CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006600180001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 22, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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22 September 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Argentina: (Page i)
3. Cuba: Increased Soviet influence may benefit
old-line Communists. (Page iii)
4. Sino-Indian Border: Latest northeast frontier
clash results in casualties for both sides.
(Page i v)
i. Laos: Coup rumors continue in Vientiane.
(Page v)
6. Thailand: Sarit government plans stronger op-
position to US Southeast Asia policy. (Page vi)
7. Indonesia: Sukarno may reorganize his cabi-
net soon. (Page vii)
10. British Guiana: London conference on Guiana's
independence hinges on constitutional provisions.
(Page x)
(Continued)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
(Continued)
11. Venezuela: Army may overthrow Betancourt
before the end of September. (Page xi)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 September 1962
DAILY BRIEF
*Argentina: (Information as of 0415 EDT) Presi-
dent Guido reportedly resigned early today under
pressure from "hard-line" anti-Peronist army and
navy elements and a military junta appears to be on
the verge of taking over the Argentine government.
An early morning announcement by the navy minis-
try indicated that officers of both factions engaged
in the four-day-old struggle would be called into
council "to reorganize the government:'
since the overthrow of Frondizi.
Yesterday's short-lived "victory" of the Campo
de Mayo rebels was followed by a renewal of hostil-
ities when "hard-line" Generals Lorio and Labayru
refused to accept their dismissal by President Guido.
Air force participation in the struggle on the side of
the Campo de Mayo rebels apparently provoked the
navy into lining up on the side of the "hard-line" ele-
ments. It is not yet clear whether all forces involved
in the struggle have heeded the navy's peacemaking
overtures. The only certainty is that Argentina is
closer to a military dictatorship than it has been
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Cuba: Fidel Castro and his "new Communists"
still hold dominant positions in the regime's party
and governmental machinery, but their power rela-
tive to that of the veteran Cuban Communists may
be diminishing.
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signs of the resurgence o
old-line Communists, especially Blas Roca have be-
come pronounced in recent weeks. 25X1
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part of the price the
Cubans were forced to pay for the recent Soviet mil-
itary deliveries was the yielding of a greater political
and policy-making role to the "people in whom Soviet
leaders have confidence in Cuba," i. e. , the veteran
Communists. Soviet Ambassador Alek-
seyev is in frequent contact with and works closely
with old-line Cuban Communists.
'Since last March, when Castro stemmed the vet-
eran Communist drive for domination and purged old
Communist Anibal Escalante, the old Communists
have appeared to be adjusting to a role subordinate
to Castro's leadership. Recently, however, Castro's
dependence on the Soviet Union has greatly increased,
and this may in time put him at a disadvantage in as-
serting his will over the old Communists, whom Mos-
cow probably finds more reliable than Castro`? F-
22 Sept 62
DAILY BRIEF iii
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.~r(Snan n in irsp 11iI 'I ,s Scene of repeated skirmishes
Gyangtse
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---- - Boundary shown on Indian maps
Boundary shown on recent
Chinese Communist maps
----- Moto rable road
-- -- -- Motorable road
under construction
---- -- Minor road or trail
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Longiu...'. Qp~. A RCy
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Sino-Indian Border: The clash which occurred
in the northeast frontier area on 20-21 September
has resulted in casualties on both sides, including
the first admitted Chinese fatality of the year. Each
side immediately issued strong protests and Peiping
warned that the situation has "reached a most crit-
ical point and the flames of war may flare up" in the
area.
The clash was probably the result of the Indian
effort to expel Chinese troops which New Delhi alleges
intruded south of the Mc Mahon line last week.
The incident will set back prospects for an early
initiation of talks. In an exchange of notes just be-
fore the clash both Peiping and New Delhi had reit-
erated their proposals for border talks and had an-
nounced willingness in principle to meet on 15 October.
Differences on the scope and substance of the pro-
osed talks, however, have not
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Laos: Rumors of coup plotting continue to cir-
culate in Vientiane. According to the most recent
rumor, General Phoumi plans a coup on 9 October
after the US Military Assistance Advisory Group
completes its withdrawal47
(Although these rumors are not supported by
other evidence, it is clear that Phoumi and the right-
wingers are becoming increasingly disturbed over
indications that North Vietnamese troops are pre-
paring to remain in Laos
(O 10 September, Phoumi told a group of his
military supporters that if the "foreign troops"--
presumably North Vietnamese--are not evacuated
by the end of the withdrawal period on 7 October
there would "certainly" be a resumption of hostilities.
22 Sept 62 DAILY BRIEF
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Thailand: Prime Minister Sarit apparently fears
for his position he does not show stronger opposition
to US policy in Southeast Asia:`?
Confidence in his leadership of the military ol-
igarchy has been shaken by a series of setbacks to
Thai prestige following Sarit's endorsement of US
policy in Laos against the advice of subordinates.
The International Court decision awarding a disputed
border temple to Cambodia and increased American
militar aid to Cambodia have figured largely in this
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the
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proposed Thai-Soviet trade agreement is only the
first step to free Thailand from its dependence upon
the United States
Thai officials
have agreed to ask for withdrawal of American troops
from Thailand if Foreign Minister Thanat fails to
obtain a modification of US policy toward Cambodia
during his present visit to the UN General Assembly'
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Indonesia, f-sukarno is proposing to make certain
changes in the Indonesian cabinet in the near future
(i e most significant change would be the elevation
of Foreign Minister Subandrio to the post of First
Minister, replacing Djuanda, who has been relatively
inactive because of illness. This appointment would
be a further indication that Sukarno is seeking to re-
duce the currently strong political role of the military
in keeping with his long-standing policy of balancing
opposing elements in order to assure his own contin-
uation in power. Subandrio has opposed the army's
participation in politics in recent years, whereas
Djuanda has tended to support the military
The changes would have no immediate effect on
Indonesia's policies, but reduction of the army's po-
litical role could lead to increased Communist in-
fluence in the governmen j
It this not clear at present whether or not Suban-
drio will retain his Foreign Ministry portfolio after
assuming the First Minister post. If he does not,
the most likely successor to the Foreign Ministry is
Ambassador to Moscow Malik, who has not been in-
volved in internal political maneuvers:
22 Sept 62 DAILY BRIEF
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ferences are so great that the conference may founder
hinge on constitutional provisions on which the dif -
set a date for British Guiana's independence will
British Guiana: ~ Now scheduled for 23 October
after two postponemen s, the London conference to
The Jagan party and the leading opposition party
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are agreed upon. Jagan insists upon retaining the
their respective proposals for the electoral system
have threatened to walk out of the conference unless
present system of election by plurality, while the op-
position parties are equally determined to install
proportional representation. Disagreement is also 25X1
bitter over Japan's proposal to lower the voting age
to 18.
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Venezuela: A group of military officers
reportedly is plotting to overthrow Presi ent Romulo
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Betancourt before the end of September. Their ob-
jective is said to be "to put an end to Communist ter-
rorist activities in the country:'
Last month these military leaders demanded
that President Betancourt take various steps to in-
hibit the activities of Communists and other leftists.
One of their demands was that he remove the con-
gressional immunity of two deputies charged with
complicity in the leftist revolt of last June.
President Betancourt and other government of -
f icials have been aware of the plot for at least a week,
but do not appear greatly concerned and have not taken
any extraordinary security measures to prevent it.
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 Approved F
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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