CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 7, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 6, 1962
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A006300160001-4.pdf | 880.7 KB |
Body:
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6 April 1962
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6 April. 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Syria: Tension persists in Damascus. (Page i)
2. France: De Gaulle may call for new elections after ref-
erendum on Algeria. (Page i)
3. Communist China - Laos. Chinese Communist construc-
tion of road between Yunnan and Phong Saly apparently
scheduled for completion this month. (Page it)
4. Angola: Holden Roberto heads National Liberation Front
provisional government. (Page it)
5. Spain-Morocco: Madrid reported willing to negotiate with
Morocco on Ifni and Spanish Sahara. (Page it i)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
6 April 1962
DAILY BRIEF
*Syria: An atmosphere of tension persists in Damascus
as military officers and politicians continue behind-the-
scenes maneuvers for control of the government. Chief of
Staff Zahr al-Din has announced the formation of a new mil-
itary command which he says "has won the confidence of all
the army units," but he has not disclosed the names of any of
its members. Nasir believes that a conservative, anti-UAR
military faction has temporarily gained the upper hand in
Syria and that it will try to avoid implementing the Homs com-
promise agreement which ended the rebellion on 3 April. This
belief would appear well founded judging from attacks since
last Wednesday by Damascus radio on Radio Cairo. A Swiss
official has advised a US Embassy officer in Bern that the
seven "exiled" members of the former Syrian military com-
mand expect to return to Syria in the near future.
Aleppo remains quiet, but uneasy. The curfew, which
applies throughout the day and night except for three hours
each morning, is being enforced with increasing strictness,
and potential trouble
France-Algeria.- De Gaulle will reportedly base his deci-
sion as to whether to dissolve parilament in the near future on
the outcome of the 8 April referendum on his Algerian policy.
While a large majority of those voting are expected to respond
affirmatively, a high percentage of abstentions- -implying dis-
approval of the regime as a whole rather than opposition solely
to the Evian accords- -would probably weight the scales against
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Road under const,
by Red Chinese
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:."?i~iong Saly
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uong Yo
HONG AMY ?' t Dien
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ong Net
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annakhet
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6 Apr 62
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overnmenr Forces
Meo operational areas
Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North
Vietnamese Forces
Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North
Vietnamese areas
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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a decision to dissolve parliament and to call new. elections in
the near future. If a high percentage of the electorate abstains,
Premier Debra, who is almost universally unpopular, might
soon be. replaced by Georges Pompidou, former head of De
Gaulle's personal staff.
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Meanwhile, there are still conflicting reports on the in-
fluence and intentions of the Secret Army Organization (OAS)
in France. While some reports indicate the OAS has lost all
political influence, according to one.Sureta Nationale official
a study of the OAS prepared for Interior Minister Frey indi-
cates that its "structure" has not been seriously damaged by
recent government actions and that it still has strong support
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two, companies of i- 25X1
nese Communist army engineers were employed on the proj-
ect. recently stated that the 25X1 0
road is being built by demobilized inese troops and that
Communist China - Laos: /,Chinese Communist military
personnel, either in regular un is or under civilian cover,
are apparently constructing the road which Peiping agreed
last year to build in northern Laos as a gift to the Souvanna
government. Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong
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be completed by the end of this month. Military personn
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are often used for road construction in Communist Chine
Peiping had asked the Sou anna government that they be per-
mitted to carry arms. IIthe road, which will link
China's: Yunnan Province with Phong Saly, is scheduled to
golan government in Leopoldville on 5 April reportedly is part
of a desperate attempt by Roberto's newly formed Angola
*Angola: o en o er o s formation of .a .provisions n-
6 Apr 62
DAILY BRIEF ii
OFU/
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6 Apr 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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fationai Liberation Front to maintain its international posi-
ion in the face of increasingly effective competition from
cause of AnLyolan nationalism
have already charged that R b rto's action has "betrayed the 25X1
its rival, the Communist-backed Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Roberto's Angolan Peoples'
Union and its associate in the Front, the Angolan Democratic
party, apparently still control most of the rebel activity in
Angola. While the MPLA has been unable to mount any op-
erations in Angola, it has been. exploiting the general
dissatisfaction of African governments with Roberto's continued
refusal to merge with the MPLA. Roberto's representatives
apparently are touring Africa to drum up support for his or-
ganization, but African governments- -particularly the radical
Casablanca group--are likely to delay recognition, especially
if the MPLA forms a rival government. MPLA spokesmen
pain-Morocco: a bpanish overnmen is now repor
edly willing to negotiate with Morocco regarding the, future of
Ifni and the Spanish Sahara. Madrid would agree to give up
Ifni and share any oil found in the Sahara on a 50-50 basis with
Morocco, but is unwilling to relinquish its sovereignty over
the Spanish Sahara or the encl es of Ceuta and Melilla on.the
Mediterranean coast of Morocco.
he Spanish have generally shown themselves more flex-
ible than the Portuguese in making concessions to nationalist
pressures on their overseas holdings. Their willingness,
since 1956, to grant many Moroccan demands suggests that
Spain would also be ready to make concessions to African na-
tiolism when pressures develop in Rio Muni and Fernando
Poo (Map)
6 Apr 62 DAILY BRIEF
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The French Referendum and the Question of New Elections
De Gaulle will make his decision concerning elections,
according to the authoritative Le Monde, on the day follow-
ing the. referendum. A number offaactors, including the
security situations in France and Algeria, will also be taken
into consideration. The official purpose of the referendum
has been blurred by his interpretation--repeatedly stressed
by Debre and other Union for the New Republic (UNR) lead-
ers--that a heavy vote will in effect constitute a "blank check"
for De Gaulle's other policies. The major political parties,
except for the UNR, are taking the position that a "yes" vote
applies solely to the Algerian settlement, and even to that
with reservations.
According to a French Institute of Public Opinion survey
conducted between 27 and 30 March, 68 percent of those inter-
viewed indicated they will vote yes in the referendum, 5 per-
cent no, 6 percent refused to answer, and 21 percent were un-
decided or will not votes The embassy estimates that between
85 and 90 percent of those voting will vote affirmatively, but
notes that the government is somewhat concerned that the ab-
stention rate will be high, perhaps even topping the 23.5-per-
cent abstentions in.the 1961 referendum endorsing De Gaulle's
self-determination policy for Algeria. If this occurs, De
Gaulle may conclude that the present climate of opinion would
not be conducive to the election of a legislature as obedient as
the present one. He still seems reluctant to involve himself
personally in the campaigning for "loyal Gaullist" candidates.
In interpreting the electoral climate UNR leaders.will bear in
mind the 5 March municipal election at Mont-de-Marsan in
southwestern France--where a UNR list lost to a leftist coali-
tion--and several other municipal elections in which the Com-
munists have regained strongholds they lost shortly after De
Gaulle returned to power.
The constitution provides that following a dissolution of
parliament, elections must be held between 20 and 40 days. Dis-
solution pronounced on 9 April would put them in the period
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29 April-20 May. Since there are few candidates for a lame-
duck premiership, Debra would probably be asked to stay on.
If De Gaulle, however, decides against early dissolution, he
will probably seek to reduce some of the accumulated resent-
ment against the government- -personified by Debra's high-
handed tactics--by appointing a new premier. Pompidou is
currently said to have the inside track, but Minister for Al-
gerian Affairs. Joxe is also considered a possibility because
of his role in concluding the Evian accords.
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Possibility of Spanish- Moroccan Negotiations Over
Territorial Issue
In April 1956 the Spaniards turned their northern protec-
torate in Morocco over. to Rabat. Two years later they with-
drew from their southern protectorate and by the end of
August 1961 had pulled the last of their forces from these ter-
ritories. Madrid has consistently refused to give up Ceuta and
Melilla, maintaining that they are integral parts of metropol-
itan Spain. Morocco has not yet made a formal claim to these
enclaves, although the Moroccan ambassador to France on
5 October. publicly listed them among the Spanish-held areas
claimed by Morocco. There have been indications. that the
Spaniards might be willing to give up Ifni in return for Moroc-
can guarantees on the enclaves. The question of Spanish
Sahara might be negotiable if Madrid felt it could be retained
only by a costly and protracted military effort.
Relations between Spain and Morocco have been far from
cordial and at times have been severely strained by incidents
along the Spanish Saharan border and by Moroccan attacks on
Ifni. Since mid-February Moroccan customs officials have
been harassing travelers en route to Ceuta by overzealous in-
spections. The Spaniards have charged the Moroccans with
failure to meet them halfway in efforts to solve outstanding
problems. Specifically, they point to Rabat's failure to carry
out economic and financial agreements made in 1957 and its re-
fusal in 1958 to accept a Spanish offer to submit the Ifni issue
to arbitration.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Coun3elor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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