CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 7, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 6, 1962
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4.pdf880.7 KB
Body: 
~~~ ~i,~i~i~i~iii Approved For Release 2 TOpCI5I JR~QT75A006300 0001-4 25X1 6 April 1962 Copy No. C 96 -40- TELL16E CE TOP SECRET State Dept. revie5PJUVV Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06300160001-4 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06300160001-4 j Approved For Releas 003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A0 360001-4 25X1 6 April. 1962 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Syria: Tension persists in Damascus. (Page i) 2. France: De Gaulle may call for new elections after ref- erendum on Algeria. (Page i) 3. Communist China - Laos. Chinese Communist construc- tion of road between Yunnan and Phong Saly apparently scheduled for completion this month. (Page it) 4. Angola: Holden Roberto heads National Liberation Front provisional government. (Page it) 5. Spain-Morocco: Madrid reported willing to negotiate with Morocco on Ifni and Spanish Sahara. (Page it i) 01 j 25X1// Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4 E Approved For Releas 003/04/17 .CIA-RDP79T00975A0 63~Q60001-4 M //V A 0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 6 April 1962 DAILY BRIEF *Syria: An atmosphere of tension persists in Damascus as military officers and politicians continue behind-the- scenes maneuvers for control of the government. Chief of Staff Zahr al-Din has announced the formation of a new mil- itary command which he says "has won the confidence of all the army units," but he has not disclosed the names of any of its members. Nasir believes that a conservative, anti-UAR military faction has temporarily gained the upper hand in Syria and that it will try to avoid implementing the Homs com- promise agreement which ended the rebellion on 3 April. This belief would appear well founded judging from attacks since last Wednesday by Damascus radio on Radio Cairo. A Swiss official has advised a US Embassy officer in Bern that the seven "exiled" members of the former Syrian military com- mand expect to return to Syria in the near future. Aleppo remains quiet, but uneasy. The curfew, which applies throughout the day and night except for three hours each morning, is being enforced with increasing strictness, and potential trouble France-Algeria.- De Gaulle will reportedly base his deci- sion as to whether to dissolve parilament in the near future on the outcome of the 8 April referendum on his Algerian policy. While a large majority of those voting are expected to respond affirmatively, a high percentage of abstentions- -implying dis- approval of the regime as a whole rather than opposition solely to the Evian accords- -would probably weight the scales against 25X1 11 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06300160001-4 Road under const, by Red Chinese Luang' rnbang :."?i~iong Saly d BounNgua uong Yo HONG AMY ?' t Dien Bien Son .? 1 t Phu Vi nn~J Nong Khai THAILAND ong Net Muoreg Sen auang Ubon Th$nt Pha Lane annakhet r ~`f NAMTHA J E:S , npF's i~'/ 6 Apr 62 Appro % For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP 0975A006300160001-4 overnmenr Forces Meo operational areas Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese Forces Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese areas CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06300160001-4 nppr,. d F OO3IO 17 CIn RDP79TOO975nn 63an 6OOO1 " 25X1 R I a : ve or e e s a decision to dissolve parliament and to call new. elections in the near future. If a high percentage of the electorate abstains, Premier Debra, who is almost universally unpopular, might soon be. replaced by Georges Pompidou, former head of De Gaulle's personal staff. 0 j 0 25X1 in the army. Meanwhile, there are still conflicting reports on the in- fluence and intentions of the Secret Army Organization (OAS) in France. While some reports indicate the OAS has lost all political influence, according to one.Sureta Nationale official a study of the OAS prepared for Interior Minister Frey indi- cates that its "structure" has not been seriously damaged by recent government actions and that it still has strong support 25X1 25X1 two, companies of i- 25X1 nese Communist army engineers were employed on the proj- ect. recently stated that the 25X1 0 road is being built by demobilized inese troops and that Communist China - Laos: /,Chinese Communist military personnel, either in regular un is or under civilian cover, are apparently constructing the road which Peiping agreed last year to build in northern Laos as a gift to the Souvanna government. Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong 25X be completed by the end of this month. Military personn 25X1 are often used for road construction in Communist Chine Peiping had asked the Sou anna government that they be per- mitted to carry arms. IIthe road, which will link China's: Yunnan Province with Phong Saly, is scheduled to golan government in Leopoldville on 5 April reportedly is part of a desperate attempt by Roberto's newly formed Angola *Angola: o en o er o s formation of .a .provisions n- 6 Apr 62 DAILY BRIEF ii OFU/ I O 25X1 p Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4 Approved For Release 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP 00975AO06300160001-4 25X1 25X1 6 Apr 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06300160001-4 Approved For Releas 003/04/17: CIA-RDP79TOO975AO 630400001-4 25X1 25X1 fationai Liberation Front to maintain its international posi- ion in the face of increasingly effective competition from cause of AnLyolan nationalism have already charged that R b rto's action has "betrayed the 25X1 its rival, the Communist-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Roberto's Angolan Peoples' Union and its associate in the Front, the Angolan Democratic party, apparently still control most of the rebel activity in Angola. While the MPLA has been unable to mount any op- erations in Angola, it has been. exploiting the general dissatisfaction of African governments with Roberto's continued refusal to merge with the MPLA. Roberto's representatives apparently are touring Africa to drum up support for his or- ganization, but African governments- -particularly the radical Casablanca group--are likely to delay recognition, especially if the MPLA forms a rival government. MPLA spokesmen pain-Morocco: a bpanish overnmen is now repor edly willing to negotiate with Morocco regarding the, future of Ifni and the Spanish Sahara. Madrid would agree to give up Ifni and share any oil found in the Sahara on a 50-50 basis with Morocco, but is unwilling to relinquish its sovereignty over the Spanish Sahara or the encl es of Ceuta and Melilla on.the Mediterranean coast of Morocco. he Spanish have generally shown themselves more flex- ible than the Portuguese in making concessions to nationalist pressures on their overseas holdings. Their willingness, since 1956, to grant many Moroccan demands suggests that Spain would also be ready to make concessions to African na- tiolism when pressures develop in Rio Muni and Fernando Poo (Map) 6 Apr 62 DAILY BRIEF Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06300160001-4 Approved For Rele The French Referendum and the Question of New Elections De Gaulle will make his decision concerning elections, according to the authoritative Le Monde, on the day follow- ing the. referendum. A number offaactors, including the security situations in France and Algeria, will also be taken into consideration. The official purpose of the referendum has been blurred by his interpretation--repeatedly stressed by Debre and other Union for the New Republic (UNR) lead- ers--that a heavy vote will in effect constitute a "blank check" for De Gaulle's other policies. The major political parties, except for the UNR, are taking the position that a "yes" vote applies solely to the Algerian settlement, and even to that with reservations. According to a French Institute of Public Opinion survey conducted between 27 and 30 March, 68 percent of those inter- viewed indicated they will vote yes in the referendum, 5 per- cent no, 6 percent refused to answer, and 21 percent were un- decided or will not votes The embassy estimates that between 85 and 90 percent of those voting will vote affirmatively, but notes that the government is somewhat concerned that the ab- stention rate will be high, perhaps even topping the 23.5-per- cent abstentions in.the 1961 referendum endorsing De Gaulle's self-determination policy for Algeria. If this occurs, De Gaulle may conclude that the present climate of opinion would not be conducive to the election of a legislature as obedient as the present one. He still seems reluctant to involve himself personally in the campaigning for "loyal Gaullist" candidates. In interpreting the electoral climate UNR leaders.will bear in mind the 5 March municipal election at Mont-de-Marsan in southwestern France--where a UNR list lost to a leftist coali- tion--and several other municipal elections in which the Com- munists have regained strongholds they lost shortly after De Gaulle returned to power. The constitution provides that following a dissolution of parliament, elections must be held between 20 and 40 days. Dis- solution pronounced on 9 April would put them in the period 25X1 25X1 6 Apr 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO0630016 b001-4 25X1 29 April-20 May. Since there are few candidates for a lame- duck premiership, Debra would probably be asked to stay on. If De Gaulle, however, decides against early dissolution, he will probably seek to reduce some of the accumulated resent- ment against the government- -personified by Debra's high- handed tactics--by appointing a new premier. Pompidou is currently said to have the inside track, but Minister for Al- gerian Affairs. Joxe is also considered a possibility because of his role in concluding the Evian accords. 6 Apr 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06300160001-4 Approved For Release ?003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4 25X1 Possibility of Spanish- Moroccan Negotiations Over Territorial Issue In April 1956 the Spaniards turned their northern protec- torate in Morocco over. to Rabat. Two years later they with- drew from their southern protectorate and by the end of August 1961 had pulled the last of their forces from these ter- ritories. Madrid has consistently refused to give up Ceuta and Melilla, maintaining that they are integral parts of metropol- itan Spain. Morocco has not yet made a formal claim to these enclaves, although the Moroccan ambassador to France on 5 October. publicly listed them among the Spanish-held areas claimed by Morocco. There have been indications. that the Spaniards might be willing to give up Ifni in return for Moroc- can guarantees on the enclaves. The question of Spanish Sahara might be negotiable if Madrid felt it could be retained only by a costly and protracted military effort. Relations between Spain and Morocco have been far from cordial and at times have been severely strained by incidents along the Spanish Saharan border and by Moroccan attacks on Ifni. Since mid-February Moroccan customs officials have been harassing travelers en route to Ceuta by overzealous in- spections. The Spaniards have charged the Moroccans with failure to meet them halfway in efforts to solve outstanding problems. Specifically, they point to Rabat's failure to carry out economic and financial agreements made in 1957 and its re- fusal in 1958 to accept a Spanish offer to submit the Ifni issue to arbitration. 25X1 6 Apr 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4 Approved For Releas - -4 25X1 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Emergency Planning The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Coun3elor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4 OPO/// 411 I'd 1 "0 Ill., I all 01 ~ 01 Approved For Re 3/ 7 00975A006300160001-4 /