CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A010700250001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
201.
1 February 1968
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1 February 19 88
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam. Situation report.. (Page 1)
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Central America: Difficulty over picking new OAS
chief is causing strains. (Page 8)
USSR-Germany. New note (Page 9)
Poland: SA-3 missiles (Page 9)
France. Arms embargo (Page 9)
Mali-Cuba: Technicians (Page 10)
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Panama. Election campaign trouble (Page 10)
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1 Feb 68 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
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*South Vietnam: The clandestine Viet Cong Libera-
tion Radio in South Vietnam and Hanoi Radio late last
night announced the establishment of a "-Revolutionary
Administration" in South Vietnam.
The "Revolutionary Administration" purportedly
would have authority and administrative power in Saigon
and in. areas where the Viet Cong have an influence on
the people. The purpose of the "Revolutionary Power,
according to the Communists, is to act as an authoritative
voice to demand the withdrawal of US forces to end the
war and to call for negotiations with the Liberation
Front. The Hanoi broadcast asserted that "an unprece-
dented enthusiastic atmosphere is powerfully mounting
throughout Saigon city and its suburbs. "
This maneuver appears to be a further step in the
overall enemy Tet offensive strategy of creating a
stronger Communist position within South Vietnam and
discrediting the present South Vietnam government.
The Tet offensive--now in its third day--appears
to be sputtering. Strong enemy influence is still pre-
valent in several major provincial capitals but is mostly
limited to scattered pockets of resistance throughout
the rest of the country.
In the northern half of South Vietnam, Communist
main force and local-level units remain entrenched in
Hue and the highland cities of Kontum and Ban Me Thuot.
New attacks on other key towns yesterday were repulsed,
and allied troops are mopping up remnants of enemy
forces still resisting in the coastal provinces of South
Vietnam's Land II Corps.
Sharp fighting flared at several points in the Saigon
area on 31 January and early on 1 February. Within
the Tan Son Nhut airfield and headquarters complex north-
west of the city allied forces met heavy opposition while
clearing out a number of enemy strongpoints. In the
capital itself, heavy fighting took place in the. race track
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area, near the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff com-
pound, and at several points downtown where enemy forces
have established pockets of resistance. The Viet Cong
have held one building in Saigon for more than 30 hours
and at last report still held the An Quang Buddhist pagoda
In the delta area south of Saigon sporadic fighting
continued early on 1 February in several provincial cap-
itals- -particularly at My Tho and Ben Tre--but nowhere
was the situation completely out of hand.
Preliminary reports of casualties during the current
enemy campaign show more than 6, 000 Communists killed
in contrast to some 575 allied. troops killed and 1, 700
wounded. Civilian casualties are expected to be high. Al-
though these figures are not complete, the enemy apparently
had little regard for losses in their attempt to stage a
spectacular countrywide show of force.
Although there has been little evidence of panic in
Saigon, various reports suggest increased fear among
the population of several other major towns and diminished
confidence in the government's ability to provide protection.
Wild rumors circulated in some northern towns that Presi-
dent Thieu may have been killed or that the US permitted
the Communist attacks in order to convince Saigon to nego-
tiate an end to the war.
While these rumors are likely to subside quickly where
allied control has been re- established, there is certain to
be extensive residual damage to the pacification program
and related activities which have been seriously disrupted
in some areas.
Vietnamese Communist propaganda is continuing to
give heavy play to the upsurge in military activity and to
stress that its size and scope demonstrate the Communist
capabilities to stand up to US military power.
Viet Cong action in the two northern provinces of Quang
Tri and Thua Thien., has received particular attention. In
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a broadcast of 31 January Hanoi reported that the popu-
lace of these provinces was supporting the Communist
efforts. It claimed that the Viet Cong were in control
of Hue and were advancing toward seizing control of
both provinces. Viet Cong attacks in Saigon have also
been singled out as particularly significant in demon-
strating Communist ability to strike at the heart of the
enemy camp.
Hanoi has made no attempt to portray the current
offensive as the conclusive phase in the Communist
struggle although there are a few propaganda claims
that it represents a step toward 'final" or "total" victory.
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Central America: [The difficulty in electing a new
OAS secretary general has become a source of strain
among the Central American republics.
LThe lack of consensus is the only certain result
of a meeting among the foreign ministers from Panama
and Central America held on 26 January. The pro-
moters of the meeting had hoped the ministers could
agree on how to force the withdrawal of the three
present candidates in favor of a more acceptable one.
The foreign ministers will meet again on 5 February
in a last-ditch attempt to achieve regional unity before
the fifth ballot is taken. I
None of the present candidates can be sure of a
clear-cut victory. Another :impasse or even a close
victory would further tarnish the image of the OAS.7
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*USSR-Germany; Moscow has poured more cold
water on West German hopes to negotiate an exchange
of declarations with the USSR renouncing the use of
force. In a note delivered on 29 January, the Russians
indicated that Bonn would have to go a long way toward
recognizing East Germany as the price of such an
agreement. The note, in addition to mollifying the
East Germans, will test how far Bonn will go in its
eagerness for progress on its eastern policy. Foreign
Minister Brandt is evidently determined to continue
the dialogue with the Soviets despite.this latest rebuff,
but support for his efforts within the Bonn coalition is
bound to diminish as a result of this Soviet action?
Poland: [The first SA-3 surface-to-air missile site
in Poland has been sighted at Brzeg, near Wroclaw in
the southwestern part of the country. Like the 22 SA-3
sites recently deployed with Soviet troops in East Ger-
many, the site in Poland is at a tactical airfield. The
SA-3 low-altitude air defense missile system probably
will be made available to Soviet troops elsewhere in
Poland and to the USSR's forces in Hungary. All but a
few of the sites in Germany have now received equip-
ment, and missiles have been seen at four sites, sug-
gesting that they are nearly operational.?
France: LDe Gaulle told departing Ambassador Bohlen
that France's embargo on arms to Israel is in effect and
gave the impression that it would remain so for a long
time, De Gaulle confirmed that France would sell Mirages
to Iraq, since it was not in his eyes a "battlefield, " He
indicated, however, that it would be some years before
the planes would be produced. Iraq's President Arif ar-
rives in Paris on 7 February, and arms sales are ex-
pected to figure prominently in talks then
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Mali-Cuba,\Cuba has agreed to send 400 techni-
The first contingent of
cians to Mali over an extended period of time,
Cubans report, y will arrive in March. Some prob-
ably will be involved in training the Malian civilian
militia. Cuban assistance at the scale indicated
would represent a substantial effort by the Castro
regime to expand its influence in Mali. Only 25 Cuban
technicians, all nonmilitary, are there now.
Panama, [Partisans of presidential candidates
Samudio and Arias could clash at a campaign rally
to be staged by Arias in western Panama on 3 February.
Both sides are preparing for trouble, and Samudio's
supporters reportedly have plans for a deliberate
provocation. National Guard Commandant Vallarino
of hand.
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guard commander could allow the situation to get out
has vowed to maintain order, but the anti-Arias local
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