CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006200490001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 17, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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17 March 1962
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
3. USSR: Moderate,tone of Khrushchev's remarks. on Berlin.
and Germany in 16 March speech indicates continued in-
terest in negotiations. (Page it)
France-Algeria- Paris officials do not believe Evian
talks will be extended past this weekend. (Page it i)
5. Syria-Israeh. Damascus evacuates families of troops
stationed.in Israeli border area. (Page tv)
7. Mongolia: Ulan Bator moves indicate strong commitment
. to USSR in Sino-Soviet dispute. (Page v)
9.
Kenya-Britain-
11. Brazil-Czechoslovakia- Prague moves to open consulate
in Recife. (Page v it)
12. Situation Report- Cameroon. (Page vit)
13. Guatemala- Comment on situation. (Page vitt)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 March 1962
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*USSR' The moderate tone of Khrushchev's remarks on
Berlin and Germany in his. 16 March speech--his. first major
foreign policy pronouncement since the party congress last
October--was intended to hold the door open for a negotiated
settlement. He again indicated willingness to work out an
agreement with the West on. the status of West Berlin and Al-
lied access which would be incorporated in a separate peace
treaty with East Germany. He also reiterated that there is
.no "fatal deadline" for the conclusion of such a treaty. Khru-
shchev sought to convey an impression of restraint by declin-
ing to comment on the current US-Soviet exchanges on these
questions, but attempted to heighten the sense of urgency in
the. West by implying that Soviet patience is. nearing an end.
He emphasized that a Berlin settlement must include not only
guarantees for Allied access but also "recognition and respect
for the sovereign rights of the GDR.'
Khrushchev again warned that the USSR would respond to
US nuclear testing in the atmosphere by "staging its own tests;"
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explosion, announced by the US Atomic Energy. Commission
for controls over a test ban agreement and will insist that na-
tional. detection systems provide a "sound foundation" for an
agreement. He claimed that the Soviet underground nuclear
clear that the USSR will continue to reject Western proposals
that the US might achieve a "military advantage.' He made it
and contended that Soviet tests would preclude any possibility
on 2 February, was staged deliberately to disprove the.West's
contention that it is impossible to detect some underground
tests.
In criticizing the West's attitude toward disarmament, Khru-
shchev asserted that the Western leaders overlook their own
vulnerability in a war under modern conditions which should in-
cline them to take a more favorable view of Soviet disarmament
proposals. He sought to point up this alleged vulnerability by
claiming that the USSR has developed a "global rocket" which
cannot he detected and is invulnerable to "anti-missile weapons.'
France-Algeria: The director of De Gaulle's personal
cabinet told a US Embassy officer on 15 March that although
the Evian negotiations had dragged out much longer than ex-
pected, he did not think they would be extended "over another
weekends'
A high French official and a rebel. spokesman
nave confirmed that the expected signing of a cease-fire ac-
cord on 15 March was delayed by disagreement over a French
proposal for the disposition of the rebel army following a cease-
fire. The French Government is taking extensive measures,
both in Algeria and metropolitan France, to control the violence
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the. Secret Army Organization is expected to provoke ;follow-
re
in announcement of a cease-ti
desnite the cease-fire that has been arrange
which precipitated the latest incidents. he Syrians have said
they would attack Israel.if the diversion project is implemented.
The actual diversion is not scheduled to begin until late 1963,
but Syrian units in the border area recently had been put on the
highest degree of alert and families and dependents of Syrian
troops were being evacuated in anticipation of a possible early
clash over the dispute. The subsequent Israeli land and air at-
tacks may lead to additional and possibly more serious incidents
*Israel-Syria: Israeli air .Tee planes om a 6yrian ar-
tillery positions east of lake Tiberias on 17 March following
an artillery duel and an infantry attack by tank-supported Is-
raeli units in the same area. The UN Mixed Armistice Com-
mission negotiated a cease-fire which became effective at
0700 local time (2400 EST). The clash resulted from a series
of incidents--on 8, 15, and 16 March--involving Syrian artil-
lery and Israeli patrol boats which, according to the Israelis,
were escorting Israeli fishermen on Lake Tiberias.
The fighting reflects the sensitivity on both sides regard-
ing Israel's long-range plan to pump Jordan. River waters out
of lake Tiberias, as well as the more immediate issues
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Mongolia: Ulan Bator has recently made several moves
which underline the Mongolian leaders' strong commitment to
the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute. After denouncing
the Albanians and openly criticizing Peiping's support for
Tirana,the Mongolians. embarked on their own version of de-
Stalinization by attacking Marshal Choybalsan, who ruled the
Mongolian party and state from the .193 Os until his death in
1952. Charging that the Choybalsan cult of personality had
led to tremendously harmful consequences, Mongolian party
leaders have ordered his name removed from.the industrial
combine in Ulan Bator and from the national university. A
similar effort to follow Moscow's lead in the 1956 de-Stalin-
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ization had severe repercussions within the Mongolian party
as opposing factions struagled_ for, power.
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Kenya-Britain:
Both the Kenya Afri--
can National, Union, which represents the4arge Kikuyu and Luo
tribes, and the Kenya African Democratic Union, a coalition
of smaller tribes, seem to be awaiting a decision from Colo-
nial Secretary Maudling, which each expects will favor its po-
sition. Maudling, however, apparently still hopes to work out
a negotiated settlement and wants to avoid having to impose a
constitution, British officials in both London and Nairobi ex-
pect violence from dissatisfied tribal elements if the next con-
gfitutional qten has to be imi3ose-WT-
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Brazil-Czechoslovakia- Recent Czech activities in Recife,
the principal city of economically depressed northeastern Brazil,
may indicate that Prague is planning to open a consulate there,
in line with the bloc's efforts to foster closer relations with Bra-
zil. Ferdinance Hadek, Czech commercial attache', is quoted in
the local pre ss as saying,that Czechoslovakia wants to help the
northeast with technical assistance, scholarships, credits, and
machinery, and plans to set up industrial plants in all. the states
of the northeast. Czech technicians are constructing flour mills
in three of the ten northeastern states, and several other states
in northern Brazil have apparently expressed interest in Czech
proposals. The US consul in Recife notes that increasing Czech
exports to northeastern Brazil may persuade the Brazilian Gov-
ernment that a consulate is needed there. I
Situation Report- -Cameroon: President Ahmadou Ahidjo
of the Federal Republic RE ~!am oon has shown considerable
political skill in guiding the formation of the new Cameroon
Federation. Despite his strong political position, which derives
largely from his French support, his influence does not extend
to the important southern areas of Cameroon, and left-wing ter-
rorists continue active in the southwest. Discontent in the south
stems from the slow pace of economic development and the vir-
tual exclusion of, its representatives from top posts within the
government. F7 I
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*Guatemala: President Ydigoras faces the most serious po-
litical crisis of his four years in office. The army has taken.
over from the police in Guatemala City, and unless the situa-
tion in the capital is quickly stabilized the military is likely to
force his resignation. The army would justify its move as
necessary to prevent a takeover by. those Communist-supported
elements who sparked.the rioting and now support the guerrilla
operations. in the interior. An army takeover, however., would
not necessarily mean an end to the threat. The Guatemalan
military has. in the past shown itself unwilling to act against
what it interprets to be the popular will.
The rioters in.the capital on 15 March included.many who
were not students, and the police excesses used against the
Communist- led student rioters on the previous two days have
aroused a wide segment of the populace in the capital against
the regime. The disturbances may become even bloodier.
Ydigoras threatened publicly on 15 March to use thousands of
his peasant supporters against the rioters and is reported by
to have already brought a number of
peasants into the capital. F7 I
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 Possible OAS Reactions to a. Cease-fire Announcement
{lthoughthe proclamation of a cease-fire is generally ex-
pected at any moment, according to the US consul general in
Algiers, the OAS has, not called for any specific reaction. in
Algeria other than a 48-hour, general strike. He comments
that some spectacular raid or sabotage will probably be under-
taken, although there is no evidence that the OAS is prepared
to abandon its guerrilla and psychological tactics in favor of an
overt assault which would expose it to destruction by the French
.Army and security forces. Many high French officials have
said they expect a cease-fire announcement to provoke greatly
increased violence .In Algiers and Oran for aboutt vo weeks,
after. which the army will gradually impose order
clan will declare an
ind pen ent Algerian government following a cease-fire. The
OAS has taken some pains to create the impression that is is
already functioning as a government, by issuing mobilization
orders, requiring "visas" for exit and entry to Algeria, print-
ing its wn currency, and otherwise exercising administrative
powe
he bulk of the Europeans, especially in Algiers: and Oran,
wouTd"probably be willing to make some demonstration of hos-
tility more violent than a general strike. The consul feels, how
ever, that an.emotional outburst may be inhibited.by the slow
approach of a cease-fire, which has given many Europeans time
to become accustomed to the idea, and by the massive presence
of French Army forces and the threat of Moslem. retaliation
In France itself, the government has taken extraordinary
me'sures to control any internal disturbances, that might follow
a ceasefire announcement. All army officers have been placed
on an alert status, and troops may not leave quarters. except for
official purposes. The US Army attache considers that these
measures are largely psychological, and that there is little like-
lihood of a successful OAS or military move against the govern-
ment. The French minister of the interior, however, expects
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/ ome disorder, and reportedly has information indicating that
The OAS Dlans to exDlode 150 elastic bombs in the Paris area
acts of violence--including assassination--so extreme that
the day a ceasefire is announced, and that Salan has ordered
some OAS members are said to be reluctant to carry them out
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Situation Report: Cameroon
The most dangerous threat to Ahidjo is the Communist-
supported terrorist wing of the Union of Cameroun Peoples
(UPC), This terrorist group began its campaign in 1954. to
reunify the Cameroons and obtain independence from France.
Since Ahidjo became prime ministe in 1958 the UPC has con-
centrated on trying to unseat him. any qualified observers
expected widespread terrorism at a time of federation,
1 October 1961. Its failure to occur- probably was the re-
sult of a tactical decision to delay, rather than a lack of capa-
bilities. UPC terrorists are estimated to number 1,000 to
3,000 Most of the terrorists' arms are of crude local manu-
factti , but some Soviet bloc weapons have been seized by the
government, and last year several UPC terrorists.:were cap-
tured following their return from a 10-week course in guer-
rilla warfare and sabotage in Communist China. UPC leaders
"in exile" are located in Ghana and Guinea.
Even without strong bloc support the terrorists have been
able to compel the government to divert scarce resources to
its armed.forces. About 30 percent of the ordinary budget goes
to maintain security. Despite French aid, amounting to $40-
50,000,000 annually in recent years, economic development
projects have proceeded very slowly, largely because of secu-
rity costs and high government operating expenses. The ex-
penses of the new federal structure will produce even larger
budget deficits, at a time when Cameroon's exports of cocoa,
coffee, and bananas face increasing competition in world mar-
kets. There is considerable and persistent grumbling and
criticism of Ahidjo, particularly among the younger educated
Cameroonians, over the slow pace of economic development.
Ahidjo has a satisfactory working relationship with his
main potential political rival on the federal level, Prime Min-
ister John Ngu Foncha of. West Cameroon, the smaller compo-
nent of the federation, and Ahidjo's party, the Union Camerounaise
(UC), is in firm control in East Cameroon. However, Ahidjo's
almost exclusive basing of his party and regime on the more
backward, conservative Moslem northern area and his moves
to eliminate all opposition see certain to cause him serious
political trouble in the future.
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 Approved Fq
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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