CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006300040001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 March 1962
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23 March 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
2. France-Algeria: OAS increases terrorism in Algiers and
Oran. (Page t)
5. Argentina: Peronista Unions announce strike for 23 March
in protest against government intervention in provinces.
(Page iti)
6. Israel-S ria: Hostilities continue in Lake Tiberias area.
(Page iv)y
10.
Pakistan-Afghanistan: Deadlock on frontier problem con-
tinues but border may remain open to US aid shipments.
(Page vi)
11. Iraq-Kuwait: Iraq continues diplomatic retaliation against
countries accepting Kuwaiti representatives. (Page vi)
I
(Continued)
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23 March 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
(Continued)
13, Bolivia: President Paz complains of unfair treatment un-
der the Alliance for Progress. (Page vit)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 March 1962
*France-AlLreria-. The OAS on- 22 March intensifiect ter
rorism and'strikes in Algiers and Oran, and created so much
tension in Corsica that the gov rnment airlifted additional
sprur ity forces to the island.
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I er to convince its European settler follow-
ers of I s a ility to sabotage De Gaulle's Algerian policy, the
OAS - may feel compelled to take more forceful action soon to
interfere with the government's moves toward implementation
of the Evian accords.
Members of the PAG were reportedly impressed and
gratified by the prompt US action in furnishing an aircraft
for vice premier Ben Bellas 21 March trip from Switzerland
o Morocco. FA-mbassador Walmsley in Tunis feels that the
PAG deliberat-ely scheduled his 20 March appointment with
tDremier Ben Khedda ahead of that of thp Snuipf nmhn.,--Qnr1-r-7
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*Argentina: The Peronista-led bloc of labor unions--which
represents about half of organized labor--has announced a 24-
hour strike for 23 March; Peronista leaders informed the US
Embassy that the strikes will continue until Frondizi cancels
the intervention in the provinces where they have won. electoral
victories, and permits Peronistas "to participate in a coali-
tion cabinet."
In the political arena, the air force still favors continu-
ance of Frondizi in the presidency, following a suitable cabinet
reshuffle. The navy, which wanted a prompt ouster of Fron-
dizi, and leading army officers have now apparently agreed
"with great reluctance" to permit Frondizi to remain as pres-
ident on condition that he appoint ministers to the new cabinet
who are of national stature and free from any taint of Peronism
or Communism. There will be considerable political jockey-
ing during the next few days until the composition of the new
cabinet is announced.
Meanwhile in Madrid, the. Spanish foreign minister told
Ambassador McBride that Spain preferred a Frondizi-type re-
gime to the return of Peron; he stressed the warm relation
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Letween Spain and the Frondizi government. The foreign min-
ister also pointed out that Peron is in Spain.at Frondizi's re-
quest and that Peron had given the Spanish no trouble and had
not violated the conditions of his asylum. The foreign minis-
ter did not believe Peron would undertake "overt political
activity" from S ain t this time.-/
sae. - yria: On 21 March Foreign Minister Meir said
Israel's cabinet had decided, in order to permit a relaxation
of tension, to keep patrol boats off Lake Tiberias during
the next few days and not "at this time" to initiate further re-
taliatory action. That same morning, however, an air battle
occurred in which the Syrians claim to have downed an Israeli
Super Mystere jet, and that night, according to the Israelis,
Syrians fired on two villages north of Lake Tiberia7
j in Damascus the Syrians are displaying captured Israeli
half-tracks, and speakers are pointing out that the equipment
is of American manufacture. The half-tracks are rebuilt
World War I I vehicles which the Israelis purchased on the
surplus marke
The Syrian Government also has. accused Egypt of aiding
Israel by refusing to return Syrian arms, aircraft, and ships
held by Egypt at the time of Svria's secession from the UAR.
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Pakistan-Afghanistan, (Little progress has been made in
breaking the deirdlock between Rawalpindi and Kabul over the
frontier problem, as the two-month period during which the
Afghans reopened the border for transit of US aid shipments
comes to a close, The limited concessions Rawalpindi is will-
ing to make toward restoring normal commercial and diplo-
matic relations are not likely to be regarded by Kabul as suf -
ficient to enable the Afghan Government to accept without
appearing to back down completely from its present position.
However, the Afghans are experiencing growing economic
pressure as a result of the stoppage of normal. trade f or six
months, and may be willing to use the negotiations as a face -
saving pretext to extend the present temporary -border opera-
Mons beyond the 29 March deadlinQ.
Iraq-Kuwait: -he Qasim regime appears to be stiffen-
- [T
ing its attitude to*ard those countries maintaining foreign
diplomatic representation in Kuwait. On 17 March it withdrew
its ambassador in Tokyo and threatened to close the Japanese
Embassy in Baghdad. The Iraqi ambassadors in Iran and Jor-
dan were withdrawn after. these countries had received Kuwaiti
ambassadors. Ambassador Sulayman in Washington may be
recalled following the Kuwaiti ambassador's presentation of his
credentials3.
liuwait is exerting considerable pressure on Lebanon for
.an exchange of ambassadors and is said to have threatened
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Fretaliation against Lebanese economic interest6 should the
Lebanese refuse. So far ambassadors from the UAR, Jor-
dan, Britain, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the US have presented
their credentials in Kuwait. Among the Arab states, Libya,
Sudan, and Lebanon, have not yet sent emissaries, and Syria
has not yet recognized Kuwait. Iraq continues to boycott Arab
League a s a result of Kuwait's participation in the
Leag
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Bolivia* cpresident Paz told the US ambassador in Bolivia
on 19 ffa-rch that he felt Bolivia was not being treated fairly
under the Alliance for Progress. He charged that Argentina
and Chile, have received relatively larger allocations than Bo-
livia, which has made more progress in such basic institu--
tional changes as tax and land reform emphasized by President
Kennedy. The US ambassador points out that the funds allocate~
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Vladimir Bazykin, who is returning to Moscow after complet-
.ing a five-year tour, was scheduled to arrive in La Paz ' on
22 March, where presumably he will discuss commercial
and diplomatic relations. Bolivia has. diplomatic relations
with the USSR, but the two countries have never exchanged
.Missions.
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pact, and that this will increase pressures for Bolivian ac-
ceptance of Soviet aid. The Soviet ambassador to Mexico,
to Bolivia for fiscal year 1962 will have little immediate im-
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 Brazilian Interest in Shale Oil Development
Soviet technicians spent three months in Brazil in early
1960 under the auspices of a private Brazilian firm, CIRB,
which has concessionary rights on some shale deposits. On
the basis of Soviet surveys, a small pilot plant was built in
.the USSR and. Brazilian shale was shipped there for experi-
mental purposes. The prototype plant to be set up in Brazil
would be used to determine the feasibility of producing gas
commercially.
Both the USSR and Communist China have had considerable
experience in processing oil shale. China's vast deposits of
shale in Manchuria were developed originally by the Japanese;
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the processing facilities were later expanded in the postwar
period with Soviet assistance. China was producing shale oil
at a rate of about 20,000 barrels a day in 1961, and plans call
for continuous expansion of the industry. Soviet capabilities
for providing assistance in the development of Brazil's oil
shale are based on more than 4.0 years of experience in the
field. The USSR probably is capable of providing any type of
equipment found in the West and some not used outside the
bloc.
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Soviet Ambassador to Visit Bolivia
i 1960 the USSR tentatively offered a credit of $150,000,-
000 and a tin smelter, which has great appeal in Bolivia, and
negotiations on these offers have apparently been delayed pri-
marily by President Paz. Paz is under increased pressure to
give serious consideration to Soviet aid because of campaigning
in Bolivia for congressional elections in June. The nominating.
convention of the government party, the Nationalist Revolution-
ary Movement (MNR), is scheduled to open on 24 March and,
while MNR nominations are probably still tantamount to elec-
tion for most seats as has been true since 1956, the party con-
tains two leftist factions which are not under Paz' control. Half
the Chamber of Deputies and 15 of 27 senators are to be elected.
CEn route to Bolivia Ambassador Bazykin was not permitted
to deplane in Peru and was obliged to proceed to Santiago, where
he was given 48 hours to leave Chile, according to a press re-
port. His expected visit to Ecuador was "postponed" at the last
moment. Ecuador's President Arosemena.recently declared
that he was willing to see an expansion of the currently insignif-
icant trade between his country and the USSR. Bazykin planned
an extensive trip to Latin American countries a year ago, but
only Venezuela and Ecuador granted him visas at that time, and
his tour failed to produce a significant results.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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