CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006300170001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 7, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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7 April 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR-Berlin: Clarke-Konev agreement prompted by Soviet
desire to avoid jeopardizing next round of talks on Berlin.
(Page t)
3. Algeria:: Rebel. army elements attempting to organize po-
litical opposition to provisional Algerian government. (Page it)
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6. Burma: Authoritarianism of Ne Win regime increases. (Page tv)
8. Argentina: Guido and political leaders not yet agreed on
means of dealing with Peronista electoral victories. (Page v)
9. Dominican Republic: Popular support of Council of State
weakens, (Page v)
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11. Syria: Syrian military leaders having difficulty in restor-
ing civilian government. (Page vi)
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PON,
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7 April 1962
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USSR-Berlin: Marshal Konev's 5 April agreement with
General Clarke to resume normal operations of the Soviet
and US Military Liaison Missions probably was prompted
by the Soviet leaders' desire to avoid actions: which might
jeopardize prospects for moving ahead.in the next round of
negotiations with the US on a Berlin settlement. Konev ac-
cepted the US view that the Huebner-Malinin agreement of
April 1947, governing the liaison missions, should be re-
affirmed. This, coupled with the continuing suspension of
Soviet flights, in the air corridors and the absence of fur-
ther harassments of Western military ground traffic to West
Berlin, suggests that, following the Rusk-Gromyko talks at
Geneva, the Soviets have taken a more. favorable view of. the
chances for an eventual Berlin.agreement. They may also
intend.to maintain a posture of caution and restraint ending
.further developments in negotiations.
(Backup, Page 1)
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Algeria: According to he US Embassy in Tunis, here are
indications that elements of the Algerian rebel army (ALN) who
have often disagreed with their political leaders are opposed to
rights and economic concessions given France at Evian, and are
attempting to organize political opposition to the provisional
Algerian government (PAG). This ALN group reportedly looks
to PAG vice premier Mohammed Ben Bella, now touring the
Middle East, as its political championa.nd is planning an elab-
orate reception for Ben Bella's mid-April arrival in Tunisia.
The. PAG, aware of these developments, is moving loyal ALN
units into key centers inside Algeria before the dissident influ-
ence can manifest itself there.
d1he OAS in Algeria is confronted with popular acceptance
Of the cease-fire and of the provisional executive everywhelr-$~.
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e ce I
x pt in Algiers and Oran. This development should facil-
ate the rapid assumption of control by local forces respon-
sible to the provisional executive and release French troops
y
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ers and Oran. Although
the OAS still has a strong capability for terrorism, despite
having suffered significant tactical defeats, it will probably 25X1
be restricted in the future, to actions by arouas oaeratine from
to supplement securit
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ism;as well as toward authoritarianism.
(Backup, Page 3)
economic problems suggests a stronger trend.toward social-
Burma. Since seizing power on 2 March the military
oligarchy headed by General Ne Win has extended its con-
trol over all aspects of the nation's political and economic
life. The abandonment of constitutional procedures, high-
lighted by the abolition of the independent court system, con-
trasts sharply with the limited authoritarianism of his 1958-
60 regime. Although there is no evidence of a shift in Burma's
neutral. foreign policy, the government's approach to domestic
? =~N~ ,,rai ~,i nnlr~r lv
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Argentina: President Guido and the political leaders he
has consulted have not yet agreed on a plan to meet the key
problem of dealing with the Peronista electoral victories.
Leaders of the two main non-Peronista parties have taken a
public stand in favor of validating the Peronista victories in
11 provinces. A widely respected conservative leader be-
lieves that these party positions. will make it difficult for
Guido to call a special session of congress, as requested by
the. military, to deal with the Peronista problem and a new
electoral.law. He believes that the crux of the problem is
not the Peronistas but. lack of cooperation among. democratic
parties in meeting a Peronista-leftist threat.
A message from Frondizi on 6 April to those elements
of his party who are calling for his reinstatement reportedly
urge .that they be calm and not further upset the country.
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Dominican Republic: Popular support for the ruling Coun-
cil o tate has weakened during the past several days. as a
result of press and verbal attacks on the: council by the Na-
.tional Civic Union (UCN)--the country's largest party. Scat-
tered violence has occurred, instigated by extreme leftists.
Reports that some council members were considering the
formation of a "new party" or a coalition of parties o posed
to the UCN have also served to create uneasiness.
(Backup, Page 8)
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which are designed to placate. pro - Nasir sentimen
*Syria: ~Syrian military leaders are having difficulty in
restoring civilian government. Political leaders are reluc-
tant to participate in the formation of a new government,
stating that they are "not interested in governing for ten days
and going to prison on the eleventh"--an allusion to the fate
of the Dawalibi cabinet. The army command appears over-
confident regarding the extent of its suppression of the recent
pro-Nasir upsurge in Syria. While the command is aware that
any new regime must ultimately be less conservative than the
Dawalibi government, they have indicated that they haveno
intention of implementing those parts of the Homp_#greement
rfjie command's present middle-of-the-road nolicien r- -
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livitical groups--the extremely conservative business and
property-owning elements who backed the Dawalibi regime,
and the leftist- socialist pan-Arabists. With support from
neither the right nor left, the life of the present army junta
is likely to be short, and a shift to the left in its composition
is- almost certain to take Wace 11
counter to the interests. of the country's two most important -
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USSR Agrees to Resume Normal Operations of Military
Liaison Missions in Germany
Although there were several indications that the USSR
might use. the incidents in March involving US and British
Military Liaison Mission personnel in East Germany to cur-
tail. or terminate the activities of these missions, Moscow
apparently decided that possible gains on this front were out-
weighed by the risk that su tactics might upset the process
of negotiation with the. Us.
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The joint communique issued on .5 April at the conclusion
of a."friendly" discussion between Marshal Konev and General
Clarke apparently disposed of the 20 March incident in which a
US Military Liaison Mission car. was disabled by gunfire and
the US personnel detained by the East Germans for 26 hours.
Some of the restrictions which the USSR had placed on.the US
mission in Potsdam in retaliation for US prohibitions against
the travel of the Soviet mission in Frankfurt were lifted on
3 April.
The Huebner-Malinin agreement of 1947 which was to guide
the "future operations of the missions" was a formal agreement
between the. US and USSR to exchange military liaison missions
and accredit them to the respective military headquarters in the
occupied zones. It stipulated that mission personnel are to en-
joy "complete freedom of travel without escort or S7 envision"
in the US and the Soviet zones. F7
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Ne Win's. Regime in.Burma Becoming
Increasingly Authoritarian
One of the military government's. first acts after. detain-
ing. the major leaders of U Nu's government was to replace. all
elected officials by appointed councils responsible directly, to
the Union Revolutionary Council .(URC). During its second
week in office, the URC announced that its chairman, General
Ne Win, was vested with all legislative, administrative, and
judicial powers; on 30 March, it announced the suspension of
the Supreme Court and the High Court and their replacement
by a newly appointed Union Chief Court as the court of final ap-
peal. The former justices of the two courts, given life tenure
under the constitution, have been dismissed from office. Al-
though the change might have appeared justified because of the
thousands of cases which the former justices. had allowed to ac-
cumulate, this break with the tradition of an independent judici-
ary stands as the government's most direct rejection of parlia-
mentary democracy and the rule of law to which Burmese have
been accustomed.to pay at least lip service.
There has been less. direct action in the economic field,
but.it is apparent that the military regime intends to establish
the same complete control here as in the political field. Brig-
adier Aung Gyi, Ne Win's second.in command, has emphasized
the government's intent to press the development of a socialist
economy, although assuring a continued role for private invest-
ors. He has indicated, however, that the government will ex-
ercise strong direction. The American Embassy believes. that
the U.RC, in seeking solutions to its economic problems, will
draw on the experience of authoritarian states, including Com-
munist China.in particular.
Ne Win has frequently stated that the Burmese people have
shown that they are not ready for democracy. He has also de-
plored the role of army personnel in political office, fearing
.that the., temptations to corruption would affect the army's mil-
itary efficiency. He now has. decided, however, to put aside
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this consideration in the interest of efficient government for
Burma.
So far the Burmese people have shown no overt opposition
.to the military dictatorship and appear willing to give the new
regime a chance to show its worth. The minority peoples,
however, are restive under Burman domination and the Bur-
mans themselves are notably intolerant of strong discipline.
It is probable that ultimately there will be an attempt to oust
Ne Win, perhaps resulting from a.split within the army. This
danger to the regime. remains particularly strong as long as
ex-Prime Minister Nu, who still refuses to acknowledge the
coup, remains as a potential rallying point.
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Argentine Political Crisis Unresolved
The tentative plan negotiated between the national com-
mittee of Frondizi's-Intransigent Radical Civil. Union,(UCRI)
and.the armed forces--and subsequently endorsed by Pres-
ident Guido-called for a special session of congress in mid-
April. The_UCRI, which has a majority until the new session
on 1 May, was to pass. legislation providing for proportional
representation, revision of the basic labor law, and the out-
lawing of "totalitarian parties!' The specific problem of the
Peronista victories was to be decided in the light of this
legislation and consultation among various political groups,
some of which have suggested entirely new elections.
Practical politics are behind the reluctance of political
leaders to make amore positive effort to help resolve the
crisis. It was.. with great difficulty that Guido managed to
complete his cabinet on 6 April--the appointees were gener-
ally conservative individuals, rather than party represent-
atives as he had hoped. Important UCRI leaders having polit-
ical ambitions have denounced Guido and called for Frondizi's
return. They ignored the fact that both Frondizi and the UCRI
national committee asked Guido, formerly a UCRI member,
to take the job. The People's Radical Civic Union (UCRP), the
second largest political party, has complicated political nego-
tiations by its call for lifting. federal control over five of the
provinces where Peronistas won. The UCRP, as well as other
opposition parties, endorsed Frondizi's removal, and there is
widespread resentment of the adverse reaction abroad.
Lack of progress in political negotiations and foreign crit-
icism of the armed forces for ousting Frondizi are threatening
to provoke disunity and competition among, the armed services.
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Political Tensions in the Dominican Republic
There has been increasing discord among the seven mem-
bers of the Council of State. In recent weeks some members
of the council have appeared to fear a military coup and report-
edly believe the national election scheduled for December should
be postponed for a year while moderate parties develop leader-
ship and organization.
Though both the council and the UCN privately deny that
there is serious disagreement between them, the UCN continues
to make statements disturbing to the council. It has insisted on
adherence to the election schedule, and on 31 March it sharpened
the council's fears of a coup by publicly demanding "revolutionary"
measures to purge the armed forces of officers guilty of crimes
under the dictatorship. The UCN claimed that it might ask party
members to resign from government posts unless its demands
were met.
Some members of the council have been reported considering
an effort to form an anti-UCN coalition made up of other parties
of the center and non-Communist left. The pro-Castro 14 of June
party continues its open oppostion to the government and was prob-
ably responsible for most of the clashes between civilians and
security forces which occurred between 30 March and 2 April in
a number of provincial towns as well as the capital. The pro-
Communist Dominican Popular Movement was responsible for
other incidents.
The present top military leadership still appears to be loyal.
It is, however, made up of young and inexperienced officers, and
is reportedly preoccupied with reorganizing. the armed forces into
a professional nonpolitical force, modeled along US lines. Reac-
tionary officers suspected of having pro- Trujillo sympathies are
gradually being retired or reassigned. The greatest threat of
antigovernment action by the military probably comes from this
reactionary group of officers. Their views may gain wider sup-
port in the armed forces if the split in the Council of State deepens
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and results in political divisions that might be interpreted by
some officers unaccustomed to a.free political system as an-
archy and as the last phase before a Communist take-over.
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(0170001-3
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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