CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A007900410001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET 19 October 1964
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
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19 October 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR: New leaders try to give business-as-usual
impression. (Page 1)
2. Communist China: World reaction to the nuclear
test. (Page 3)
3. South Vietnam: Buddhists appear restive over
Khanh's maneuvers. (Page 6)
4. Britain: Wilson government likely to give prece-
dence to consolidating its domestic position.
(Page 7)
5. Iraq-Egypt: New unified political command is
Nasir's minimum response to Iraqi pleas for im-
mediate union. (Page 8)
6. Panama: Increasing expressions of dissatisfac-
tion over relations with US. (Page 9)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 October 1964
DAILY BRIEF
USSR: The new Soviet leaders are attempting to
give the impression of business as usual, and there
have been no indications of popular unrest or disorder.
The US Embassy reports that Moscow citizens
tended to respond initially to Khrushchev's ouster in
a disinterested, almost apathetic manner. Some
people reacted with a shock of disbelief, while others
expressed skepticism about the official explanation.
A few critical comments and expressions of anxiety
were also heard..
Many people spoke favorably of Khrushchev and
lamented his removal. Criticism was directed mainly
at the way in which the ouster was effected.
Rumors of further removals persist, but there
have been no official announcements on personnel
actions since the original Brezhnev-Kosygin changes
were made.
Rumors that the editors of Pravda and Izvestia
and the head of the state radio-television committee
have been removed are probably true, however. It
is to be expected that Khrushchev's personal advisory
staff and other members of his office retinue, includ-
ing the top officials of his security detail, have also
been sacked. Higher level changes may be announced
as soon as the new leaders have had time to solidify
their position.
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The concern of the new Soviet leaders to dis-
suade the West from any attempts to exploit the
changeover in Moscow was reflected in the 17 Octo-
ber Soviet-Cuban communique on President Dorticos`
visit. The communique noted. that Cuba is still being
threatened by "aggressive actions" by US "imperialist
circles" and reaffirmed the Soviet Union's "full soli-
darity and resolute support" for the Castro regime.
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*Communist China- World reaction to Communist
China's nuclear test continues to accumulate.
The East German Communist Party's official
organ, Neues Deutschland, joined the Yugoslav govern-
ment and press in accusing China of "brusquely disre-
garding worldwide demands for non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons:' The Yugoslav Foreign Office added
that the Chinese explosion would encourage militant
anti-colonialists in the non-aligned camp. It also said
that China could not forever be excluded from disarma-
ment negotiations. The Albanian Communist Party and
press on 17 and 18 October aggressively elaborated on
earlier congratulatory comments by making clear that
China had developed nuclear weapons in order to "smash
the monopoly of the nuclear powers, destroy their weap-
ons, and defend socialism:' China's success, they
claimed, was the result of the "just Marxist-Leninist
line and leadership of the Chinese Communist Party:'
President Ho Chi Minh and the North Vietnamese
press and radio, as well as the North Korean govern-
ment and party, joined Albanian media in an aggressive
tone,, They said this "fruitful result of the line of self-
reliance.. , under the correct leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party" had struck the "imperialists and
their lackeys (with) alarm" and had held in check "the
aggressive and war schemes of the US imperialists:'
Pyongyang radio called it an "inspiration to all fighting
revolutionary peoples:" The clandestine Pathet Lao
radio said China's ability "to defend world peace against
the US imperialists" had been strengthened.
High officials of the United Kingdom, Australia,
and New Zealand commented that no foreseeable develop-
ment of nuclear capacity by the Chinese could signifi-
cantly affect the balance of military power in view of
the defense systems available to the Western Alliance.
In France, scientists called the explosion "rather rudi-
mentary." Germany's former chancellor Adenauer and
Australia's Minister of External Affairs, however, both
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indicated that Peiping would attempt to increase its
influence in Asia. The London Times, as well as
official circles in Canada and Scandinavia, felt Com-munist China might be more subject to world opinion
if it were a member of the United Nations.
Turkey and Greece were preoccupied with
Khrushchev's ouster. Pro-government papers in
Greece downplayed the significance of China's experi-
ment. One Greek opposition paper felt China's feat
would impress the Afro-Asian nations. Egypt has not
commented as yet on the Chinese nuclear test.
The Government of India, while minimizing the
significance of the Chinese blast, was seriously con-
cerned over its effect on New Delhi's relations with
Moscow and Peiping. It was attempting to ensure
that friendly relations with the USSR would continue.
The Indian Communist Party (not contradicted by its
pro-Chinese wing) condemned Peiping, charging it
with pursuing "expansionist aims." The Pakistani
radio, however, stressed China's efforts to ban and
destroy nuclear weapons and noted that China could
not remain idle in the face of the American nuclear
threat.
Indonesian Coordinator Minister for Public Rela-
tions, Abdulgani, said that the Chinese blast was an
open announcement that Asians have capabilities equal
to those of Western nations and that the "West can no
longer encircle the peoples of Asia and Africa.' The
Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party said
China's and Asia's prestige had been greatly raised.
The Cambodian Government claimed that China's "vic-
tory is also the victory of all Asian, African, and
Latin American peoples, victims of the contempt and
chauvinism of the imperialists and colonialists.' The
Malaysian press feared Indonesia would now step up
its aggressive actions. Taipei called the nuclear test
a "propaganda stunt," and South Korea minimized its
importance. Some Thai newspapers followed suit.
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Following the Japanese government's official protest,
non-Communist Japanese political parties and labor
organizations also sent cables of protest to Peiping.
The Premiers of Uganda and Somalia condemned
China's nuclear test as contrary to the policies of the
African states and to the trend of the recent non-
aligned conference in Cairo. The Ghanaian Times on
17 October called the explosion a "major achievement"
in China's effort to oppose US "nuclear blackmail:'
Reaction in Latin America is still sparse, and no
official pronouncement has been made. An influential
Brazilian daily editorialized that Peiping's possession
of the atom bomb means it should be admitted to the
United Nations. A government party congressman in
Peru also said Peiping's nuclear detonation would
strengthen its claim to UN membership. A prominent
Costa Rican radio station reported the nuclear blast
as meaning that China's "hard line" would win out in
the Sino-Soviet controversy. Havana's reporting con-
tinues to be limited to replaying Radio Peiping's an-
nouncements.
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*South Vietnam: There are signs of growing
Buddhist restiveness over Premier Khanh's maneu-
vers to influence the new government.
Buddhist leader Tri Quang has told the US Em-
bassy that Khanh's recent behavior has demonstrated
the premier's inability to lead. the country. Quang
said that he would not object to Khanh's holding a
prominent but purely military role. Quang implied,
however, that if Khanh emerged as the key govern-
ment leader, he would urge Buddhists not to cooperate.
There may be growing concern in the Buddhist
hierarchy that the Viet Cong would exploit any new
Buddhist demonstrations. In the past few days, public
statements by both moderate and militant Buddhist
officials have denounced the Viet Cong for forcing
Buddhists in central Vietnam to stage "fake" demon-
strations, and have used their strongest terms to
date in warning that Buddhism is opposed to Commu-
nism.
The promulgation of a new constitution by the
Hig National Council has been postponed while the
council tries to reconcile the views of Khanh and
young military officers, on the one hand, and General
Minh and civilian leaders, on the other. Khanh told
the council on 15 October that he could not accept its
proposed draft, which gives strong powers to the
chief of state--probably Minh. Khanh warned that
the council must provide an independent role for the
military or risk a new military cou
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Britain: 'he new Labor government's need to
consolidate its domestic position during its first
months of office will almost certainly result in de-
ferment of any major foreign policy decisions for
some time
Prime Minister Wilson's first priority is the
establishment and maintenance of cohesion within
his own thinly stretched and traditionally conten-
tious party. Also, Britain faces a serious balance-
of -payments problem, and the immediate economic
situation will require the new government's full at-
tention, according to the US Embassy in London,
L Ambassador Bruce notes that Wilson is keenly
aware of the paramount necessity over the longer
run of reaching accord with the US on the general
terms of defense and foreign policy. Bruce believes
Wilson would assent to participate in the multilateral
nuclear force (MLF) only if he judges he can gain
national advantages, and then only after extensive
bargaining with the US on the whole issue of NATO
and defense.-/
Bruce believes the greatest danger to US-British
accord on the MLF and subsequent questions confront-
ing the alliance is Wilson's belief that he can bargain
with the Soviets more successfully than can other
Western leaders. He may hope to obtain a spectac-
ular Soviet offer on disarmament in return for per-
suading the US to abandon the MLF. A lesser danger
could be his high expectations in regard to the quid
pro quo he might get from the US in return for re-
nouncing Britain's independent deterrent.R7
LBruce considers that Wilson's high opinion of his
own negotiating ability is largely justified, and that he
will be fully in charge of his government, leaving his
foreign and defense ministers very much in his shadow.
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Iraq-Egypt: The decision to establish a unified
Egyptian-Iraqi political command as a step toward
full union of the two countries amounts to the mini-
mum Egyptian response to Iraqi pleas for immediate
union.
Members of the "joint presidential council" set
up last summer have been meeting in Cairo for sev-
eral days, with Iraqi President Arif in attendance,
to discuss the unity question. A handful of pro-Nasir
Iraqi officers occupying key staff and cabinet posts
have been pushing for rapid constitutional union.
Nasir, however, distrusts Arif and almost cer-
tainly recognizes that full union would involve him in
complex and virtually insoluble Iraqi internal prob-
lems. He probably also believes that announcement
of full union would spark a violent reaction from
anti-Egyptian Iraqis.
L
has no diplomatic representation.
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diplomatic affairs for Iraq in countries where Iraq
The 16 October announcement of the new political
command is thus a sop to the Iraqi unionists. The
unified. command is to "take all practicable steps"
to achieve constitutional union within two years and
will have undefined supervisory responsibility in the
fields of foreign policy, armed forces and defense,
national security, economic planning, culture, na-
tional guidance, and. education. Egypt already handles
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Panama: Expressions of dissatisfaction over
relations with the United. States are increasing and
could. cause serious problems for the new Robles
government.
Even progovernment deputies recently joined. in
strong attacks against. the US as the National Assem-
bly passed a resolution criticizing the "unjust aggres-
sion" of US forces last January. Panamanian news
media are complaining over the apparent lack of
progress in discussions with the US over the Canal
issue. The radio station identified with defeated
presidential candidate Arnulfo Arias has several
times charged the Robles government with duping
the Panamanian public about the talks.
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THE PRESIDENT
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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