CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A008100240001-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 8, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 25, 1965
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A008100240001-5.pdf1.03 MB
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J.. I LOA-1 25; January 1965 Copy No. -(y CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY 25X GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AU1OMA11CADOWNGRADING State Dept. review completed TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100240001-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100240001-5 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100240001-5 Approved For (ease 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975A0081002 40001 -5X1 25 January 1965 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. South Vietnam: Military and Buddhist intrigues evident behind Buddhist demonstrations. (Page 1) 2. France - West Germany: Erhard believes De Gaulle's attitudes have shifted on major Franco- German issues. (Page 3) 3. UK: Labor to watch closely results of three by- elections on 4 February. (Page 5) 4. Congo: Rebel activity in western regions appears to be increasing. (Page 6) 25X 6. Notes: Approved Syria. (Page 8) 00240001-5 511 =MM====MJ Approved For Rel se 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO08 00240001-5 25X1 25X1 ME. 0 ME MINO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 25 January 1965 *South Vietnam- Nilitary and Buddhist intrigues for power are evident behind the continuing wave of Buddhist demonstrations] jUeneral Kbanh and the military fear that Premier Huong's inflexibility -toward the Buddhists will lead to his downfall and replacement by anti-American ele- ments seeking to negotiate with the Viet Cong. On 24 January, Khanh told Deputy Ambassador Johnson that these fears had been conveyed to Huong and Chief of State Suu, who offered to resign and hand over power to the military, Khanh claimed the Buddhists had already agreed to support an army takeover, but one officer reportedly told Suu that the military had reconsidered their position7 I-Premier Huong denies that he has offered to re- sign. He charges that the military are exaggerating the Buddhists' strength in order to maneuver Khanh into power with Buddhist backing. He claims this could lead to a proneutralist government7 CKhanh's maneuvering is reported to have aroused considerable opposition within the military with some officers expressing the view that both Khanh and Air Force chief Ky should be removed from the scene.2 &uong believes that the Buddhist Institute has little popular backing, and that, if the military co- operate, he can use strong measures to deal with Buddhist troublemakers. Huong has again publicly (continued) 25X1 240001-5 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79TOO975AO081002 0001-5 0 0 accused the Buddhists of lending themselves to Communist purposes.) [Although there continue to be signs of rivalry between Buddhist leaders Tri Quang and Tam Chau both evidently expect their hunger strike, now in its sixth day, to lead to a military coup. Chau has long been reported in contact with General Khanh but Quang is said to feel that the Buddhists can more easily influence the "Young Turk" generals, who he thinks lack any clear political ideologO [Buddhist anti-American agitation so far seems intended to force the US to abandon support for Huong, but recent references in Buddhist propaganda to the need for peace may be more ominous. One of Tri Quang's followers recently told the US Embassy that, although.they knew Buddhism would be crushed under Communist rule, the Buddhists saw no point in continued killing on behalf of se rals and of a regime that oppressed them:7" 25 Jan 65 M M // Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975A0081 0240001-5 A France - West Germany: (Chancellor Erhard says he feels there has been a marked change in De Gaulle's attit a toward major issues in French-German rela- tion in briefing Ambassador McGhee on the Rambouillet talks, Erhard said he felt that the most striking evi- dence of change in De Gaulle's thinking was the latter's assent to having French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville join German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schro- eder in inviting the foreign ministers of the other four EEC countries to prepare for a meeting of prime min- isters on the question of European unity] [On the subject of German reunification, De Gaulle had finally agreed, according to Erhard, that a "very favorable declaration" should be made. De Gaulle did not undertake to support any precise form of a pro- posal for an initiative toward reunification. He agreed, however, to further meetings among the US, UK, France, and Germany to discuss the German proposal for a four-power council, comprising the US, UK, France, and the USSR Erhard said that during the discussions of European defense, De Gaulle showed no hostility toward the US, whose strength he conceded is basic for the defense of the West. However, De Gaulle still believed NATO must be changed and a decision made as to when nuclear weap- ons should be used. Regarding German participation in the MLF, Erhard said De Gaulle merely questioned whether Germany would be wise to join nuclear organ- izations in view of the suspicions of German intentions still existing in Eastern Europ [rx.;rhard believed it was significant that De Gaulle did not say he would "have nothing more to do with us" if Germany joined the MLF. He also thought that in the 25 Jan 65 Approved F r Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08 00240001-5 25X1 25 27: CIA-RDP79TOO975AO08100,'!40001-5 last analysis De Gaulle would "put up with the MLFII to counter the Soviet medium range ballistic missiles facing Western Europe7 ffhere have been no other indications of any change in De Gaullds view that the MLF has no place in his concept of a politically unif ied Europe based on a uni- T, A L~ 25X1 e uropean defense [- 25 11 r 25 Jan 65 4 1-00, Approved F r Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO081(0240001-5 25X Approved For Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975AO0810 240001-5 25X1 UK: he US Embassy believes that the two by- election reverses on 21 January demonstrate that the Wilson government has not yet established itself in the public's confidence] The government will watch closely the results of three by-elections which will be held on 4 February in j "safe" Conservative constituencies. Labor is not ex- pected to stage any upsets, but a good showing would indicate that the results last week were temporary aberrations which do not reflect serious disenchant- ment with the Labor government_.7 j In the meantime, with its Commons majority re- duced to three, Labor will be increasingly dependent j on the support of the Liberal parliamentary delegation. 0 The Liberals have consistently opposed such controver- sial Labor programs as steel renationalization. Al- though Wilson has indicated he intends to press on with his legislative program, he will have to proceed with caution on policies which might arouse Liberal op- position or dissent within his own party. 25 Jan 65 Approved Fo 25 Approved For Rel DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO GABON. Gambo , o :v G BRAZZAVILLE a.._.. Gemena ? 25X1 BanzyviU Aketi Lisaia_ Bumba I ama~..r / ~ '. I h"F y KI GALI Bukavu 2~ rz ind a )ROND13 .BUJUMBURA (I kKigoma Kongolo A TANZANIA ~(~` ki~rtvilie i ilw~oinvi l le ,,,;/ anono\ C~(?'r'h lc4 1111 F'H] Kc n i a IIf \tEl4Ja thvillre Watsa Apg6ojead n F6 "RI-2003/02/27 ELLIGENCE BULLETIN 24Map Approved For elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008100 40001-5 0 Congo: Rebel activity in the western Congo may be increasing. On 23 January, a rebel band, presumably from the Gamboma training base in Congo (Brazzaville), estab- lished a beachhead on the east bank of the Congo River near Bolobo. Similar raids were repulsed in late July and again last week, and government troops are re- ported to be moving successfully against the rebels in this instance. M Activity at Gamboma intensified this month after a curtailment in late 1964. The aim of this activity reportedly is the opening of a "second front" at Bolobo The rebels may hope to relieve pressure on the north- eastern Congo, where government forces plan to renew the offensive. sel unloaded six 120mm. mortars at Dar es Salaam. Rebels in Kwilu Province have rebuilt a missionary airstrip. Trenches dug earlier by the rebels have been filled in and the runway has been extended. The "Mulele rebellion" in the Kwilu region has long been handi- capped by lack of arms in quantity. An airlift to this region could probably come from Congo (Brazzaville) without Leopoldville's detecting it. In the eastern Congo, government troops destroying a large rebel camp reportedly have captured a 120mm. mortar, as well as chemicals- -apparently for making Molotov cocktails--in drums marked "Tanganyika. " Although there have been numerous reports of arms moving from Tanzania, this would be, if confirmed, the first solid evidence of the use of Soviet-manufactured 25X1 equipment in this area. On 30 October, a Soviet ves- 25 Jan 65 25X 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100240001-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08100240001-5 //////////////////// 25X1 No Approved Fo - 001-5 11 0 NOTES 25X1 25 I 25X1 USSR: The USSR, reversing"another Khrushchev policy, is now encouraging construction of private houses. On 17 January, Izvestia reported that the bank respon- sible for financing such construction had criticized three Union Republics which refused to allocate land for this purpose, and that the bank is offering credit to individ- uals for private housing and is granting loans for repair work. Under the original Seven Year Plan (1959-1965), about one third of the urban housing built in 1965 was to be private. Since 1960, however, the regime has sanc- tioned only a limited loan program, and private construc- tion, which was 33 percent of urban housing built in 1958-60, dropped to 19 percent in 1984_ yriae The s Tike by merchants in Damascus yes- terday is a defiant protest against the Baathist military regime's recent nationalization measures, A govern- ment decree that such activity "contrary to the applica- tion of socialism" can be punished by life imprisonment or death had forestalled plans for a similar demonstra- tion two weeks ago. Although security forces have arrested a large number of the strikers and apparently are in control of the situation, the Damascus strike is likely to encourage similar anti-regime demonstrations by conservative elements in other major cities. 25X 25X1 25X1 M 25 Jan 65 8 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975A0081 0240001-5 Approved For THE PRESIDENT Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Commander in Chief, Atlantic The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Administrator The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved Fort 25X1 25X1 Approved For Rele a 20TOP : ~RfT975A00400240001-5 Approved For Release 2mP 7 :5~ 975AO08100240001-5