CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A006900320001-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
18
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 8, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 6, 1963
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A006900320001-0.pdf1.14 MB
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Approved For lase 2T 6 :SEcRET0975AQ 900320001-0 6 April 1963 Copy No. Cl State Dept. review completed GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Release 20 OIp : Er75A006900320001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06900320001-0 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06900320001-0 O/ Approved For Releas 2003/05/16 .CIA-RDP79T00975A 06900320001-0 6 April 1963 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 25 2. Brazil: Goulart's moves against Governor Lacerda increase political tensions. (Page 2) 3. USSR-Brazil: Prospects for substantial increases in Soviet-Brazilian trade appear limited. ' (Page 3) 5. NATO--Nuclear Force- West German and French views. (Page 5) 6. Canada: Liberals have a good chance to win a plu- rality in next Monday's election. (Page 6) 7. South Korea: Junta leader agrees to suspend his proposal to extend military rule. (Page 7) 9. Poland: Regime's economic policy meets with popular dissatisfaction. (Page 9) j j 110 Notes: Poland; j USSR; . Argentina. (Page 11) Approved For Releas 2003/05/16 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0 6900320001-0 25 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06900320001-0 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06900320001-0 25 ~/e ea/ Mo 5/16: CIA-RDP79TOO97 900320001-0 M I ME *Brazil. Political tension is increasing as a re- sult of actions bythe Goulart regime against anti- Communist Governor Lacerda of Guanabara State. . Goulart is evidently seeking to create a situation of unrest in Rio de Janeiro which would permit feder- al intervention to depose Lacerda. In recent months, the government has interrupted food supplies for the area, given wide publicity to scandals in the Guana- bara police, and ordered federal troops to counter Lacerda's prohibition of the pro-Cuban Congress of Solidarity. Pro- Communist First Army Commander Osvino Alves--whose headquarters is in Rio de Janeiro--has now apparently seriously proposed early intervention against Lacerda but is being strongly opposed by anti- Communist War Minister Kruel. A decision by Goulart to back Kruel.at this time would probably indicate only, that Goulart believes that he is not yet in position for this action. Intervention is ' permitted under the Brazilian constitution under certain imprecisely defined con- ditions such asto'assure "the independence and har- mony ofthe branches" of a state government. In order to legalize the action, however, the executive requires cooperation from either the judiciary or the legislature. 25 25 M N 6 Apr 63 DAILY BRIEF 2 Approved For Kelease i UU3/U5/1 6 C I i i I UTUU975AU 69UU32UUU-i -U 25 0 Milo I Approved For ReFeasle 2003/05/16 CIA-RDP79T00975A0U6900320001-0 USSR-Brazil: (Soviet bloc economic negotiations with Brazil continue to encounter difficulties, and prospects for substantial increases in trade appear limited.)) (The difficulties stem largely from Soviet reluc- tance to undertake the economic commitments sug- gested by Brazil. Negotiations for a new long-term Soviet-Brazilian trade pact are continuing, however) (The question of how much of Brazil's chief ex- ports, especially coffee and cocoa, are to be traded remains unresolved. A Brazilian Foreign Ministry official states Brazil had hoped to obtain 600,000 to 1,000,000 tons of Soviet wheat and some 3,000,000 tons of Soviet oil this year, but .the USSR states it cannot supply those amounts. Brazil, in turn, can- not supply the rice and leather requested by the USSR.) (Trade between the two countries reached about $70 million in the last year of their first trade pact (1960-1962), and the 1963 target may be over $100 million) (Difficulties have also cropped up in Poland's eco- nomic negotiations with Brazil. Talks on trade and aid, which were concluded in Rio on 3 April, appar- ently went badly. In particular, little progress seems to have been made toward allocating the remaining $36 million of the $70 million. in Polish industrial de- velopment credits which Brazil accepted in 1961. j j 6 Apr 63 DAILY BRIEF 3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06900320001-0 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06900320001-0 CIA RDPZQT-00975 0 00320001-0 Approved For Releas j j j j NATO--Nuclear. Force: foreign Minister Schroeder told Ambassador Stevenson on 3 April that if the multi- lateral nuclear force (MLF) does not come into being, the Germans would ultimately seek equal status with Britain ticipants~ (This statement appears to represent a shift in Bonn's position on this issue. Schroeder said the Germans pre- fer the MLF solution principally for political and psycho- logical reasons, but implied that he was worried that it might involve a control system giving the US the prepon- derant v 'ce over that of a majority of the European par- and France as a nuclear power) QThe French are intimating in NATO that an inter- allied force will "inevitably" involve a change in the NATO chain of .command established by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) "many years ago." US Ambassador Finletter sus- pects France is building up a case that it has a right to vote on--and to veto if it desires--any action which may be taken regaiding the command arrangements for a NATO nuclear force) (Secretary General Stikker has also said he is worried by the French attitude and thinks it is desirable that the command arrangements be made virtually final. before the NATO ministerial meetin in late May lest a major dispute be spotlighted at that time F_ I 6 Apr 63 DAILY BRIEF 5 25 25 Approves For Keiea a 2003/U0/1b CIA-KUP 9 i 009 5AU b9UU3L0001-U 25MM 25 ffn pprove or a se 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79TOO97 25X1 j Canada: The US Embassy in Ottawa believes a trend favoring the Liberals has set in, giving them a good chance .of a plurality in the 8 April electi n. The likelihood of a Liberal majority is small The embassy considers that Liberal prospects have ecently improved because of support from the Quebec provincial machine, and Liberal leader Pear- son's sharp attacks on Prime Minister Diefenbakerm Enthusiasm for Diefenbaker on the other hand has been dampened by his carelessness with fact and by his florid campaign style. One pollster reports that three out of ten Canadians are so disgusted with na- tional politics that they may not vote) . (The Social Credit Party . is still expe ted to. in- crease its representation over last year. (Speculation is increasing that Diefenbaker will precipitate a constitutional crisis by refusing to re- sign if the Liberal plurality is narrow l 6 Apr 63 DAILY BRIEF F?R M 25X1 Approved For Relea a 2003/05/16. CIA-RDP79T00975 900320001-0 25 M M 25X11 PA4 DAILY BRIEF 0 *South Korea: (Pak Chong-hui. has agreed to suspend'his proposed referendum for extension of military rule, according to a member of the junta supreme council. He told a US Embassy officer that following.the announcement of Pak's decision a resumption of political activity will be permitted, but did not say when. the announcement would be made. He claimed that the, situation would be re- examined next October and a decision made on whether to hold elections for a civilian government or hold a referendum on the prolongation of mili- tary rule. It was the regime's present intention to hold elections, making possible the seating of a e e nment this year as required by the con- n w gov stitution (There have been some indications, that the civilian political leaders might go along with this kind of an arrangement provided they believe they would have an opportunity to seek representation in the new government. They have emphasized that the assurance of elections wa necessary for any compromise to be acceptable (The proposed plan will still permit. Pak and his backers to maneuver to ;perpetuate their power. Pak might very well be "persuaded" to run for president as he had contemplated in his original plans for re- taining power-)) F 6 Apr 63 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06900320001-0 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06900320001-0 iiii~-- lx/ j, Approved For Relea 2 03/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00975A00'0320001-0 25X1 VON .j j j j *Poland: For the first time since 1956, all major elements of the Polish population simultaneously ap- pear to be displeased with the regime?s domestic eco- nomic policy. The prevalent popular mood. could lead to widespread local disturbances and may cause a shake-up within Gomulka's regime. Angry public reactions commenced with the de- cision to raise prices on coal, gas, electricity, and other fuels announced by Premier Cyrankiewicz in a nationally televised speech to the parliament on 28 M/larch, When debate on the decree opened. on the following day, minority non-Communist deputies implied the decision was wrong and in a veiled way warned of difficulties which might result. On 1 April, party boss Gomulka reportedly was called to the politically important Zeran Automobile Plant--its armed. workers helped bring him to power-- to help stave off a strike in protest over the increases. The US Embassy in Warsaw also has received sev- eral reports of strikes in coal-producing Silesia. The fuel price increases will force white-collar workers for the first time to spend a significant por- tion of their incomes on housing expenses, even .though rents themselves will remain at the same low rates. Farmers do not accept regime claims that promised increased. payments for hogs and other agricultural produce will compensate for increased prices of industrial products, especially coal. NJ 6 Apr 63 DAILY BRIEF 9 Approved For Release 003/05/16. CIA-RDP79T00975A00 900320001-0 25X1 0 MEN 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06900320001-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06900320001-0 j Approved For Release 20 - OQ320001-0 NOTES 0 Poland: The Polish party--and presumably the others in Eastern Europe--seems not to be receiving adequate information and guidance from Moscow on bloc affairs. A knowledgeable and usually reliable Polish party source recently told a US Embassy of - ficial that "at the moment there is no firm direction from Moscow nor in Warsaw," that any Soviet bloc action will be taken in "jerks and withdrawals," and that this situation would continue until a new course is charted. He attributed this to Moscow's dispute with Communist China and observed that Polish leaders now regard even the wide differences in the party over domestic policies as secondary to the ef- fects of the Sino-Soviet dispute, 6 Apr 63 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 20 - 0320001-0 25X1 Approved For Release - 39d'320001-0 25X1 25X1 *USSR: The intended mission of the lunar probe launched from Tyuratam on 2 April still cannot be established. It appears that the probe failed to land on the lunar surface and there is no evidence to sug- gest that the probe is now in a lunar orbit. The lack of Soviet announcements on the terminal phase of. the flight suggests that its intended mission was not ac- complished. 25X1 6 Apr 63 DAILY BRIEF 12 Approved For Release 20 3/05/16 :CIA-RDP79T00975A00 900320001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 20 - 9320001-0 25X1 00/17 *Argentina: (ome navy rebels are complying with the negotiated terms for a cease-fire, but capitulation of the main naval base has not been officially acknowledged, despite the individual sur- render of the base commander and the marine corps commander. Other rebel leaders have fled to Uru- guay. The truce terms include the surrender of both civilian and.military rebel leaders who are to be placed on trial. The government is reported making widespread arrests of civilians suspected of aiding the rebellion as civilian commandos.) 6 April 63 DAILY BRIEF 13 25X1 j MNNI JV U I JI RCICQJC LUfJJ/VJ/ IV VIM-RLJF I l I UU 1I JMVVy.7VVJLVVV 1-' LV/\ Approved For Relea a 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00975A00690032 001-0 25X1 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Commander in Chief, Atlantic The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved For Relea a 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0069003200 1-0 25X1 ApproVftFor FTIQFOC5EiC DP7 975AO06900320001-0 Approved For 0 / DP79TOO975AO06900320001-0