CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A006600290001-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 7, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 5, 1962
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A006600290001-7.pdf772.89 KB
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Approved Fo lease'1O /15E E~T0097 1006600290001- / 25X1 Copy No. 25X1 [OR 109 State Dept. review completed GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and 25X1 declassification / Approved For Release'rOfp/1SE 1J00975AO06600290001-7 OAOI 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06600290001-7 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06600290001-7 25X1 Approved ForIe se 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T0097 06600290001-7 5 October 1962 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 25X1 2. USSR: Moscow shows sensitivity to McNamara's 28 September remarks on West's readiness to fight for West Berlin. (Page it) 3. Soviet-Yugoslav Communique: Cooperation on eco- nomic, cultural, and foreign affairs to be improved. (Page iii) 4. Yugoslavia-Albania: Yugoslavia may be planning to subvert Hoxha's regime. (Page iv) 25X1 8. Venezuela: Terrorist activities in and around Cara- cas rise sharply. (Page vii) 25X1 10. France: National Assembly votes censure of Pompi- dou cabinet. (Page ix) Approved For Rel se 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T0097 A0p~QQ290001-7 m SRI/ 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06600290001-7 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06600290001-7 c012 25X1 0 j Approved For Rile se 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T009 90001-7 /,,; USSR: (Moscow's reaction to Secretary McNamara's 28 September press conference reflects Soviet sensi- tivity to assertions of the West's readiness to use force to maintain its position in Berlin and to the pos- sibility that West Germany may acquire a nuclear capability.) rpolyanov, Izvestia's authoritative commentator on Berlin and German affairs, asserted in a 3 October article that Western "saber-rattling" will make no im- pression on the USSR. He renewed previous warnings that any "showdown" over West Berlin could escalate into a general nuclear conflict. Izvestia reaffirmed Moscow's preference for a neg tiated settlement but warned that there is a "time . limit" to Soviet patience) The Soviet press has claimed that Secretary Mc- 6 Namara's recent trip to West Germany provided further evidence that the "West Ge man brass virtually al- 25X1 ready have atomic 5 Oct 62 DAILY BRIEF ii Ann Approved For W. a 9003/04/17 ? C:ID-RDP79T00 75 iri LM,'hd0290001-7 "USSR-Yugoslavia: The Soviet-Yugoslav communi- que of 3 October indicates that Belgrade and Moscow gonesybeybygones and to develop closer cooperation in I 11111/101 ,/ I ~j / U The communique detailed broad areas of agreement in foreign policy, particularly on disarmament and nu- clear testing. Both sides recognized the need "to sign a German peace treaty and to normalize the situation in West Berlin," but no reference was made to a separate East German treaty. Moscow endorsed last July's Cairo Economic Con- ference of Developing States. This conference, origi- nated by Yugoslavia, called for an international trade conference under UN auspices. Moscow's endorsement in effect recognizes Yugoslavia's leading role among the neutrals and identifies the USSR with their aspirations. The communique placed particular stress on in-. creased economic cooperation between the two countries, apparently assuring future Soviet loans and permission for Yugoslavia to participate in some committees of the bloc's economic organization (CEMA). The document did not mention party relations but hinted, by advocating "co- operation between public and other organizations," that party questions will be further pursued. The communiques endorsement of the June 1955 Tito-Khrushchev declaration will provide another source of disagreement in the bloc. The 1955 declaration in ef- fect legitimized Yugoslavia's unique "road to socialism." The Yugoslav official news agency said an invitation for Tito to spend a "holiday" in the USSR as Khrushchev's guest had been renewed and Tito "is expected to visit" the Soviet Union "this year." 5Oct62 Approved For ReI 25X1 DAILY BRIEF iii i 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 1 1-7 Approved F .CIA-RDP79T009 554E OQ290001-7 Mol 25X1 j Yugoslavia-Albania: (Yugoslavia may be planning to subvert the Albanian regime of Ever Hoxha. Such a plan may have Moscow's blessing. 30 September, Dusan Mugosa, party chief in Yugoslavia's Albanian minority region, warned pub- licly that Communist rule in Albania was threatened by the Hoxha-Shehu leadership. In his speech he as- serted that even Albanian politburo members lacked confidence in the two men. The speech was featured by Borba, one of Belgrade's leading dailies. (Moscow's acquiescence is suggested by the timing of Mugosa's speech during Soviet President Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia and the fact that Mugosa visited Moscow last July) (As early as last winter the Yugoslav secret police wer reportedly laying the groundwork for forming a new Albanian refugee organization. It was to be com- posed of educated Albanian refugees and former Al- banian party members, men who apparently could serve as the nucleus of a new Albanian government. 5 Oct 62 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975 0O9kW90001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06600290001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06600290001-7 Approved For Wez 25X1 Caracas have risen sharply. 6 2~Xl M 6600290001-7 Venezuela: Terrorist activities in and around Several military and police personnel have been murdered and others threatened with death in what may be part of a leftist campaign to provoke a mili- tary coup against President Betancourt's government. Several high-ranking officers, dissatisfied with the government's inability to control the extremists, re- portedly have planned to overthrow Betancourt if the terrorism is not stopped. According to the US Embassy, the present un- easiness will probably be compounded now that the violence-prone Central University has reopened and the Congress--with the lower house controlled by the 25X1 onposition--has reconvened. 5 Oct 6 2 DAILYBRIEF Approved For Reif ase zuu;3/u4Tf7-7CTA--RDP79-uuu975*O9kW290001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06600290001-7 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06600290001-7 *France: The toppling of the Pompidou cabinet early today by a censure vote in the National Assem- bly will not diminish popular support for De Gaulle in the 28 October referendum on his proposal for election of the next French President by universal suffrage. De Gaulle's handling of this proposal- -specifi- cally his bypassing of parliament in scheduling the ref - erendum--was the immediate issue which led to the censure vote. It is generally anticipated that the National As- sembly will now be dissolved. Both opponents and supporters of De Gaulle will portray today's vote as a victory. Gaullists will ar- gue that De Gaulle finally succeeded in goading the deputies into opening the way for new elections; they are confident they can profit at the polls from public backing for De Gaulle's plan for election of his succes- sor. The other parties will proclaim that a stand has been made for republican liberties; but their inability to agree on a counterproposal to De Gaulle's referen- dum scheme shows the difficulties they face in trying to form a united front to defeat Gaullist candidates. De Gaulle may decide against dissolving the pres- ent assembly and instead simply appoint a new premier. New elections would restrict his maneuverability some- what, since under the constitution a new assembly could not be dissolved for at least a year. 25X1 5 Oct 62 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 M Approved For Rel ase - ,Qg 00290001-7 Approved For THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Emergency Planning The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approve or Releasee - 0001-7 25X1 ' // / /// : Approved For IeasE7Op/1 SECRET 0097ft06600290001-7 Approved For e-. 2 OM /aA/17 ? g P~400975A006600290001-7 SKIM