CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A009700100001-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 2, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 28, 1967
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A009700100001-3.pdf416.03 KB
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Approved For R?&se 2003/05/19: CIA-RDP79T00975AQW7001 (~1$eCret n r_ \/ 4 N1 Secret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed. 25X1 Top S~e~c~et 25X1 28 February 1967 Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO09700100001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO09700100001-3 Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO09700100001-3 Approved For Rase 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00J700100001-3 28 February 1967 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1) Indonesia: Suharto pressing Congress to limit action against Sukarno. (Page 3) NATO-UK: Council representatives critical of British agreement to negotiate friendship treaty with USSR. (Page 4) Nigeria: Ojukwu lays groundwork for Eastern Region to assume greater independence. (Page 5) Chile: Senate rebuffs Frei on proposed constitu- tional amendment. (Page 6) Approved For Relea$e 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO09p00100001-3 Approved For Relent 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100001-3 `Savannakhet NORTH .bong Hoi VIETNAM ?Pakse ,Sihanoukville f-?7 r Kontum? ?Quang Ngai Qui Nhon ?Nha Trang SOUTH VIETNAM 25 50 75 100Miies 0 25 50 75 160 Kilornelers 4?Da Nang 25X1 65874 2-67 CIAA proved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009700100 01-3 2#3 Ii e CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Approved For Rd a 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 700100001-3 25X1 *Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST) South Vietnamese Political Affairs: [Political as- sociates of Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu are making major bids to win civilian support for the pres- idential aspirations of both leaders iTran Quoc Buu, chief of South Vietnam's largest labor group, reportedly intends to campaign for Pre- mier Ky among the members of his union. Another Ky booster, prominent politician Dang Van Sung, is said to be working for the cooperation of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao political-religious groups] [Supporters of Chief of State Thieu, on the other hand, are reportedly developing a civilian front to en- dorse the military candidate for President. They as- sume this will be Thieu. The activity suggests that Ky and Thieu are taking seriously their unannounced can- didacies and that they are taking appropriate measures to gauge their chances for success] The Military Situation in South Vietnam: The enemy mortar attack on the US airbase at Da Nang on 27 Febru- ary killed 11 Americans and seriously wounded 27 others, according to revised casualty reports. Eighteen US air- craft were damaged and five communications vans were destroyed. From positions about four miles south of the base, the Communists for the first time fired Soviet-designed 140-mm. barrage rockets--a weapon not previously known to have been in the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong inven- tory. Some of the 51 rockets fired hit a village near the base, killing 32 South Vietnamese civilians and damaging about 200 homes. (Map) (continued) 28 Feb 67 25X1 Approved For Relea$e 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0P9700100001-3 25X16 Approved For Re" se North Vietnamese Political Developments: A four- man delegation, led by the chief of the DRV mission to the International Control Commission, arrived in Ran- goon on 25 February, according to western press re- ports. The event is considered potentially important because UN Secretary General Thant is in the Burmese capital. 25X1 The North Vietnamese may make contact with U Thant despite their avowed rejection of any UN role in a Viet- nam settlement. The DRV delegates could use such a meeting to reiterate to U Thant alleged US violations of the Geneva Accords and to impress upon him Hanoi's contention that a settlement of the war must be along the lines of the DRV's interpretation of those accords. Changes in North Vietnamese Government: Among several organizational changes in the DRV government recently announced by Hanoi, the most significant was the upgrading of the Ministry of Heavy Industry by the appointment of politburo member Le Thanh Nghi as its head. Until this time politburo members headed only the ministries of defense, public security and foreign affairs. In view of North Vietnam's small industrial base, it is not yet clear why the Ministry of Heavy Industry should receive such influential leadership at this time. It is possible that Hanoi is undertaking a review of its long- range plans for industrialization because of the damage done by US bombing. Le Thanh Nghi's appointment may also be connected with the major reconstruction a d re- pair efforts brought on b the bombing. 28 Feb 67 2 Approved For Releas 25X1 25X1! Approved For Re W4 25X1 Indonesia: General Suharto is pressing Congress to modify its action plan against Sukarno f 25X1 s Suharto's rationale is his need to maintain sup- port within the armed forces and to avoid further re- sentment and violence in pro-Sukarno areas. Suharto apparently believes that the turnover of power of 20 Feb- ruary was as far as the regime could go and still main- tain unanimity among the four armed services.j 1Meanwhile, anti- Sukarno political activists will continue to demand Sukarno's suspension as president and a public trial. They already are maintaining that Congress cannot limit itself merely to confirming the 20 February transfer of power. Since General Suharto has called on the nation to accept all decisions made by Congress, he may be preparing the way for a com- promise between pro- and anti-Sukarno elements 25X1 which might lead to suspension of Sukarno as presi- dent but no trial. Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO09700100001-3 I Approved For Rai NATO-UK: rMost of the representatives to the North Atlantic Council have sharply criticized Prime Minister Wilson's agreement to develop a "treaty of friendship and cooperation" with the USSR._' At an informal meeting, Secretary General Brosio argued that such a treaty would lead to a division of the alliance between those members who had declared their friendship for the USSR and those who had not. The representatives of Italy, Canada, and Denmark supported Brosio, noting that a UK-Soviet treaty would generate "uncomfortable" popular pressure in their countries to follow suit. The German and Dutch representatives criticized London's failure to consult with its NATO partners and stressed the need for a common political line to- ward the USSR. The German delegate claimed that the broad title of such a pact would be interpreted as a "radical" change in British foreign policyi The French representative termed the UK action not really compatible with "alliance obligations," not- ing that Paris had turned down a similar Soviet bid.' lWhile pique over lack of consultation is probably involved, the vigorous criticism of Britain appears to reflect genuine concern over the potentially divisive ef- fect which Soviet bilateral overtures of this nature could have on the NATO countries.I .British officials say they will begin a study of what should go into the proposed treaty, but emphasize that Wilson made it clear to Kosygin that nothing in the treaty would imply a change in Britain's attitude toward its NATO commitments. 28 Feb 67 25X1 25X1 Approved For Re ease 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 700100001-3 25X1 . Approved For RdWsIe 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00970g100001-3 Nigeria: Eastern military governor Ojukwu ap- pears to be laying the groundwork for a unilateral as- sumption of still greater regional independence after the end of the fiscal year on 31 March. On 21 February the Eastern government issued a decree giving the governor authority to impose martial law in any part of the region. The decree appears aimed at forestalling subversive activity by troublesome mi- nority tribes in the East. Recent reports indicate that the East's army--officially one battalion--has been re- organized as a brigade, and that extensive recruiting has been undertaken. Ojukwu, in a radio address on 25 February, warned the other regional military leaders that unless the agree- ments made in Ghana last month were fully implemented by 31 March he would consider himself free to take any measures necessary to protect Eastern interests. COjukwu told US and UK representatives in Enugu that the next two weeks would be crucial. He has asked to see them again early this week, and the US ambassador and the UK high commissioner as well. Ojukwu's sec- retary added that the financial situation is critical be- cause the East needs substantially more revenue to take care of the approximately one million refugees from other parts of Nigeria.' The Lagos press has strongly attacked Ojukwu's de- cree. His threat to make further moves toward inde- pendence should encourage those hardliners in the other regions who are pressuring Gowon to take military meas- ures to halt the Eastern Region's moves toward inde- pendence. Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A009700100001-3 25X1 Approved For Re "se 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0097q Chile: President Frei's second rebuff by the Senate in less than six weeks will further complicate the Chilean political situation, Frei's proposed constitutional amendment permit- ting the president to dissolve Congress and call new elections failed to pass in the Senate on 23 February. In spite of strong pressure by the administration, the only support outside Frei's own Christian Democratic party came from the Nationalists and the Communists. The effect of this vote on Frei's position is unclear. The government had insisted on an early vote, possibly with the intention of injecting national affairs into the forthcoming municipal elections, which normally hinge on local rather than national issues. Although the Senate's vote looks like a defeat for Frei, Ambassador Dungan comments that the government probably never contemplated making the concessions necessary to en- act the reform proposal. 28 Feb 67 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00P700100001-3 T6ff Si fed" Rele a 2003/05/19: CIA-RDP79T00975A002 0100001-3 Top Secret Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO09700100001-3