CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A009100160001-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 20, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 26, 1966
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A009100160001-3.pdf1.22 MB
Body: 
Approved FbrwRelease 2003/04/22: CIA-RDP79T00A009100160001-3 25X1 TOP SECRET 26 July 1966 Copy No. C 1GO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY 25X1 GROUP . State Dept. review completed 25X1 E%CLUDEOIIND DEC485IFII~DOWNGRADING T09 T ~oFMYf I ET pproved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 0 1 01 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO09100160001-3 Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO09100160001-3 ----------------- --- - ------------------ - Approve For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0091 0160001-3 W 25X1 26 July 1966 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 25X1 M ME 1 2. Indonesia- New Indonesia cabinet is victory for General Suharto. (Page 3) 3. Sudan: Ouster of Mahjoub may bring end to paralyzing political infighting in government. (Page 5) 4. UK: Defense establishment got off rather easily in new economy measures. (Page 6) 5. USSR- Statistics for first half of 1966 indicate no improvement in the economy over past years. (Page 7) 6. Brazil: Bombings in Recife may signal terrorist campaign to discredit government. (Page 8) 7. Notes: Congo (Kinshasa). (Page 10) MEN 0 Approved Fo Release 2003/04/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A009 00160001-3 25X1 ----- --- -- ------ 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO09100160001-3 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO09100160001-3 Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009 00160001-3 25X1 Indonesia: The Indonesian cabinet announced yesterday is, as had been anticipated, a victory for army chief General Suharto. As chairman of the presidium, Suharto will head the cabinet. He also retains the defense portfolio. The five ""first ministers" who make up the presidium in- clude the triumvirate that directed the preceding cabinet - - Suharto, Adam Malik, and the Sultan of Jogjakarta. The other two are representatives of Indonesia's two largest parties--Chalid of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Sanusi of the National Party. 25X1 Three minor parties are also represented in the cabinet--the Catholic Party, the Christian Party, and the pro-army Association of Supporters for Indonesian Independence. However, 12 of the 27 individuals in the cabinet are military officers, and several ministers appear to be technicians rather than political selections. The inclusion of Chalid, is Suharto's only major conces- sion to President Sukarno, whose position thus has been further eroded. As first minister for people's welfare, Chalid will have under him the ministers of education, religion, social affairs, public health, and manpower mobilization. Only one of these, the minister of re- ligion, is a member of the NU. (continued) 26 Jul 66 j Approved II 25X6 25X1 25X1 Annroved F r Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0091 0160001-3 75X1 j 5X1 During the cabinet negotiations Suharto and his colleagues were determined that certain portfolios should not go to politicians. These included the six ministries grouped under economics and finance-- which have now gone to either military officers or technicians--as well as the home affairs and informa- tion ministries, both of which could be exploited during the pre-election period. An army officer, Major Gen- eral Basuki Rakmat, will hold the home affairs port- folio. The information post has been given to Burhanud- din Diah, a newspaper editor and diplomat who is close to Adam Malik. Malik, who aside from Suharto is probably the ablest man in the cabinet, remains foreign minister and retains his general supervisory position over in- ternal political affairs. 26 Jul 66 25X1 25X1 A roved F r ReIease 2003/04/22 ? CIA-RDP79T00975A00 100160001-3 A I'll rmm"!M or Rplpasp 2()()3/()4/22 - CIA-Rr)P7gTflflq75Aflflilf)f)lsf)f)f)1-3 I E 25X1 Sudan: The ouster on 25 July of Prime Minister Mohammad Mahjoub may bring an end to the prolonged political infighting which has paralyzed the Sudanese Government. . A nonconfidence vote was called in the Sudan's Constituent Assembly by supporters of Sadiq al- Mahdi, president of the dominant Umma party, who is expected to form a new government. Sadiq had been opposed in his bid for the premiership by the Imam al- Hadi al-Mahdi, spiritual leader of the Ansar sect-- which forms the Umma's power base--and a strong supporter of Mahjoub. A substantial majority of Umma parliamentarians have long supported Sadiq's candidacy, but Sadiq himself had heretofore been reluctant to risk an open split within the party. The Imam has called large numbers of his tribal supporters into the Khartoum area, but it is not clear that he intends to use them to block formation of the new government. The National Union Party, the Ummals coalition partner, is apparently backing Sadiq. Security forces have been put on the alert to maintain order in the capital. L 25X1 011 26 Jul 66 5 F?R ZDA I Approved or Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO09100160001-3 j 25X1 Approved For Release 04/22: CIA-RDMT00975A00 100160001-3 j IA j j j j j j UK: [Britain's defense establishment got off rather easily in the economy measures announced last week The economic package does not include any cuts in ov r seas military deployment beyond those already planned. According to Defense Minister Healey, it calls for a reduction of $280 million in overseas spend- ing, but the only new measures definitely decided upon are a cut of $70 million from foreign aid programs, and of $2. 8 million in the Foreign Office's overseas costs. The rest is to be saved mainly by accelerating reduc- tions already planned in British troops in Malaysia. London also hopes to persuade West Germany to in- crease its offset of the foreign exchange cost of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR)J [London has long threatened to reduce the BAOR unless Bonn increases its purchases of British mili- tary goods, or agrees to direct payments to the UK Treasury, to offset the BAOR's foreign exchange cost of about $263 million a year. Negotiations on this issue, however, are likely to drag on at least until a British - West German commission, appointed last May, reports on the problem in late September (Nevertheless, London seems determined this time to reduce this particular foreign exchange drain and some cuts in BAOR seem almost certain, possibly as part of a cut in over-al]. British troop strength. 26 Jul 66 Approved r F Approved aiwiovovw 9100160001-3 25X1 1111 IN 1 Lmm;; 710/1,111. Approved Felease 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T009009100160001-3 SELECTED SOVIET-ANNOUNCED FIGURES ON PLAN FULFILLMENT, 1965-66* (Percentage Change from Corresponding Period of Previous Year) Electric Powe Coal Crude Petroleum Gas Mineral Fertilizers Plastics and Resins Chemical Equipment Oil Equipment Agricultural Equipment Fuels Metallurgy Chemicals Machine Building and Metal- working ,Lumber, wood-processinand cellulose-paper Construction materials Light / Consumer Goods Food Household Articles 1965 1966, 10 10 5 4 8 9 17 17 26 23 16 14 17 12 14 0 3 3 11 11 10 7 7 7 8 9 9 14 14 12 9 9 11 5 10 9 10 10 8 8 4 10 13 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. * Soviet official figures of industrial growth are 2-3% higher than CIA and other Western estimates. N.A. - Not Available. j 25X1 j j Approved F r Release 2003/04/22 :CIA-RDP79T00975A00910 160001-3 j j j j % j j I 25X1 USSR: Soviet economic statistics for the first half of 966 indicate no improvement over the unsatis- factory performance of the. economy in recent years. The figures seem to suggest a further increase in the share of durables devoted to military and space pro- grams. This is implied by a slight increase in the rate of growth in the production of machinery with a con- current decline in the rate of growth of principal civilian machinery users. A harbinger of continued difficulties is the virtual stagnation of gross fixed investments in new plant and equipment. State plan investment- -about 3/4 of the total- -increased only two percent over the same period last year. In recent years the Soviets have consistently failed to achieve an increase in the annual rate of in- vestment sufficient to maintain the desired rate of growth for industrial output. The figures on the growth of the energy industries provide another indicator of increased difficulties. Only petroleum production maintained last year's rate of growth and is meeting the planned rate. The growth in, electric power consumption was the lowest for any six- month period in the past decade. On the basis of the statistics, the consumer made out little better than last year. Some progress does appear, however, in the program to remedy the tradi- tional neglect of agriculture. 26 Jul 66 Approved WA Approved F r Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009100160001-3 25X1 j *Brazil: Yesterday's bombing incidents in Recife may have inaugurated a wave of terrorism designed to discredit the Castello Branco government and disrupt this fall's national elections. At least three persons were killed and several injured in three separate bomb explosions in Recife. In what appeared to have been an assassination attempt, a powerful blast was set off at the Recife airport just as the government-backed presidential candidate, retired marshal Arturo Costa e Silva, was scheduled to arrive. Costa e Silva was uninjured, however, since his aircraft had been delayed and he was forced to travel by car. The perpetrators of the incidents have not yet been apprehended, although local security forces have begun a sweep of known Communists in the area. The government can be expected to take firm measures against known oppositionists. The bombings took place at a time when pre- election tensions have begun to climb. The legislatures of half of Brazil's 22 states will elect new governors on 3 September, Congress will choose the new president on 3 October, and direct elec- tions for the new federal congress are slated to be held on 15 November. Costa e Silva is the sole candidate for the presidency. The Brazilian Democratic Move- ment--the only legally recognized opposition party-- may not name presidential or gubernatorial candidates, since it believes that the regime is using arbitrary and undemocratic methods to ensure the victory of the gov- ernment party's candidates. (continued) 26 Jul 66 Approved Fir Release 2003/04/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A00910~160001-3 "'~" I r Release 2003/04/22. CIA-RDP79T00975A00 100160001-3 As the election dates approach, further incidents, including attacks against US installations and property, can be expected. The target of one of the Recife blasts was a USIS office. Local security forces are believed capable of preventing such terrorism from becoming a serious threat to governmental stability, however. 25X1 * Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense. 25X1 Approved ~ Approved or Release 2003/04/22 CIA-RDP79T00975AO091~0160001-3 25X1 NOTE OFMI Congo (Kinshasa): The situation is calm in Kisangani (Stanleyville), and the mutiny of Katangese troops and a few mercenaries has not spread to other parts of the country. Premier Mulamba, however, is 25X1 apparently having some trouble reaching an agreement with the mutineers. American citizens have been evacuated from Kisangani. j 25X1 MI. 26 Jul 66 10 LV/\ 1 Approved r Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 100160001-3 25X1 - Approved F4 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistants to the President The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Commander in Chief, Atlantic The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Administrator The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved F Approved F elease 20 45E?AE'R79T009 009100160001'-3 Approved For ReleaseT4IS lPT9T00975A009100160001-3