0 him ousted 2 CAd~oula, according to Gullion, is confident he has both Gi- zenga and his erstwhile followers under control or effectively neutralized. He is still undecided, however, on what legal form to use against Gizenga, and Gullion expects no decision prior to Adoula's completion of his cabinet reorganization. Adoula ex- pressed confidence that the Congo parliament would follow his lead, but "dozens" of members feared that lifting Gizengass par- liamentary immunity would "open Pandora's box" for similar action against them. A dossier of charges against Gizenga. is still under preparation 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200070001-5 27 Jan 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200070001-5 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200070001-5 25X1 25X1 ase 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00975A006 British Pessimistic on Holding Bases in Kenya ((Despite their. pessimism, British defense officials have no i mediate plans for withdrawal from Kenya and hope that agreement may be possible on a phase-out period of up to five years and on "staging through" air rights utilized on an occa- sional basis. British officials realize this period may be short- ened by increasing local opposition As early as last November. the opposition party in the Kenya legs ature, which has a. good chance of forming the government after Kenya becomes. an independent state, presented a motion demanding British military withdrawal "without delay" after in- dependence. Pressure from inside the country and from other African states would make it extremely difficult for even a mod- erate African government to allow the British bases to remain. Moreover, officials in London feel. that even if such permission could be obtained, an independent Kenya government would 'm- pose such stringent conditions that the bases would be useless he army camp and airfield near Nairobi and the naval sta- 25X1 25X1 w reserve supplemented by naval task forces in critical areas tion at Mombasa make up Britain's Kenya bases. London would find it hard if not impossible to replace their facilities for ac- commodating Britain's overseas strategic reserve. The Defense White Paper due in late February or March will probably indi- cate a long-term shift in policy involving reductions in forces stationed overseas and reliance on a mobile.UK-based stra tegic _EThis plan, however, will not make up for the loss of the Kenya bases if political developments force an accelerated with- drawal. In that case Aden would assume increased importance for London's security interests in the Persian Gulf area now that Arab states refuse it overflight rights. Although Aden is inferior to Kenya in training facilities and living conditions, the present garrison of 4,000 British troops could be strength- ened enough so that, with forces in Singapore and naval. units in the genera area. could deal with limited local hostilities. Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200070001-5 27 Jan 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 25X1 Approved Fo THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006290070001-5 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release's/1'- 09 5A006200070001-5 ~' ./. f f/ f /~ Approved For Relea 5/ T00975A006200070001-5 '7 .r- JwILI 71