CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A008800110001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 21, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved Forflease 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T0097UP08800110001-2
TOP SECRET
25X1
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY
DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed.
25X1
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08800110001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08800110001-2
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08800110001-2
 Approved Fo Release 2003/04/11: CIA-RDP79T00975A00880 110001-2
25X1
rM!M
21 February 1966
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
Ell
3. Indonesia: Sukarno in bold countermove against
army. (Page 4)
4. Dominican Republic: Further negotiations to re-
place two military chiefs. (Page 5)
6. USSR: Five-year economic plan seems largely a
projection of recent trends. (Page 8)
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800110001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08800110001-2
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08800110001-2
 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00880011 01-2
Indonesia-, .president Sukarno appears to be at-
tempting his boldest countermove against the army
thus farm
on-
18 February Sukarno demanded the resignations of De-
fense Minister Nasution and of the navy and police
chiefs--who have supported the army in its anti-Com-
munist campaign. Sukarno also plans to abolish Gen-
eral Nasution8 s other post, that of chief of staff of the
armed forces1
Nasution went to Bandung, West Java, this week-
end to avoid possible arrest. Four army battalions
from the West Java command are reported to be moving
to the Djakarta area.
that Sukarno will press changes in the three posts at
FH H i r masts h~YTTATtIlw. r~v$.+....$ ~a~v.ra r.~.~r .err JL,r l- 9 X1"
N
f In view of army resistance, it seems unlikely MIN
According to an Indonesian press release this
morning, Sukarno plans to announce some cabinet
changes later today. These could involve the removal
of the three military officials. Officers whom Sukarno
has considered for these positions are with him in
Bogor
political strength and resolved 4
will facilitate his continuing effort to erode the army's M
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800110001-2
25X
25X1
 25X
j Approved or Release 2003/04/11 .CIA-RDP79T00975A008800 10001-2
j
Dominican Republica Intense negotiations are
j under way to replace the last two military chiefs who j
j took a major part in last spring's fighting.
j
j
President Garcia Godoy has informed the Organiza-
tion of American States Committee of a plan calling for
generals Martinez Aran.a and de los Santos to step down
as army and air force chiefs. The two generals would
retain their present ranks and serve jointly with the
service chiefs on an advisory general staff board to be
established, Garcia Godoy claims this plan was unan-
imously approved at a lengthy meeting which he held
on 18 February with all the military leaders except
Martinez and de los Santos, who sent their deputies.
Should the two recalcitrant generals agree, Garcia
Godoy has told Ambassador Bunker that he is prepared
to announce that no further changes will be made in the
armed forces' command structure.
It is unlikely that. such an agreement would be
well received by those leftist forces which led last
week's general strike, The strike and disorders may
resume when the proposal becomes public knowledge.
The leftists, who have consistently demanded that the
generals leave the country, would probably consider
their appointment to positions in the National Palace
as a betrayal. In, a speech on 16 February Garcia
Godoy promised to demand immediate "compliance
with the 6 January decrees" which ordered both gen-
erals to overseas assignments:
It now appears that there will be at least three
presidential candidates in the elections scheduled for
1 June. Former president Rafael Bonnelly announced
his candidacy in behalf of a "third force" on 19 Feb-
ruary. Joaquin Balaguer publicly became the Reform-
ist Party's candidate last summer, and Juan Bosch is
expected to be the Dominican Revolutionary Party
candidate.
(continued)
21 Feb 66 5
25X
ONEVIVIN,
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 CIA-RDP79T00975A008800110001-2
 A o p r oved oved
pr
Bonnelly's "third force" will probably attempt to
picture itself as filling the vacuum in a polarized po-
litical setting, but it is expected that the conservative
Bonnelly would run a poor third to Bosch and Bala uer
and primarily take votes from Balaguer.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
M
66
21 Feb
EMINNUM/mma
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800110001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08800110001-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08800110001-2
 ai i i i i i i
Approved F r Release 2003/04/11 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0088 0110001-2
25X1
j
j
USSR: The official TASS summary of the 1966-
70 Soviet economic plan approved by the party plenum
on 19 February is generally a realistic projection of
trends of the recent past, although it includes factors
that make its complete accomplishment doubtful.
The summary, which presumably puts the plan
in its most favorable light, sheds little new light on
whether the hard decisions have been made on how to
split the USSR's limited resources during the coming
five years among the principal claimants: industry,
agriculture, defense, and the consumer. The plan is
highlighted by an increase in the national income of
about 40 percent. This is to be achieved largely by a
rise of some 50 percent in industrial output and an ap-
parent growth in agricultural production of 25 percent
compared with 1961-65.
Within industry, the gap between the production
of capital and consumer goods is expected to narrow,
but heavy industry is still favored for the rest of the
1960s. Although data on selected industrial items show
planned increases of considerable magnitude, these in-
creases appear attainable given the planned growth in
investment and labor productivity. In all cases the
targets are reduced from the 1970 goals included in
the 20-year program approved on 1961.
The apparent 25-percent rise planned for agri-
culture goes far beyond the ten-percent rise claimed
to have been achieved during 1961-65. This also holds
for the planned 30-percent increase in grain production.
Soviet statistics on grain production, which US intel-
ligence considers to have been inflated since 1958,
show only a nine-percent rise during 1961-65.
The USSR apparently is counting heavily on the
incentives contained in Brezhnev's agricultural program
to reach its 1970 goals for farm products. Increased
21 Feb 66
(continued)
00
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08800110001-2
 iiiiiii
Approved Fo Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO0880 110001-2
yields are to be the major factor in this growth, along
with a huge planned increase of 40 to 45 percent in
agricultural labor productivity A monthly guaranteed
wage for collective farm workers is to be a primary
means for achieving this rise.
Large increases are planned in the production of
consumer durables, including a four-fold rise in the
output of automobiles, but effective demand for many
of these items probably will not be met during the plan
period. Even if the automobile target is met, produc-
tion in 1970 would still, total only about 800,000 units,
about ten percent of US output last year. The major
emphasis in consumer welfare will be to narrow the
gap between the living standards of the rural and urban
population.
Emphasis on consumer durables suggests that de-
fense expenditures will not grow rapidly. The sum-
mary simply notes that "the five-year plan is to en-
sure the further growth of the Soviet Union's defense
capacity." However, as in all past plans, the 1966-70
plan as announced does not give any clear indication of
trends in defense spending.
25X1
21 Feb 66
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO08800110001-2
 Approved for Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975AP08800110001-2
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Commander in Chief, Atlantic
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Administrator
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008800110001-2
 Approved Fo lease p/1 :Lft 7fT009^08800110001-2
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04