CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008700400001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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3 February 1966
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Copy o' 156
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
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State Dept., JCS reviews completed
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3 February 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
2. North Vietnam - US: Hanoi still believes Com-
munists can win the war. (Page 3)
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5. Dominican Republic: Garcia Godoy offering more
concessions to military. (Page 7)
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3 Feb 66 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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The Military Situation in South Vietnam : Opera-
tion MASHER, the largest allied offensive of the war,
is taking a steady toll of Communist forces in north-
eastern Binh Dinh Province. Numerous contacts
between relatively small units during the past eight
days have resulted in enemy losses of 721 killed, 158
captured, and 614 suspects detained. Allied casual-
ties in the fighting total 111 killed (58 US), 450 wounded
(261 US), and three US missing.
At present, elements of the US First Cavalry
Division are sweeping a suspected Communist staging
area bombed by B-52 Stratofortresses on 1 February.
No results of this phase of the operation are yet avail-
able.
Farther north in Quang Ngai Province, US Marines
in Operation DOUBLE EAGLE have searched about one-
half of an area struck earlier by Stratofortresses without
significant results.
Communist Political Developments: Peking has
again accused the Soviet Union of collaborating with the
US to bring the North Vietnamese to the conference
table. A People's Daily "Observer" article on 2 Feb-
ruary carried the often reiterated Chinese propaganda
attack on the "Soviet revisionists leaders" to the great-
est length observed to date. It charged the post-
Khrushchev leaders with going further than Khrushchev
in cooperating with US "counterrevolutionary global
strategy."
The theme of Soviet collaboration with the US in
Vietnam has been emphasized by Peking more heavily
since Shelepin's visit to Hanoi in January. This added
so
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emphasis probably reflects Chinese concern that Hanoi
might at some point respond to Soviet suggestions for
a negotiated settlement. The violence of the article fur-
ther suggests that the Chinese are more than usually
irked at Moscow and are probably responding to the
current circulation of an anti-Chinese letter within the
CPSU as well as preparing a position against the pos-
sibility that the Soviets intend to use their Party Con-
gress scheduled for late next month for some new action
against Communist China.
Also on 2 February the Chinese blasted the US
move to raise the Vietnam problem at the UN Security
Council. In a People's Daily editorial Peking asserted
that the UN "has nothing at all to do with the Vietnam
question."
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IMP/ NEI
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*North Vietnam - US: Hanoi anticipates the eventual
introduction of "over 700, 0001' American troops into
South Vietnam, but still believes the Vietnamese Com-
munists can win the war, according to the North Viet-
namese minister of defense, Vo Nguyen Giap.
Giapts latest assessment of the situation in Viet-
nam and of Communist prospects there is contained in
a long article in the January issue of the North Viet-
namese party journal, Hoc Tap. Similiar articles by
Giap have become a periodic feature of North Viet-
namese propaganda; he authored comparable assess-
ments, for example, in July of 1964 and 1965. The
articles are designed to provide Vietnamese Commu-
nist cadre, military personnel, and the informed popu-
lace with the latest official regime view of the war,
formulated by a popular North Vietnamese leader who
has successfully led the DRV? s armed forces since
their founding.
In each of his past articles, Giap has argued that
the US was engaged in a "special war" in Vietnam in
which its own direct combat position was limited. In
his present article, however, Giap asserts that the US
has now gone beyond the "limits and scope" of the
special war and has shifted to a new "strategic stage"
characterized by the use of US troops for the "core"
of the fighting.
By pointing to the new stage in the conflict, Giap
may be laying the groundwork for calling upon the DRV
rank and file for greater effort and endeavor in the war..
He declares, in fact, that "our nation must mobilize
the forces of. the whole country" to defeat the US, and
must do "all that is necessary" to bring the war to a
successful end.
Giap acknowledges the great "material strength"
of the US and argues that Washington's strategy is to
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"rely" upon it to "gradually" win a position of strength
which will enable the US to "end the war with a favor-
able solution" or "prolong or expand" the conflict as
necessary.
Giap argues that there are basic political and
military weaknesses in the American position in Viet-
nam which will bring about a US defeat. US troops, he
notes, are thinly deployed throughout the world and
Washington "cannot send to the South whatever number
of troops" it would like without reckoning with "world-
wide difficulties." In addition, the US cannot decide
whether to make its main military efforts along the
coast, where the full power of American weapons can
be used, or in the hinterlands where the effectiveness
of US weapons is limited. Moreover, US troops
possess "low, morale, and the US Army is not organized
or trained to fight successfully against a people's war. "
Giap has made all of these points before in his articles,
and it is probable that Hanoi does not overestimate
them in its military planning, but does find them use-
ful in encouraging its own forces.
In regard to the air attacks on the DRV, Giap
acknowledges the possibility of more "fierce" attacks,
but claims that the raids cannot "by any means cut off
our main communications routes" and cannot shake
Hanoi's determination to continue the support of the
insurgency in the South. There is no indication in
Giap's article of any change in the DRV terms for a
settlement of the war, or, in fact, of any present
interest in starting discussions on the conflict. 25X1
* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.
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Dominican Republic: resident Garcia Godoy is
offering additional concessions to the military but the
armed services may still force a showdown involving
the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPFj
CGarcia Godoy is now willing to keep the service
chiefs in their posts and allow Minister of Defense
Rivera to designate his own successor. It is not yet
clear what the reaction of Rivera and subordinate of-
ficers will be to this proposal. *Rivera apparently
sees the proposal as a way out of his predicament,
but whether he can persuade the service chiefs to ac-
t this course remains questionable
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The military has thus far been united in its re-
sistance to Garcia Godoy's orders.
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On 31 January senior military
officers made clear to the provisional President their
view that command changes now would lead to the dis-
integration of the armed services)
According to Garcia Godoy, a major factor com-
pelling a rapid resolution of the crisis is increased
pressure on him from the left, including the threat of
strikes and student-led disturbances. There is no
firm indication that such agitation is imminent. Never-
theless, Bosch and other "constitutionalists" have been
insistent in demanding command changes and they may
not accept the proposed compromise
Garcia Godoy and the OAS Committee have agreed
tha action to force the issue must be taken soon. Am-
bassador Bunker has advised that the IAPF should be
ready to force Rivera out, but it is not clear that the
Latins will go along with this advice. Bunker indicated
that a "less drastic solution" will be sought, but warned
that "no other alternative may be available. IjF
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 Approved-4or Release '2003105116 - CIA-Rr)12793T:009- 5A008700400001-1
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved F
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