CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008000170001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 21, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
State Dept. review completed
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Communist China - USSR: Peiping warns that
there can be no improvement in Sino-Soviet rela-
tions without concessions by Moscow. (Page 1)
2. Canada-UN: Ottawa tentatively has decided to
support seating Peiping in UN. (Page 3)
3. Communist China - French Africa: Several former
French African territories moving toward recog-
nition of Peiping. (Page 4)
4. Cambodia: Sihanouk again seeking international
guarantees of Cambodia's borders. (Page 5)
5. Sudan: Deadlock over composition of executive
council. (Page 6)
2
7. Panama: Communists once again exploiting Canal
M 11100 INEENEffill
issue. 8)
8. Notes: (Page Congo; India-UK; 25X1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 November 1964
DAILY BRIEF
*Communist China - USSR: Peiping's harsh edi-
torial, implicitly claiming credit for causing Khru-
shchev's downfall by its consistent opposition to his
policies, is a warning to his successors that there
can be no improvement in the Sino-Soviet relationship
without significant concessions by the Soviet Union.
Red Flag has set forth a series of demands, char-
acterizing them as Khrushchevian "mistakes," which
leaves the USSR little room for maneuver. The edi-
torial stops short of condemning the present leaders,
however, despite the fact that they have already re-
affirmed many of Khrushchev's policies as their own.
This relative restraint appears to be connected
with the problem of the preparatory meeting which
Khrushchev had called for December 15. When in
Moscow last week, Chou En-tai undoubtedly tried to
get the Soviet leaders to postpone, if not abandon,
this conference. It is possible that he was met with
equivocation, with no firm decision made one way or
the other.
In their editorial, the Chinese lay the blame wholly
on Khrushchev for ordering an "illegal" conference,
and imply that the present leaders can gracefully post-
pone a meeting by also blaming it on Khrushchev.
They make it clear, however, that such a Soviet con-
cession would be, in their view, only a first step, and
that Chinese intransigence will continue until there
has been a complete change in Soviet policy.
(continued)
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The USSR is continuing to evade establishing a
firm date for a preparatory conference leading to an
eventual world Communist meeting. Soviet Ambas-
sador Mikhailov told. the US ambassador in Djakarta
on 20 November that the CPSU "had definitely decided
to proceed with a meeting of world Communist parties,"
but he did not define what sort of meeting this was to
nor did, he mention a date for such a meeting.
*Because of the shortage of time for preparation
of this item, the analytic interpretation presented
here has been produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency without the participation of the Bureau of In-
telligence and Research, Department of State.
21 Nov 64 DAILY BRIEF 2
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Canada-UN: Ccanada tentatively has decided to
favor seating Communist China in the United Nations;,]
,The Canadians assert that such a move is now
necessary if the West is to escape being "overwhelmed"
by an unfavorable vote. They are, in fact, drafting a
resolution which would "open up" a seat for Peiping,
but at the same time protect Taiwan's future position
in the UN. Ottawa intends, however, to press this
resolution only if it seems assured of commanding
"respectable" supporj
[On Monday, the Canadians began consultations
with the Belgians and Italians on the Chinese repre-
sentation issue. Whether or not Ottawa's ideas are
adopted, any concerted initiative by the three prob-
ably would be well received. by a number of countries
in Europe and elsewhere.]
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Communist China - French Africa: More former
French territories in west and central Africa appear
to be moving toward. diplomatic recognition of Peiping.
A spokesman for Chad's President Tombalbaye
told, the US ambassador in Fort Lamy this week that
it is "possible" Chad will recognize Communist China.
The spokesman made it clear that his government,
which in common with other French protege states is
subject to increasing radical internal pressures, is
anxious to keep in step with its sister countries, es-
pecially those which are close neighbors.
According to the French ambassador to Chad,
Tombalbaye intends early next month to discuss the
China question with the presidents of the Central Afri-
can Republic (CAR), which established relations with
Peiping and broke with Taipei this fall, and of Came-
roon, which is evidently contemplating a similar move.
CAR President Dacko, however, has told the US am-
bassador in Bangui that both Chad. and Cameroon have
already decided to recognize Peiping, although prob-
ably not until sometime next year.
On 18 November, the foreign minister of Mauri-
tania, which last week established relations with North
Korea, made statements to the US ambassador which
appeared to be preparing the ground for possible early
recognition of Peiping.
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Taipei without establishing them with Peiping. 25X1
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Cambodia: Sihanouk is starting another campaign
for international guarantees of Cambodia's borders.
In a session with his advisers on 18 November,
Sihanouk said that a delegation headed by Foreign Min-
ister Sambath would, go to Peiping and Hanoi, while
another Cambodian team is being prepared for nego-
tiations in New Delhi with US representatives.
Sihanouk indicated that he intends to focus the
New Delhi talks on South Vietnam's incursions into
Cambodia, for which the Cambodians hold. the US
jointly responsible. He said that these talks had a
"one percent" chance for success.
Sihanouk was not optimistic about the prospects
for the mission to Peiping and Hanoi, either. The
object of this mission is to get North Vietnam and the
National Liberation Front to "recognize" Cambodia's
borders. He characterized. the Vietnamese Commu-
nists as "depraved" for not being more forthright on
the border issue when he was in Peiping in October.
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P1' Sudan: Communist and non-Communist elements
appear deadlocked over the composition of the new su-
preme executive council which was announced last week. The non-Communists insist on a five-man body,
made up of representatives of the traditional political
parties. The Communists are calling for either a com-
mission of three "independents," or continuation of the
present cabinet, in which they have taken a major role,
as the top executive. \\\
The moderate politicians now seem more deter-
to place limits on the Communists. In addition
mined
to trying to exclude the Communists from the execu-
tive council, the mode MINMENS
rates may also attempt to reor- ganize the cabinet so as to reduce Communist repre-
sentation.
If the moderates hold together, the Communists
to block them at this time.
probably will not be able
A likely next move for the Communists would be agi-
tation for delay of the elections scheduled for next
\\~
March, in the hope that they could gain time to develop a larger popular following. \\\
ne the moderates from another direc-
To undermine 25X1
tion, the Communists are reported to be encouraging
the southern Sudanese leaders to make unrealistic de-
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Panama: Communists are once again exploiting
the Canal issue.
The Communists, for example, are behind the
current student demonstrations demanding that the
government assume a stiffer posture on the Canal
question. The Communists are also reported to be
working with the large opposition Panamenista Party
and probably hope to spur its leader, Arnulfo Arias,
into more active efforts against the administration.
Another development is the reactivation of the
Communist-front Committee for the Defense of Na-
tional Sovereignty, which was very active in maintain-
ing anti-US sentiment after the riots in January 1964.
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NOTES
*Congo: [The main government column moving on
Stanleyville was last reported ahead of schedule and
over halfway to the rebel capital from its jump-off
point at Kindu. In an attempt to halt the column, rebel
"president" Gbenye says he has moved the American
hostages from Stanleyville pending "negotiations" which
he wants carried out under the aegis of the Organization
of African Unity's (OAU) ad hoc commission on the
to intervene
I n d i a - U K : , o f f i c i a l s an Indian Defense Minis-
ter Chavan have failed to agree on a naval aid package
for India, thereby bucking the problem to Prime Minis-
ters Wilson and Shastri who are to meet when Shastri
visits London in early December. Britain's compro-
mise offer, which went a considerable way toward
meeting India's requirements, apparently was rejected
by the Indians, who insisted stiffly that newer class
destroyers be included. Continuation of the impasse
would ultimately lead New Delhi to turn to Moscow for
naval aid. 7
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Congo. The commission has consistently sought to
advance the rebel cause. Tshomb6--who sees mili- 25X1
tary victory within his grasp--is reported. to be "fu-
rious" at the possibility of negotiations with the insur-
gents and probably will try to stall off any OAU attempts
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THE PRESIDENT
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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