CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
17
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 12, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 6, 1968
Content Type:
REPORT
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
6 June 1968
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No. 0.175/68
6 June 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
France:. Students intransigent, but transport and
postal workers expected to return to work. (Page 2)
Yugoslavia: Student unrest has spread from Bel-
grade to other cities. (Page 3)
Poland: Some 3,000 to 3,500 Jews have been processed
for emigration to Israel in the past year. (Page 4)
Belgium: Formation of a new government may be an-
nounce in a few days. (Page 5)
Burma: Tribal insurgents may cooperate with Commu--
nists from China. (Page 7)
Ni eria: Gowon threatens to push Biafrans "to the
wall." (Page 9)
Algeria-Tunisia: New strains threaten the fragile
cordiality. (Page 10)
Somali Re ublic: A labor confederation has called
a general strike for 10 June. (Page 11)
C rus: Greek and Turkish Cypriots talk (Page 12)
Bolivia: Terrorist bombing (Page 12)
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.~~. Saigon city limits
Police precinct
Cholon
1i z T 1Mile
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[South Vietnam: There are few signs of any let-
up in the military pressure on Saigon.
Prisoners, captured documents, and the pattern
of recent Communist military thrusts into the city
all point to prolonged pressure in the capital area
for the next few months.. The Communists are not
after permanent control.. They penetrate the city
in small bands and precipitate fighting that causes
as much damage and destruction as possible.
Prisoners say their instructions are to fight
in turns, put up as much resistance as possible for
seven days,. and then pull out in favor of another
group. Prisoners also say that the first precinct
is the primary target. So far this precinct has
been.. disturbed only by rocket and mortar rounds,
but there are lucrative propaganda targets in the
precinct--the US Embassy and many important South
Vietnamese Government buildings.
Since the attacks on the capital city were re-
sumed on 5 May, damage to civilian targets may well
have surpassed the proportions of the Tet offensive.
Statistics are available only from 5 to 14 May, but
in that period civilian casualties had already
reached 3,000, some 23,000 homes had been destroyed
(Map) j
6 Jun 68 1
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C France: The student situation remained dead-
locked, but breaks have come in two key sectors on
the strike front.
Extremists are still in control of the Sor-
bonne and Nanterre, and exercise varying degrees
of control in other universities throughout the
country. Pro-Gaullist students and moderates who
are interested only in educational reform attempted
to dislodge the radicals in Lyon on 4 June but
were repulsed after a violent four-hour fight.
Both students and professors in Paris believe that
if either police or newly formed Gaullist "civic
action" groups.attempted to seize university build-
ings, students might resort to armed resistance.
The government is not likely to move against
students, however, until after the parliamentary
elections of 23 and 30 June. By that time the gov-
ernment probably hopes that moderate students agree-
able to negotiations with the Ministry of Education
will have improved their position in relation to
the radical groups, and that by backing up the mod-
erates with police intervention the universities
can be reclaimed for the state.
Transport and postal workers are expected to
return to work today, but the "massive return-to-
work" movement which was predicted by the govern-
ment has not yet materialized.
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Yugoslavia: Student unrest has spread from
Belgrade to other cities.
Students throughout Yugoslavia are reportedly
voicing support for the Belgrade students. Demon-
strations broke out in Sarajevo, the capital of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the night of 4 June. In Bel-
grade defiant students continue to occupy various
university buildings which they seized on 3 June.
Scattered criticism of some elements of the
regime has begun to crop up. One student placard
carried the slogan "Down with the Red Bourgeoisie,"
an allusion to Yugoslavia's affluent Communists.
The students also have demanded the dismissal of
security officials whom they hold responsible for
police brutality.
The students are getting support from faculty
members at Belgrade university, which has closed
for a week. The entire liberal arts faculty re-
portedly has resigned. The University Council,
announcing its support of student demands, has
agreed to work with students to seek satisfaction
from Serbian authorities.
Reflecting the regime's concern, top Serbian
party and government leaders have been attending
student protest meetings. The Serbian executive
council met in emergency session and Belgrade party
chief Veljko Vlakovic went on national television
to express general approval of student grievances.
The executive committee of the Yugoslav party,
however, has made it clear that violence, pressure,
and a departure from the general party line will
not be tolerated. The Serbian Interior Ministry,
in particular, has taken a hard line, banning all
rallies in Belgrade and blaming "irresponsible
elements" for causing the riots.
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Poland: Some 3000 to 3,500 Polish Jews have
been processed for emigration to Israel in the past
year.
These figures, however, represent intent and
not actual departures. Although about 500 Polish
Jews filed applications in April with the Dutch,
who handle Israeli interests in Warsaw, and about
600 did so in May, actual departures totaled only
45 and 119. Most of the applications appear to be
for "previsas," which entitle the applicants to ob-
tain exit permits from Polish authorities.
Despite an atmosphere of tension and anxiety
among Polish Jews, many apparently are hesitant
about actually leaving. The probability of loss
of property through customs obstructionism is for
some a barrier. Another is a four-year old Polish
law requiring university graduates to practice
their professions for a specific time or to compen-
sate the government for the cost of their education,
a penalty which for some could amount to the equiv-
alent of $4,000-5,000.
The Polish Foreign Ministry has been "extremely
cooperative" in assisting with the emigration pro-
gram, according to Dutch sources. For example, as
a result of Dutch representations the regime's one-
week time limitation for departure from Poland after
exit permits were issued to prospective emigrants
was recently extended to one month.
At least for now, the regime appears to be im-
plementing Gomulka's offer of June 1967 to permit
emigration "to Israel" by all Polish Jews who wish
to go. Not all of the emigrants who subsequently
are processed by Jewish relief agencies in Vienna
choose, however, to go to Israel. Some are proc-
essed for entry to other countries, including the
US.
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Belgium: Formation of a new coalition govern-
ment may be announced within a few days.
The major obstacles which have plagued earlier
efforts to form a government after the elections on
31 May appear to have been overcome. Caretaker
Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants announced recently
that his Social Christians and the Socialists have
agreed on a common approach to handling the divisive
linguistic issues, including the future of the Uni-
versity of Louvain. This precipitated the govern-
ment crisis in early February.
There is still some chance that snags will de-
velop on other aspects of a government program,
including the budget and general economic and for-
eign policies. Although the two parties have dif-
fered widely on these questions in the past, the
spirit of compromise which marked their approach to
the more emotional linguistic issues probably will
prevail. It is likely that events in France and
the student occupation of the University of Brussels
have finally given a sense of urgency to government
negotiations.
It is uncertain whether Vanden Boeynants will
assume the premiership of the new government. Al-
though he is formateur, he is less acceptable to
the Socialists than would be other Social Christian
leaders. He has informally said that he would only
head a coalition that includes the Liberals, the
third major party. This the Socialists steadfastly
oppose.
Liberal support for the proposed linguistic
legislation will be needed if the bills are to re-
ceive the necessary two-thirds support in parlia-
ment, since a Social Christian - Socialist coali-
tion would have on1 28 of the 212 seats.
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Kachin Insurgents May Permit Communist Access to lower Burma
CHINA
BHUTAN
I N I) 1 A
I Operating Areas-
r, of Kachin
Independence Army
IS,
PAKISTAN
L1.S t ) Naw Sengs
I aIagm Followers: }
t j
Bas,sein`o
Operating Areas
of White Flag
Communist Party
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Burma: Leaders of the Kachin insurgents may
permit Communists from China to travel through their
territory into lower Burma, but they seem opposed
to any further cooperation.
Although no final decision has been reported,
several leaders of the Kachin Independence Army
were said last month to be considering a laissez-
faire policy toward the Kachin Communist, Naw Seng.
He recently returned to Burma after many years in
Communist China and now leads pro-Peking Kachins
who are allied with the White Flag Communist Party.
Under the new policy, the Kachins would oppose Com-
munist forces only if they attempted to occupy
Kachin lands. They would not interfere with Commu-
nists passing through a narrow corridor to the White
Flag base area in lower Burma.
For the past year, the Naw Seng group has at-
tempted to gain Kachin cooperation. The Kachin in-
surgent movement, however, is dedicated to the es-
tablishment. of an autonomous state, and most of its
leaders prefer to remain free of entanglements with
other groups.
Peking to date has been cautious in its efforts
to provide material support for Communist insurgents
in Burma, apparently extending only arms and train-
ing on a small scale. Although the access of White
.Flag Communists to the border area may be facili-
tated, it seems unlikely that the Chinese will be
willing to go much beyond their present level of
support. (Map)
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SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA
Enugu
~OOnitsha
. Umua h icy
,'Abih
Port Harcourt, a a'~
FERNAND" P0
(SpJ _s?'.
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Nigeria: Following the breakdown of the Kam-
pala peace talks on 31 May, federal leader Gowon
reaffirmed that Biafra must renounce secession or
be "pushed to the wall."
He left the door open, however, for further
talks. The Biafrans walked out of the Kampala
meeting after failing to get an immediate, uncondi-
tional cease-fire.
I Gowon indicated yesterday in a press conference
that federal troops will complete the occupation of
the Rivers State, hoping that the secessionists will
then back down. If the Ibos continue their resist-
ance, however, Gowon reaffirmed his intent to oc-
cupy all of Biafra. al I(Map) 25X1
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Algeria-Tunisia: New strains threaten the frag-
ile cordiality recently built up between Tunis and
Algiers.
The latest incident to exacerbate relations
was Tunisia's announcement on 4 June that former
Algerian army chief of staff Tahar Z'Biri had ap-
plied for political asylum in Tunisia.
ITunisia
would not be above using Z'Biri's presence to re-
taliate for recent Algerian press attacks and diplo-
matic slights, and as an instrument of counterpres--
sure.
Last month Algerian newspapers distorted a
statement made in the US by Tunisian President
Bourguiba into a criticism of Algeria's acceptance
of Soviet arms. Earlier this year they published
a report that Tunisia was about to join CENTO. In
each case the Algerian Foreign Ministry promptly
demanded an explanation from Tunisia..
Z'Biri's presence in Tunisia represents in
Algerian eyes a threat to its internal security.
As such it will almost certainly revive Algerian
fears that it is being "encircled by US imperial-
ism and its lackeys," particularly as Bourguiba
has just returned from the US. An additional
cause for Algerian suspicions may be the apparent
Moroccan support for Algerian opposition leader
Belkacem Krim and the fact that Moroccan King
Hassan recently conferred with Bou . uiba after the
King's visit in the Middle East.
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Somali Republic: The General Confederation of
Somali Labor hopes to mount a general strike in
Mogadiscio and several other locations on 10 June.
There are several labor confederations in So-
malia. This one is affiliated with the Communist-
dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. It has
not been particularly effective and probably could
not mount a serious strike on its own. Soviet-
backed opponents of Prime Minister Egal, however,
may be planning to use the strike to attack his
government.
The party has unsuccessfully attempted to mount
antigovernment demonstrations in the past. The po-
lice have been alerted, and the party president is
even reported to be keeping President Abdirascid
Ali Shermarke informed on these activities.
The reported Soviet involvement could be in-
dicative, however, of Soviet displeasure with Egal.
The USSR, heavily involved in providing economic
and military assistance to Somalia, has viewed with
concern Egal's generally pro-Western policies since
he became prime m' in 1967.
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Cyprus: What are described as "full talks"
will open in Nicosia on 24 June between represent-
atives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
The representatives held preliminary discussions in
Beirut this week after weeks of haggling over a mu-
tually agreeable site. The meeting marked the first
open contact between the rival groups since Decem-
ber 1963. Continuing discussions will allow some
optimism that intercommunal peace may be maintained
on the island, but the basic problems dividing
Greek and Turkish Cypriot remain formidable.
Bolivia: Nervousness has increased as a re-
sult of the fourth terrorist bombing in three weeks
in La Paz. On the evening of 3 June a bomb exploded
just a block away from where President Barrientos
was scheduled to meet with leaders of the teachers'
strike. The police have no leads, and it is not
known whether one group is responsible for all the
recent bombings. Political tension has been inten-
sified by disorders in Santa Cruz and the threat
of an all-out teachers' strike.
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