CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A007100280001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 17, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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17 July 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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1. British Guiana: Both major political pa.rtl s are
divided over Sandys' proposals for- a coalition
government. (Page 1)
2. USSR: Agriculture will apparently receive a
higher priority. (Page 2)
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25X1 4. USSR-Cuba: Cas-
tro desires a rapprochement with the US. Page 5)
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6. Common Market: Assessment of EEC Council
agreement concerning contacts with the UK within
the WEU framework. (Page 7)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 July 1963
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DAILY BRIEF
*British Guiana: (Both major political parties--
Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) and Forbes
Burnham's People's National Congress (PNC)--are
divided over Colonial Secretary Sandys' roposals to
form an all-party coalition government.
(The extreme left wing of the PPP, led by Jagan's
wife and by Agriculture Minister Brindley Benn, are
reported strongly opposed to a coalition and seem to
have carried the majority of the party leadership with
them. Jagan--in the past amenable to working with
Burnham--is now said to be adamantly opposed to in-
cluding conservative United Force leader Peter D'Aguiar.
Jagan has also indicated that he is opposed to coalition
unless his party retains six of the ten cabinet posts.
For its part, the PNC agreed to enter coalition talks
after a heated argument in its executive committee on
12 July)
(Jagan and Burnham nevertheless have agreed to
hold regular weekly meetings to discuss the possibil-
ity of coalition. The prospects of these talks are poor.
(On his return to London on 16 July, Sandys an-
nounced that Britain is awaiting the outcome of the
talks before imposing a solution. Trinidad's Prime
Minister Eric Williams also hopes to mediate and has
recently invited all Guianese party heads to attend a
West Indies heads-of-state meeting in Port of Spain
on 22 Jul . So far none of the Guianese have re
onded.
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USSR: Khrushchev apparently intends to embark
on a course which, if implemented, will boost sharply
agriculture's claim on the country's resources at the
expense of other objectives, possibly even including
defense.
Signs over the past year of increased investment
in agriculture and a stepped-up program for agricul-
tural machinery production have now been followed by
Khrushchev's assertion to Belgian Foreign Minister
Spaak that he intends to surpass US production in chem-
ical fertilizers in the next five years. He claimed that
the USSR was now able to spend more on the-,civilian
economy since the "peak" of Soviet military expendi-
tures had been passed.
Khrushchev's goal implies a production five years
hence of upwards of 40 million tons. Production at
the end of 1962 was only a little over 17 million. The
minister of agriculture recently announced that farms
would have 47 million tons of fertilizer by 1965, sug--
gesting that even more ambitious plans are being con-
sidered.
The tempo and scope of Khrushchev's agricultural
program will determine its impact on other priority
sectors of the economy. Khrushchev is obviously con-
cerned over the stagnation of Soviet agriculture since
1958 and presumably will press for whatever measures
are necessary--including increased industrial support--
to alleviate the situation rapidly. The investment in
chemical equipment, farm machinery, and storage fa-
cilities required for such a program, if actually imple-
mented, probably cannot be obtained entirely by alter-
ing previous commitments in the consumer and heavy
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industrial sectors. A review of defense objectives
aimed at restraining increases in defense costs may
also be under way.
While Khrushchev's new program could have con-
siderable benefit, Soviet agriculture will still be faced
with a myriad of problems associated with collectiviza-
tion, improper organization, and lack of incentives for
the peasantry-
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USSR- Cuba: (Moscow is promoting the idea that 0
the Castro regime desires a rapprochement with the
us.
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(It is unlikely that either Moscow or Havana be-
liev there is any prospect for a significant adjust-
ment of Cuban-US relations in the near future. They
may believe, however, that even rumors of Cuban
interest in rapprochement and negotiation with the US
would complicate US efforts to obtain the cooperation
of other governments in tightening Cuba's isolation.
C oviet and Cuban leaders probably also hope that
these tactics will undercut anti-Communist moves in
other Latin American countries as well as prevent
further deterioration in Cuban relations with the five
Latin countries with which Havana still maintains di -
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a
pprove or a se
- -
Nov/
Common Market: The agreement at the EEC
Council meeting on 11- 2 July to establish formal con-
tacts with the UK within the framework of the Western
European Union has apparently removed a major irri-
tant among the six countries of the Common Market
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nce De Gaulle's veto of Britain's accession to
the ommon Market last January, the renewal of con-
tacts with London had become a question of national
prestige and a symbol of opposition of the other five
members to the French position. Potentially explo-
sive itself, the issue had also become an obstacle to
serious consideration of other community problems
and in some cases an excuse for delay)
There is little expectation, however, that the corn-
pro ise will lead to early resumption of talks on Brit-
ish accession or that the better atmosphere which has
been created will of itself lead to quick and easy solu-
tions to the other intracommunity problems. Fore-
most among these i implementation of the common
agricultural policy
The US Embassy in London reports that it expects
the K eventually to accept the offer to maintain contact
with the EEC via the WE U.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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