CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A006300250001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
19
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 5, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 17, 1962
Content Type:
REPORT
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17 April 1962
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. West Germany: Adenaue.r may ask De Gaulle to help op-
pose US proposals for Berlin settlement. (Page i)
2. Israel: Meir asks removal of UN Truce Supervision Or-
ganization chief. (Page it)
3. Congo: Kasavubu and Adoula considering means of dismiss-
ing army chief General Mobutu. (Page it)
USSR: Khrushchev apparently in fair health but has begun
to slow down. (Page iii)
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Iran: Atmosphere in Tehran tense over arrests of top mil-
itary officers on corruption charges. (Page ip)
$. Common Market Africa: EEC and 16 African countries
reach agreement on new association arrangement. (Page v)
Guatemala: New demands for Ydigoras' resignation follow
12 April riots. (Page vi)
10. Bolivia--Chile: Diplomatic relations suspended in dispute
over water rights to' Lauca River. (Page v)
11. Syria: New cabinet named. (Paige vii)
12. LATE ITEM: Chinese Communist National People's Con-
gress ends; the few details thus far available indicate no
basic change in policies. (Page vii)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 April 1962
DAILY BRIEF
0
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I posa s for a Berlin settlement. Christian Democratic
West German est German political leaders are
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Bundestag floor leader Von Brentano and Minister for Special
Tasks Krone view them as "unacceptable:' At a special meet-
ing of officials and the Bundestag floor leaders on 12 April,
Adenauer, showing concern over. the sharpness of Brentano's
reaction, said he would approach De Gaulle to ask him to op-
pose the.. plans, noting that the time had apparently come to
against any move which could encourage a loosenin of West
German ties to the Wes 25X1
nerstone of his European policy, and he has frequently argued
he German press has given wide, coverage to the. US pro-
posals without any particular expression of alarm, although
two leading newspapers stress Brentano's opposition, assert-
ing his visit to the US beginning 25 April now assumes the charac-
ter of a "special mission" to express German opposition.to some
of the proposals. De Gaulle would probably be sympathetic to
an appeal by Adenauer. French-German cooperation is the cor-
endorsed the proposals as "the only realistic. polic
"test German-French friendship:' Foreign Minister Schroeder,
Free Democratic party leader Mende, and Social Democratic
party "(SPD) leader Ollenhauer, however, appeared to be more
sympathetic, and the SPD executive committee has subsequently
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Israel-Syria-UN~ he Israeli attitude toward UN pro-
cedures for dealing w border: tension has hardened as a
result of the Security Council's censure of the mid-March
reprisal raid against Syria. Foreign Minister Meir has re-
quested the removal of General von Horn, chief of staff of
the UN Truce Supervision Organization, because of his "in-
accurate statements" to the Security Council. She has also
emphasized Israel's conviction that the only answer to Syrian
"provocation" is to return the fire. Israel claims that
Syrian fishing boats are again operating on Lake Tiberias
and that Syrian Army equipment has been seen on the lake
shore. The Israelis have returned their patrol boat to the
lake and have moved a limited number of tanks and heavy
equipment toward the area. US Embassy officials are con-
vinced that the failure of the most recent Israeli raid- -in
which Von Horn said 1,300-1,500 Israelis participated-will
induce them to launch any new operation in greater force.
Meanwhile, the ambushing of two Israeli trucks on 11-12 April
in southern Israel has raised tension in that areT
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Congo: resident Kasavubu and Premier Adoula are con-
sidering means of dismissing army chief General Joseph Mo-
butu, according to UN officials in Leopoldville. Ambassador
Gullion observed that while Mobutu has shown no animosity
toward Adoula, the premier has lately spoken disparagingly
of Mobutu.. There are also rumors in Leopoldville that Adoula
may initiate a ,cabinet shakeup in the near futurJ
Recent friction between Adoula and Mobutu has stemmed
in part from Adoula's frustration over the army's shortcom -
ings, disagreements. concerning its retraining and eventual
size, and from Mobutu's reported efforts to obtain military
advisers from Belgium. Mobutu's dismissal would have rep r-
cussions within the army and could damage Adoula's position
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USSR: Khrushchev, who is 68 years old today, appears
to be in generally fair health, but there are signs that he has
begun.to slow down. During each of the past three winters,
for example, his heavy schedule has left him visibly fatigued
and susceptible to respiratory infections, with the result that
at least one bout with influenza has become an annual event.
He was ill with flu in early January of this year; another
virus.attack evidently necessitated a postponement of the Su
preme Soviet from 10 to 23 April.
The other leaders, carry on quietly during Khrushchev's
extended absences from Moscow, and as yet there has not been
any noticeable increase in political maneuvering within the
party presidium in preparation for a succession crisis. Khru-
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shchev gives every indication of being. in full command. How-
ever, there probably continue to be disagreements within the
hierarchy over such questions as the proportion of economic
.resources that should be devoted to the consumer sector and
the pace and extent of liberalization in the wake of renewed at-
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Iran: ((The atmosphere in government and military cir-
cles in e'J r"an has become increasingly tense over rumors
that former chief of the Supreme Staff General Hedayat and
former Minister of War General Vossuq will be arrested on
charges of corruption in negotiations of military contracts.
Two generals and two colonels were arrested on 12 April on
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imilar charges. Prime Minister Amini was minister of fi-
'lance from 1953 to 1955 when the military contracts were
being negotiated. The arrests were reportedly ordered by
the Shah before he left for the United States. The Shah dis-
like Amini and may be laying the groundwork for removing
him
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Common Market - Africa: /(The Common Market (EECyand
16 African countries reached arreement in principle at a three-
day meeting last week on the broad outline of a new EEC-Afri-
can association arrangement to replace the 1957 convention
which expires at the end of this year. Major exports of the
associated states will begiven preferential access to EEC
markets, but thedegree of preference will be reduced some-
what. EEC financial assistance to the Africans is expected
to total about $800,000,000 over the next five years, although
the exact amount and the contribution of each EEC country to
the aid fund have not, yet been decided. The EEC contemplates
no direct reply to the US memorandum of early February which
again offers to negotiate alternative arrangements. to soften the
discriminatory impact of the new EEC-African association on
producers. in other underdeveloped arei4_.~
IlLast week's meeting did not discuss an extension of the
newMrmula to African states which are not now associated
with the EEC, but it was generally agreed that such extension
was not precluded. London has already begun consultations
with African members of the Commonwealth to point out the-
advantages to them of EEC associatio-iIAT_
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BOLIVIA
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Guatemala: //Fhe death of four students following a clash j
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on 12 April_ with ilitary police has led to new demands for
President Ydigoras' resignation. The three anti-Communist
opposition parties issued a demand for the President's resig-
nation on. 1.4 April after student leaders, admitting that their
efforts against the regime last month were unduly influenced j
by the
y had sought
ofparties' Guatemala support. Cit The
sev eral professional groups have joined in the demand. a
speech ? broadcast late on 15 April, Ydigoras theInde-
mands.for his resignation but a heIde
announced.that he would soon chaadoptede the cabinet the inter-
ests
of better government during the rest of his term.. He also
month and ea1thMarip to the. US he had planned j
said he now f ort ate this plans
early %
Events since mid-March have weakened Ydigoras' posi=
tion, and new crises can be expected within the next three
months. The military--the final arbiter in Guatemala.--are
still proclaiming their loyalty to "constitutional order" but in
the past have proved ready to turn against a President when
they have determined that he has lost popular sunnor9.
.consulted repeatedly by Chile over its plans for aLauca River U
Bolivia-Chile: . Bolivia has suspended diplomatic relations
with Chile in a dispute over water rights to the Lauca River,
and Chile in turn has announced a decision to withdraw its am-
bassador and embassy staff from La Paz. The Bolivian capi-
tal was the scene of anti-Chilean demonstrations yesterday,
and police reportedly used tear gas in dispersing several thou- .
sand students who tried to storm the Chilean Embassy. Bolivia
had taken the water dispute . to the Organization of American
States on 14 April. Since 1939 the Bolivian authorities have been
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irrigation project but raised no objection until the project was
ready for testing late last year.
President Paz has encouraged Bolivian agitation on the
Lauca-River question since December, when large-scale riots,
similar. to those on 16 April, first occurred at the Chilean
E
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Paz' motives may be to promote unity in the badly divided
government party. He may also be seeking popular support for
a build-up of the army, which is more likely to be loyal to Paz
.than to his chief opponents in domestir nolifirs. I
*Sxri : The new civilian cabinet announced by President a
Qudsi yesterday is.largely composed of technicians, but has Se
key defense ministry post held by army commander in chief Gen-
eral Zahr al-Din, head of the military junta.which last week per-
suaded Qudsi to resume the presidency. The cabinet, formed
partially as a result of pro-UAR pressures in Syria, has been
described by Damascus radio as "transitional," and probably is
almost completely army-dominated. New Prime Minister Dr.
Bashir al-Azmah has 09an a professor at the Syrian University
Medical School, and w minister of health for the Syrian Region
of the UAR from October 1958 to August 1960; he is not known to
have any. political party affiliation. Leftist pressure for cabinet
representation has been recognized by the appointment of pro-
Baathist Ahmad Abd al-Karim, a former army colonel, as min-
ister of social affairs, labor, and agrarian reform, Abd al-
Karim was- amember of the leftist army junta in Syria prior to
the 1958 union with Egypt, and subsequently served in the Syrian
'Region cabinet under the UAR. Several other members of the
new cabinet served in technical capacities in cabinets during the
UAR period. F_
. *Communist China: Peiping has thus far released few details
of what went on at the 21-day session of the National People's
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Congress. which concluded yesterday, and it apparently hopes
to keep most of the proceedings there secret. What has been
released suggests that the regime was so embarrassed by its
domestic failures that it. even withheld details from the con-
gress delegates; although congresses have in.the..past been
called on to give formal approval to the state budget and plan,
this time a resolution was passed transferring this.task.to the
congress's Standing Committee.
ape recordings of some of the speeches at the congress
rep rtedly are being played for - privileged audiences in China,
and says they
contain "a great d al of criticism and self-criticism" for China's
economic failure The summary account released by Peiping
of Premier Chou En-lai's remarks. on. domestic policy indicate
that the regime will continue its retreat from exaggerated "leap-
forward" economic policies, and that the regime's. awareness of
widespread popular dissatisfaction has. led it to adopt a concilia-
tory stance toward non-Communist elements of the population.
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Peiping's even briefer account of Chou's remarks on foreign
policy included an affirmation of "unswerving" friendship and co-
operation with Moscow, but no suggestion whatever of any signifi-
cant modification of Pei in 's position on s ecific issues in dispute
with the USSR. (Backup, Page 4) 25X1
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Adenauer to call a special meeting of the leaders of all three
Bundestag parties that afternoon. At the meeting, Brentano
called the proposals an intolerable "giveaway" which, Krone
added, would "never be accepted in Berlin or West German JJ
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West German Views on Berlin
The new US proposals apparently did not cause a particu-
lar stir in the Bonn government until Brentano heard of them
on 12 April. the for-
mer foreign minister became so agitated that he persuaded
They charged that practical. control of access was conceded
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[En the early part of the meeting with party leaders, Ade-
nauer reportedly was somewhat evasive as to his position, but
under prodding by Brentano began to complain about "US soft-
ness and unreliability" and asserted that the United States seemed
not to recognize the vital interests of its Allies and to be "un-
willing to keep American pledges:' With regard to acceptance of
the Oder-Neisse frontier, Adenauer said he had agreed with the
President that such a sacrifice would be made only if it would lead
to progress toward meeting other popular German aspirations--
i, e. , reunification. Adenauer also said it had been a terrible
mistake not to proceed more rapidly with European integration,
since it would then have been possible to tell the Americans that
of the neutrals
to the East Germans, and that nonaggression declarations would
amount to acceptance of the interzonal and Oder-Neisse borders.
They also maintained that East German participation in access
control, the German technical commissions, and acceptance of
the borders amount to recognition of the partition of Germany
and the theory of two German states. In talks with American of-
ficials in Bonn, Adenauer has contended that the proposed inter-
national acceas authority would leave Berlin access at the mercy
all Europe as a body rejected these idea
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Israel Requests UNTSO Chief's Removal
TN Under Secretary Bunche has said that as far as he can
determine, this is the first time a written protest against any
UNTSO chief of staff has been submitted by either Israel or the
Arab states, although he recalled that the Israelis had made oral
protests against both of Von Horn's predecessors. Israel's re-
quest for Von Horn's removal was made in a.letter from Foreign
Minister Meir to U Thant. Mrs. Meir asserted that, while oc-
casional disagreements were possible and excusable, no basis for
further cooperation between Israel and Von Horn existed because
of the "total loss of confidence" which now prevaile
he Israelis were especially annoyed by Von Horn's. conten-
tion, in his report to the Security Council, that UN observers had
found no evidence of a fortified position, "existing or destroyed,"
in the area that Israel attacked on 16 March. Israel contends, that
the Syrians provoked the reprisal by firing on Israeli boats from
fortified positions. Von Horn admitted privately to members of
the American UN delegation that his observers had not seen the
entire area in question at the time his report was presented, but
that subsequently tYey had, and that only slit trenches and fox-
holes were observe
Non ,10 April the Israeli Knesset, by a 76-3 vote, adopted a
resoTution categorically rejecting the Security Council's resolu-
tion on the recent Lake Tiberias incidents as biased and fostering
aggressiveness. It further asserted Israel's inalienable right to
self-defense, its unwillingness to submit to aggression, and its
determination to preserve its sovereignty in principle and prac-
tice over "all its territory and waters.' Israel claims sovereignty
over all of Lake Tiberias despite the existence of the demilitar-
ized zone--only ten meters wide for half the length of the lake
on the eastern shore. The issue of sovereignty within the zone
was left unresolved in the Israeli-Syrian armistice agreement of
1949
The Israelis have become sensitive to any challenge in this
are - ecause of their plans to use the. lake's waters as part of their
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ordan River diversion project. They are tending to identify
yrian shooting with attempts to impede, if not stop, imple-
mentation of the project. The probability that the Israelis will
respond to future Syrian firing with even greater force is indi-
cated by evidence that the recent Israeli raid did not silence
the Syrian positions. Von Horn, in fact, has said the Israelis
were decisively beaten and did not come anywhere near their
target objective
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Communist China's National People's Congress Closes
According to the summaries released by Peiping, Chou in-
dicated to the congress that economic policy this year will follow
the lines., laid out in 1961--further consolidation, retrenchment,
readjustment, and preparation for future economic progress.
But no indication was given as to when the currently depressed
economy might be capable of further advances... Two days after
Chou made his report, . the conservative nature of his remarks
was underlined by an authoritative People's Daily editorial which
called for realism in economic planning, observed that "haste
.will not succeed;" and stated that "we reject the theory of a quick
victory... a desire to get things done cheaply and by empty talk:'
Thus, despite the ritualistic nod which Chou made toward the
"three red banners of the general line, the leap forward, and the
people's communes," these programs no longer have substantive
significance.
Chou put great stress on improving the regime's relations
with such disparate groups within China as the national. minori-
ties, "patriotic capitalists," the bourgeois intelligentsia, and
religious bodies. The regime. probably considers it prudent to
relax restrictions on non-Communists during the protracted eco-
nomic crisis in an effort to gain wider public support.. In this con-
nection, Chou stated that the regime will continue through 1966,
and possibly longer, to pay capitalists interest on their confiscated
holdings, although -such payments could have been.ended this year
under Peiping's. original schedule. Intellectuals are also to receive
more favorable treatment;. Chou asserted that most Chinese intel-
lectuals are now loyal to Peiping and must be allowed increased re-
sponsibility. Prior to the congress, Vice Premier Chen Yi had
.toured various parts of the country speaking in a similar vein, tell-
ing intellectuals they will now be judged by professional quality
rather than political fervor.
On the subject of Sino-Soviet relations, Chou indicated that the
Chinese still see their concept of the "east wind prevailing over the
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west" as the basis for correct Communist tactics toward the
West, despite Moscow's displeasure with this formulation.
While affirming for the record Peiping's support for negotia-
tions and peaceful coexistence. with the West, Chou urged a
strategy whiph would give priority to armed revolution in colo-
nial and underdeveloped areas of the world. Chou's insistence
on these points, is a.further indication that while Peiping and
Moscow have evidently been making some efforts to give an ap-
pearance of unity, they hold fast to their res ctive views. in
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep . , Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Warning Center
The Director
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