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December 15, 2016
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January 7, 2003
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June 12, 1965
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Approved For Rise 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A300360001-0 TOP SECRET ,_. ,(S J2 (- 25X1 DIA and DOS review(s) completed. GROUP 1 EXCLUDED AND DECLASSIFICA ION NGRADING Copy Noe, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY TOPS CRET 25X1 25X1 Approve or Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08300360001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08300360001-0 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08300360001-0 aiiiii~iaiiiii/ iaiiiiii aiaiiiaiiiiia Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00830 360001-0 25X1 25X 1 25X1 8. Notes: Chile; U (Page 11) 12 June 1965 CENTRAL ,INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 3. Uruguay: The replacement of the UN ambassador may signal a change in the role Uruguay has been playing at the UN. (Page 5) 4. Britain: Ministerial level talks on long-range de- fense commitments begin this week end. (Page 6) 25X6 6. Cyprus: The wide gap between Greece and Turkey on this issue is slowly narrowing. (Page 9) 7. Cuba: Che Guevara reportedly has been replaced as Cuba's Minister of Industries. (Page 10) Britain; Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975A0083003 0001-0 25X1 ? 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08300360001-0 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08300360001-0 ? Approved For R lease 2003/02/27 .CIA-RDP79T00975A0083003 0001-0 25X1 .0 Approved Uruguay: The expected replacement of Uruguayan UN Ambassador Velasquez may signal a change in the role Uruguay has been playing at the UN. The National Council of Government (NCG) has voted unanimously to censure Velasquez for his recent harsh attack on the US and President Johnson during the Security Council discussions on the Dominican Republic. Several NCG members have demanded that Velasquez be recalled to Montevideo. Velasquez has consistently embarrassed the US by his initiatives and attitude in the Security Council debates on the Dominican crisis. He has also irritated his Latin American colleagues by his attempts to broaden UN involvement in the Dominican Republic at the expense of the Organization of American States. According to the NCG president, he exceeded his in- structions. The NCG's action evidently stems in part from its gratitude for the prompt representations the US made to Brazil and Argentina recently after Brazilian press attacks on Uruguay. These attacks had led to Uruguayan fears that Brazil might seize on the Dominican crisis as a precedent for intervention in Uruguay. 12 June 65 Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975A0083003 /////////////////////00/O///O/O///////////////// iiiiiiaiiiaiiiiiaiiiiiiia 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00830 360001-0 j 0 j j Britain, [Ministerial-level talks to determine Britain?s long-range defense commitments begin this week end] [The first phase of the defense review probably will concentrate on saving money without cutting exist- ing commitments, These economies, as wbll as some juggling of costs within the budget, are designed in part to placate left-wing Laborites who are demanding a ten percent ($560 million) reduction in defense spend- ing, Individual decisions probably will be announced piecemeal to Parliament before the summer recess The more critical second phase will determine what British defense commitments should be in the 1970s, and what sort of forces will be needed to meet them. Key questions will be nuclear capability; NATO commitments (specifically the British Army of the Rhine); ability to maintain key overseas bases, es- pecially Aden and Singapore; the role of aircraft carriers; and aircraft requirements] The government is reported insistent that this time military strategy, based on the outcome of this review, is to determine equipment needs rather than itself be determined by the equipment available] [Extensive consultations with the US and other allies will be required before decisions on the second phase can be made. The British are pressing to have NATO count their overseas commitments as part of their contribution to over-all Western defense. They almost certainly will ask Allied and Commonwealth help in carrying this burden] Major decisions on the second phase are unlikely before late fall, in part because there may be some (continued) 12 June 6 5 6 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 ? CIA-RDP79T00975A0083003 0001-0 25X1A ////////////O///////////////////// Approved For R lease 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975A0083003 0001-0 25X1 footdragging in the Ministry of Defense. The US Embassy in London feels that some civil servants, who do not think such far-reaching decisions should be taken by a government with Labor's shaky future, may try to impede the government's efforts. 25X1 j j ON' j 12 June 65 7 0 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975A0083003 0001-0 25X1 : j Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08300360001-0 25X6 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08300360001-0 / _ Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00830036 001-0 25X1 Cyprus: Exchang'es between Greek and Turkish officials are slowly narrowing the wide gap between the two countries' positions] (Discussions are now focused on providing the Turks with territorial compensation for allowing Cyprus to unite with Greece. In agreeing to con- Sider such union--a departure from Ankara's past stand--the Turks demanded compensation equivalent to 20 percent of the island's area, either on Cyprus itself or in Greece. This 20 percent roughly corre_._ sponds.Withthe portion of the Cypriot population which 0 is Turkish] j he Greeks have offered minor border rectifications in Thrace or to lease the Turks a military base on Cyprus. j The Urguplu government, which is especially cautious in view of the imminence of national elections this fall, pre- sumably will consider this insufficient] 0 (The Greek Cypriots could still prove a stumbling block to any agreement between Athens and Ankara. They 0 adamantly oppose any territorial concession, including a leased base, in return for enosis. President Makarios 0 may be more inclined to accept the establishment of a NATO base at which Turks might be stationed. He may hold discussions with Turkish Premier Urguplu, whom he knows personally, at the upcoming Afro-Asian conference in Algiers j j j ._ DIA 25X1 f E ti j a ew gyp an I missile personnel have arrived on the island. SA-2 missile- associated equipment has been on the island for several 25X1 m n f m n th t is 1. th l thc b t there i n r a on a m s s emse es s no con u j j j A proved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975AO08300360001-0 j summer which could have increased tension between the present officials rather than hold scheduled elections this Cyprus itself remains relatively quiet. The Greek ~ Cypriots apparently will extend the terms of office of 4 communities E Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00830036 001-0 25X1 *Cuba: Che Guevara reportedly has been replaced as Cuba's Minister of Industries. Guevara will be succeeded by his deputy minister but Che's new job has not yet been announced, accord - ing to press reports from Havana. Cuba's ambassa- dor to Mexico told a group of students in Mexico City on 9 June that Guevara would shortly be given a new post in the Cuban hierarchy. Guevara has been conspicuously absent from public view since his 14 March return from a three- month tour of Africa and Communist China. His dis- appearance has produced a spate of rumors in Havana concerning his whereabouts and his relationship with Fidel Castro. The possibility that Guevara has fallen into dis- favor cannot be altogether ruled out, but it seems more likely that he will continue to play an important role in Castro's regime. Castro has mentioned Guevara's contributions to the rebel cause during the fight against Batista in two recent speeches, and ear- lier had publicly spoken highly of Guevara's talents. The Cuban ambassador in Mexico City also lauded Guevara as one of the "most famous and representa- 12 June 65 0 PIR, Approved Fo 10 Y Approved For lease 2003/02/27 - - 60001-0 25X1 I NOTES r 5X1 Britain: [Prime Minister Wilson's majority in Parliament has been temporarily reduced to one by the illness of two Labor MP's, one of whom will be sidelined for the summer. Should the Conservatives agree to provide pairs for the sick MP's it will be I further indication that Douglas-Home does not intend at this time to force Wilson to an early election. In any case the narrowness of Labor's majority could en- danger controversial sections of its vitally important finance bill) I 25X1 V VMN 12 June 65 11 j Approved Fo Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975A008300 60001-0 25X1 j j MMM ME!! 001-0 Approved For elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO083004( Chile: The majority Christian Democratic Party has joined with Communists, Socialists, and Radicals in passing a resolution in the Chamber of Deputies which condemns US policy in the Dominican Republic and asks President Frei to recognize the "legitimate constitutional government" of Colonel Caamano. Although Frei has, thus far, declined to follow the desire of much of his Christian Democratic Party for recognition of the Caamano regime because such action could isolate Chile in the OAS, this resolution could force him to reconsider. F USSR: The USSR may step up its purchases of Western industrial plants and equipment this fall, according to several Western commercial counselors in Moscow. The counselors note that there is little negotiating activity for such plants and equipment at present, but they believe this will change as Soviet import priorities are set for the next five-year plan (1966-1970). Moscow's industrial purchases fell off in the wake of the 1963 agricultural failure, which necessitated laraye grain imports,,_~ 12 June 65 `Approved For Rd THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Commander in Chief, Atlantic The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Administrator The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved For Rel 25X1 25X1 Approved For Relep?P00 /iUWP~RDP79T '0l5A008300360001 b Approved For Relerr$$034$EZRRDP79T00975AO08300360001-0