CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A006200440001-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
16
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 30, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 12, 1962
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A006200440001-4.pdf1.02 MB
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Approved For R sEAO/2S:ECrMT00975A1 00440001-4 25X1 12 March 1962 25X1 Copy No. C ' j 19m - -m IN 25X1 DIA and DOS review(s) completed. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200440001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 0975A200440001-4 12 March 1962 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 25X1 3. Syria: Cabinet shake-up imminent. (Page it) 4. Congo: Leopoldville. leaders deny plans for military cam- paign against Tshombe but doubt 15 March talks will be constructive. (Page iii) 25X1 6. Communist China - India: Peiping proposes resumption of talks on Sino-Indian border dispute and Tibetan-Indian trade treaty. (Page iv) 7. Burma: Rumors circulating in Rangoon of US and Thai sup- port for Shan separatism may be forerunner of official Bur- me se charges. along these lines. (Page iv) 8. Casablanca powers reportedly will shortly announce estab- lishment of "Joint African High Command" headquarters. (Page v) 9. Cuba: Announcement of committee headed by Castro is another step toward development of Communist-type single political party. (Page vi) 10. Peru: Leftist bank workers' union threatens general strike to force deportation of three American officials of New York bank branch in Lima. (Page vi) 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 25X1 Approved For R lease 2002/10/22. CIA-RDP79T0 975Ab@d200440001-4 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 12 March 1962 DAILY BRIEF %%Y Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 - CIA-R0P79TO6975A200440001-4 Syria: shake-up in the Syrian cabinet appears imminent, instigated by the Syrian Army Revolutionary Command which ef- fectivel rules the country from behind the scenes. changes are likely within the next few days. Incumbent rime Minister Dawalibi has come under increasing criticism from military as well as Baath- ist and other leftist elements, who consider him irresolute and ineffective. the next prime minister is likely to be leftist Nationalist party leader Sa- bri al-Asali, but the US army attache reports persistent rumors in Damascus that former Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm is slated .for the post. Azm is believed to be favored by the army, while Asali appears to derive support fr, i the Baathists and is said erred by President Qudsi 12 Mar 62 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 /4 25X1 Approved For R - 75A 200440001-4 25X1 25X1 Congo: n recent separate talks with Ambassador Gul- lion, both ?A loula and Kasavubu denied any intention of making war on Tshombe in the near future, insisting that the mission of their recently reinforced troops in northern Katanga was only to bring "order" to the area. At the same time, they re- flected doubt that the 15 March Adoula-Tshombe negotiations in Leopoldville will contribute to an early settlement of the Katanga problem. Kasavubu, commenting that too much em- phasis had been placed on the possibility of a short-term so- lution, either military or diplomatic, said he "counts on time leaders' main objective now is to hold their own vis-a-vis the to take care of Tshombe." Gullion believes that the Congolese that Mobutu is counting mainly on direct Belgian aid outside the against the UN. Belgium's newly arrived charge has indicated There are some indications that the Congolese; particu still-recalcitrant Tshombe into. line at some future date gian support, a reliable military force capable of brining a Katangan leader while gradually creating, perhaps.with Bel- framework of the UN operation to reorganize the Congolese ter Spaak, on the other hand, is reported to have intervened . UN, has apparently been encouraging. Belgian Foreign Minis- Army--a preference which the charge, a strong critic of the recently to halt the departure from Brussels, penaing receipt of approval from the UN, of 12 Belgian officers as i ig e advisers to the Congolese Army's headquarters staff 12 Mar 62 DAILY BRIE F iii 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For - 975A200440001-4 Communist China - India: Peiping has reportedly taken the completion of India's elections as the opportunity to propose resumption. of talks on the Sino-Indian border dispute and rene- gotiation of the treaty governing Indo-Tibetan trade. The reported Chinese note. is the third in an. exchange with the Indians regard- ing renewal of the 1954. trade treaty, which expires in June. The Chinese. value the treaty because of its enunciation of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" and because it provides for three Chinese trade agencies in India. Ti'e' Indians, who derive only marginal benefits from the treaty at present, indicated in a prior note that renewal would be pointless so long as the Chinese "illegally" occupy Indian-claimed territory along the northernbor- der. It is doubtful that the Indian response will be very forthcom- ing unless the text of the note, which is not yet available, suggests to New Delhi that there has been a significant shift in the Chinese nttitiiria cinete the last discussions more than a year ago. ers of the Shan states, abetted by Americans and Thais, planne itary government of General Ne Win. These rumors, possibly encouraged or even initiated by army officers, allege that the le *Burma:7umors persist in Rangoon of American and Thai support for eparatist sentiment in the Shan states and could be the forerunner of public charges along these lines by the new mil- 12 Mar 62 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 %% 25X1 Approved For Re 75A0`100440001-4 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 25X1;; 25X1 I MM o secede from Burma, set up an independent state, and join EATO. Brigadier Aung Gyi, Ne Win's second in command, has publicly denied any evidence of connection between. SEATO and the Shans, and relations between the new government and American officials in Rangoon have thus far been cordial. Ne Win, however, has apparently been unsuccessful in efforts to persuade U Nu to retire. from the political scene quietly,. and may soon feel a need to voice publicly charges of foreign in- tervention in Burmese affairs to justify his ouster of Nu's ci- vilian. government on 2 March and to make the reimposition of authoritarian government more acceptable to the Burmese pub- lic. Popular opinion in Burma has long held the United States at least indirectly responsible for the presence of Chinese Na- tionalist irregulars in northeastern Burma, and probably finds it easy to believe charges of US involvement with e. *African High Commando a permanent headquarters of the Casablanca powers' much- allyhooed "Joint African High Command" reportedly will be activated in Accra immediately after the planned meeting in. Cairo, probably early next month, of the heads of the participating governments- -Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, UAR, and the Algerian rebel regime. Among the publicized purposes of this joint military command, which has been in the process of formation since January 1961, is the supply of "military assistance to other states," which presum- ably is meant to include arms aid to nationalist elements in de- pendent territories of Africa. itant, frequently anti-Western, pan-African policies. They ma for some time largely a paper organization. Its various pro- moters, however, particularly Ghana's Nkrumah, can be ex- pected to try to develop it as an effective instrument of their mil pants' military establishments, the command is likely to remain Be Caube 01 sic og s ica and other deficiencies in the partici- 12 Mar 62 V Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200440001-4 251 Approved For 975A200440001-4 25X1 25X'1 25X1 25X1 of the new commant . among the nonparticipating African states regarding the aims 25X1: 1 11, turn more and more to the Communist bloc, which. is already providing some military support to all the Casablanca states, for assistance. The announcement of a joint military head- quarters is certain-to heighten suspicions and apprehensions Cuba: The announcement on 9 March of the formation of a National Directorate of the Integrated or Revolutionary Or- ganizations (ORI)- -described by the Cuban press as an impor- tant step in the planned evolution of the ORI toward becoming the United Party of the Socialist Revolution- -merely formal- izes a situation which has existed since the ORI was formed last August. For some months the ORI leaders have formed the regime's top policy- making body, and the party machinery has developed interlocking functions and leadership with all organs of the state, down to the local level. The. list of 25 ORI national directors, headed by Fidel Castro, includes all the key leaders who have controlled this political machine since its official formation in August. Also on the directorate are individuals who do not play a leading role in policy formation but who are included as representa- tives of the political groups- -Castro's 26 of July Movement and the small Revolutionary Directorate--which "merged" with the Communists' long-extent Popular Socialist party (PSP) to form the ORI. Of the 25 directors, ten are veteran PSP leaders, ten were prominent .in the 26 of July Movement, one was the leader of the Revolutionary Directorate, and the re- maining four are not known to have been affiliated with. any prior political group. Peru: Communist-led unions have threatened a general strike unless three American officials of the Lima branch of the National City Bank of New York leave the country by Wednes- day morning. The three officials forcibly ejected a Communist 12Ma.r62 DAILY BRIEF vi Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 j Approved For 975A200440001-4 25X1 I 25X1 labor leader from the bank's premises last Thursday when he was.urging bank employees to join a street demonstration sym- pathizing with Indian squatters evicted by the militia. from Peru- vian-owned haciendas in the Andean highlands. Communists and other leftists have been centering propa- ganda attacks on US-owned interests in Peru, apparently in an attempt to embarrass the pro-US conservative government dur- in- the campaign period before the 10 June presidential election. EM M 12 Mar 62 DAILY BRIEF vii M Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T009 5A200440001-4 National Directorate of Cuban .Political Machine Announced If the development of the ORI continues to follow the pat- tern of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, the National Directorate is likely to become the equivalent of the Soviet party central committee. Only about half of those named to the directorate play a.leading role in the formulation of policy; it is. from these individuals that the . Cuban equivalent of the Soviet party presidium is likely to be drawn. Although veteran Communists hold only ten of the 25 seats on the ORI National Directorate, there is little doubt that they will dominate it. The. others have already demonstrated that they are subject to Communist control, and a. number of them may well have been secret members of the Communist party for some years. Major. Juan Almeida, army chief of staff, could be one ex- ception. His relatively devout Catholicism has reportedly been a source of concern to the Communists, and he is reported on one occasion to have `shown lack of respect for a group of Soviet officials and their families. He is personally devoted to Fidel Castro, however, and, though not considered particularly intel- ligent or capable, is useful as a symbol of Negro solidarity with the regime. The list of ORI directors as issued-don which Fidel Castro is followed immediately by his brother Raul, Che Guevara, and Pres- ident Dorticos--does not reflect the members' relative importance in the formulation of policy. Blas Roca, secretary general of the PSP since 1935 and recently the OR-I's most authoritative spokes- man, is named fifth, whereas in tenth place--well ahead of such important Communist leaders as Lazaro Pena, Joaquin Ordoqui, and Cesar Escalante--is Faure Chomon, former leader of the dissolved Revolutionary Directorate, whose present role as Cuban ambassador in Moscow has been largely that of a technician per- mitted little if. any initiative. 12 Mar 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200440001-4 Approved ~ Peruvian Union Demands Deportation of Three Americans Labor leader Jorge Zapata Cuadra, a Communist, on 8 March entered a restricted area of the Lima branch of the National City Bank of New York to harangue the employees during a "demonstration of sympathy" with the Indian squat- ters. The Communist-dominated bank employees' union, FEB, charges that the Indians--several of whom were killed-- had been driven from lands owned by the US-owned mining company, Cerro de Pasco Corporation. It accordingly directed its demonstration against US-owned businesses in Lima, and singled out the National City Bank of New York because its em- ployees had refused to join FEB. The Lima police broke up the demonstration with tear gas and clubs before Zapata was ousted from the National City Bank, Although the FEB has only 7,000 members, Communist influence in other Lima unions- -particularly of transportation .and electrical workers--is great enough to paralyze the city if they all join the strike. The Peruvian Banking Association, a management organization, has agreed to support the National City Bank but has not indicated what form this support would take. The conservative Peruvian Government, attempting to re- duce antigovernment sentiment before the June elections, has for the past two or three months taken a conciliatory stand on . demands of leftist-dominated labor unions, particularly in con-, troversies involving US-owned companies. In the face of fur- ther demonstrations and riots inspired by Communists and Cas- troites, the government may well decide that deportation of the three US bank officials is the better part of valor. 25X1 25X1 25X1 12 Mar 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4 Approved THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Emergency Planning The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200440001-4 Approv or Releas! OP0/SF& 9 975AO06200440001-4 TOP SECRET ///// Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200440001-4