CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A007400280001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 24, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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24 December 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
III
2. Brazil-Cuba: Goulart opposes collective OAS ac-
tion against Cuba. - (Page 2)
3. Dominican Republic: A move by the triumvirate
to replace the cabinet could bring a political show-
down. (Page 3)
5. Morocco: Hassan renews pressure for Western
arms. (Page 5)
6. USSR--Resource Allocation. The 1964-65 econom-
ic plan. (Page 6)
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Brazil-Cuba: (Pesident Goulart is strongly op-
posed to any collective action against Cuba by the
OAS in connection wii the recent discovery of Cu-
ban arms in VenezuelA1
1Goulart has suggested to Ambassador Gordon
that a Cuban problem could best be handled by a
bilateral arrangement between the US and Venezuela,
thereby avoiding OAS action. He indicated that while
Brazil would. respect its treaty obligations --includ-
ing the implementation of sanctions voted by the OAS
--he regards compulsory sanctions as "most unde-
sirable _'
arlier statements by Goulart and his foreign
minibfer reflected uncertainty on what position Bra-
zil would take should the matter come to a vote in
the OAS. It is clear from these, however, that Bra-
zil would be unwilling to engage in, or support the
use of, armed action against the Castro regime.
Nor is it likely that Brazil will actively support a
move to break relations with Havana
In his conversation with Ambassador Gordon,
Goulart attempted to justify his comments by citing
a message which he said he received from Khru-
shchev concerning Cuba. According to Goulart,
Khrushchev stated that the USSR had no desire for
trouble in Cuba but could not fail to honor its com-
mitments if Cuba were attacked,
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Dominican Republic:1 A political showdown may
be shaping up over the ruling triumvirate's right to
replace the prQgWt party-based cabinet with one of
its own choosing.
(I The triumvirate is allegedly planning to call for
the te-'signation of the present cabinet, made up of
representatives of six minority parties, in order to
choose a more independent group. The junta and
other politically influential Dominicans believe such
a change is essential if the regime is to be freed from
the partisan-4ower struggles which have hampered
its operationAl
10
h a showdown, the triumvirate appears likely
to have the support of the armed forces. Also, the
National Civic Union, the only sizable party in the
present coalition, favors a cabinet shake-up. Sev-
eral of the smaller parties, which are loath to give
up their recently acquired patronage, can be x ted,
however, to put up stiff resistance to any change.
ME
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Morocco: 1~w orocco is renewing pressure on j
Western gover ents to supply significant quantities
of arm
y
J
-20 December King Hassan advised British,
FrdWch, Spanish, and American diplomats that the
USSR was willing to provide substantial quantities
of armor and artillery. He stated that this was
covered by a protocol signed some time ago, and
claimed this officers were pressing him to ac-
cept deliver
Ever since the border clashes with Algeria in
ea 1V October, Moroccan leaders have sought new
Western arms commitments to offset the heavy equip-
ment Egypt, Cuba, and the USSR have supplied to
Algeria. Although shipment of Western light weapons
and ammunition under earlier agreements has been
speeded up, the Moroccans have expressed sire
to obtain aircraft, tanks, and artillery as well
Hassan's uneasiness may have been deepened by
Alg ia's alleged refusal last week to receive a new
Moroccan ambassador, contrary to a recent commit-
ment. Meanwhile, little concrete progress has been
made toward implementing the conciliation procedures
agreed to at Bamako and later formalized at a special
meeting of the Or ization of African Unity at Ad '
Ababa in Novembe
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producing for the military would continue to do so
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USSR--Resource Allocation: Data in the 1964-
65 economic
Khrushchev's creleased on 17 hemical program will imply
have a
limited but significant effect on some aspects of the j
military hardware program during the next two years. j
If the plan is implemented as scheduled, the ab-
solute available the
military establishment in each of the next two years
j
will increase--as it has in each of the last five years--
but the sizes of these increases reverse j trend
in that they will be smaller than in the past the
several j
years. j
In percentage terms the share of the total indus-
trial pie going to the military is apparently scheduled j
to stabilize. In the has been allocated a last
bigger slice of a bigger pie of
total current aeffo is tou obtain each year. Moreover, unless
greatly increased quantities
of industrial imports for purposes such as the chem-
ical program succeed, the military share of the total j
pie may fall slightly, j
Even under this last condition, it seems likely
that the programs for advanced weapons and space
would continue to grow rapidly, presumably at the
expense of the more conventional military programs.
Little if any direct transfer
from support of hemi military to thel resources
chemical program j
would be needed--that is, industrial facilities now
j
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 Approved For R4
THE PRESIDENT
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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