CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A008200430001-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 31, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 19, 1965
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A008200430001-3.pdf611 KB
Body: 
Approved Forlease 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00974&08200430001-3 25X1 TOP SECRET 19 April 1965 25X1 Copy Nog JCS and State department review(s) completed. 25X1 GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08200430001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08200430001-3 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08200430001-3 Approved F r Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200 30001-3 19 April 1965 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Vietnam: Current situation report. 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200430001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08200430001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08200430001-3 Approved CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 19 April 1965 *Vietnam: (Information as of 2400 EST, 18 April) Moscow may be setting the stage for an announcement of the dispatch of Soviet military personnel to North Vietnam. Although cautious and contingent, the Soviet pledge to send volunteers to the DRV, contained in the joint Soviet - North Vietnamese communique of 17 April, goes well beyond Brezhnev's ambiguous reference on 23 March to the readiness of Soviet citizens "to take part in" the DRV's defense. The 17 April pledge of personnel makes their dispatch contingent both upon an intensification of US military action against North Vietnam, and upon a request for Soviet volunteers from Hanoi. There is still no firm evidence of the transit or arrival i the DRV of Soviet military equipment or per- sonnel. Preliminary field analysis of 17 April photog- raphy, however, indicates continuing progress in the construction of the surface-to-air missile site southeast of Hanoi. This installation was first detected in photog- raphy of 5 April. According to analysis of the latest photography, four of the six launch positions now ap- pear to be completed. Work on the revetted central guidance facility also appears complete, but the perim- eter roads are still under construction. Following Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to the DRV in early February, both governments asserted that "regular consultations" would be held on "meas- ures which should be taken to strengthen" North Viet- namese military capabilities. The joint Soviet-DRV talks in Moscow which preceded the 17 April communi- que are the first to be publicized since Kosygin's visit. The secrecy which surrounded the talks prior to the 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08200430001-3 Approved Fo'tIease 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00908200430001-3 D ()a Nang (TOUrahe; OC NAM0Horwn Muang Ubon ~^i~Y.Nnn War akie Chamral ~.. ({ honk I oNil,ry o huoc Bin) oAn Pi1L 9pn9Cau II CORPS Loc Pht!oc Binh Thanh.ciaaNG Special Zone NghiaE)1-i' N?!i1e -a80 Dun ?. 5th Division PHNOM PENH( T9. i, A Y INH (((((~ Tay Ninh CAPITAL MILI1cAR DISTRIcT ASihanouk Ka 9th Division. I o pot Cha5, Reag Tien Long XGye KtEN. , Duong Doeg\ :Y/i-* . Cy /' O QUOCN (.y M1110 BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 'IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE AM 1) Nl^46 ao Loc o o Di Linh - t;t 0 QI~ng Ngai (a t- A N t `II . r1o Dun NI AI of BIiJH F JP.hae~ThioI huo~tBien Special Zone 3 tr Nam NOW CU Tan LAD oPhuoc ~e o n III COMPS Truc Clan A.... 8C t Sp vial 2df Di:vi'~ ion N HI N ~ 1A 1JrN ~i %v 7th Division ,Con Son (Poulo Condore) CON SON SOUTH VIETNAM MILITARY BOUNDARIES As of 8 March 1965 ammom Corps boundary Special zone boundary Division boundary Hop Tac area 46993 0 25 hu 75 100 Miles I y 1 0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers 19 Apr 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08200430001-3 Approved 25X1 communique suggests that neither government was sure at the outset whether the discussions would be successful. The communique contained the most authoritative public Soviet references to President Johnson's 7 April speech yet noted. While critical of the speech, the communique avoided the vitriolic, personal criticism of the President which appeared in earlier assessments of the speech from Hanoi and Peiping. The communique stated that it would be "useful to convene the relevant international conferences" to solve the problems of Laos and Cambodia. It thus fol- lowed up on the 8 April Soviet proposal for an imme- diate international conference on Cambodia. Hanoi and Peiping had already publicly endorsed the Cambodian appeal of 15 March for a conference. In other political developments, the Asian Commu- nists continued their efforts to line up greater Afro- Asian support on Vietnam. Over the week end, North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist delegates at the Bandung anniversary celebrations in Djakarta held a series of meetings with Sukarno, Sihanouk and several of the African leaders present for the anniversary. Hanoi and Peiping propaganda indicates that the Viet- nam situation figured prominently in these discussions. A series of Bandung anniversary fetes were also held in China over the week end. Top Peiping leaders used them as an occasion to stress the necessity of Afro- Asian support for the "Vietnamese people's struggle:' Their speeches were among the toughest yet given by Chinese officials on the Vietnam situation. They at- tempted to convey the impression that Peiping is in the vanguard in offering support to the Vietnamese. How- ever, they failed to pledge any specific action. Chi- nese politburo member Peng Chen, for example, as- serted that the Chinese were "willing to take emergency action to force the US aggressors" out of Vietnam. An- other politburo member, Teng Hsiao-ping, declared China ready to support the Vietnamese "no matter what happens and regardless of what price we must pay:' 19 Apr 65 (Continued) Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200430001-3 / / / / / / / O / / / / Approved FoIease 2003/04/11 CIA-RDP79T009708200430001-3 25X1 VIOETNHAf~ THAILAND STRIKE TARGETS 17 & 18 APRIL .1965 ^ US Target - US Armed Recce 25X1 25X1 HANOI*` Dong Thanh Bks. ~a~ Rte. 101, Rte\ 102 d o M~ LAOS 19 Apr 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map ApprdVi6d or a ease - 0 5A008200430001M3 25X1 Approvedj For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO082QO430001-3 Both Chinese leaders, however, carefully emphasized that the Vietnamese were at the "forefront" of the fight- ing. Full results of the air strikes against North Viet- nam on 17 and 18 April are not yet available. Accord- ing to preliminary information, some damage was in f licted to buildings in Mu Gia Pass on 17 April. A string of 12 boxcars on the rail line between Vinh and Dong Phuong was also attacked on the same day. Armed road reconnaissance missions conducted along Route 15 from Vinh northward during the evening of 18 April encountered several large truck convoys. Bombing runs were made against an estimated 12 to 20 truck convoy and against another convoy believed to con- tain 80 to 100 trucks. Heavy antiaircraft fire was en- countered during the latter attack. It was believed that portable antiaircraft guns were accompanying the trucks. Damage to the convoys is unknown. In South Vietnam, the pace of Communist activity remained unchanged with incidents confined mainly to harassments of government posts and hamlets, as well as to limited sabotage against road communications. Following his tour of South Vietnam's IV Corps in the delta late last week, General Westmoreland reported a marked improvement in the confidence of the three di- visional commands and a general improvement in both military and civilian morale. He was also told that more intelligence is being received from the local population, including reports of low Viet Cong morale. South Vietnam's 7th Division commander told West- moreland that some Viet Cong units were moving from his .area to III Corps, possibly to conduct operations which would force the government to bring its general reserves back to the Saigon area from II Corps, where they have scored several successes against the Viet Cong. The Buddhist Institute in Saigon is continuing its low- keyed anti-Communist campaign, and has denied exerting any pressure in the recent government suspension of two senior military officers. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08200430001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08200430001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08200430001-3 Approved F~r Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T0097541008200430001-3 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Commander in Chief, Atlantic The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Administrator The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008200430001-3 Approved For Release 2W15IRf0097^8200430001-3 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A0082D043M