CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006300090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 29, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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29 March 1962
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 29 Idarch 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN,
CONTENTS
.2. France-Algeria: PAG official expresses guarded satis-
faction with action by French Army against OAS. (Page t)
3. Congo: Adoula-Tshombd talks continue stymied. (Page it)
4. Angola: Holden Roberto under pressure to merge with
Communist -backed nationalist group. (Page it i)
5. British Guiana: Governor warns disorders could recur
at anytime. (Page M)
Situation Report: Ecuador. (Page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
29 March 1962
DAILY BRIEF
*France-Algeria: /An official representative of the PAG,
in a 27 March conversation with Ambassador Walmsley in
Tunis, expressed guarded satisfaction with action the French
Army has taken so far to crush the OAS. The ambassador
feels, however, that the PAG is not et ready to consider the
army as a firm ally against the OAS Algiers and Oran re-
mained relatively quiet yesterday, with reinforced army units
and settlers apparently in an uneasy stand-off following the 26
March clash in which a reported 53 demonstrators were killed.
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The army is continuing its systematic efforts to neutralize
the OAS stronghold of Bab-el=Oued through searches and ar-
rests.
The OAS is attempting to divide the army and intensify
the. European settlers' anti=Moslem feelings; pamphlets were
distributed in Algiers on 28 March alleging that the demon-
strators, were killed by Moslem soldiers of the French Army.
Official army spokesmen have also said that most of the deaths
were caused by "weary, nervous Moslem troops" but claim that
these troops were under fire from OAS snipers.
Congo: he Adoula-Tshombe talks are apparently still
bogged down over Tshombes continued insistence that any
agreement he makes must be ratified by the Katangan Assem-
bly. There have been. no discussions of practical financial,
economic, or military measures for Katanga's reintegration.
Tshombe continues to press hard for constitutional changes,
while Adoula insists that he cannot suspend the so-called Loi
Fondamentale, the Belgian-drafted constitution, through any
bilateral agreement with Tshombel)
ing Katanga, to meet at the University of Lovanium on 2 April.
Adoula, in an apparent attempt to break the impasse, has
called for members of all six provincial assemhlies_ incl?cl-
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak feels that the talks must
by
be =owed to continue "in Bantu fashion" withot.t undue outside
interference. He believes that any attempt by the. UN. to. siphon 25
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tan a to collect mining taxes would result in renewed
itie
29 Mar 62
DAILY BRIEF ii
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front" reportedly will refuse to cooperate with the MPLA,
although it will invite other organizations to join with it.
MPLA leaders, however, are said to be confident that Ro-
ngola: holden Roberto may lose the leadership of the
Angolan nationalist movement as a result of increasing pres
sure from other Angolan nationalists to merge his Angolan
Peoples' Union (UPA) in a united front with the Communist-
OEM backed Popular Movement for. the Liberation of Angola
j . (MPLA). Roberto reportedly is setting up a "national front"
with a minor Angolan nationalist party in an effort to divert
this pressure, and hopes to follow this up in a few days with
the formation of a provisional government. The "national
Bri sh G. anae he British Governor o uiana expressed
a pessimistic view o e colony's future to US officials on 25
March. He believes disorders could recur at any time despite
the continued presence of 600 British troops. The Governor
is particularly concerned over the danger of future racial con-
flicts. London ha offered to increase the local police force
from 1,500 to 2,0a
Colonial Office Under. Secretary Fraser returned from his
cent visit to the colony sharing the Governor's pessimistic out-
look and anxious that Britain quit the colony as soon as pos-
sible. London has apparently not yet decided whether to post-
pone the independence conference now scheduled for Ma
(Backup, P 1)
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Situation Report-- Ecuador: Since he became president
on 9 November ' Arosemena has adhered to middle-of -the-
road policies which have subjected him to strong criticism
from both right and left, culminating in plots to force his
resignation. A group of military leaders and conservatives
who favor breaking relations with Cuba and oppose tolerance
of leftists in important government posts, plans to force Aro-
semena to resign in favor of the vice president. Several of
the "constitutional coups" this group had planned since late
December were called off when Arosemena showed willing-
ness to risk civil war to retain office. The plotters may now
be waiting-for the outcome of the congressional elections on
3 June. 11 Arosemena's supporters win a strong majority in
Congress, the plotters will be forced to decide whether to
launch a coup or to accept Arosemena rather than affront pub-
lic opinion.
President Arosemena announced late yesterday that a
military insurrection had occurred in the' southern city of
Cuenca but that it had no repercussions elsewhere. The
president said the situation is under control.
I I
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
he United States Intelligence Board on 28 March approved HE
the `following National Intelligence Estimate
LrSNIE 36.1-62: "Prospects for Nasser," dated 2
March 1962, F7 I
hours of USIB approval, and the printed text within five days.
j'NIE 13-3-62: "Probable Consequences of Chinese
Nationalist Military Operations on
the China Mainland," dated 28 March
1962,
advance conclusions are normally distributed within 24
p
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29 Mar 62 DAILY BRIEF vii
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Situation in British Guiana
Governor Grey considers the Jagan administration ex-
truly incompetent and foresees a chaotic situation "on
which Communism could capitalize:' The Governor predict-
ed that there will soon be "no money in the till"--despite
London's recent advance of $1,298,000--and that Jagan will
shortly make a "real" effort to obtain bloc aid. Jagan has
already sent missions to bloc countries to discuss various
projects, but one official who jus turned from the bloc
claims he got no firm credit offerr= .1
ondon seems to feel that the principal prerequisite for
holc i'g the may independence conference on schedule is a de-
gree of prior agreement between Jagan and opposition leaders
D'Aguiar and Burnham on a constitution. Parliamentary Un-
der Secretary Fraser, who will be influential in determining
London's decision, envisages independence no later than early
1963. Another Colonial Office official who recently visited
British Guiana commented that by stalling, the opposition lead-
ers could delay independence and probably force new elections
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Situation Report: Ecuador
The. Ecuadorean cabinet is made up predominantly of con-
servatives and moderates. The Communists are the only
national party not represented, but some alleged Communists
have been appointed to subsecretarial posts, and the Ministry
of Education has reportedly been strongly infiltrated.
Arosemena has ignored a request from the rightist plot-
ters that he expel leftists from the government and break
diplomatic relations with Cuba. On the other hand, he has
spoken out strongly against domestic Communism and "sub-
version by Castroite elements:' He directed his ambassador
to the UN to support the US in the dispute with Cuba, and he
appointed Ecuador's first representative of ambassadorial rank
to the Vatican.
Arosemena has sufficient military and political backing
in the coastal provinces to warrant a relatively independent
position. Although the commanding officers of the armed
forces and the minister of defense claim to have enough con-
trol of the armed services to force Arosemena out and estab-
lish a military junta, the officers of the coastal provinces have
stated that they would not support such a move.
With congressional elections scheduled for 3 June, the
plotters may decide to postpone a decision on a definite line
of action until they can gauge Arosemena's postelection
strength. His main political backing is in the Concentration
of Popular Forces (CFP), centered in Guayaquil. If the CFP
makes significant gains, the rightists will have to decide be-
tween armed revolt and acceptance. If the CFP does not im-
prove its electoral position, they will be encouraged to renew
efforts. to cow Arosemena without removing him from office.
Ecuador's economic problems add to the general dissatis-
faction. Former President Velasco's irresponsible fiscal and
monetary policies--which led to his downfall--forced Arosemena's
administration to adopt a program of foreign exchange stringency
and fiscal austerity. Needed reforms and development programs
have been postponed for lack of funds, exchange speculation has
created some reluctance to invest and some flight of ca ital and
there is a manifest lack of confidence in the economy.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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