CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A009600030001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 20, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

A Z.- amsacrat
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed.
Top Secret
c 160
20 January 1967
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20 January 1967
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
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Burma: Ne Win seeks military equipment from US. (Page 7)
West Germany - Rumania: Progress made toward establishment
of diplomatic relations. (Page 8)
Belgium: Cabinet crisis hampers government's ability to me-
diate Congo problem. (Page 9)
France: Paris retreats on gold price issue. (Page 10)
Israel-Syria: Forthcoming meeting offers little hope for reduc-
tion in tension. (Page 11)
South Arabia: Violence and political turmoil in Aden. (Page 12)
Ghana: Deposed president Nkrumah plots to bring down govern-
ment. (Page 13)
Guatemala: Increase in urban terrorism planned. (Page 14)
Chile: President Frei will seek to dissolve Congress. (Page 15)
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Burma: President Ne Win's decision to seek sub-
stantial amounts of advanced military equipment from
the US marks a departure from his carefully plotted
neutralist course between Communist China and the
United States.
In recent meetings with US officials in Rangoon,
Burmese Air Force officers have expressed an inter-
est in trainer, transport, and tactical aircraft, in
addition to several fighter-bombers of the Mach 2
class. The Burmese Navy wishes to acquire patrol
ships, minesweepers, torpedo boats, auxiliaries,
and amphibious craft.
Burma has in the past purchased modest amounts
of surplus American equipment at reduced prices--
mainly obsolescent arms and aircraft. Acquisition
of the equipment on the current shopping list would
be considerably more provocative to Peking.
Many of the items discussed could be utilized
to meet a changing and potentially more serious in-
ternal. security threat. Burma's more than 12, 000
insurgents have recently shifted the focus of their
activity from the economically unimportant border
regions to the rich farming areas in the delta. Re-
cent coordinated attacks by Communist and Karen
insurgents on rice mills, and increased intimidation
of farmers in the delta area are posing a threat to
rice production.
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West Germany - Rumania: A German mission to
Bucharest made further progress toward establishing
diplomatic relations.
A major problem was posed by Rumania's re-
fusal to accept Bonn's claim to be the sole legitimate
representative of the German people. It appears that
this will be overcome by an agreement to disagree,
although the details have yet to be worked out. How
to treat West Berlin is still under consideration. The
West Germans may settle for a confidential, oral com-
mitment recognizing Bonn's authority to act for West
Berlin in trade and consular matters. It is not cer-
tain, however, that the Rumanians will comply.
Once the West Berlin issue has been resolved a
formal announcement of diplomatic relations may fol-
low within a few weeks. The occasion would probably
be a visit to Bonn of Rumania's foreign minister, which
is expected shortly.
Meanwhile, Bonn has also completed the first
round of talks in Prague and a delegation is due in
Budapest on 23 January.
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Belgium: A threatened cabinet crisis over the
budget is likely to affect adversely Brussels' capa-
bility to mediate matters in the Congo.
The Catholic-Liberal government is divided on
how to deal with a deteriorating economic and finan-
cial situation. Its erroneous claim last fall that the
1967 budget would be. in balance and no significant
new taxes would be needed has led to a widespread
loss of confidence.
The government's preoccupation with domestic
politics is likely to weaken its efforts to persuade
Union Miniere to cooperate with the Congolese. The
company is in any case maintaining that it has no par-
ticular desire to continue operations in the Congo.
It has refused so far to grant Congolese President
Mobutu even the face-saving formality of setting up a
new Belgian technical management company for the
copper mines.
The political strains over the budget may also
harden Belgium's inclination to cut its NATO contri-
bution. The present plans of the ministry of defense
call for a considerable cut in the ground forces.
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France: For lack of support from its EEC
partners, France has had to back away, at least
for the time being, from its advocacy of a rise in
the price of gold.
At an EEC meeting this week in The Hague,
some of the finance ministers lectured the French,
stating that discussion of the gold question would
have undesirable consequences. The Italian minister
cited the potential danger of pushing the US into ex-
treme measures to protect the dollar.
The French finance minister consequently pro-
posed that future discussion focus on reforming the
International Monetary Fund to give Europeans a
larger role in decision making. The Six agreed that
this possibility, already under study, could be pur-
sued further.
Ambassador Bohlen, however, later got the im-
pression from Premier Pompidou that Paris had
made a definite decision to mount an assault this
year on the international monetary system and the
position of the dollar. Pompidou seemed obsessed
with the s' e of the US role in economic and financial
matters.
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Israel-Syria, The forthcoming Israeli-Syrian
meeting on their border dispute offers little hope for
a reduction of tension, especially since it will not deal
with the critical issue of Syrian-supported terrorism
in Israel.
Only the chronic problem of cultivation in the de-
militarizes zone is to be discussed at the meeting, for
which no date has yet been set, whereas Israeli offi-
cials have indicated that they are most concerned about
the terrorist incidents. There have been seven Syrian-
backed terrorist raids in the past three weeks, accord-
ing to the Israelis, although they resulted in only one
fatality. ?'Fatah, " the principal Palestinian terrorist
group, has publicly claimed "credit. "
The Israelis themselves, however, specified that
cultivation in the zone should be the sole subject on the
meeting's agenda, in order to avoid a debate on the
more basic issue of their claim to sovereignty over
the demilitarized zone. The impasse over that claim
has virtually paralyzed the UN Armistice Commission
since 1951 and has been "the main origin and cause of
tension and incidents" along the Syrian border, in the
words of a recent UN report.
An official organ of the ruling Baath party in
Damascus, meanwhile, has stated that Syrians can
not be compelled to "act as guards for the Israel
border" by preventing strikes by Palestinian infil-
trators. After a talk with the Syrian foreign minister,
US Ambassador Smythe concluded that any Israeli at-
tack in force will be met b the Syrians with a fierce--
if suicidal-- counterblow.
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South Arabia: Violence and political turmoil are
steadily increasing in Aden, with a year to go before
the final British withdrawal.
Key figures in the South Arabian federal government
apparently have gone to London in another attempt to
find some way to keep the lid on during and after the
British evacuation. The federal government's forces
do not now seem likely to be able to cope with the sit-
uation if the transfer of power is abrupt, and Federa-
tion authorities hope to persuade London to allow them
to begin policing Aden well before independence.
The problem has become more urgent because a
recent upswing of terrorism in Aden not only has pitted
Egyptian-backed gangs against the government, but has
split the trade unions into rival factions, aligned Com-
munists against local Baathist radicals, and set indi-
vidual terrorist against terrorist. British security
patrols have failed to control these skirmishes, and
even the Egyptians seem unable to quell internal
vendettas among the terrorists.
The British remain adamant about departing by
1 January 1968 and show no sign that they will be will-
ing to provide anything like the present security guar-
antees to the federation after independence.
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Ghana: The military regime is concerned over
new plotting by Nkrumah to bring down the government
in Ghana and return to power.
Strict security measures have been imposed fol-
lowing the disclosure of a plot to assassinate the eight
members of the ruling National Liberation Council
(NLC), the US ambassador, and the British high com-
missioner.
The NLC announced on 13 January that it will set
up military tribunals to try subversive civilian ele-
ments and punish convicted offenders with a minimum
of 25 years' imprisonment and a maximum penalty of
death. It also ordered tighter security measures at
public utility installations that could be the target of
terrorist attacks.
The NLC, building up a strong public case about
Nkrumah's chronic plotting, plans to present concrete
evidence to bolster its charges. The NLC believes
that, as the anniversary of his ouster on 24 February
approaches, Nkrumah will make more determined ef-
forts to get disturbances started in Ghana.
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Guatemala: The Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), action
arm of the Guatemalan Communist Party, plans an in-
crease in urban terrorism soon.
There is growing evidence of dissension between
leaders of the party and of the FAR, reportedly caused
by intensified army pressure on FAR guerrillas in the
field. Party action groups that were supposed to re-
lieve the pressure on the FAR by increasing terrorism
in Guatemala City have apparently not succeeded in
their efforts. In recent meetings, the FAR has ac-
cused party leaders of obstructing the "revolution, "
of lacking militancy, and of failing to give active
support to the FAR.
Fidel
Castro recently insisted to a FAR member that con-
ditions in Guatemala are ripe for revolution; that
the only obstacles are the old-guard Communists
who oppose action; and that the FAR should demand
a party congress soon to depose the "soft-line"
leaders.
Some party leaders fear that a congress would
result in drastic changes in party leadership or a
complete split between the two groups. Young FAR
hotheads meanwhile have reportedly been discussing
plans to form a "Red Guard" unit to attack old party
hacks.
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*Chile: President Frei, angered by the Senate's
veto of his proposed trip to the US, will seek consti-
titutional authority to dissolve Congress and call new
elections.
In a speech on 19 January, he announced that he
will send to the Chamber of Deputies today a bill that
would allow such action once during a presidential
term. The proposed bill is certain to encounter strong
opposition, and probably stands almost no chance of
passage in time to be used to gain permission for the
US trip.
The speech was Frei's strongest public state-
ment since the Senate voted against his proposed trip
on 17 January. He berated the opposition for ob-
structing many of his reform programs, emphasizing
in particular the restraints that the Senate's action
would place on his conduct of foreign affairs.
Frei is caught between a desire to gain domestic
political benefits by picturing the opposition parties
as blindly obstructionist, and the problem of con-
ducting Chile's foreign policy in an orderly manner.
He indicated yesterday that he might not consider him-
self able to attend the inter-American summit meeting
in April, since he was denied permission to visit the
US. Furthermore, submitting to the Senate's will
would lessen his reputation in inter-American councils
and hamper his efforts to promote Latin American
integration.
His Christian Democratic Party stands to gain
substantially, however, if opposition intransigence
can be made a prime issue in the municipal election
campaigns in April. Much of the impact of this issue
will be lost if Frei should make his US visit without
the congressional permission required by the consti-
tution.
* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence
Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The United States Intelligence Board on 19 Jan-
uary 1967 approved the following national intelligence
estimate:
SNIE 57-67, "Significance of Cambodia to
the Vietnamese Communist War Effort"
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Top Secret
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