CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A010700100001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 15, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
C s
15 January 1968
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Central Intellzence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Laos: Communists overrun Nam Bac, (Page 3)
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Cyprus: Makarios calls for presidential election.
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Cuba: Castro criticizes US "imperialism" and
Communists who lack revolutionary vigor. (Page 6)
Yugoslavia: Party purges opponents of Tito's liberal
reforms. (Page 8)
West Germany - Yugoslavia: Diplomatic ties (Page 9)
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CHINA
THAILAND
2.5 St)
MILES
sum neuaI
Nakhon Phanom
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Laos: The Communists have succeeded in over-
running the important Laotian outpost at Nam Bac.
The collapse of the government's defense peri-
meter on 14 January culminated a ten- month campaign
by the Communists to reoccupy an area they lost in
August 1966, after controlling it for nearly ten years.
Government forces are being redeployed approximately
20 miles to the south to block further Communist ad-
vances.
Lack of communication with Nam Bac has pre-
cluded an accurate assessment of the situation, but it
appears that the Laotian Armed Forces General Staff,
faced with growing Communist military pressure, de-
cided that it was not worthwhile to hold the position.
The King, fearing the loss of Nam Bac would threaten
the approaches to the royal capital at Luang Prabang,
had pressured the military into overextending itself
in order to defend the area. This had resulted in a
general weakening of the government's defense posture
throughout Laos, most significantly in the south.
The loss of Nam Bac is more a reflection of the
lack of decisive leadership within the Royal Laotian
Army than an indication that the Communists have em-
barked on a larger offensive :role in Laos.
Commander in chief General Ouan Rathikoun's
reputation will probably be eroded, and there may be
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a new round of political maneuvering within the mili-
tary for control of the armed forces.
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Cyprus: President Makarios' sudden call for na-
tional elections next month may represent a significant
change in his public posture on a final settlement of the
Cyprus dispute.
His widely publicized statement calling for new
elections warned the Greek Cypriots that compromise
will be necessary since "what is desirable" is not al-
ways "feasible. " He appeared to be telling the Greek
Cypriot community that enosis--union of the island with
Greece--is no longer a realistic goal.
In an apparent gesture to the Turkish Cypriots,
Makarios for the first time referred publicly to the
"Turkish Community" rather than speaking of the
Turkish minority on the island. He also noted that a
"Charter of Rights" would be "entrenched" in the con-
stitution.
Makarios further appeared to be calling for direct
talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He de-
clared that his government is developing a "document"
which could become the basis for discussions and urged
the other side to do likewise.
Both Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leaders have
reacted cautiously to the announcement. Ankara has in-
dicated it will not oppose elections if they are held ac-
cording to the present constitution, but this could be a
sticking point as Makarios no longer regards this con-
stitution as valid. Turkish Cypriot leaders have thus
far declined to comment, probably awaiting guidance
from Ankara.
Although Makarios' new overture to the Turkish
Cypriots may clear the way for direct talks between the
two communities, past experience with Makarios weighs
heavily on the side of caution. He may be trying to con-
solidate support within his own community by silencing
criticism from the right-wing element that has been
pushing for enosis.
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Cuba. Fidel Castro has delivered one of his
most bitter'verbal attacks against US "imperialism. "
Speaking at the closing session of the interna-
tional Havana Cultural Congress on 12 January, Castro
abandoned the relatively passive tone of his more re-
cent speeches. He called the US a "universal enemy, "
the "buttress of all the reactionary governments" in
the world and compared US foreign policy with that
of Hitler. He expressed special annoyance with the
US economic denial program, saying that the US is
"sabotaging" Cuban efforts to make trade deals in
Western Europe.
Castro, returning to his theme of last summer,
made some stinging remarks about Communists who
are lacking in revolutionary vigor. Undoubtedly re-
ferring to the pro-Moscow parties in Latin America,
Castro said that Marxism needs to be revamped to
"conduct itself like a revolutionary force, not like
a pseudo revolutionary church. " Castro castigated
those parties not supporting "armed struggle" as
being in the "rear guard" of the struggle against im-
perialism. ' " ., IIA
He described Ernesto "Che" Guevara as a
paragon of revolutionary virtue, and offered to trade
100 political prisoners in Cuba "to be selected by the
CIA and the Penta on" for Guevara's corpse.
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Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav party has taken an-
other step in its long-awaited purge by ousting 400
members of the Belgrade city organization.
The expulsions are the first large-scale reflec-
tion of Tito's call in a TV interview on 29 December
for cleansing the party of members who oppose his
liberal economic and social reforms. Most of those
marked for expulsion are conservative older ex-par-
tisans and minor bureaucrats who had backed former
party secretary Aleksandar Rankovic before he was
ousted in July 1966 for opposing the reforms and
plotting against Tito.
Replacement of his supporters with new, younger
members, combined with a current reorganization of
local party machinery, will be an important step by
the liberals in consolidating their control prior to the
party congress scheduled for December.
The purge is likely to add to the regime's al-
ready ticklish nationality problem. Many Serbs, in
particular, regard the decentralizing reform program
as a blow to their prestige and economic interests.
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NOTE
West Germany - Yugoslavia: German and Yugo-
slav officials will meet in Paris this week to discuss
procedures for restoring diplomatic ties between Bonn
and Belgrade. Despite some anxiety about repercus-
sions in Bonn, both countries are eager to normalize
relations, which have been broken for more than ten
years. Neither is expected to attach conditions to such
a step. Controversial issues yet to be resolved, how-
ever, include the Yugoslav demand for indemnification
of victims of the Nazis and Bonn's desire for Yugoslav
support of the German right of self-determination.
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