CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008200040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 4, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
State Dept. review completed
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4 March 1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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2. France-USSR: Paris advises Moscow it is pre-
pared to explore means to end Vietnamese war
provided no prior conditions are set. (Page 3)
W
5. USSR: Government decree restores ministerial
form of organization over defense industries.
(Page 7)
p
8.
Tanzania- Germany: President Nyerere maneuver-
ing on question of relations with West and East
Germany. (Page 11)
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9. EEC: Merger of the three communities important
primarily for psychological impact and contribu-
tion to administrative efficiency. (Page 12)
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France-USSR: Caris has advised Moscow that
it is "disposed to concert" with the USSR. to explore
a means to end. the Vietnamese war if Moscow im-
poses no prior conditions to an international conference,,,7
he official French reply to Soviet Ambassador
Vinogradov's 23 February demarche to De Gaulle re-
iterated De Gaulle's statement that Paris would enter
into bilateral consultations only if the USSR would
drop its condition that any conference must be pre-
ceded. by cessation of US attacks against North Viet-
nam. The French contended that acceptance of any
preconditions for a conference would only lead to
counter conditions, thus effectively nullifying any pos-
sibility that a conference could actually be convened.
In the reply, Paris repeated its position that peace
can be re-established in Vietnam only by an interna-
tional conference based on the principles of the 1954
or 1962 Geneva agreements'
Commenting on the De Gaulle-Vinogradov meeting,
the former French ambassador to Moscow, Maurice
De Jean, stated that he assumed De Gaulle had. made
clear that the French rejection of preconditions was
directed. at the "ridiculous Chinese demand that the
US quit Southeast Asia beforehand."
4 March 65
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*USSR: The Soviet Government's decree restoring
a ministerial form of organization over its defense
industries reverses another of Khrushchev's major
reforms.
The industries involved are aviation, shipbuild-
ing, defense (largely ground armaments), radio elec-
tronics, atomic energy, and general machine building
(function unknown). These industries in recent years
had been transferred from a centralized ministerial
system of administration to a system of state com-
mittees. Khrushchev sponsored this move in order
to break up the entrenched industrial bureaucracies
in Moscow. The new decree will probably be por-
trayed as a step to improve the administration of this
key area of the economy. It does not appear to signal
an increase in the influence of the military establish-
ment.
Although the full implications of this action are
uncertain, it is presumed that these ministries will
recover the responsibilities for plant management
and control of supplies that they had lost. The re-
organization, however, does not necessarily fore-
shadow similar changes in all branches; other deci-
sions by the new regime suggest increased local
direction of consumer-oriented. industries.
Indications appeared. immediately following Khru-
shchev's ouster that changes in the administration of
industry were being discussed. Proposals for a re-
turn to a ministerial system were made in the press
in early December and the question was the subject
(continued)
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of some controversy at the session of the Supreme
Soviet later that month. The fact that a decision of -
fecting at least one major part of economic adminis-
tration has now been made might indicate that the
power balance in the leadership has begun to shift,
but it is still too early to pinpoint the personalities
in the leadership involved.
The changes have no apparegt relation to the
current international situation.
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CBecause of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency without the participation of the Bureau of intelligence and Research,
Department of State-or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense;]
4 March 65 8
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Tanzania-Germany: President Nyerere is still
maneuvering around the problem of Tanzania's rela-
tions with West and East Germany.
Earlier this week he "rejected" West German
economic aid in retaliation for Bonn's withdrawal of
its military training mission in Tanzania. Nyerere
has told a foreign journalist that he has no intention
of granting diplomatic recognition to East Germany,
but he may well permit an East German Consulate
General either in Dar es Salaam or Zanzibar.
Bonn withdrew the training mission because
Nyerere would not give assurances that the juris-
diction of the East German Consulate General would
be restricted to Zanzibar, where it was first estab-
lished as an embassy before the union of Zanzibar
with Tanganyika. Nyerere's latest argument for
Western consumption is that, having "ousted" the
West Germans, he can decide about the East Germans
without being accused of knuckling under to Bonn.
Meanwhile, rumors are floating as to who will
replace the West German military mission. Polish
and Czech officials in Tanzania reportedl have said
that they would be willing to fill the gap, he Cana-
dians, however, have stated that Tanzania has asked
them to take overjThe West German mission left
behind all its equipment, including eight aircraft
and four patrol boats,
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EEC: The 2 March agreement to merge the exec-
utives of the three European communities is important
primarily for its psychological impact and its contri-
bution to administrative efficiency.,?)
he effect of the merger is to bring under the
purview of a single commission seated in Brussels
the executive and. policy-forming prerogatives pres-
ently exercised by the EEC and EURATOM commis-
sions and the Coal-Steel Community High Authority,]
he combined. executive should have greater
prestige and. influence than its predecessors, and,
Brussels will be more firmly established as the com-
munity's administrative center. Several important
European institutions will still be housed in Luxem-
bourg, however, and as long as the European Parlia-
ment is in Strasbourg the community will be lacking
a true "capital.'
he reasons for France's recent support of a move
which enhances the Brussels "bureaucracy" are not
entirely clear. Executive merger will, however,
pave the way for consideration of combining the three
community treaties--during the course of which Paris
is expected to try to water down their supranational
features. It would, of course, require the consent of
the other five members to do this. -I
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THE PRESIDENT
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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