CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008600030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

? Approved FiQo~ Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T0V5A0019013er 1965
r% ED cr-7 r,QPT
25X1
25X1
Copy No. 139
JCS review(s)
completed.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED AFRO DELL AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDR79T00975AO08600030001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08600030001-3
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08600030001-3
 Annrnvnrl Gnr R Innm 9ffl If19/97 f`IA_Rr1D7QTf1f1Q7riAflflRRflflfl4 fl I_4
28 October 1965
-CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
2. Indonesia: Armed Communist activity in central
Java increasing. (Page 3)
3. Brazil: Country generally calm as President decrees
near dictatorial powers. (Page 4)
5. Notes:
25X
0 MI,
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RD 79T00975A008600030001-3
 4
Approved Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008600030001-3
M-an
Sakon Nek oe
Muang 'N
Nakhon Phanom
A I L A N D
~^ - Muang
~. (?n, Nun Warin
Chamrap
J, DEMARCATION LINE
-0Bp Ho 9y Qo{+g To
.TCO epone'.
))~n~ C)
Saravane
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTNORITATIVS
HueN
MUI DA 'SANG
Nan,(7ourane)
,Chu Lai
hu Lai U
~Quang Ngai
h'5ILrARY BOUNDARIES
I .: a ra.i ,da;y
Z'~ e UOU':'S{a'Y
Con Son (Poulo Condore)
CON SON
28 Oct 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
25X1
pproved For Release 2003/02127 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08600030001-3
 Approved For
Plpanp 200-1/02/27 - r.iA-RnP7ATflf)975Aflf)RROO
-110001--lI
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 October 1965
*Vietnam : (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)
The Military Situation in South Vietnam: A three-
pronged Viet Cong attack launched against two US Marine
installations at Da Nang and another at Chu Lai during
the night of 26-27 October was only partially successful,
but succeeded in destroying or damaging 47 aircraft.
Hardest hit was the US helicopter installation
located to the east of Da :Wang city, where 22 helicopters
were destroyed and 18 damaged by an enemy mortar
bombardment- -and possibly by hand carried explosives--
before defending forces were able to neutralize the
attack. Near the main jet air base at Da Nang, however,
an estimated company of Viet Cong attackers was routed
by US forces before an attack could be mounted.
At Chu Lai, Viet Cong forces were apparently
unable to make an effective penetration of the defensive
perimeter, although two A-4 Skyhawk aircraft were
destroyed and five damaged.
US casualties totaled three killed and 80 wounded;
Viet Cong losses were 39 killed, six wounded, and six
captured.
j
There have been no reports of heavy fighting re-
sulting from clearing operations being conducted in the
vicinity of the Special Forces camp at Plei Me during
the past 24 hours. Revised reports from US military
authorities in Saigon now place cumulative Viet Cong
losses at 316 killed (201 by body count) and 97 weapons
captured; government casualties are 111 killed (12 US),
231 wounded (5 US), and 25 missing.
In Hau Nghia Province, government troops defend-
ing an outpost at Duc Lap on 26 October beat off an attack
by Communist forces in excess of two battalions. Initial
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDR79T00975A008600030001-3
~ 25
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008600030001-3
28 Oct 65 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008600030001-3
 Approved or Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975AO086
25X1
rIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIZIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII,I
reports listed 100 Viet Cong killed (body count con-
firmed by US advisors) as opposed to government casual-
ties of 35 killed and 41 wounded (1 US).
Elsewhere, Vietnamese government forces con-
ducting a search operation in Kien Tuong Province yes-
terday discovered an extensive Viet Cong grenade factory
containing 20,000 hand grenades, 2,000 mines, 3,000
detonators, and nearly a ton of TNT.
Military Developments in North Vietnam: A US Navy
F-8E Crusader was shot down by a surface-to-air mis-
sile on 27 October. The aircraft was one of a flight of
two aircraft. The area of the shootdown was probably
about 40 miles southwest of Hanoi although the returning
pilot was unable to pinpoint his position accurately. Threi
missiles were sighted and four explosions were noted.
SAM radar (FAN SONG) signals had been noted from this
general area on 25 and 26 October. However, it is not
known whether the responsible site is a new one.
This is the sixth US aircraft lost to a surface-to-
air missile out of a total of 140 US aircraft lost to all
causes over North Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese have deployed ground control
intercept (GCI) equipment to Kep airfield for support of
jet operations there. Photography of 22 October reveals
a large slit trench revetment with a TOKEN GCI radar
and a ROCK CAKE heightfinder radar. A FLAT FACE
low altitude acquisition radar was also visible. ~~
28 Oct 65 2
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDR79T00975AO08600030001-3
 t 25X1
Co
0
0
rt
C)
n
to
z
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08600030001-3
N D O
BRUNEI
B O R N E O
N E S I A
DJAKARTA
t
Merak
?
DJAKARTA
Bogor Tjirebon.
?
Bandung
k rta Comunist activity
*Malang
`,PORTUGUESE TIMOR
TIMOR
n
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008600030001-3'
 Approved Fo
Indonesia: Armed Communist activity in
central Java is increasing.
030001-3 25X1 j
In their fir8tmajoreffort since the coup at-
tempt on 30 September, the Communists staged an
unsuccessful attack on police headquarters in
Jogjakarta and two smaller central Javanese cities
on 25 October. Yesterday the Central Java mili-
tary command proclaimed a "state of war" through-
out the province. Troops from an infantry brigade,
which had earlier been transferred to Sumatra for
confrontation duties against Malaysia, are being
returned to Central Java.
the Com-
munist Party (PKI) will resort to terror and sabotage
operations should President Sukarno not be able to
bring about a political settlement favorable to the
party. It is unclear, however, whether the PKI now
is entering this stage or whether the current Com-
munist guerrilla activity merely represents un-
coordinated reaction to army attacks against the
party
Sukarno is continuing to oppose the army's
anti-Communist campaign. F_ I
25X
ukarno told a
meeting o leaders of Indonesian political parties j
yesterday that a switch to the right "would be a
calamity even greater than the 30 Septemb r in- 25X
cident. "
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RD 79T00975A008600030001-3
 Approved Fc1r Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975A00860 0001-3
403
*Brazil: Political conditions in.Brazil appear to
'
s announce-
be generally calm following the government
ranting near dictatorial
of a new decree
d
t
t
g
er
ay
, men
yes
powers to President Castello Branco.
The wide-ranging powers are contained in a new
"Institutional Act" that suspends all political parties.
j Among the 33 articles in the act are provisions giving
Castello. Branco authority to declare a state of siege for
up to 180 days and to order congress into recess. He is
also granted broad power to intervene directly in the
states more easily, to remove the political rights of any
person for 10 years, and to cancel the mandates of
elected officials. In addition, military courts are given
j jurisdiction over civilians accused of crimes against
national security.
The new decree also provides for an indirect presi-
dential election by congress to be held by 3 October 1966
j in place of the direct election previously scheduled for
November of next year. Castello Branco, however, is
j specifically barred from succeeding himself.
j The decision to issue the Institutional Act was
probably precipitated by the regime's expectation that
congress would reject the government's request for
legislation to strengthen the president's authority.
Castello Branco apparently felt that drastic action was
necessary to ease the recently increased pressure from
the armed forces for a stronger stand against corrup-
tion and subversion. In a nationwide radio and tele-
vision speech Castello Branco explained the changes
as necessary to counter "growing leftist and counter-
revolutionary activities."
It is still unclear how Castello Branco plans to use
his new authority, but the Institutional Act is likely to
have widespread political repercussions during the
coming weeks. Some protest demonstrations and other
disturbances may occur, although security forces
should succeed in preventing any major violence. For-
eign reactions are likely to be strongly critical for the
most part, particularly in the other Latin American
countries.
p
28 Oct 65 4 25X/
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RD979T00975AO08600030001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08600030001-3
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08600030001-3
 j Approved For R lease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008600030 01-3 25XrA
Approved
NOTES
*Dominican Republic: Extremists of both the
right and left appear to be shifting their activities out-
side the capital. Since 23 October suspected rightwing
vigilantes have assassinated two leading leftist politi-
cians in the northern provinces.
leading members of both the pro-
Castro 14th of June Group and the pro-Chinese Domin-
ican Popular Movement are traveling to the interior
to enlist support amone- farm and urban workers.
25
 Approved For R
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDR79T00975A008600030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08600030001-3