CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A011200070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 18, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
46
18 May 1968
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No. 0159/68
18 May 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Czechoslovakia: Soviet leaders visit Prague in
effort to bring matters to a head. (Page 2)
Poland-Hungary: Warsaw is prodding the Hungarians
to help contain Czechoslovak liberalism. (Page 4)
Finland-USSR: Finnish Social Democrats in Moscow
to establish relations with Soviet Communist Party.
(Page 5)
Laos: The Communist push against Na Khang has
stalled, but pressure is increasing in other areas.
(Page 7)
Hungary-Rumania: Minorities issue may again irri-
tate Budapest's relations with some of its neighbors.
(Page 8)
France: The government attitude to the unrest has
stiffened. (Page 9)
Berlin: Rightist rally (Page 10)
Berlin: Access problem (Page 10)
USSR: Attack sub (Page 11)
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THAILAND
\ NCR'S
vIETNAid
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.Queng In
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CAMBODIA
PHNOM
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Pleiku.
Da tat?
Can Tho
CAM RANH
SOUTH VIETNAM
!.`7,C,K,n,..eters
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[Vietnam:
South Vietnam: Military activity remains gen-
erally light, but signs point toward new enemy of-
fensive actions in the near future.
The enemy threat to Da Nang appears to be in-
creasing. Communist mortar attacks along the Quang
Nam - Quang Tin Province border have increased
markedly in the past several days, possibly to
cover troop movements toward Da Nang. The North
Vietnamese Second Division, which recently overran
an allied Special Forces camp in Quang Tin Province
may be headed in that direction.
North Vietnam: Hanoi's propaganda has harshly
rejected Ambassador Harriman's suggestions of areas
of similarity in US and North Vietnamese positions.
The propaganda comes down hard on the bombing as
the first substantive issue to be tackled in the
Paris talks.
At the same time the Communists have polished
up their negotiations scenario in another effort
to extract additional US concessions prior to mov-
ing on to other business. A North Vietnamese spokes-
man said in Paris on 17 May that if the bombing
and all other acts of war are stopped uncondition-
ally, "we will be ready to discuss a political set-
tlement for Vietnam." Earlier formulations almost
always framed postbombing talks with such ambiguous
phrases as "other matters of interest to the two
25X1 sides." (Map) ]
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*Czechoslovakia: The simultaneous visits to
Prague by Soviet Premier Kosygin and Marshal Grechko
signal a new and perhaps climactic point in the
crisis.
The hard bargaining that is certain to take
place will probably find the Soviets insisting on
some firm commitments from the Czechoslovaks to
moderate their recent course. More specifically,
Kosygin probably will demand assurances that Prague
will effectively suppress, or at least curb, dis-
sidence within and outside the Communist Party.
Kosygin may be prepared in return to respond
to Prague's request for a massive and desperately
needed loan equivalent to $400-500 million. Ac-
cording to Czechoslovak Premier Cernik, the Soviets
refused a definite commitment for a loan when the
Czechoslovak leaders visited Moscow earlier this
month, saying that they would have to analyze the
proposal.
The presence of Grechko, along with members
of the Soviet high military command and commanders
of the Soviet forces which have taken up positions
near the Czechoslovak borders, will lend visible
support to Kosygin's arguments. At least, the
show of military brass will remind Prague that the
Soviets retain the option of armed intervention in
the event no modus vivendi is reached. Soviet
units are still ranged around the Czechoslovak
border.
Prague apparently got little warning of Kosy-
gin's arrival yesterday for what the Czechoslovaks
announced was a "continuation" of earlier talks.
Cernik had indicated only four days ago that Kosy-
gin had been invited but that the visit would not
take place for some time.
(continued)
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Conservatives in Czechoslovakia, buoyed by the
Soviet pressure tactics of the ?past week, have now
begun to criticize the liberal trend. The recently
ousted rector of the party school suggested on 15
May that the government in effect impose some sort
of censorship on the press. Conservatives, more-
over, may have been connected with the dissemina-
tion of leaflets which attack the liberals for
attempting to restore a "bourgeois republic."
The liberals, on the other hand, continue to
call for the ouster of conservatives from the party's
central committee. The controversy doubtless will
be intensified in the central committee if it meets
as scheduled on 29 May.
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Poland-Hungary: The Poles are attempting to
prod Hungary into helping contain the contagious
Czechoslovak liberalism.
Speaking at ceremonies marking the renewal of
Poland's friendship treaty with Hungary on 16 May,
Polish party boss Gomulka stressed the mutual obli-
gations of the two countries to the socialist bloc.
Unlike Kadar, Gomulka singled out the Warsaw Pact
alliance as the major vehicle for intrabloc coop-
eration. He stressed the dangers to Hungary and
Poland of external and internal "anti-socialist,
imperialist subversion." Kadar ignored these warn-
ings in his remarks.
Gomulka is worried about the impact of events
in Prague on the rest of Eastern Europe. He shares
Soviet fears over a loss of Communist control in
Czechoslovakia. His predilection for national au-
tonomy and fear of setting adverse precedents, how-
ever, probably led him to counsel the Soviets to
avoid military intervention. Recent Polish support
for the moderate Czechoslovak leaders, coupled with
criticism of the party's extreme liberals, suggests
that the Poles hope Dubcek will be able to put his
house in order.
The Hungarian regime is torn between approval
of Czechoslovakia's new course and concern that the
reformers could go too far. Even more than Gomulka,
Kadar probably fears the constraints on his own
position which could result from a decision by Mos-
cow to press for coordinated pressures against Czech-
oslovakia.
According to Czechoslovak Premier Cernik, Dub-
cek will lead a delegation to Budapest in June to
renew Czechoslovakia's 20-year bilateral alliance
with Hungary. Much of the visit, however, probably
will be devoted to the situation facing both coun-
tries.
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Finland-USSR: A Finnish Social Democratic
Party delegation is in Moscow to establish official
relations with the Soviet Communist Party.
The visit of the six-man delegation, led by
Social Democratic chairman and former prime minis-
ter Paasio, is in response to a Soviet invitation
issued last year. It is the first major step in
his party's program, enunciated in 1967, to develop
contacts with the Communist parties of Eastern Eu-
rope. The program resulted from a decision by
party leaders that their domestic fortunes would be
best served by abandoning their traditional anti-
Communist and anti-Soviet stance. The long history
of ill will between the Social Democrats and Moscow
led to their exclusion from the government from
1958 to 1966.
Although a major purpose of the visit will be
to reaffirm the party's support of Finland's policy
of friendship toward the Soviet Union, the visit
also has certain narrower domestic political objec-
tives. By demonstrating a new-found respectability
in Moscow, the leadership hopes to better the par-
ty's competitive position among the Finnish Left
and to undercut the Finnish Communist Party and the
dissident left-Socialist Simonists. There is a
danger that the move will alienate the party's right
wing, which does not favor increased ties with the
Soviets.
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LAOS
CHINA
ciiINA
???0
? ?Na
N 0 R T
VIE I N A M
THAILAND
? Government-held location
Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
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Laos: The Communist offensive against Na
Khang has stalled but the enemy is increasing
pressure in other areas.
With the support of heavy US air strikes,
government troops have reoccupied a number of out-
lying defensive positions around Na Khang lost in
early May. The Communists, however, appear to be
continuing their buildup. There are reports that
additional troops are moving in.
North of Paksane, the enemy is stepping up
pressure against government outposts. Ground ob-
servers have noted the movement of North Vietnamese
troops into the area. A recently captured enemy
document outlined an offensive plan which included
an attack against Paksane itself. The government
has responded with additional troops and air strikes.
In the south, the Communists may be preparing
for an upsurge of activity in the Bolovens Plateau
area which has been quiet in recent weeks. They
overran a government outpost on 16 May some 17
miles east of Khong Sedone and briefly renewed
their mortar attacks on the provincial capital of
25X1 Attopeu. (Map)
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Hungary-Rumania: Hungary's reported plans to
increase its news coverage on the welfare of the
Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
and Rumania may become an irritant in Budapest's
relations with some of its neighbors.
The Hungarian Writers Union last week approved
a proposal for "regular and organized" press cover-
age of the cultural and social development of Hun-
garian minorities in nei hboring countries,
If, I
, the main thrust is to be directed toward
rne 1.9 million Hungarians living in Rumania, Buda-
pest probably will use factual reports and only
subtle criticism in order to avoid releasing poten-
tially uncontrollable nationalist forces in Hungary.
During a period of particularly bad feeling
over the Transylvanian minority in the mid-1960s,
the Soviets reportedly goaded the Hungarians into
making nationalistic statements in response to Ru-
mania's irridentist claims to the Soviet territo-
ries of Bessarabia and Bukhovina. The Hungarian
regime, however, was very cautious in its public
handling of the situation.
Unless the currently proposed increase in cov-
erage of Transylvanian minorities takes the same
cautious approach, Bucharest probably will view it
as a threat to Ceausescu's relatively successful
efforts to reduce tension among the Hungarian mi-
nority.
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France: The government has stiffened its at-
titude to spreading student and labor unrest.
Premier Pompidou, who earlier tried to restore
calm by granting student demands and withdrawing
riot police from the Sorbonne area, issued a stern
warning on 16 May against further disorder. He
also augmented the Paris police force and mobilized
units of France's national guard. Although thou-
sands of extra police now protect key points in the
capital, no attempt has been made to regain con-
trol of the universities. Any such move, the gov-
ernment apparently reasons, would lead to more vio-
lence.
Pompidou's warning was also directed against
labor disturbances set off by the student crisis.
Acting without orders from union leaders, workers
have taken over a number of factories and declared
strikes of "unlimited duration." France's state-
controlled radio and television network and Orly
airport have been partially closed by strikes.
The government's firmer stance may produce a
degree of unity previously lacking in student-labor
relations, but problems remain. Although the stu-
dents' and professors' unions issued a joint com-
munique on 17 May declaring that the entrance of
workers into the struggle had altered the situation
in their favor, France's largest labor union is
still unenthusiastic about cooperating with students
A National Assembly vote on a censure motion
against the government is scheduled for 22 May.
Even though the vote will be close, the cabinet is
likely to survive. Pompidou is reportedly thinking
of a major cabinet reorganization, but De Gaulle,
who returns from Rumania on Sunday, may balk at im-
mediate change as an unworthy submission to public
pressure. In any case, no solution is in sight.
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NOTES
Berlin: The rightist National Democratic
Party (NPD) in West Berlin has designated today as
"NPD Day" and plans to hold a rally. The leftist
student "extraparliamentary opposition" may stage
a counterdemonstration. West Berlin police are
prepared for such an eventuality. Strong opposi-
tion and difficulties in acquiring a hall may mean
a last-minute cancellation of the rally. The East
Germans, who have condemned vigorously the NPD's
intention to stage the affair, would almost cer-
25X1 tainly claim the credit for its cancellation.
25X1
Berlin: East Germany may be considering visa
and passport requirements for West Germans transit-
ing its territory.
told a West German journalist that
Pankow soon can be expected to institute such reg-
ulations. The Soviets have backed Pankow's travel
bans on Bonn officials and members of the rightist
National Democratic Party, measures which do not
affect Allied access. Bonn's reluctance to take
strong measures against the bans may have convinced
the Communists that the time is ripe for more re-
strictions. Enforcement of the existing measures
has, however, been highly selective.
(continued)
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USSR: One of the USSR's newest torpedo attack
submarines was sighted off the Kola Peninsula on
25 April. The unit, probably built at the Gorkiy
shipyard, is one of two new classes of nuclear
powered attack submarines under construction in the
USSR. It probably has considerably better perform-
ance than the 15 older nuclear powered attack sub-
marines in the Soviet inventory and may have a
speed and diving depth comparable to the latest US
attack submarines.
(Photo)
NEW SOVIET ATTACK SUBMARINE
Sighted off Kola Peninsula on 25 April
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