CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A007400530001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 24, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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24 January 1964
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State Dept. review completed. On file USAID release instructions apply.
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Excluded from automatic
/ downgrading and
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CONTENTS
1. Panama: Chiari government worried that Alli-
ance for Progress contracts may lapse.
(Page 1)
2. Cyprus: Situation remains explosive. (Page 2)
3. USSR-Cuba: New sugar arrangement appears
advantageous to both sides. (Page 4)
4. Tanganyika: President Nyerere's prestige
dimmed by his role during the army mutiny.
(Page 5)
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5. Bolivia: Vice President and air force com-
mander may be planning a coup. (Page 6)
6. Belgium-Congo: Belgium's program to train
the Congo Army is not yet off the ground.
(Page 7)
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7. Notes: Spain-Cuba; Algeria- Morocco; Cey-
lon; Guatemala; Libya. (Page 8)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 January 1964
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*Panama: The Chiari government may carry out
its threat to accuse the US of economic, as well as
physical, aggression if Alliance for Progress con-
tracts are allowed to lapse. 0
OAS Ambassador Moreno is preparing to make %
such a move in the OAS, according to a Panama City 0
broadcast. The Panamanian Minister of Public Works j
recently told the acting director of AID that his gov-
ernment considers the Alliance agreements not sub-
ject to cancellation or suspension, despite the break
in diplomatic relations.
The extent of Panama's. economic difficulties are
increasing, The local manager of an American bank.
said on 22 January that five million dollars in foreign 0
deposits had been withdrawn from his institution alone
since the crisis started.
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Cyprus: (the situation on Cyprus continues to
deteriorate
he bomb explosions yesterday in Nicosia will
greatly inflame passions and increase the danger of
a general breakdown in security. The attack on one
of the most prominent Turkish Cypriot mosques may
incite the Turkish Cypriots to retaliatory forays
against the Greek communityn
ritish authorities on the island say that media-
tion etween the Greek and Turkish Cypriots is be-
coming increasingly difficult. Both sides are report-
edly stepping up their efforts to acquire armn
CA Greek Cypriot estimates that 20,000 shotguns
are now in the hands of Greek Cypriots who are not
controlled by the community's leadership. The use
of locally manufactured ammunition makes these
weapons particularly lethal
(George Grivas, the leader of the Greek Cypriot
underground prior to the island's independence, may
soon challenge Makarios' leadership. Grivas, who
is living in Athens, has invited 150 Greek Cypriots
to meet him there today to discuss how to deal with
the crisis, Makarios has publicly denounced Grivas'
action
'ithin the Turkish Cypriot community, Vice
President Kuchuk appears to be losing control to a
committee of irregulars. The Turkish Cypriots say
they cannot vouch for the safety of Greek Cypriots
who enter the Turkish sector of Nicosia, and reportedly
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Rare using force to keep members of their own com-
unity from leaving the Turkish secto
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1ith the London conference near a deadlock,
both Greek and Turkish leaders appear to be look-
ing to NATO for possible assistance in restoring
order to the island. It seems doubtful at this point,
however, that Makarios, who shows every intention
of taking fl j%issue to the UN, would accept NATO
interventional
The Greek Foreign Minister has again empha-
size to the US Ambassador the urgent necessity of
withdrawing the Greek and Turkish military contin-
gents from Cyprus. The ambassador comments
that, while the Greek military leaders appear to
realize the catastrophic consequences of war between
Greece and Turkey, they seem determined to risk it
if Turkey sends more troops to Cyprus or if the Turk- 25X1
ish contingent esentl on the island attacks the
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USSR-Cuba: The new Soviet-Cuban sugar arrange-
ment appears advantageous to both sides.
The pact ensures continued stability in economic
relations between the two countries and complements
other agreements for Soviet support of the Cuban econ-
omy.
The USSR will continue to pay a fixed price of six
cents a pound for Cuban sugar through 1970 as it has
since last year. This is considerably below current
world prices, but world prices probably will fall in the
next few years.
Soviet dollar payments for 200,000 tons of sugar
annually apparently were eliminated because of the sub-
stantial cash reserves the Cubans have built up in the
past year through exports to the West.
Cuban sugar exports to the USSR are scheduled to
increase gradually beginning in 1965 in accord with
planned production increases. Trade plans for 1964
suggest Cuba will ship little more than a million tons
of sugar to the USSR- -approximately the same as in
1963. Thus the agreement is designed to enable Havana
to continue exporting sugar to Western markets. This
will again allow Cuba to profit from high world sugar
prices and to continue to eand its trade with the West.
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Tanganyika: President Nyerere's role during the
army mutiny this week has dimmed his prestige and
casts doubt on his future influence.
I.
Nyerere's description of the week's events to the
US Ambassador left unanswered several questions con-
cerning the part he played in the crisis. Nyerere did
not account for his whereabouts while the mutiny was
under way on 20 January, nor did he explain why he
did not resume his presidential functions for at least
24 hours after the mutineers had returned to their
barracks.
In contrast, the key part played by Oscar Kambona,
the rabidly nationalist Minister of External Affairs and
Defense, is evident. Kambona quickly granted the mu-
tineers' demands to expel all British officers--a move
he had considered necessary, but one which Nyerere
appeared to oppose--and announced the naming of new
Tanganyikan officers to top commands without Nyerere's
concurrence.
Although Nyerere insists that Kambona remained,
entirely loyal to him, Kambona may believe that he can
use the army in the future to strengthen his own power-
ful position in the government.
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Bolivia: Vice President Lechin and Air Force
Commander arrieti ps are plotting a coup, accord-
ing to President Pa
Vaz told the US Ambassador on 22 January that
his information indicated that Barrientos had issued
arms to air force troops. Paz, however, expressed
doubt that Barrientos would really act, and seemed
confident of thwarting him if he di
Paz did not disclose what evidence he had against
Lechin.
rospects are that pro- Lechinists will walk out
of the national convention of the ruling National Rev-
olutionary Movement (MNR) now in progress. They
apparently intend to form a new arty and nominate
Lechin to run for the presidency
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In the MNR convention, interest presently centers
on Ale selection of Paz' running mate. The odds are
that a "dark horse" will win the nomination. One of
these is former Vice President Nunflo Chavez, who
has a record. of maintaining ties with extme leftists,
including members of the Cuban Embassy \)
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Belgium-Congo: (LBelgium's program to train the
Congolese National Army (ANC) for relieving Unit d
Nations forces on 30 June is not yet off the groun
olonel Logiest, who heads the training mission,
states that the ANC lacks discipline, confidence, and
esprit de corps. He believes, however, that by next
June it will have a discernible chain of command and
that both its communicat' ns and logistic systems
will be greatly improved
/Logiest's judgment is that the ANC, by summer-
time, will probably be able to maintain minimum se-
curity in most areas, but that Katanga and Kasai will
continue to be particularly troublesome. He also notes
that any small, well-trained mercenary force would
be able to cut through the ANC "like a knife through
hot butter.'
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NOTES
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Spain-Cuba: Information Minister Fraga Iri-
barne has confirmed that a ships-for-sugar deal
with Cuba is going forward. He claimed the move
was in accord with Spanish opinion which strongly
favors promoting trade with Cuba, and he indicated
that Madrid would not be deterred by the prospect
of retaliation by the US. Fraga also said he and
other influential ministers are so strongly opposed
to Washington's economic policy toward Cuba that
they would resign if Franco complied with it.
Algeria- Morocco: Several difficulties prevent
restoration of full diplomatic relations between Al-
geria and Morocco, despite optimistic reports ema-
nating from last week's Arab summit conference.
Algeria insists that an exchange of ambassadors--
now pending for over two months--must wait until
Morocco proves it is treating Algerian nationals
properly. Algeria also insists that the border de-
militarization commission established in late Octo-
ber first complete its work, which has been blocked
by Rabat's refusal to withdraw its forces from the
disputed border.
Ceylon: An open split rooted in the Sino-Soviet
conflict has developed in the Ceylon Communist Party.
In a bid for party primacy, the dissident pro-Peiping
faction has styled its meeting this week in Colombo
the official "Seventh Congress" of the party. The
CCP's pro-Moscow leadership, which controls the
central committee, reportedly has been considering
convening its own long-overdue congress in April.
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Guatemala: Communist -backed revolutionaries
may be shifting emphasis from guerrilla activities to
urban terrorism, according to the US Embassy. On
21 January, they mounted their third mortar attack in
the Guatemala City area in less than a month, this time 0
firing several shells at the headquarters of a top mili-
Ell
Libya: Following a week of sporadic rioting, the
King has dismissed Premier Fikini rather than the
unpopular national police chief, who is a strong sup-
porter of the monarchy. The new Premier, Mahmud
Muntassir, held the same office following Libya's in-
dependence in 1951 and is likely to be more pro-West-
ern than his predecessor.
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Approved For
THE PRESIDENT
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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