CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008700100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Rase 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 70010 1Acember 1965
TOP SECRET
25X1
25X1
COPY o e 0 1 5 0
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
25X1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
State Dept. review completed
GROUP 1
E.U.M. M. AXIOMATIC DDWNGR%DING
AND DECL%SSIFIC%TI DN
Approved For Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A0d87`0010?fH -q R ET
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08700100001-4
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08700100001-4
 Approved For Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A0087001 0001-4 j
25X1 V
29 December 1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
25X1
20 USSR: Shelepin's trip to Hanoi indicates Soviet
bid to make influence felt. (Page 3)
25X1
E
5. Notes,. Indonesia; Zambia-Rhodesia; France -
West Germany. (Page 7)
N?r//"
p
Approved Fo Release 2003/04/11 ? CIA-RDP79T00975A0087 0100001-4 25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08700100001-4
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08700100001-4
 ------------- - OMM
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO0870 )0001-4
*USSR - North Vie tnam - Communist China*.
Moscow's decision to send one of its fop leaders--
4- 4- -" in--fn Hanoi indicates a clear
a
M/1"NO/z,
ME
par y secre
y p
intention to make its influence felt with the North Viet-
namese, especially at this time.
According to a 28 December TASS announcement,
Shelepin will head a Soviet delegation which is to leave
for the DRV "shortly." His visit will mark the first
trip to Hanoi by a high-level Soviet leader since the
Kosygin mission last February.
The Soviets probably feel that the current pause
in US bombing raids against North Vietnam provides
a good opportunity to encour e Hanoi to seek politi-
cal alternatives to the war. They have been advising
the North Vietnamese recent that they should en-
courage the Liberation Front to "facilitate negotia-
tions when that stage is reached.13
The announcement of the Shelepin visit coincides
with increased Russian material and political support
for the DRV and renewed expressions of Hanoi' s grati-
tude for Moscow-Is "great assistance." It also comes
at a time when the Soviets have displayed particular
sensitivity and concern over possible US moves which
might lead to an escalation of the war both in North
and South Vietnam.
The Shelepin mission in any event represents
a direct challenge to China's influence in Hanoi.
Nevertheless, he will probably stop over in Peking
where perfunctory talks with tfib Chinese can be
expected.
Hanoi, perhaps in an effort to balance Shelepin's
visit, has published a lengthy article lauding the
"broad and tremendous support" which the Chinese
Communists have provided North Vietnam. This
article in the authoritative North Vietnamese organ
Nhan Dan on 28 December included a statement that
29 Dec 65
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO0870C 100001-4 25X1
 Approved F Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A008700100 01-4
"several hundred thousand Chinese youths, including
a large number of army men, have enlisted as volun-
teers to fight by the side of the Vietnamese people
against the US aggressors."
e used in the article appears to be
ua
The lan
g
g
stronger than the standard Chinese statements con-
cerning Peking's "willingness" to send volunteers
to Vietnam. There is, however, no evidence of a
campaign to recruit volunteers in China nor are there
any indications of a concentration of "several hundred
thousand" Chinese near the Sino-DRV border. Peking
has said it was prepared to send volunteers to Viet-
nam if they were requested, but Chinese propaganda
has not stressed this position recIn fact Chi-
nese propaganda has implied that [Mel" intervention
is not required under present circumstances.
Nonetheless, the Nhan Dan statement apparently
is intended to intimate that a substantial Chinese pre-
sence could well appear in Vietnam on short notice if
it were re uested. 25X1
C Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.]
29 Dec 65
25X1
4
Approved Fo Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79TOO975AO0870 100001-
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08700100001-4
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08700100001-4
 ---------------
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO0870010(1001-4 25X1
NOTES
'11
01
0
lotters late next month. The army is also consider-
Inclonesia, iNo majur 11vw uuvq--%jy&--- ME
been reported. The army is giving priority attentionjmA~et4 ~?014rvi tmp~ARV
fn prenarations for trials of the 30 Aleptember coup 11
e
ing a legal maneuver designed to get around Sukarno's
continued refusal to ban the PKI. [Military legal
experts are reported planning a declaration by the
special military tribunal, on the "criminal" nature 25X1
of the Communist party, which wojuld legalize the
army's anti-Communist activitiesi I
Zambia- Rhodesia'. [Britain's POL airlift to
ZambiTmay ~bestopped for a few days by an unex-
pected lack of oil drums at the Dar es Salaam load-
ing base. President Kaunda, who already doubts
Britain's ability to keep Zambia afloat during the
UK program of sanctions against Rhodesia, is likely
to see in this temporary snag further proof that
London's strategy will not work. Notwithstanding
the accord which was reached with the Zambian
Foreign Minister in Washington on 27 December,
the danger is increasing that Kaunda will feel com- 25X1
i3elled to take some reckless action against the rebel --I
regime.
France - West Germany, TuRlier
the grZ;w- -ingf riction between France and West Germany
was revealed during the mid-December NATO minis-
terial meeting in Paris. The French opposed inser-
tion of a clause in the final communique` supporting
the Federal Republic against recent Soviet charges
of revanchism and nuclear ambitions and were forced
to back down only after the other Alliance members
closed ranks behind Germany. The incident paralleled
the French foreign minister's unsuccessful campaign
during the same meeting to set a time limit on the
work of the new NATO Special Committee on nuclear
plannin& in which the Germans are participating.
25X1
1-4
 Approved For R41ease 2003/04/11 - CIA-RDP79T00975A0081r00100001-4
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
Approved For (Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0087Ij0100001-4
25X1
 Approved For Ruse 200TQVIR :$IjE- b975A 100100001-4~
Approved For Release 2 0 b 1 'I E ETT00975A008700100001-4