CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006800160001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 27, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 19, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Rise 200T%OP C75AQQ00160001-9
19 January 1963
Copy No. C 105
'AhWINTEI L16E,-~'ssCF
0,11
F-9M 2 L
Dept. review completed
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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19 January 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CO
NTENTS
1. Cuba--Co
air-to-su
rade on 2
astal Mis
rface mis
January.
sile: Soviet AS-1 Kennel
sile detected in Havana pa-
(Page 1)
3. Communi
German p
Khrushch
(Page 3)
st Bloc:
arty cong
ev's plea f
Chinese delegate to East
ress not fully responsive to
or a halt in polemics.
4. Sino-Indi
acceptanc
will not l
5. Congo:
sonal safe
an Dispute
e of Colom
ead to bord
Tshombe s
ty. (Pag
: Indian leaders feel that
bo conference proposals
er negotiations. (Page 5)
eeks guarantees for his per-
e 6)
0
6
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7. Britain--
(Page 8)
Labor Par
ty: Hugh Gaitskell dead.
25X
9. Spain: S
agreemen
panish rea
t. (Page
dy to negotiate US bases
10)
W
10. Notes:
II
iraq
; Thailand-Malaya; Bolivia.
(Page 11)
I
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COASTAL DEFENSE MISSILE DISPLAYED IN HAVANA PARADE ON 2 JANUARY 1963
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RAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 January 1963
DAILY BRIEF
*Cuba--Coastal Missile: Recent analysis re-
veals that the coastal defense missile shown in the
j Havana parade on 2 January is a version of the So-
viet AS-1 Kennel 55-nm. air-to-surface missile.
Changes have apparently been made to the AS-1
missile to adapt it to a coastal defense role. Major
changes include modifications of the vertical tail de-
sign and of the guidance antenna on the tail. As a
coastal defense weapon, it probably has a range of
30 to 40 nautical miles with a payload on the order
of 2,200 pounds.
The Havana parade missile appears to be the
same one observed at the coastal defense installa-
tion at Banes and deployed at the other two cruise-
missile sites in Cuba.
The Kennel is a cruise missile with a high sub-
sonic speed. It is believed to have been carried
only by TU-16 (Badger) jet medium bombers.
There are no known combat aircraft in Cuba
that could accommodate the Kennel system. A few
Cuban transport-type aircraft have the weight-lifting
capacity for this missile, but it is highly unlikely
that these aircraft could be sufficient) modified to
employ this weapon system. 25
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*Communist Bloc: The speech given by the Chi-
nese Communist delegate to the East German party
congress on 18 January was not fully responsive to
Khrushchev's plea for a halt in the Sino-Soviet po-
lemics.
Wu Hsiu- chuan indicated that Peiping would find
it "helpful" if there were a further initiative by Khru-
shchev, who was implicitly charged with "continuing
to make attacks" even while he called for their ces-
sation.
Wu referred to "fully justifiable" worries among
many Communists that the tactics employed against
Communist China were "creating a split:' The de-
velopments at the East German party congress since
Khrushchev's speech on 16 January reflected a con-
certed maneuver by the Soviet bloc to isolate the
Chinese Communists and blame them for any contin-
uation or intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict.
Khrushchev's call for a polemical truce and his
equivocal endorsement of another international Com-
munist conference in the distant future- -seconded
by East European delegates--were intended to dis-
arm Peiping's attack on Soviet leadership and strat-
egy. Wu agreed that a discontinuation of attacks
against "fraternal" parties was a necessary prelimi-
nary to an international Communist conference. He
indicated, however, that China does not regard Yugo-
slavia as a "fraternal" party, and he reiterated the
standard Chinese positions on such issues as Alba-
nia's orthodoxy and on his country's record in the
Sino-Indian border dispute.
Peiping may feel that Khrushchev's seeming of-
fer of the olive branch imposes on the Chinese the
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tactical necessity of some conciliatory gestures,
and Wu's remarks do not preclude a decision by
Communist China to moderate its propaganda.
There are no indications of real progress thus
far, however, toward a durable truce. TASS
criticized Wu for his "completely inadmissible
tone:' The uproar in the audience that attended
Wu's speech also reflected the deep-seated differ-
ences that continue to prevent any brid ing of the
rift between Moscow and Peiping.
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Sino-Indian Dispute: Contrary to the public im-
pression created following rime Minister Bandara-
naike's talks in New Delhi, Indian leaders do not
expect that their qualified acceptance of the Colombo
conference proposals will lead to serious negotiations
of the border dispute.,
Nye ru made clear in letters to Mrs. Bandaranaike
that the Indians accept the proposals only as modified
by them during the Ceylonese prime minister's visit.
Fo ,reign Secretary Desai expects the Chinese to
reject the proposals as modified by India. He feels
that even if an agreement on a cease-fire is reached,
the immediate result will only be "talks about talks."
Desai and Defense Minister Chavan agree that Indian
acceptance of the modified proposals does not remove
the need for a military build-up,
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*Cong :Qjntalks with the British, Belgian, and
US consuls on 18 January, Tshombd was seeking
guarantees for his personal safety and assurances
'that the UN plan would still be appliej
--..0
mbd claimed that Adoula's and Hasavubuls
lette-rs to U Thant on the amnesty were only "vague
promises" which gave no real assurances to him or
his colleagues and suggested that Leopoldville had
ulterior motives. Tshombd said that although the UN
plan provided for an amnesty law to be submitted to
Parliament, it appeared that the UN reintegration
plan had been abandoned. The Katangan leader as-
serted that he would "live up to the letter" of his
agreement on entry of UN forces into Kolweil
Y-ohombd also expressed concern over the future
of the Katangan forces, particularly those "in the
bush." He said he feared that if they were not re-
assured on their future ' tb_q_y would not surrender
and would turn to brigandagel
19 Jan 63 DAILY BRIEF
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*Britain: QTbe death of Hugh Gaitskell materially
changes the domestic political situation by substan-
tially weakening the Labor Party in a pre-election
perio
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6 Gai skell was the only figure in the party able
to command the support of most of its factions. He
is the only Laborite acknowledged by the public to
have the ability to handle the prime ministership.
Gaitskell's possible successors at one time or
an er have all aroused the antagonism of factions
within the party. The most prominent are George
Brown, the strongly pro-NATO and pro-US deputy
party leader, and Harold Wilson, foreign affairs
spokesman who enjoys wide support among the left
wing. A possible compromise candidate is James
Callaghan, party spokesman on Treasury affairs.
Callaghan is c a political moderate on
most issues
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Spain: The Spanish appear ready to renegotiate
the US bases agreement which expires this Septembe
Foreign Minister Castiella informed US Ambas-
sa oodward on 17 January that Spain does not
desire a bid to join NATO, and wishes the US to con-
sider it as close a collaborator as its NATO allies. 0, 1
He said his government is convinced a new bases
agreement can be concluded or the present one ex-
tended for five years in accordance with its terms,
if "US reciprocal actions" are satisfactory.
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Madrid has been pressing for some time for
connuation of large-scale economic aid, and for
relaxation of the US insistence, that Spain purchase
its military equipment largely in the US. Spanish
officials have also alluded to the possibility of some
new form of alliances ossibl a formal US-Spain
mutual defense treaty. 25
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Iraq: Qasim again is making peace overtures
to Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani in an effort to end the
18-month-old Kurdish revolt. Qasim has apparently
begun to realize that the Iraqi Army has neither the
will nor the ability to end the revolt. Previous
negotiations between Qasim and Barzani have foun-
dered on Qasim's refusal to meet Kurdish demands
for local autonomy.
terrorist action against Thai provincial officials.
Thailand- Malaya: Thailand and Malaya plan
joint security operations in March against an esti-
mated 400 Communist terrorists in the southern
border provinces of Thailand. These terrorists,
holdouts of the Communist rebellion in Malaya,
have long been using Thailand as a sanctuary and
as a base for raids into Malaya. They are also re-
portedly engaged in increased local recruitment and
p
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*Bolivia: The leftist Bolivian Government has
announced the appointment of a consul general to ME
Havana and reportedly expects to reopen its office
there shortly. Although the Bolivian Government
has continued diplomatic relations with Cuba, it
has not had an official mission in Havana since
Castro came to power. Only four other Latin Amer-
ican countries- -Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay
--now maintain missions in Cuba. =
19 Jan 63 DAILY BRIEF 12
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 Approved For Rq'
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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