CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A007900260001-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 19, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 1, 1964
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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TOP SECRET 1 October 1964
25X1
I
Copy No. C
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed.
EXCLUDED FROM A TOMATIC DDWNCRADING np F
AND DECLA IFICAT~DN For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO4730026 0'1 R ET
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HEN MIJIJIVVCU Ti, RCICQJC LVVJ/V4/ I 1 VIM-RL/r/.71 VV.7/JMVV/L7VVLVVVV 1 .I 25X1
1 October 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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1. South Vietnam: Khanh resumes purge of con-
. troversial elements in his regime. (Page 1)
Laos: Prospects for successful negotiations
among Laotian factions dimmer than ever.
(Page 3)
4. Cyprus: Cypriots sign economic and military
aid agreement with USSR. (Page 4)
5. Libya: Death of chief of security forces may
further undermine stability of regime. (Page 5)
6. French Africa - Communist China: Several of
the moderate French-speaking states moving
toward closer ties with Peiping. (Page 6)
7. Belgium-Congo: Brussels appears to be taking
greater initiative on internal security matters.,
(Page 7)
8. Ecuador: Political stability may be threatened
by resurgence of regionalism. (Page 8)
9. Notes: NATO-Malta. (Page 9)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1 October 1964
DAILY BRIEF
*South Vietnam: Premier Khanh has resumed the
purge of controversial elements in his regime.
General Khiem, a member of the ruling military
triumvirate, will soon leave for what may be a pro-
tracted. tour of European countries, ostensibly to ex-
press Vietnam's gratitude for their aid. Colonel
Pham Ngoc Thao, an inveterate coup plotter, is also
slated for early departure. He is to be assigned to
the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington.
Both of these officers have been reported to be
targets of the group of young generals who won a
commanding position for themselves in the military
establishment by suppressing the 13 September coup
attempt.
In another personnel change, Khanh has accepted
the long-pending resignation of Deputy Premier Gen-
eral Do Mau, reassigning him to the Defense Ministry.
Yesterday, the young generals issued a commu-
nique reaffirming their support for Khanh, possibly
as their part of a bargain struck with him regarding
these and perhaps other personnel changes.
If Khanh can make his moves against Khiem,
Thao and others stick, he may have bought enough
time to carry out his plan to return the government
to predominantly civilian control.
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\`N
MIMM"M
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LAOS
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6409304
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Laos: Prospects for successful negotiations
among the Laotian factions are dimmer than ever.
[Premier Souvanna has told the US ambassador
he is convinced that the Pathet Lao plan to launch
a "major offensive" this month. Souvanna repeat-
edly emphasized the necessity of doing "everything
possible" to interdict Communist supply routes into
Laos from North Vietnam. He announced yesterday
that he is withdrawing the Laotian ambassador from
Hanoi
The Pathet Lao jls j appear to be losing hope
of gaining anything through negotiations. Prince
Souphannouvong, protesting continuing rightist mil-
itary attacks, last week warned that his forces in-
tended to retake lost territory by force if necessary.
Government forces, nevertheless, are still
pressing the Communists in northern Laos. South-
east of the Plaine des Jarres, rightist forces are
consolidating their hold over the recently captured
villages of Tha Thom and Ban Ta Viang. In the hills
east of the Plaine, Meo guerrilla units are moving
against a number of Communist strongpoints lost
to the Pathet Lao earlier this year.
To the west, rightist and neutralist forces are
continuing mop-up operations against Pathet Lao
forces in the Vang Vieng - Muong Kassy region.
In this area several hundred Pathet Lao troops, suf- .
fering from shortages of military and food supplies,
have gone over to government forces during the past
few weeks.
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Cyprus: The Cypriots have announced the sign-
ing of an economic and military aid agreement with
the USSR.
Greek Cypriot Commerce Minister Araouzos
admitted to Western press representatives in Mos-
cow
yesterday that an agreement had been signed,
but refused to give details. No comment on the
terms is as yet available from Soviet officials.
In Cyprus, the question of Turkish troop rota
-
tion may soon lead to a new crisis. Although an
agreement on this issue seemed to have been reached
last week, Makarios has posed new conditions which
Turkish officials say are unacceptable. Makarios
wants the Turkish troops and armed Turkish Cypriots
to withdraw from positions along the Nicosia-Kyrenia
road which they have occupied. since the fighting be
gan on the island last December.
]
A Turkish Foreign Ministry official believes
that if a solution is not reached. by early next week
at the latest, Prime Minister Inonu will announce
that his government will carry out the rotation with-
in a day or two thereafter. The Turkish armed
forces are in a somewhat relaxed, alert, but they
could. probably reach a state of immediate readiness 25X1
in less than three days.
IMMIN
IMMININ,
1 Oct 6A DAILY BRIEF 4
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Wz:
Libya: The sudden death of the chief of the Lib-
van security forces may further undermine the sta-
bilitY of the regime.
Although General Bu Quwaitin was generally un-
popular, his firm hand has been a major factor in
maintaining order in the country. King Idris also
.10 frequently relied on him to carry out royal policies.
The general's death may encourage antigovernment
elements to adopt bolder tactics in opposing Libya's
U
conservative oligarchy. The public currently is disturbed by repressive
government actions in connection with parliamentary
elections to be held on 10 October. The regime last 25X1
week arrested a large number of pro-Egyptian per-
sonalities who were potential opposition candidates. \\~
Although most of those arrested are now reported to
have been released, serious demonstrations are
still a possibility.
1 Oct 64 DAILY BRIEF 5
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PORT.OUIPW VOLTA ;'
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AFRICA
Capitals visited by Chinese
Communist delegation
Moderate former French
territories below
the Sahara
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SOUTH AFRICA I
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CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
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French Africa - Communist China: Several of
the moderate French-speaking African states which
have supported Taipei are moving toward Peiping.
Established leaders in these states are under
rising pressure from nationalist and leftist elements
critical of their regimes' close ties with France.
At the same time,. they are increasingly concerned
to find new sources of aid to supplement diminish-
ing French assistance. In this situation, Chinese
Communist economic inducements have exercised
a strong attraction.
The governments of the Central African Republic,
Dahomey, and Cameroon recently have engaged a
Chinese Communist "good-will" delegation in serious
talks aimed at "developing relations:' Each now ap-
pears to be preparing to recognize Communist China.
Recognition is the only condition attached to Peiping's
aid offer, according to President Dacko of the Cen-
tral African Republic.
Almost all the French African moderates have
long favored a "two Chinas" policy. Dominant
leaders of the three states are reluctant to break
with Taipei, but they are unlikely to be able to hold
this line very long. Senegal recently severed its
diplomatic ties with Nationalist China possibly in
part because of economic offers from Peiping, al-
Communist China
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though Dakar has not yet established relations with
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Belgium-Congo: Belgium appears to be taking
greater initiative on internal security matters in
that part of the Congo not under rebel control.
Colonel Logiest, Belgium's military coordinator
in the Congo, told Ambassador Godley on 29 Septem-
ber that he had assigned experienced Belgian mili-
tary officers and a group of Congolese commissioned
and noncommissioned officers trained in Belgium to
one battalion of gendarmerie in Leopoldville. Organ-
ization of a similar battalion for Coquilhatville has
been started., and twelve in all are planned.
Another plan approved in principle by Belgium
would send small teams of Belgians to provide basic
administrative services in some towns recaptured
from the rebels.
The Belgian Government may now believe that
it will receive more domestic support than hereto-
fore for direct Belgian assistance to the Congolese
Government. Belgian financial and business leaders
with interests in the Congo recently told Spaak they
now realize that the rebels' prospects are poor. 25X1
They conclude, therefore, that they must work with
and support the Tshomb6 government.
1 Oct 64
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Ecuador: CThe governing military junta is facing
a serious resurgence of regionalism in Guayaquil
which may threaten political stability)
CA propaganda campaign, mounted by the coastal
oligarchy against government reforms aimed at
centralization of tax collections, has succeeded in
arousing traditional regional loyalties of the masses.
A demonstration involving about 200 youths was
broken up on 28 September by military forces using
tear gas. Opposition groups hope to exploit this
sentiment by promoting disturbances and even vio-
lence on 9 October when Guayaquil celebrates inde-
pendence day]
The local military authorities appear ready to
quell disturbances and a leader of the Concentration
of Popular Forces, whose party is probably the
strongest in Guayaquil, is siding with the govern-
ment. However, a government delegation which
arrived in Guayaquil on 29 September failed to ar-
rive at a solution, and yesterday the government
dismissed the president and councilmen of Guayaquil,
putting a Navy captain in charge of the city. This
action may exacerbate local feeling against the junta
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NOTES
EEMN
NATO-Malta: [Prime Minister Giorgio Borg-
Olivier has assured NATO that the headquarters of
the alliance's Mediterranean command will continue
to be accorded the same legal status it enjoyed on
Malta before the island became independent on 21 Sep-
tember. In talks with NATO Deputy Secretary Gen-
eral Roberts on 23 September, the Prime Minister
evinced genuine interest in ensuring Malta's partici-
pation in the alliance on some mutually satisfactory
basis. He said he would not want to exclude a pos- 25X1
sible application for NATO membership by Malta in
the course of future negotiations with the alliance?
1 Oct 64
DAILY BRIEF
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MINNEW
Approved Fo
THE PRESIDENT
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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TOP SECRET
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