CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A010500140001-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 21, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 17, 1967
Content Type:
REPORT
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
c 193
17 November. 1967
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17 November 1967
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Cyprus: The situation has eased, but fighting could
resume and bring quick Turkish intervention.
(Page 1)
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Congo (Kinshasa)- New snags are delaying evacuation
of mercenaries and Katangans from Rwanda. (Page 4)
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USSR: Nonproliferation treaty (Page 5)
France: IRBM difficulties (Page 6)
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Cyprus: The situation has eased after the bitter
clash between Greek and Turkish Cypriot forces on
15 November, but the truce is fragile and renewed fight-
ing could lead to early Turkish military intervention.
The tactical status quo ante has been essentially
re-established in the area where the fighting took place.
About 25 persons were killed in the fighting with the
number of casualties divided about evenly between the
two communities, according to local reports.
Nearly all observers on the island agree that Greek
General George Grivas, the commander of the Cypriot
National Guard, precipitated the current crisis by his
insistence on sending an armed Cypriot patrol through
an area held by the Turkish Cypriots. Cypriot Presi-
dent Makarios asserts that Grivas went far beyond what
he was authorized to do. It seems likely, however, that
Grivas had cleared his actions beforehand with the main-
land Greek military authorities.
Available evidence indicates that Turkish air strikes
against the positions occupied by Grivas' forces on
15 November might have taken place as early as dawn
of 16 November if the positions had not been evacuated.
Turkish ground and naval forces also went into a con-
dition of advanced readiness, possibly for operations
against mainland Greek forces in the Aegean and Greek
Thrace. Both Turk and Greek forces remain on the alert.
Turkish officials recognize the role US diplomats
played in inducing the withdrawal of the Greek Cypriot
forces, but anti-US elements have seized the opportunity
to blame Washington for the whole crisis. They insti-
gated street demonstrations in both Istanbul and Ankara
on 16 November, and they will probably follow this up
17 Nov 67
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Congo (Kinshasa). Efforts to evacuate Schramme's
mercenaries and Katangans from Rwanda are making
headway, but new complications have arisen.
On 15 November the mercenaries,
I I signed a commitment in the presence of OAU
and Red ross observers not to return to Africa. The
departure of the mercenaries is still held up by Con-
golese insistence that their countries give similar guar-
antees and by Mobutu's demands for indemnification
for damage resulting from the mercenaries' activities.
New problems have also cropped up in the case of
the 2,400 Katangans. A poll conducted by Congolese
Government representatives in the presence of the Red
Cross indicated that, contrary to previous expectations,
most of the Katangans want to take advantage of Mo-
butu's amnesty and return to the Congo. Mobutu has
already asked for US aircraft to transport them. The
Red Cross representative, however, believes the Con-
golese subjected the Katangans to "extreme" pressure.
He has recommended that the Red Cross have nothing
to do with their return to the Congo unless Mobutu pro-
vides further
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USSR: Despite hard bargaining in Geneva, Mos-
cow continues to consult closely with the US on tactics
for guiding a nonproliferation treaty through the UN.
Soviet delegates said this week that the USSR's posi-
tion on non-use of force--a topic expected to come up
next week--would be cast in terms which would not
draw US opposition. The Russians also reaffirmed
their readiness to cooperate at the UN in heading off
efforts by nonnuclear nations to scuttle the treaty and
in avoiding heated exchanges on disarmament topics
that might jeopardize the treaty's progress.
(continued)
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France: De Gaulle's land-based IRBM program
continues to be plagued by difficulties. French offi-
cials admit that the second full- scale test of the two-
stage missile, conducted on 10 November, was unsat-
isfactory. Failure of the first two- stage test flight
in July and other problems had already forced a delay
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in the deployment date, from mid-1969 to 1970.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The United States Intelligence Board on 16 Novem-
ber 1967 approved the following national intelligence
estimate:
NIE 11-14- 67, "The Soviet and East European Gen- nr_V 4
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Top Secret
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