CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A007900440001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 22, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For ase 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T009754Wp7900440001-6
TOP SECRET 22'October 1964
.25X1
Copy No,. C 126
25X1
DIA and DOS
review(s) completed.
25X1
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING -
I GROUP 1 ~-~g q R ET
AND DECLAS I ppN v For Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A0 7 44
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO07900440001-6
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO07900440001-6
 0440001-6
25X1
22 October 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
25X1
1. USSR: New Soviet leaders stressing their desire
to improve relations with non-Communist world.
(Page 1)
2. Bolivia: Student riots may aggravate Paz-
Barrientos split. (Page 3)
3. UK: Tories likely to give Labor government
period of grace. (Page .4)
4. Cyprus: Makarios continuing his campaign to
reduce Greek influence. (Page 5)
6. Mozambique: Recent guerrilla efforts may be
start of long-term campaign against Portuguese
rule. (Page 7)
7. France - Common Market: De Gaulle threaten-
ing to break with EEC if Bonn does not agree to
unify grain prices. (Page 8)
8. United Nations: Majority of members evidently
favor postponing opening of General Assembly
session. (Page 9)
9. Notes: USSR;
Italy-MLF. k Page ID)
Appro d For Release 2003/04/11 CIA-RDP79T00975A00
SOMM,
\\\\\\ \\\ \ \ \\ \\ \ \ \ \ \ \
E", M
101 NNI
25X1
\\ \
 Approved Fo elease 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975 07900440001-6
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 October 1964
DAILY BRIEF
*tJSSR: The new Soviet leaders are showing con-
cern to prevent Khrushchev's downfall from damaging
Soviet relations with non-Communist governments.
At the 19 October Kremlin reception for the cos-
monauts, Brezhnev, Kosygin and other leaders sought
out Ambassador Kohler to underscore their interest
in improving US-Soviet relations. Deputy Premier
Novikov gave similar assurances to the Indian Ambas-
sador on relations with New Delhi.
A Soviet diplomat in Ottawa, stating that he was
speaking "officially," told a US official on 20 October
that the decision to oust Khrushchev was prompted
by his impulsive, erratic administration of domestic
affairs, primarily those associated with agriculture
and the decentralization of administration. The dip-
lomat asserted that foreign policy issues, including
Cuba, the struggle with China, and the disarray in
the Communist movement, did not figure in the criti-
cisms of Khrushchev. He also claimed that Soviet
military leaders were not involved in the coup and
that they had been excluded from active participation
in "civil affairs" since Marshal Zhukov's ouster in
1957.
As for de-Stalinization, the Soviet diplomat said
this policy will continue and will be less complicated
without Khrushchev who was tainted by his close re-
lationship with Stalin. A similar view was expressed
(continued)
Approved For ReiPasP 200s104111 - CIA-Rnp79T00975AOO7900440001-6
 Approved or Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007 0440001-6
M
U
by the Soviet representative to the International Atomic
Energy Agency in Vienna who, on his return from the
central committee meeting in Moscow, told the US
representative that the de-Stalinization process will
go on, "if anything faster than before."
Soviet spokesmen appear especially sensitive to
foreign speculation that Moscow may now make new
overtures to the Chinese Communists that would im-
ply reversion to a harder line toward the West. The
Soviet diplomat in Ottawa stated that Khrushchev's
departure heralds no modification in Soviet policy
toward Peiping. He claimed that Suslov has been,
and will continue, to be, the "strategist" in dealing
with Peiping. He discounted the possibility that the
USSR will inscribe the issue of Chinese representa-
tion at the forthcoming UN General Assembly. The
diplomat also said plans for both a conference of all
Communist parties and the preparatory meeting in
mid-December will go forward, despite Chinese op-
position.
Although the Chinese leaders have so far main-
tained a correct but noncommittal stance, their real
feelings toward the new Soviet regime probably were
accurately reflected by a remark by the Chinese Com-
munist ambassador in Moscow to the French minister
that Khrushchev alone was not responsible for the
deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations. Gesturing
toward the Soviet presidium members at the Kremlin
reception the ambassador said "they are all respon-
sible."!
22 Oct 64
Approved F
DAILY BRIEF 2
0440001-6 25X1
25X1
U
 \ \\ \\ \\\ \ \\\ \ ? ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ 0 0 0 0 ~ ~ o ~ 0 0 0 ~ ~ o ~ 0 0 0 0 ~ o ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ \ ~ ~ ~ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ~ ~ \ \ \ \ \ \ ~ ~ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \
Approved
*Bolivia: (information as of 0400 EDT) Student
violence has created a serious problem for the govern-
ment which may lead to a showdown between President
Paz and Vice President Barrientos.
Students rioted throughout the day and night yes-
terday in Cochabamba protesting the detention of a
student accused of anti-government activity. So far
at least two students have been killed. Well-armed
students have erected barricades in the streets and
are threatening to lynch five captured policemen.
Police reinforcements have been flown into Cocha-
bamba, but the government security forces are out-
numbered and short of anti-riot equipment. Addition-
al riots are expected to break out in La Paz and other
cities today.
The situation is also reported to be critical in
the city of Santa Cruz, some 200 miles east of
Cochabamba, where the private militias of two con-
tending political chieftains are on the verge of armed
conflict.
Barrientos flew to La Paz from Cochabamba
late yesterday to confer with Paz on the precarious
situation. Barrientos, who is engaged in a struggle
for power with Paz, has been under heavy pressure
from his military and civilian supporters to over-
throw the government. Barrientos may either resign
in an effort to create additional anti-Paz sentiment
outside the capital or attempt to force Paz into a
showdown which could lead to civil war.
22 Oct 64
DAILY BRIEF 3
Approved For RplpACp 7nns1nA111 ? rIA-PnP7gTnna7snnm9no440001-6
25X1
25)`
 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 CIA-RDP79T00975A007900 40001-6
UK: The Conservatives will probably give the
new Labor government a period of grace.
The US Embassy in London believes that it is
to the Tories' tactical advantage to give Prime Min-
ister Wilson time to organize his government and
present his program. To harass the new govern-
ment or to press for new elections would give the
appearance of irresponsibility and vindictiveness.
The Conservatives are, in any event, quite
satisfied to let Labor struggle with Britain's deep-
01 ening economic difficulties. They are confident
that over the long run, they will have ample oppor-
tunities to launch strong attacks against the govern-
ment's policies, as well as any mistakes it may make.
An all-out effort by Labor to satisfy its more
doctrinaire elements by trying to force through such
controversial parts of its domestic program as the
nationalization of steel or of development land
would greatly alter the situation. Wilson, however,
is not likely to ask for legislation which would al-
most certainly lead to the early downfall of his gov-
ernment. Indeed, he may use Britain's current eco-
nomic problems as an excuse to his party's left wing
for postponing action on drastic reforms, while not
abandoning them as long-term goals,
22 Oct 64 DAILY BRIEF 4
-s
Approved or Release -
O ~ O ~ ~ OO O O ~ 0000 ~ O OOOO ~ ~ ~ ~ O 000 ~ O ~ O O 00 O
25
25
MEM
 MEMEMMEMMEMM:
App oved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0079 0440001-6
Cyprus: President Makarios is continuing his
campaign to reduce Greek influence in Cyprus.
In a meeting on 17 October with General Grivas
and other senior Greek officers, Makarios obtained
their agreement to confine themselves strictly to
military matters, according to one of the officers.
In return, Makarios is said to have agreed to
the disarming of irregular bands of Greek Cypriots,
a long-term goal of Grivas who considers them
loyal to Makarios. Nevertheless, Makarios is un-
likely actually to permit their dissolution at a time
when his relations with Grivas and the Greek Gov-
ernment are under increasing strain.
Leftist Cypriot newspapers are trying to under-
mine Grivas by presenting the meeting as a confron-
tation in which Ma.karios reprimanded Grivas before
the other officers.
The final agreement reached yesterday on open-
ing the Nicosia-Kyrenia road should permit early
rotation of part of the Turkish Army contingent on
Cyprus. A Turkish spokesman has stated that An-
kara probably would be unwilling to countenance
further delay in rotation beyond the end of this week.
22 Oct 64 DAILY BRIEF 5
Approve or Release - 40001-6
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO07900440001-6
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO07900440001-6
 Approved or Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A00790 440001-6
Mozambique: Recent guerrilla efforts in Mo-
zambique may be the start of a long-term campaign
against Portuguese rule.
Eduardo Mondlane, head. of the main nationalist
group, the Tanganyika-based. Mozambique Libera-
tion Front (FRELIMO), claims responsibility for a
series of attacks in recent weeks on administrative
centers. communications lines, military patrols,
and vehicles.
FRELIMO's potential is enhanced by the foreign
support it receives. Tanganyika provides it with
sanctuary, military instructors. and training facil-
ities. The OAU's Liberation Committee and prob-
ably Communist China have provided funds. FRE-
LIMO claims to have 2,000 trained fighters, 150 of
whom completed a 7-month guerrilla fighting course
in Algeria last April.
The Portuguese, with some 17,000 troops in
the territory, appear in a strong position to cope
with the operations FRELIMO is now capable of con-
ducting. Nevertheless, they are sufficiently worried
over the effect on the morale of local Europeans to
be calling up Mozambique reservists and to have
cleared Africans from a belt along the Tanganyikan
border.
App WV oo'elease 2003/O MI''91A 9T00975A007900440001-6
25X
2 5Xt
 a
Approved Fo
France - Common Market: De Gaulle is threat-
ening to break up the-Common Market and disrupt
the Kennedy Round if West Germany does not agree
to unification of grain prices within the EEC.
French Information Minister Peyrefitte yester-
day quoted the French President as saying France
would leave the Common Market unless "agriculture
is organized as agreed." Peyrefitte also stated that
it would not be possible for the EEC to negotiate
successfully with the US on trade without such agree-
ment.
Shortly before Peyrefitte's statement, a ranking
French official told a US Embassy officer that the
French decision to fight for unified grain prices was
made early in September in response to farmer pres-
sures and was in effect irrevocable. The embassy
believes De Gaulle will not be deterred by the pros-
pect of an open disagreement with Bonn and may in
fact have been looking for a good issue on which to
take a stand against the Germans.
De Gaulle's ultimatum confronts Erhard with a
major dilemma. The Chancellor is on record as
saying he would not let the grain-price question re-
sult in a Kennedy Round failure. On the other hand,
recent domestic political setbacks have made it very
difficult for Erhard to agree to price unification un-
til after next year's elections, and even then it may
be difficult.
In any case, it now is very doubtful that Kennedy
Round tariff bar ining can begin on 16 November as
scheduled.
22 Oct 64
Approved
Approved
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
25X1
 Approve
United Nations: A majority of UN members
evidently favor postponing the opening of the UN
General Assembly, now set for 10 November.
This is indicated. by a caucus of Latin American
delegates, who unanimously favored postponement
until 1 December, and by the action of Scandinavian
UN officials who have already asked U Thant to put
off the meeting. Sentiment for postponement stems
from uncertainties created by the emergence of new
governments in London and Moscow. In addition,
many "nonaligned" countries are unwilling to take
a position on the Article 19 financing issue which
threatens to provoke a crisis on the assembly's
opening day.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko "bluntly"
told the Indian ambassador on 19 October that Mos-
cow's position on Article 19 remains "unchanged."
This would appear to be an authoritative statement,
although a Soviet Embassy official in Ottawa has
"anticipated" that his new leaders might relax the
Soviet position "to avoid creating a threat to the
future of the UN."
25X1
Gromyko recently indicated to British Ambas-
sador Trevelyan that he intends attend the u -
coming UN General Assembly.
22 Oct 64 DAILY BRIEF 9
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007900440001-6
 MEEMEENME
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 CIA-RDP79T00975AO079 0440001-6
25X1
USSR: Preliminary data released by Moscow on
the third-quarter economic results show that the me-
diocre performance since the start of the year has
continued except for the chemical industry. The
growth rate of industrial output dropped to about 7
percent during the first nine months of 1964, com-
pared to 8, 7 percent last year at this time. Increases
in the chemical industry of 15 percent and in min-
eral fertilizer production of 28 percent continue to
be considerably higher than those in other major
sectors such as steel and iron which remain at about,
6 percent.
22 Oct 64
DAILY I3RIEF
10
25X1
 I
25X1 M
HII:i \ ~~~~~o~~~o~~~~~~0~~0~~~~0\~~ \O\\\0000\\\\O\\\~~\\\O\O\\\\\\\\\\\\\\~\\\\\\\\\
Italy--MLF: A senior official of the Italian
Foreign Ministry has expressed the view that it is
not realistic to expect Rome to sign an MLF agree-
ment by the end of the year. He indicated that the
government coalition, and particularly the Nenni
Socialists, are not prepared to take a stand on this
controversial issue until sometime after the national
municipal elections scheduled for late November.
The official did not think that refusal by the UK to
join the MLF would be an insurmountable obstacle
to Italian participation. but did not look for a decision
by the Italian Government before next spring.
Approved 1
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
25X1
11
00440001-6 9tiX1
 Approved
THE PRESIDENT
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved Fob
 Approved For Release 20D L04(11 gQPIRT00975A 7900440001-6
Approved For Release 2M"/1~5.Lot 7fT00975AO07900440001-6