CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A006200440001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 30, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 12, 1962
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP79T00975A006200440001-4.pdf | 1.02 MB |
Body:
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12 March 1962
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DIA and DOS review(s)
completed. TOP SECRET
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12 March 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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3. Syria: Cabinet shake-up imminent. (Page it)
4. Congo: Leopoldville. leaders deny plans for military cam-
paign against Tshombe but doubt 15 March talks will be
constructive. (Page iii)
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6. Communist China - India: Peiping proposes resumption
of talks on Sino-Indian border dispute and Tibetan-Indian
trade treaty. (Page iv)
7. Burma: Rumors circulating in Rangoon of US and Thai sup-
port for Shan separatism may be forerunner of official Bur-
me se charges. along these lines. (Page iv)
8. Casablanca powers reportedly will shortly announce estab-
lishment of "Joint African High Command" headquarters.
(Page v)
9. Cuba: Announcement of committee headed by Castro is
another step toward development of Communist-type single
political party. (Page vi)
10. Peru: Leftist bank workers' union threatens general strike
to force deportation of three American officials of New York
bank branch in Lima. (Page vi)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 March 1962
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Syria: shake-up in the Syrian cabinet appears imminent,
instigated by the Syrian Army Revolutionary Command which ef-
fectivel rules the country from behind the scenes.
changes are likely
within the next few days. Incumbent rime Minister Dawalibi has
come under increasing criticism from military as well as Baath-
ist and other leftist elements, who consider him irresolute and
ineffective. the next
prime minister is likely to be leftist Nationalist party leader Sa-
bri al-Asali, but the US army attache reports persistent rumors
in Damascus that former Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm is slated
.for the post. Azm is believed to be favored by the army, while
Asali appears to derive support fr, i the Baathists and is said
erred by President Qudsi
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Congo: n recent separate talks with Ambassador Gul-
lion, both ?A loula and Kasavubu denied any intention of making
war on Tshombe in the near future, insisting that the mission
of their recently reinforced troops in northern Katanga was
only to bring "order" to the area. At the same time, they re-
flected doubt that the 15 March Adoula-Tshombe negotiations
in Leopoldville will contribute to an early settlement of the
Katanga problem. Kasavubu, commenting that too much em-
phasis had been placed on the possibility of a short-term so-
lution, either military or diplomatic, said he "counts on time
leaders' main objective now is to hold their own vis-a-vis the
to take care of Tshombe." Gullion believes that the Congolese
that Mobutu is counting mainly on direct Belgian aid outside the
against the UN. Belgium's newly arrived charge has indicated
There are some indications that the Congolese; particu
still-recalcitrant Tshombe into. line at some future date
gian support, a reliable military force capable of brining a
Katangan leader while gradually creating, perhaps.with Bel-
framework of the UN operation to reorganize the Congolese
ter Spaak, on the other hand, is reported to have intervened .
UN, has apparently been encouraging. Belgian Foreign Minis-
Army--a preference which the charge, a strong critic of the
recently to halt the departure from Brussels, penaing receipt
of approval from the UN, of 12 Belgian officers as i ig e
advisers to the Congolese Army's headquarters staff
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Communist China - India: Peiping has reportedly taken
the completion of India's elections as the opportunity to propose
resumption. of talks on the Sino-Indian border dispute and rene-
gotiation of the treaty governing Indo-Tibetan trade. The reported
Chinese note. is the third in an. exchange with the Indians regard-
ing renewal of the 1954. trade treaty, which expires in June. The
Chinese. value the treaty because of its enunciation of the "Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" and because it provides for
three Chinese trade agencies in India. Ti'e' Indians, who derive
only marginal benefits from the treaty at present, indicated in a
prior note that renewal would be pointless so long as the Chinese
"illegally" occupy Indian-claimed territory along the northernbor-
der. It is doubtful that the Indian response will be very forthcom-
ing unless the text of the note, which is not yet available, suggests
to New Delhi that there has been a significant shift in the Chinese
nttitiiria cinete the last discussions more than a year ago.
ers of the Shan states, abetted by Americans and Thais, planne
itary government of General Ne Win. These rumors, possibly
encouraged or even initiated by army officers, allege that the le
*Burma:7umors persist in Rangoon of American and Thai
support for eparatist sentiment in the Shan states and could be
the forerunner of public charges along these lines by the new mil-
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o secede from Burma, set up an independent state, and join
EATO. Brigadier Aung Gyi, Ne Win's second in command,
has publicly denied any evidence of connection between. SEATO
and the Shans, and relations between the new government and
American officials in Rangoon have thus far been cordial. Ne
Win, however, has apparently been unsuccessful in efforts to
persuade U Nu to retire. from the political scene quietly,. and
may soon feel a need to voice publicly charges of foreign in-
tervention in Burmese affairs to justify his ouster of Nu's ci-
vilian. government on 2 March and to make the reimposition of
authoritarian government more acceptable to the Burmese pub-
lic. Popular opinion in Burma has long held the United States
at least indirectly responsible for the presence of Chinese Na-
tionalist irregulars in northeastern Burma, and probably finds
it easy to believe charges of US involvement with e.
*African High Commando a permanent headquarters of
the Casablanca powers' much- allyhooed "Joint African High
Command" reportedly will be activated in Accra immediately
after the planned meeting in. Cairo, probably early next month,
of the heads of the participating governments- -Ghana, Guinea,
Mali, Morocco, UAR, and the Algerian rebel regime. Among
the publicized purposes of this joint military command, which
has been in the process of formation since January 1961, is the
supply of "military assistance to other states," which presum-
ably is meant to include arms aid to nationalist elements in de-
pendent territories of Africa.
itant, frequently anti-Western, pan-African policies. They ma
for some time largely a paper organization. Its various pro-
moters, however, particularly Ghana's Nkrumah, can be ex-
pected to try to develop it as an effective instrument of their mil
pants' military establishments, the command is likely to remain
Be
Caube 01 sic og s ica and other deficiencies in the partici-
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of the new commant .
among the nonparticipating African states regarding the aims 25X1:
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turn more and more to the Communist bloc, which. is already
providing some military support to all the Casablanca states,
for assistance. The announcement of a joint military head-
quarters is certain-to heighten suspicions and apprehensions
Cuba: The announcement on 9 March of the formation of
a National Directorate of the Integrated or Revolutionary Or-
ganizations (ORI)- -described by the Cuban press as an impor-
tant step in the planned evolution of the ORI toward becoming
the United Party of the Socialist Revolution- -merely formal-
izes a situation which has existed since the ORI was formed
last August. For some months the ORI leaders have formed
the regime's top policy- making body, and the party machinery
has developed interlocking functions and leadership with all
organs of the state, down to the local level.
The. list of 25 ORI national directors, headed by Fidel
Castro, includes all the key leaders who have controlled this
political machine since its official formation in August. Also
on the directorate are individuals who do not play a leading
role in policy formation but who are included as representa-
tives of the political groups- -Castro's 26 of July Movement
and the small Revolutionary Directorate--which "merged"
with the Communists' long-extent Popular Socialist party (PSP)
to form the ORI. Of the 25 directors, ten are veteran PSP
leaders, ten were prominent .in the 26 of July Movement, one
was the leader of the Revolutionary Directorate, and the re-
maining four are not known to have been affiliated with. any
prior political group.
Peru: Communist-led unions have threatened a general
strike unless three American officials of the Lima branch of
the National City Bank of New York leave the country by Wednes-
day morning. The three officials forcibly ejected a Communist
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labor leader from the bank's premises last Thursday when he
was.urging bank employees to join a street demonstration sym-
pathizing with Indian squatters evicted by the militia. from Peru-
vian-owned haciendas in the Andean highlands.
Communists and other leftists have been centering propa-
ganda attacks on US-owned interests in Peru, apparently in an
attempt to embarrass the pro-US conservative government dur-
in- the campaign period before the 10 June presidential election.
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National Directorate of Cuban .Political Machine Announced
If the development of the ORI continues to follow the pat-
tern of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, the National
Directorate is likely to become the equivalent of the Soviet
party central committee. Only about half of those named to
the directorate play a.leading role in the formulation of policy;
it is. from these individuals that the . Cuban equivalent of the
Soviet party presidium is likely to be drawn.
Although veteran Communists hold only ten of the 25 seats
on the ORI National Directorate, there is little doubt that they
will dominate it. The. others have already demonstrated that
they are subject to Communist control, and a. number of them
may well have been secret members of the Communist party
for some years.
Major. Juan Almeida, army chief of staff, could be one ex-
ception. His relatively devout Catholicism has reportedly been
a source of concern to the Communists, and he is reported on
one occasion to have `shown lack of respect for a group of Soviet
officials and their families. He is personally devoted to Fidel
Castro, however, and, though not considered particularly intel-
ligent or capable, is useful as a symbol of Negro solidarity with
the regime.
The list of ORI directors as issued-don which Fidel Castro is
followed immediately by his brother Raul, Che Guevara, and Pres-
ident Dorticos--does not reflect the members' relative importance
in the formulation of policy. Blas Roca, secretary general of the
PSP since 1935 and recently the OR-I's most authoritative spokes-
man, is named fifth, whereas in tenth place--well ahead of such
important Communist leaders as Lazaro Pena, Joaquin Ordoqui,
and Cesar Escalante--is Faure Chomon, former leader of the
dissolved Revolutionary Directorate, whose present role as Cuban
ambassador in Moscow has been largely that of a technician per-
mitted little if. any initiative.
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Peruvian Union Demands Deportation of Three Americans
Labor leader Jorge Zapata Cuadra, a Communist, on 8
March entered a restricted area of the Lima branch of the
National City Bank of New York to harangue the employees
during a "demonstration of sympathy" with the Indian squat-
ters. The Communist-dominated bank employees' union,
FEB, charges that the Indians--several of whom were killed--
had been driven from lands owned by the US-owned mining
company, Cerro de Pasco Corporation. It accordingly directed
its demonstration against US-owned businesses in Lima, and
singled out the National City Bank of New York because its em-
ployees had refused to join FEB. The Lima police broke up
the demonstration with tear gas and clubs before Zapata was
ousted from the National City Bank,
Although the FEB has only 7,000 members, Communist
influence in other Lima unions- -particularly of transportation
.and electrical workers--is great enough to paralyze the city
if they all join the strike. The Peruvian Banking Association,
a management organization, has agreed to support the National
City Bank but has not indicated what form this support would
take.
The conservative Peruvian Government, attempting to re-
duce antigovernment sentiment before the June elections, has
for the past two or three months taken a conciliatory stand on .
demands of leftist-dominated labor unions, particularly in con-,
troversies involving US-owned companies. In the face of fur-
ther demonstrations and riots inspired by Communists and Cas-
troites, the government may well decide that deportation of the
three US bank officials is the better part of valor.
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12 Mar 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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