CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A007700400001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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A
'TOP SECRET
29 June 1964
Copy No. C128
State Dept. review completed
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
'GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
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29 June 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
4.
5.
6.
1. Italy: Proponents of center-left concept expected
to try to form new coalition as quickly as possible.
(Page 1)
Tanganyika-Zanzibar: Tanganyika appears to be
taking firm action to incorporate Zanzibar into the
United Republic. (Page 7)
India: Shastri's illness may slow the pace of his
administration. (Page 8)
Notes: Panama; Syria. (Page 9)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Italy: Proponents of the center-left concept can
be expected to make an extreme effort to form a new
coalition as quickly as possible, but public confidence
is shaken and a period of indecision and political
agitation is in prospect.
President Segni reportedly is considering first
calling on Aldo Moro to try to reconstitute a center-
left coalition. He apparently reasons that since none
of the responsible leaders within the Moro govern-
they should be given a chance to patch together a
viable government.
It seems unlikely, however, that a simple re-
construction of the old coalition will be possible.
Some reshuffling of cabinet posts would, be almost
certain, and some rephrasing of party commitments
will be essential. Vice Premier Nenni, for example,
is reportedly anxious to return to active leadership
of the Socialist Party, and rebellious wings of both
the Socialist and the Christian Democratic parties
will have to be reckoned with. In view of the crisis
the Christian Democratic national congress, which
had been scheduled for I July, has been postponed.
If Moro fails to re-establish a coalition, Segni
ment desired or were prepared for what happened
11- _- -A "AA%'n'.L'LV'.L %~JLIJL 10111MUL "4~L11uu.L - auu
leader, P"
erhaps Interior Minister Emilio Taviani,
with the same objective. If all efforts to reconstitute
a center-left coalition fail, an all - Christian Dem-
ocratic caretaker government is probably in prospect.
(continued)
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Partly because of the extent to which current
leaders are committed to the center-left concept and
partly because of the prospect of Communist electoral
gains, every effort will probably be made to reach an
accommodation short of elections.
extremists can be expected to increase their ef-
forts to promote political instability. Just before the
fall of the government, neo-Fascists, some Liberals,
Monarchists, and other rightists had reportedly been
organizing a "national demonstration" in the hope of
provoking a counter-demonstration from the Commu-
nists. The intention would then be to stimulate a
political shift to the right in reaction to a real or
alleged Communist danger. I
Communist Party chief Togliatti has reportedly
ordered his followers to campaign for a "new policy
and a new majority:' The Communist-led General
Labor Confederation will almost certainly foment
new strikes, which could lead to violence.
I
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Tanganyika- Zanzibar: Tanganyika appears finally
to be taking firm action to incorporate Zanzibar into
the two-month-old United Republic.
Dar-es-Salaam announced on 25 June that all dip-
lomatic missions in Zanzibar- -presumably including
the East German Embassy--are to be reduced to con-
sular level after 1 July. The same day Kambona, em-
phasizing that he was acting as the United Republic's
foreign minister, visited Zanzibar and installed an able
Tanganyikan in the job that pro- Communist Babu- -
still referring to himself as Zanzibar?s foreign min-
ister--had been filling.
Earlier last week, while four of Zanzibar's most
ardent pro-Communist leaders were absent, another
tough, able Tanganyikan took up a ministerial post
close to impressionable Vice President Karume. At
the same time, some fifteen Tanganyikan officials
began merger talks with their colleagues in various
Zanzibar ministries and the security forces.
Karume has removed two of the three pro-Com-
munist commissioners on Pemba Island following com-
plaints about their brutal tactics, and a number of po-
litical prisoners on Zanzibar have been released.
President Nyerere has told the West German am-
bassador in Dar-es-Salaam that reduction of the East
German Embassy in Zanzibar to a consulate was "the
limit of his ability" Nyerere, who pointed out that he
had "inherited" this embassy and was not in a position
"to solve the German problem," promised that the
East Germans would not be admitted to Tanganyik3J
Although West Germany would prefer to see East Ger-
many represented by nothing higher than a trade mis-
sion, Bonn may find a way to accept Nyerere's formula.
log
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 mentous transfer of power from Nehru
*India: LPrime Minister Shastrils illness--de-
scri6e-dmerely as "exhaustion" requiring a period
of complete rest- -introduces uncertainties at a
time when the air has. barely cleared f roln the mo-
MEN
El
sox/
0
Eit seems likely that the pace of his administra-
tion, rather than the administration itself, will be
the major immediate casualty. There is also a good
chance that he will be forced to cancel his planned
departure for London on 5 July for the Commonwealth
Prime Afinisters' Conference. This meeting was to
provide the first opportunity since Nehru's death for
Shastri and Pakistan's Ayub Ehan to take their prom-
ised '7resh look" at Kashmir and the other problems
which havp,4ong poisoned relations between their
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NOTES
?yKj,~L: The generally unpopular Syrian Baath
regime is apparently attempting to broaden its po-
litical base and rally wider public support. Former
political leaders have been released from the "civil
isolation" imposed on them after the Baath seized
power a year ago, many political detainees have
been released from prison, and discussions are now
in progress concerning the formation of some sort
of limited "national front" government. It is unlikely,
how-ever, that the Baathists will allow non-Baathist
elements any meaningful role in the government.
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Panama: Extremist elements may try to convert
student "sovereignty" demonstrations on 3-4 July
into a march into the Canal Zone. Non-Communist
students oppose the idea but may not be able to pre-
vent such a march as part of demonstrations to be
held at the secondary school at the Canal Zone bor-
der where the flag march of 9 January originated.
The Panamanian Government will try to avert vio-
lence during current economic and diplomatic dis-
cussions with the US, but pro-Communist elements
will keep up their pressur*e on the weak Chiari ad-
ministration duri a its remaininO, three months in
off iii:i
29 June 64 DAILY BRIEF
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S Nw~
THE PRESIDENT
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
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The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
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