CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A007400180001-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 11, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 12, 1963
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A007400180001-0.pdf869.32 KB
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Copy Nd', C [go 25X1 STATE review(s) completed. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification Approved For Releasemp165 T00975AO07400180001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO07400180001-0 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO07400180001-0 25X1 12 December 1963 OEM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Bolivia: President Paz has little room left to maneuver in the present crisis. (Page 1) 25X1 4. Czechoslovakia: Crisis in Novotny's regime. (Page 4) 5. South Vietnam: New government has made little progress. (Page 5) 6. Indonesia: Two Communist ministers appointed. (P age 6) 7. Honduras: Leftist campaign under way to split military and moderate leaders. (Page 7) 25X1 11 N ME EI'. E E M- VE/011 25X1 Approved For R ease ZUUJ/Ub/lb L;1A-KUF1U A007400180001 -0 Aft Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007400180001-0 ajRiberdlt3 25X1 -??--- International boundary -"' -- Selected road ? Nat anal capital Railroad al no! flat' SOO C R !NATION la 'NOT HZOXSSA A+CY APTMONTATIVt f ,Villa Aroma Sic a Cochabamba A an Santa Cru Chra 'a .. . Wzque' Huonuni Oru totov# -S#y!o Vein Molilloned Baquedano Antofagasta EI BBo~ogluete 24- l" Huanchaca Boyube yuni z ' \~ Yflta Montes ' PZd - _ / Tama Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007400180001-0 12 Dec 63 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map ~i~i/i/i/i/i~i~i~~~~~aa~aaj~~~~~a~.?????~????????~???~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~j 25X1 Approved For R lease 2003/05/16 :CIA-RDP79T 09757400180001-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 12 December 1963 DAILY BRIEF Bolivia, President Paz Estenssoro has very little room left to maneuver in the current crisis. 25X1 Paz told the US ambassador on 10 December that if he bowed to Vice President Lechin and the miners and.. releases the jailed Communist labor. lead- ers, he would suffer a serious political defeat. The military, who would be incensed by such action, might stage a coup despite their strong support for consti- tutional processes. A direct military attack against the Catavi-Siglo Veinte mining area might well result in the death of the hostages, and spark an intense wave of sentiment against Paz. Nevertheless, the President told the ambassador that his eventual decision must be to attack in force or else turn the country over to leftist- extremist control. ber calling on the miners to release the hostages in *Although Paz believes military action will be extremely unpopular, the minister of government has told the ambassador he thinks Paz will lose mass support if the regime does not act vigorously during the next few days. According to press reports, the minister of defense issued an ultimatum on 11 Decem- 48 hours or face military action. 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO07400180001-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO07400180001-0 ---------- NO :I -------- 25X1 Approved For e ease 2003/05/16 - c1A_ nP7QTn RnP7QTn Q75 7400180001-0 25X1 ffin Czechoslovak regim. Czechos lovakia:t lRe cent unusual exchanges of high-level Soviet and Czechoslovak party-govern- ment delegations suggest that a major crisis, in which the USSR is involved., has developed in the - houah the exact nature of this crisis is not U4 clear, it could revolve around Czechoslovak leader Novotny's increasinonability to control dissident elements of his partl scow probably is seriously disturbed by poliffboal instability in Prague, which has become increasingly evident as a result of Novotny's inept handling of de-Stalinization this year. I I 25X1 I powerful liberal elements in the Czechos lovA party will be satis - fied only by Novotny's oust-V 1~~& of these problemil 25X1 zechoslovakia, once the model satellite, has b 119aced with serious economic problems which een have contributed to popular dissatisfaction with Novotny's regime. Moscow may also be concerned with Czechoslovakia's inability or unwillingness to meet its economic commitments to the bloc because 12 Dec 63 DAILY BRIEF Ell so 11 Approved For Rele iiii! 503/05/16 : C DP79TO097 A00740018 001-0 ?/ Approved For Re ease 2003/05/16. CIA-ruJr 1 I0 975A 400180001-0 0 I No A South Vietnam: if. he new government has made little progress in establishing basic policies or de- veloping new programs, and many of the key paci- fication operations pushed by the former regime 41 have virtually ground to a ha"I impac Pacification concepts are being restudied and key administrators at provincial and district levels are being replaced. Government leaders expect the consolidation phase to be completed this month. They hope to move ahead with new plans after the first of the year and to produce some early military results which would. have a favorable psychological A decline in Communist guerrilla activity to rilla offensive last month near-normal levels has somewhat offset the gov- ernment's loss of momentum. It is apparent, how- ever, that the government suffered significant set- backs in some areas dur_Wg the intensified guer- For example, in Long An Province, near Saigon, the Viet Cong eliminated. a number of strategic ham- lets, thus extending their influence and physical control in rural districts. Government forces are responding to pressure in this province by emphasiz- ing small-unit actions and undertaking a program to General T)nn min- of ~~vnc?.ititre onHnn ft accordin g ister of defense 12 Dec 63 RMMMM~~ 007400180001-0 25X1 j Approved For Re ase 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00 75AT400180001-0 j j j j j j j j 25X1 Indonesia: Two cabinet appointments announced this week increase Communist influence in Presi- dent Sukarno's government. The new minister of justice has followed the Communist line and received Communist support since 1955, although he may not be a party member. The Justice Ministry is responsible for administer- ing the courts, but does not control the police. Also, a newly created post--minister of state, as- signed to three vice prime ministers--has been given to an official of two Communist-dominated political organizations. The appointments appear to offer the Commu- nists their first opportunity for direct influence within the cabinet, and indicate a further erosion of army influence with Sukarno. Previously the cabinet contained only two Communists who held titular ministerial rank by virtue of their legisla- tive posts. The appointments, however, apparently have been made in the context of Sukarno's policy of bal- ancing the non-Communist army against the Com- munist Party as the means of maintaining his own pre-eminent pgi;J1tio_n_F on 0 11 M U 12 Dec 63 DAILY BRIEF 6 Approved For Rel ase 2003/05/16 ? CIA-RDP79T0097 A007400180001-0 25X1 I 0 SEN. Honduras:I[A leftist campaign to undermine political cooperation between the military govern- ment and the moderate leaders of ousted President Ramon Villeda Morales' Liberal Party appears to be under way? Lihis move was precipitated by the decision of the eral Party leadership to participate in the commission drawing up a new electoral law as the first step toward reinstituting constitutional gov- ernment. Minority elements of the party oppose this decision. The pro-Communist daily, which has the widest circulation of any paper Honduras, has already called these leaders "traitors 4 (A terrorist group, identified by the letters and. allegedly composed. of Communists and extreme leftist Liberals, has been organized to resist the military government. It claims to be the "organized vanguard of the national liberation forces" and seeks the support of all groups fight- ing the "military tyranny." It may have been be- hind the brief armed seizure of the radio station in Tegucigalpa on 10 Decembe Ehe military probably can contain any minor 25X1 outbreaks of terrorism, but a potential threat is preseA-F-- 12 Dec 63 DAILY BRIEF 11 so 0 A r^11nel n nn-lingpir, m F97r_=U7QTnnQ7 Ann7AnniR nni-n 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO07400180001-0 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO07400180001-0 Approved F THE PRESIDENT Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Commander in Chief, Atlantic The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved for Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00740p180001-0 25X1 czxx- 14 LZI 0 0 ~Z/ I X~~/ ~~~Xxxo k*+ * *' /-/xxx/xxZ /Xxx/ 0 XOXXX/~~ Approved F r elease Q16R!~0975A007400180001-0 Approved For Releas~/1temnyr 00975AO07400180001