CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006300070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 27, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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27 March 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1.
USSR-Berlin: Moscow's tactics in Berlin situation. (Page i)
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3.
Cuba: Raul Castro and veteran Communist Luzardo ap-
pointed to new cabinet posts. (Page ti)
4.
France-Algeria: De Gaulle's speech indicates early show-
down with OAS. (Page iii)
5.
Argentina: President Frondizi's resignation requested by
General Aramburu. (age iii)
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7.
Communist China - Hong Kong: Peiping exploiting US re-
strictions on Hong Kong textile imports. (Page v)
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9.
Cyprus : Greek- Turkish tensions revived. (Page vi)
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11.
Western Europe: Common Market foreign ministers re-
main deadlocked on.treaty for European political union.
(Page vii)
12.
Syria: Army forces Dawalibi cabinet out. (Page vii)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
27 March 1962
DAILY BRIEF
USSR-Berlin: ecent public pronouncements by Khru-
shchev and Ulbrich ,
sugges that Moscow's current tacti-
cal line is to keep contacts with the US alive and to avoid an
impasse on Berlin.talks, on the assumption that the Gromyko-
Rusk conversations will open the way for a summit meeting
.later this ye
t the same time, Moscow continues to probe the firm-
"
limits of the Western position concerning East
German sovereignty and control over access to Berlin. In
a note. delivered by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the'NATO
ambassadors in Moscow on 26 March, the East Germans.pro-
posed that the NATO countries establish consular relations
with East Germany in order to facilitate, movement in and out
of East Germany and.Berlin. The USSR endorsed the proposal
in an attached covering letter to the East German note. The
timing of the East German proposal--two days before the East
German-People's Chamber meets to give final approval to a
new. customs law--suggests that the new legislation may im-
pose new requirements on Western civilian travel. to East Ber-
.linand East Germany, including that of West Germans'
Several bloc spokesmen, nevertheless, have expressed
optiYfism about. a.Berlin settlement but have hinted that Gro-
myko's objective at Geneva is confined to establishing. the
groundwork for further:negotiations and that Khrushchev is
holding back now because he wants to gain a rsonal credit for
any reement achieved at a summit meeting
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Cuba: Raul Castro's ap ointment on 25 March to the newly
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problems. that required the imposition of the rationing program
imposed.on 19 March. Luzardo, unlike his predecessor, is a
,member of the National Directorate of the Integrated Revolu-
tionary Organizations (ORI), the, regime's highest policy-mak-
ing body and the top organ of the country's. sole political
create post of deputy premier follows by one day the naming
of Fidel and Raul. Castro, respectively, as first and second
secretary of the ORI and makes Raul second to Fidel in .the
hierarchy of both the government and.the party. Raul retains
the post of minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.
The appointment of veteran Communist Manuel Luzardo
to head the: Ministry of Internal Trade makes him responsible
for the domestic supply and distribution of consumer goods.
Failures in supply and distribution have frequently been men-
tioned by regime leaders as. important factors iri . creating the
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machine. Cuba's ambassador to Moscow, Faure Chomon, has
been recalled to become minister of communications. Chomon
was appointed early this month to the ORI National Directorate.
*France-Algeria: De Gaulle's appeal for full support against
the Secret Army Organization (OAS) in his 26 March address,
and reported OAS intimation of mass settler action "in the next
two days" may point to an early showdown in the Algerian situa-
tion. The government's capture of Salan's deputy in Oran, ex-Gen-
eral Jouhaud, on 25 March also creates additional pressure on
the OAS to demonstrate its continued capability. The OAS will
probably attempt to exploit the "martyr" aspect of the firing by
security forces on unarmed settlers in Algiers on 26 March--
an incident which French officials there reportedly have described
as "tragically alarming:' The OAS probably calculates that its
only hope of preventing implementation of the Evian accords lies
in reversing the trend toward army identification with government
policy.
Paris' request that Moscow recall its ambassador because of
the USSR's de jure recognition of the provisional Algerian. govern-
ment is echoed in De Gaulle's biting references to the USSR in his
speech. The move was probably designed both to serve as a sop
to French rightists who oppose De Gaulle's Algerian policy and
to re-emphasize his contention that the time is not propitious for
fruitful East-West negotiations.
the request by neral Aramburu--who has been mediating t
*Argentina: T/President Frondizi's_ refusal to resign, despite
p
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10litical crisis- -has intensified pressure for his ouster. In-
creasing military impatience denied Aramburu the 10-day
period he requested for.mediation, He explained that the con-
sensus of the political and military leaders whom he had con-
sulted was that Frondizi must resign to save constitutional
order. Only the President's Intransigent Radical party, which
contpols congress until 1 AUy, has expressed support for Fron-
'. A
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nce early yesterday, the navy has won additional mili-
tary'gupport- -particularly among army units--for its position
that Frondizi must resign or be ousted by force. This Sup-
port now includes Army Commander in Chief Poggi and a mount-
ing number of army units, thus weakening Army Secretary
Fraga's earlier influence against a coup. Although Aramburuls
statement implied that all of the armed forces supported Fron-
dizils immediate resignation, there have been no late reports
on the position of the air orce, which has been the strongest
supporter of the Preside
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Ll"ational. deputy of the opposition People's Radical party
informed the American Embassy on 26 March that the armed
forces would oust Frondizi. if he did not resign voluntarily by
27 March. This view has also been expressed by a Peronista
leader; he said the Peronista High Command was not overly
concerned with Frondizi's plight and believed it could make a
better deal negotiating with military leaders- E__,
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Communist China. - Hong Kongeeiping is. exploiting the
dissatisfaction in Hong Kong over the US restrictions on im-
ports of certain Hong Kong - produced textiles. A propaganda
campaign against the US action is being conducted in the colony?s
Communist press, and a. Peiping- controlled bank in Hong Kong
is reportedly offering textile companies loans said to be no
longer available from non-Communist banks, in the colony. Pei-
ping may also Pe willing to buy up some of the textiles not mar-
ketable in the U
Fng.Kong officials believe that the Communists may at-
tempt to organize anti-American demonstrations in the colony.
Police officials have stated that May Day would be the most like-
ly-time for such disturbances--I
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L;yprus: bomb blasts in two Turkish mosques.on Cyprus
on 2TW:a-rch~ Greek Independence Day, have -revived tensions
on the island following several weeks -of gradually improving
relations between the Greek and Turkish communities.
President Makarios has denounced -the bombings as "bar-- 25X
baric acts," and Turkish Cypriot leaders have called on their
followers to refrain from street demonstrations or acts of re-
taliation. Minister of Interior Georgadjis has promised a.full
investigation, but his.former high position in the underground
Greek Cypriot organization EOKA makes him suspect to the
Turks.
The danger of new incidents between the communities will
be further increased during the forthcoming seventh anniver-
sary celebration by Greek Cypriots of the opening of the. EOKA
campaign of violence against the British on 1 Aoril 1955.
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 KesDite concessions made by the French
urpapn-rn RuronPl
.
at the, EEC foreign ministers' meeting last week, the. six Com-
mon Mrket (EEC) countries remain deadlocked on. the treaty
to establish a European political union.
_
organize the six under French political and military domination.
r e g
Foreign Minister 5PaaK rooK 'the lead in deman ng a itional
guarantees that the union evolve alon g federalist lines and that
the pre-eminence of the EEC and NATO in economic and defense
matters be explicitly recognized. Spaak's position reflects his
increasing. suspicion- -shared by other- EEC countries and par-
ticularly by the Dutch--that the political union in the form pro-
4-
a lawyer and a political neutral, has been asked by President
o has
Qudsi to form a new cabinet. The 67-year-old Ghazzi, wh
*Syria e Syrian army command has intervened and forced
e resiana Flon of the weak Dawalibi cabinet on 26 Idarch,
P 11 Said al-Ghazzi,
been a minister several times, led a caretaker cabinet during
the 1954 parliamentary elections whep Syrian political factions
could not agree on a prime minister. During the past several
days the army command is said to have pressured Qudsi to dis-
solve parliament and rule by presidential decree. Ghazzi may
be a compromise candidate for premier and acceptable to Syrian
political leaders and contending army factions. A Ghazzi cabinet
is likely to be weak and susceptible to army influence. Thecab-
P,Vw,
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inet change is unlikel to alter the belligerent Syrian a itoude
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Bloc Tactics Aimed at Summit Meeting on Berlin
lbricht's speech published on 23 March broached the
con'pt of a four-power "arbitration agency" which would be
charged with ensuring access. to and from West Berlin as
part of a broader Berlin settlement, Although this proposal
presupposes East German rather than international control
over Western access, Ulbricht sought to make the scheme
more attractive by stating that the GDR "deems it possible"
to accept recommendations on access arrangements from the
four guarantor powers or from an "appropriate UN institution
The bloc leaders probably conceived this approach, which
would provide only a facade of international authority over ac-
cess, as a means of appearing responsive to US views on ac=
cess and of testing prospects for gaining Western concessions
on this issue. Ulbricht, however, echoed Khrushchev?s speech
of 16 March in emphasizing that any Berlin settlement must in-
clude not only access guarantees but also "normalization" of the
West Berlin situation in a manner which would respect and safe-
guard East Ger an sovereignty and terminate existing Western
occupation right ,
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European Confederation Talks. Stalled by Suspicions
French Objectives
ion's institutions and broadening its democratic procedures
ubstantive discussions at the ? 20 March meeting centered
on'Me crucial articles setting forth the union's competence in
economic and defense affairs and providing for treaty revision
after a three-year transitional. period. While insisting that the
union must be free to consider economic matters, French For-
eign Minister Couve de Murville proposed new language osten-
sibly designed to preserve the. integrity of existing EEC ins titu-
. tions. He also suggested that one of. the union's objectives would
be.to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, and he offered a new. clause
stating that treaty revision should aim at strengthening t e un-
Conciliatory in intent and apparently acceptable at least in
par o the West Germans, the new French position neverthe-
less encountered sharp objections from most of the other minis-
ters. Most of them wanted further protection of the preroga-
tives of the'EEC, and all five agreed that the new clause proposed
by Couve was still too vague as to. the objectives of treaty revi-
sion--i.e.., the institution of majority decisions and the popular
election of a European assembly. On the subject of defense, Spaak
was. particularly vehement, declaring that the French proposals
seemed to assume that creation of the union would "automatically"
stye hen NATO--which he was by no means. certain would be the
cas
ile the foreign ministers are scheduled to meet again on
the 1i?eaty on 17 April, prospects for agreement are poor so long
as basic suspicions among the EEC countries of De Gaulle's, pol-
icies continue. These suspicions include the, fear that the French
may still find a basis for excluding Britain from the EEC--and
hence from the proposed political union--and.the feeling that De
Gaulle views the union as a means of creating a political-economic-
military bloc dominated by Paris. As Spaak declared at the -
isterial meeting, in which he cited the widely diverging views of
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rance from the other five on so crucial an area as NATO, he
believes the six should first demonstrate their ability to reach
an identity of views on key issues of common interest be re
attempting to institutionalize their political cooperation: 25X1
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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