CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A009500250001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 12, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed.
Top Secret
c 160
12 January 1967
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iLz January
Central Intelli~ence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)
Indonesia: Sukarno's statement on 1965 uprising will
intensify demands for his ouster. (Page 5)
India: Position of Congress Party deteriorating as elec-
tion approaches. (Page 6)
Yugoslavia-USSR: New frictions arise as Soviets criticize
Tito's reforms. (Page 8)
Belgium - Congo (Kinshasa): Union Miniere continues to
resist compromise. (Page 9)
Bahamas: Election deadlock hampers creation of new gov-
ernment. (Page 11)
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VSavannakhet
NORTH
\ 4ong Hoi
VIETNAM
N
xj Demilitarized Zone
`y Seponea
(P Saravane
3
t?~ IPakse
j Attopeu
C A M B O D I A
SOUTH VIETNAM
0 25 50 75 100Mdes
0 25 50 75 1 0 Poiometers
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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)
The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Twenty-
three allied battalions are continuing to press their
major offensive--Operation CEDAR FALLS--against
the Communist-infested Iron Triangle base area north
of Saigon in Binh Duong Province.
Viet Cong storage areas containing more than 600
tons of rice were uncovered on 10-11 January by allied
sweep forces bringing the total amount of rice captured
since this operation began on 7 January to more than
1,200 tons. In addition, large amounts of other food-
stuffs and arms and munitions have been seized.
No large- scale engagements between enemy forces
and allied troops participating in this operation have
been reported. However, many small-unit actions have
occurred in the six-day-old operation. Cumulative Com-
munist casualties now total 189 killed, 40 captured, and
256 suspects detained. American losses are 20 killed
and 102 wounded. (Map)
Political Developments in South Vietnam: Plans
are moving forward for the visit of Premier Ky to
Australia and New Zealand next week.
Premier Ky is expected to arrive in Canberra on
18 January for a five-day visit. He will tour New Zea-
land from 23-26 January. South Vietnamese officials
had earlier offered the two governments an opportunity
to postpone Ky's trip in view of the violent objections
which are being raised by opposition parties in both
countries.
Officials of the two countries have assured Ky that
despite initial adverse publicity, both governments wel-
come his visit. Although anti-Ky demonstrations can be
expected in both countries, no serious disturbances are
expected.
(continued)
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LAOS PANHANDLE
MuGia
Pass
Muong Nong
uang Khe
1117
F#d2x
-T0,4. S.
Don Ha
Quan
65
iavane
Road
Unusable road
Track or trail
Ben
Gian_$
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L INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
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North Vietnamese Military Developments: Trained
observers located near the Mu Gia Pass area report
that about 190 trucks moved into Laos between 3 and 9
January on one of the two roads connecting the Laos pan-
handle with North Vietnam. This is the largest number
of trucks reported moving into Laos in the Mu Gia Pass
area since late November, but incomplete coverage by
ground observers makes it difficult to draw precise
comparisons with previous years. Nevertheless, the
Communists thus far appear to be moving fewer trucks
in rhanhandle than they did during last year dr sea-
so
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Indonesia: President Sukarno's 10 January statement
on his role in the antiarmy action of October 1965 will not
satisfy the Suharto regime and will intensify demands for
his early ouster.
Instead of acknowledging the pre-eminent constitu-
tional authority of congress (MPRS) and blaming the
October 1965 events on the Communist Party, as the re-
gime had urged him to do, Sukarno denied that the MPRS
had any right to demand an accounting from him. He
said his own investigation of the 1 October "affair" showed
that it was caused by three factors--faulty policies of the
Communist leadership, neocolonialist and imperialist
subversion, and the existence of "undesirable elements"
in Indonesia. He reiterated that the events of 1 October
were a "complete surprise" to him.
Sukarno 's unsatisfactory statement will be useful to
those who want to mount an accelerated campaign against
him, and an intensification of anti- Sukarno publicity is
likely. Even before Sukarno issued his statement, ten
"action fronts" had demanded that the MPRS suspend
Sukarno from office, and three popular newspapers a
few days ago highlighted some of Sukarno's financial
manipulations.
There are indications, however, that General Suharto,
despite pressures from activists, will continue to move
with deliberation and to rely on legal forms. Parliament
reassembles on 23 January and may be asked to call a
special session of the MPRS to convene at some later
date. The MPRS could then vote on some means to re-
move Sukarno from office.
In the interim Suharto may proceed with plans to en-
large parliament by appointing some 110 new members
from groups that he regards as dependable. Since parlia-
ment is part of the MPRS, the former's enlargement would
ensure that the MPRS is also more responsive
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India: The Congress Party's position appears to
be deteriorating as the elections beginning on 15 Feb-
ruary draw near.
Although most observers continue to predict a
sizable, although reduced, Congress Party majority
in the new parliament, there is increasing doubt about
the results in several state elections. The party pres-
ently holds power in all 17 state governments except
Nagaland, in eastern India, and the south Indian state
of Kerala. The latter is now being ruled directly
from New Delhi.
The party is entering the elections suffering from
a number of problems, including the lack of a national
leader with the charismatic appeal of the late prime
minister Nehru. The party continues to be riddled by
factionalism and is experiencing severe strains in re-
lations between party leaders at the state and national
level. In several states, dissident Congress Party
members are negotiating with opposition parties'. in an
attempt to form antigovernment electoral fronts. Con-
tinuing economic difficulties, increased religious
fanaticism, and isolated incidents caused by growing
communal tensions currently are adding to the govern-
ment's troubles.
In addition to the probable loss of Kerala, where
a Communist-led coalition is expected to win, the US
Embassy now lists three other states as doubtful and
two more in which the Congress will face formidable
opposition. Serious reverses for the Congress Party
at the state or national level would intensify pressure
within the party leadership to replace Mrs. Gandhi.
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Yugoslavia-USSR: New frictions have arisen in
Soviet-Yugoslav relations as a result of Soviet criticism
of internal developments in Yugoslavia.
According to a Yugoslav journalist, the Soviets, in
a letter of early December, expressed concern that
President Tito's reforms designed to reduce the party's
role in everyday affairs would weaken the party's over-
all authority. The letter asserts that Belgrade has sup-
pressed those favoring a. strong party, an obvious ref-
erence to conservative Aleksander Rankovic, who was
ousted as Tito's heir apparent last July for opposing
the reform.
The existence of the letter has been reported in an
Italian newspaper as well, which states that Tito was
also requested to change his negative position regarding
a conference of European Communist parties to discuss
European security.
No matter how couched, a Soviet approach on such
a delicate issue was bound to arouse the Yugoslavs.
That the Soviets went ahead anyway is a measure of
their fear that this Yugoslav infection will spread to
other countries in Eastern Europe.
Brezhnev's trip to Belgrade last September re-
vealed Tito's irritation over alleged Soviet contacts
with Rankovic. ,, There have been several official
Yugoslav statements complaining of foreign interference.
As recently as 10 January, an official stated at a
party plenum that "criticisms of and reservations with
regard to our internal development are disturbing,"and
he virtually accused the Soviets of reverting to Stalinist-
like tactics.
Tito reportedly has scheduled a trip to the USSR
in the near future. While Tito probably hopes to
smooth things over, it is unlikely that he would change
his domestic policies ee to attend a European
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Belgium-Congo (Kinshasa): The Union Miniere min-
ing company continues to-resist any compromise in its
dispute with the Mobutu government.
Mobutu in recent days has not repeated his threat
to take over other Belgian assets, such as banks and
transportation companies, by 15 January. He may im-
plement his threat, however, if Union Miniere remains
opposed to reopening discussions.
The Congolese also claim a sizable portion: of
company assets, including copper stocks, located out-
side the Congo. Company officials appear reluctant to
exchange control of these assets for a prospect of con-
tinued operation amid the uncertainties of Congo politics.
The Belgian Government is particularly concerned
because it believes Union Miniere's refusal to reopen
negotiations will arouse anti-Belgian feeling and threaten
the safety of the 40 000 Belgians living in the Congo.
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Bahamas: The political deadlock resulting from
the ld January House of Assembly elections presents
the British Governor-General with a difficult, if not
impossible, task in forming a new government.
The Negro-led Progressive Liberal Party (PLP)
dramatically increased its seats in the House of As-
sembly from four to 18, equaling those of the incum-
bent conservative United Bahamian Party (UBP). One
of the two remaining seats in the 38-member assembly
went to a Labor Party member expected to align him-
self with the PLP. The other was won by an inde-
pendent whose alignment is in doubt. The more mod-
erate opposition National Democratic Party was
crushed, and its leader failed to retain his assembly
seat.
Under the constitution the governor appoints as
premier the man he believes best able to command
the confidence of the majority of the House members.
If neither party can form a working majority, or is
unwilling to enter into coalition with the other, new
elections would have to be held,
The PLP, formed in 1963, has for the first
time effectively challenged the tight control of the
Bahamas by the white-led UBPO Thousands of
jubilant Negroes marched through the streets cele-
brating what their leaders claimed was an end of
"three centuries of white rule. "
A period of general economic and political con-
fusion can be expected. The US Consul General in
Nassau predicts that investors will be especially con-
cerned.
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Top Secret
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