CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006200370001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 3, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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3 March 1962
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. The situation in Burma. (Page t) 25X1
France -Algeria: Moslem restraint appears to be break=
ing down as a result of continued OAS provocations. (Page i)
4. , Cuba- NATO-Japan: Lisbon and Tokyo do not intend to co-
operate in applying COCOM controls to trade with Cuba.
(Page ii)
5. Communist China: Peiping postpones National People's
Congress. (Page itt)
6. South Korea. Factional struggle within South Korean re-
gime intensified. (Page M)
7. Pakistan-USSR: Ayub moves to improve relations with 25X1
Moscow. (page tv)
9. Britain-Kenya: London negotiations for Kenya constitution
makelittle progress. (Page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
3 March 1962
DAILY BRIEF
F angoon is quite and busi-
nesses are operating as usual.
The takeover was accomplished through a concerted sweep
by Burmese Army units which in the early hours of 2 March
25X1 arrested all members of the cabinet--except two who were out
called upon all civil servants to carry on as usual.
that it will continue Burma's policy of neutralism and has
*Burma: General Ne Win, in again seizing power on
2 March, suspended the constitution and established a Union
Revolutionary Council to head the government. This coun-
cil, which is made up entirely of military men including the
vice chiefs of staff for army, navy, and air, has announced
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of town--the speakers of both houses of parliament, and the
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liament and some of the less important cabinet ministers were
later reported to have been released. Prime Minister Nu, when
arrested, reportedly refused to accompany officers to the war 25X1
office and was placedin protective custody at his home 1I
France-Algeria: After bombing and indiscriminate shoot-
ings of Moslems by the OAS, French troops had difficulty, on
1 and 2 March, in containing Arab mobs in Algiers and Oran
intent on retaliation against Europeans. Moslem restraint,
which has been urged by the PAG, appears to be breaking down.
The OAS, evidently desiring to force the army to use its full
resources in the protection of Europeans, can be expected to
continue provocations against the Moslems. The US consul
general in Algiers notes that Moslem retaliation could easily
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develop in the countryside, where PAG control is less firm
and French troops have been dangerously thinned out,
The PAG, as early as 25 February, issued a strongly
worded communique accusing the French Army and security
forces of failure to protect Moslems, and may now approach
the "final" stage of negotiations determined to demand effec-
tive F ench action against the OAS before agreeing to a cease-
fir e According to a PAG spokesman in Tunis, the PAG ne-
gotia ing team will not leave there for further talks with the
French before 6 March. One PAG representative went to Ge-
neva yesterday, possibly in an effort to obtain additional sat-
isfaction from the French on the question of Paris' determina-
tion and ability to control the French Army and Europeans in
AlgeriaAAr-
Cuba- NATO-Japan:)(The Portuguese representative to the
North Atlantic Council stated on 28 February that Lisbon did
not intend to cooperate in applying COCOM controls to its trade
with Cuba, nor would it modify its commercial relations with
Cuba. He related this stand to the positions taken by other
NATO countries toward problems in Portuguese overseas ter-
ritories. Portugal is the only NATO country, so far, to state
flatly that it would not cooperate in the US proposals, although
most others have indicated opposition to them. European
NATO members' total trade with Cuba in 1961 amounted to
about $80,000,000.
T
In Japan, whose total trade with Cuba in the first nine
months of 1961 came to some $25,000,000, a Foreign Office
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official has told the American Embassy that his government
has "no intention" of curbing trade with Cuba unless "virtually
global sanctions" are adopted. He said. that Japan could not 9 5 X
cut purchases of Cuban sugar this year si e contracts were
already concluded and shipping arraj~ged.
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Communist China- Postponement of Communist China's
National People's Congress from 5 March.is probably to per-
mit Peiping to defer a decision on the issuance of a major pol-
icy statement on Sino-Soviet relations until after the Soviet
central committee plenum, scheduled. to convene this Monday.
By delaying the congress, apparently to a date later this month,
the Chinese would hope to assess any new Soviet challenge pre-
sented at the Moscow meeting and answer it more effectively.
All current signs point to a Chinese determination to stand firm
on their present policy positions, although in at least one in-
stance in the past, deferment of the congress was associated
with a sharp reversal of regime policy. The session scheduled
for 1957 during Peiping's "Hundred Flowers" period was post-
poned twice when it became clear that liberalization had gotten
out of hand and had resulted in vitriolic popular criticism of
the regime. The resolutions finally adopted by the congress
signaled the abrupt end to the liberalization policy.
South Korea:OThe intensification of factional struggles in
the South Korean regime is reflected in a clash between Prime
Minister Song Yo-Chan and Security Chief Colonel Kim Chong-
pil. Song is seeking to restrict the extensive powers of Kim's
Central Intelligence Agency and is charging that Kim is heavily
involved in financial irregularities. Song has not produced the
evidence necessary to support his charges, and the conflict is
presently a standoff. Junta leader General Pak Chong-hui is W
attempting to resolve the clash, but may be forced to a choice.
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fIn the initial phase of this conflict, Pak seems to have sided
. U 4.1, T) 4 NO 4 + . The stabi ty of the regime however OrIvi
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could be threatened, by the publication of evidence, considered
ry-alid by the Prime Mnister, of Kim's involven)ent in corruption.j
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Pakistan-USSRY Ayub's government has decided to take
several small steps to improve relations with the USSR, os-
tensibly in the hope of diluting Soviet support in the UN of the
Indian position on Kashmir. Such gestures will.include, ac-
cording to an External Affairs Ministry official, Pakistani
recognition of Outer Mongolia, purchase of railway ties from
the USSR, permission for visits of Soviet cultural missions,
and authorization for a Pakistani agricultural team to study
the salinity problem in the USSR. These moves are consistent
with the policy of limited accommodation with the bloc which
Ayub sanctioned in mid- 1960 to ease Soviet pressures and to
extract more favorable treatment from the United States as a
treaty ally. Rawalpindi is aware that Moscow is unlikely to
modify significantly its support for India on Kashmir, includ-
ing use of the veto in the Security Council on which New Delhi
relies, and probably is more interested at this time in appeas-
ing latent neutralist sentiment in Pakistan and again reminding
the US that Rawalpindi's cooperation should not be takeq4or
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 Britain -Kenya :yThe Kenya constitutional talks in London,
which have been going on for more than two weeks, have so
far made little progress on the crucial issues which divide the
iAfrican delegations. The main point of dispute is the relative
,strengths to be assigned under the new constitution to the cen-
~tral government and to regional authorities--an issue which
,arises out of. the fear of minor Kenya tribes that they will be
!dominated by larger ethnic groups.
I INevertheless, all sides are optimistic that Me negoTTM---
.1tions ill ultimately roduce agreement and an early We tor
Kenva. indevendenci
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OAS Attempts to Prevent an Algerian Settlement
The OAS, if its present support continues, is capable of
creating a situation in which a settlement could not be imple-
mented without extensive bloodshed. Should the terms of the
settlement allay the fears of the Europeans by appearing to
safeguard their interests, the OAS might lose the widespread
European complicity that is one of the principal sources of its
strength. The OAS probably has, however, enough hard-core
militants and arms--some recent estimates run as high as
20,000 automatic weapons--as well as money and food to con-
tinue guerrilla resistance to a settlement long enough to im-
pair De Gaulle's prestige and cause strains on his regime.
The possibility of direct OAS military action against gov-
ernment installations in Algeria cannot be ruled out.I
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e increasing use
o troops instead o police in the past few ays to keep Moslem
mobs from attacking Europeans, however, will probably make
the army less likely to obey orders to take action against Euro-
peans.
Meanwhile, according to the press, Minister for Algerian
Affairs Joxe met with a chilly reception from approximately
100 ranking officers in Algeria when he explained details of
the cease-fire to them. The US air attache in Paris also for-
warded on 28 February a new report from a reliable source to
the effect that the commander in chief in Algeria, General
Charles Ailleret, has offered his resignation in protest against
De Gaulle's persistence in withdrawing the equivalent of two
army divisions at this time. Some personnel from the divisions
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began moving as early as 15 February, Continued deteriora-
tion of the security situation in Algeria, particularly if disor-
ders spread to the countryside, may lead to Ailleret's early
replacement by air force General Andre Martin, most often
mentioned as successor. Ailloret's departure during this
critical period, however, would accentuate military discon-
tent with De Gaulle's policies.
Press reports from Tunis state that the PAG met on 2
March to discuss the deteriorating situation in Algeria rather
than to make preparations for the next phase of negotiations
Other reports indicate that the PAG members are deeply pes-
simistic over what may happen in Algeria after a ceasefire.
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Communist China Postpones Its National Congress
Although the National People's Congress (NPC) is not a
policy making organ, it is one of the regime's most important
public forums; major programs are announced and Peiping's
plans and goals for the future are broadly outlined. Despite
the constitutional requirement that the congress meet annually,
the NPC did not convene in 1961 when economic setbacks and
the ensuing confusion provided a poor setting for the customary
reports of progress and aims.
The major business of the congress usually concerns do-
mestic affairs. If this 1962 session hears reports on the budget
and state plan, these may include some statistics which will show
how Peiping appraises the state of its economy. Almost no eco-
nomic statistics have been published for the last two years.
In addition to treating domestic, matters the NPC tradition-
ally hears a foreign policy report fl, Since November the Chinese
have been grooming the party and people for the possibility of
a break with Moscow. The regime has been telling the party and
influential segments of the population that Moscow is to blame
for China's economic problems and that Khrushchev is a revi-
sionist.O
While the NPC may not reflect this anti-Soviet. tone, the ma-
chinery has been set up for use if necessary to hit back at any
challenge that may emerge at the Soviet party plenum; in recent
commentaries the Russians have reopened the issue of factions
in the international Communist movement. Khrushchev may use
the issues of factions and dogmatism in his report to the Soviet
plenum in a fresh assault against the Albanian leaders and, by
implication, their Chinese defenders. He may also try to rebut
the Chinese by deriding "Albanian" charges that his polic of
re
aceful coexistence generates revolutionary softness.
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Kenya Constitutional Talks
So far the only real progress has been an agreement to
set up committees to deal with the various aspects of Kenya's
political evolution; however, the negotiators apparently have
not decided on the relationship between the committees or even
on an agenda for theme?
The stumbling block has been the demand of the Kenya Afri-
can Democratic Union (KADU), which represents Kenya's small-
er, less sophisticated tribes, that the conference declare at the
beginning in favor of giving considerable authority to regional
and local governments. Jomo Kenyatta's Kenya African National
Union (KANU), an alliance of the large Kikuyu and Luo tribes,
reportedly is determined first to discuss the areas of agreement
between the two parties, thereby postponing and partly burying
the regionalism issue, Ultimately some kind of compromise
seems likely, since neither side is willing to break up the con-
ference and take the blame for prolonging Kenya's political stale-
mate and postponing independence. 1)
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretory of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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