CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008200430001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 19, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
TOP SECRET
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19 April 1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Vietnam: Current situation report.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 April 1965
*Vietnam: (Information as of 2400 EST, 18 April)
Moscow may be setting the stage for an announcement
of the dispatch of Soviet military personnel to North
Vietnam.
Although cautious and contingent, the Soviet pledge
to send volunteers to the DRV, contained in the joint
Soviet - North Vietnamese communique of 17 April,
goes well beyond Brezhnev's ambiguous reference on
23 March to the readiness of Soviet citizens "to take
part in" the DRV's defense. The 17 April pledge of
personnel makes their dispatch contingent both upon
an intensification of US military action against North
Vietnam, and upon a request for Soviet volunteers
from Hanoi.
There is still no firm evidence of the transit or
arrival i the DRV of Soviet military equipment or per-
sonnel. Preliminary field analysis of 17 April photog-
raphy, however, indicates continuing progress in the
construction of the surface-to-air missile site southeast
of Hanoi. This installation was first detected in photog-
raphy of 5 April. According to analysis of the latest
photography, four of the six launch positions now ap-
pear to be completed. Work on the revetted central
guidance facility also appears complete, but the perim-
eter roads are still under construction.
Following Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to the
DRV in early February, both governments asserted
that "regular consultations" would be held on "meas-
ures which should be taken to strengthen" North Viet-
namese military capabilities. The joint Soviet-DRV
talks in Moscow which preceded the 17 April communi-
que are the first to be publicized since Kosygin's visit.
The secrecy which surrounded the talks prior to the
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MILITARY BOUNDARIES
As of 8 March 1965
ammom Corps boundary
Special zone boundary
Division boundary
Hop Tac area
46993
0 25 hu 75 100 Miles
I y 1
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
19 Apr 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
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communique suggests that neither government was
sure at the outset whether the discussions would be
successful.
The communique contained the most authoritative
public Soviet references to President Johnson's 7 April
speech yet noted. While critical of the speech, the
communique avoided the vitriolic, personal criticism
of the President which appeared in earlier assessments
of the speech from Hanoi and Peiping.
The communique stated that it would be "useful to
convene the relevant international conferences" to
solve the problems of Laos and Cambodia. It thus fol-
lowed up on the 8 April Soviet proposal for an imme-
diate international conference on Cambodia. Hanoi and
Peiping had already publicly endorsed the Cambodian
appeal of 15 March for a conference.
In other political developments, the Asian Commu-
nists continued their efforts to line up greater Afro-
Asian support on Vietnam. Over the week end, North
Vietnamese and Chinese Communist delegates at the
Bandung anniversary celebrations in Djakarta held a
series of meetings with Sukarno, Sihanouk and several
of the African leaders present for the anniversary.
Hanoi and Peiping propaganda indicates that the Viet-
nam situation figured prominently in these discussions.
A series of Bandung anniversary fetes were also
held in China over the week end. Top Peiping leaders
used them as an occasion to stress the necessity of Afro-
Asian support for the "Vietnamese people's struggle:'
Their speeches were among the toughest yet given by
Chinese officials on the Vietnam situation. They at-
tempted to convey the impression that Peiping is in the
vanguard in offering support to the Vietnamese. How-
ever, they failed to pledge any specific action. Chi-
nese politburo member Peng Chen, for example, as-
serted that the Chinese were "willing to take emergency
action to force the US aggressors" out of Vietnam. An-
other politburo member, Teng Hsiao-ping, declared
China ready to support the Vietnamese "no matter what
happens and regardless of what price we must pay:'
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(Continued)
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VIOETNHAf~
THAILAND
STRIKE TARGETS
17 & 18 APRIL .1965
^ US Target
- US Armed Recce
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HANOI*`
Dong Thanh Bks.
~a~ Rte.
101,
Rte\ 102
d
o M~
LAOS
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Both Chinese leaders, however, carefully emphasized
that the Vietnamese were at the "forefront" of the fight-
ing.
Full results of the air strikes against North Viet-
nam on 17 and 18 April are not yet available. Accord-
ing to preliminary information, some damage was in
f licted to buildings in Mu Gia Pass on 17 April. A string
of 12 boxcars on the rail line between Vinh and Dong
Phuong was also attacked on the same day.
Armed road reconnaissance missions conducted
along Route 15 from Vinh northward during the evening
of 18 April encountered several large truck convoys.
Bombing runs were made against an estimated 12 to 20
truck convoy and against another convoy believed to con-
tain 80 to 100 trucks. Heavy antiaircraft fire was en-
countered during the latter attack. It was believed that
portable antiaircraft guns were accompanying the trucks.
Damage to the convoys is unknown.
In South Vietnam, the pace of Communist activity
remained unchanged with incidents confined mainly to
harassments of government posts and hamlets, as well
as to limited sabotage against road communications.
Following his tour of South Vietnam's IV Corps in
the delta late last week, General Westmoreland reported
a marked improvement in the confidence of the three di-
visional commands and a general improvement in both
military and civilian morale. He was also told that more
intelligence is being received from the local population,
including reports of low Viet Cong morale.
South Vietnam's 7th Division commander told West-
moreland that some Viet Cong units were moving from
his .area to III Corps, possibly to conduct operations
which would force the government to bring its general
reserves back to the Saigon area from II Corps, where
they have scored several successes against the Viet Cong.
The Buddhist Institute in Saigon is continuing its low-
keyed anti-Communist campaign, and has denied exerting
any pressure in the recent government suspension of two
senior military officers.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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