CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 12, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
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Publication Date: 
June 6, 1968
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3.pdf670.03 KB
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Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A01130~110001e- DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Secret 50 6 June 1968 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 Approved For Release 2003/02/W.tWP79T00975A011300110001-3 No. 0.175/68 6 June 1968 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1) France:. Students intransigent, but transport and postal workers expected to return to work. (Page 2) Yugoslavia: Student unrest has spread from Bel- grade to other cities. (Page 3) Poland: Some 3,000 to 3,500 Jews have been processed for emigration to Israel in the past year. (Page 4) Belgium: Formation of a new government may be an- nounce in a few days. (Page 5) Burma: Tribal insurgents may cooperate with Commu-- nists from China. (Page 7) Ni eria: Gowon threatens to push Biafrans "to the wall." (Page 9) Algeria-Tunisia: New strains threaten the fragile cordiality. (Page 10) Somali Re ublic: A labor confederation has called a general strike for 10 June. (Page 11) C rus: Greek and Turkish Cypriots talk (Page 12) Bolivia: Terrorist bombing (Page 12) Approved For Release 2003/Qgj ..CDP79T00975A011300110001-3 Approved For Release 2003/6'3t27"CIATRDP79T00975A011300110001-3 .~~. Saigon city limits Police precinct Cholon 1i z T 1Mile l`,b,~ Approved For Release (SfifgTP79TOO975AO1 Approved For Release 2003/02& ~-P79T00975A011300110001-3 [South Vietnam: There are few signs of any let- up in the military pressure on Saigon. Prisoners, captured documents, and the pattern of recent Communist military thrusts into the city all point to prolonged pressure in the capital area for the next few months.. The Communists are not after permanent control.. They penetrate the city in small bands and precipitate fighting that causes as much damage and destruction as possible. Prisoners say their instructions are to fight in turns, put up as much resistance as possible for seven days,. and then pull out in favor of another group. Prisoners also say that the first precinct is the primary target. So far this precinct has been.. disturbed only by rocket and mortar rounds, but there are lucrative propaganda targets in the precinct--the US Embassy and many important South Vietnamese Government buildings. Since the attacks on the capital city were re- sumed on 5 May, damage to civilian targets may well have surpassed the proportions of the Tet offensive. Statistics are available only from 5 to 14 May, but in that period civilian casualties had already reached 3,000, some 23,000 homes had been destroyed (Map) j 6 Jun 68 1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003//9f f-7k$ffDP79T00975A011300110001-3 Approved For Release 20M994 iA-RDP79T00975AO11300110001-3 C France: The student situation remained dead- locked, but breaks have come in two key sectors on the strike front. Extremists are still in control of the Sor- bonne and Nanterre, and exercise varying degrees of control in other universities throughout the country. Pro-Gaullist students and moderates who are interested only in educational reform attempted to dislodge the radicals in Lyon on 4 June but were repulsed after a violent four-hour fight. Both students and professors in Paris believe that if either police or newly formed Gaullist "civic action" groups.attempted to seize university build- ings, students might resort to armed resistance. The government is not likely to move against students, however, until after the parliamentary elections of 23 and 30 June. By that time the gov- ernment probably hopes that moderate students agree- able to negotiations with the Ministry of Education will have improved their position in relation to the radical groups, and that by backing up the mod- erates with police intervention the universities can be reclaimed for the state. Transport and postal workers are expected to return to work today, but the "massive return-to- work" movement which was predicted by the govern- ment has not yet materialized. 6 Jun 68 2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27, - gIA,-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 -rtJ L l C, i Approved For Release 2003/02PR( P79T00975A011300110001-3 Yugoslavia: Student unrest has spread from Belgrade to other cities. Students throughout Yugoslavia are reportedly voicing support for the Belgrade students. Demon- strations broke out in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the night of 4 June. In Bel- grade defiant students continue to occupy various university buildings which they seized on 3 June. Scattered criticism of some elements of the regime has begun to crop up. One student placard carried the slogan "Down with the Red Bourgeoisie," an allusion to Yugoslavia's affluent Communists. The students also have demanded the dismissal of security officials whom they hold responsible for police brutality. The students are getting support from faculty members at Belgrade university, which has closed for a week. The entire liberal arts faculty re- portedly has resigned. The University Council, announcing its support of student demands, has agreed to work with students to seek satisfaction from Serbian authorities. Reflecting the regime's concern, top Serbian party and government leaders have been attending student protest meetings. The Serbian executive council met in emergency session and Belgrade party chief Veljko Vlakovic went on national television to express general approval of student grievances. The executive committee of the Yugoslav party, however, has made it clear that violence, pressure, and a departure from the general party line will not be tolerated. The Serbian Interior Ministry, in particular, has taken a hard line, banning all rallies in Belgrade and blaming "irresponsible elements" for causing the riots. 6 Jun 68 3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/ fiY li "- DP79T00975A011300110001-3 Poland: Some 3000 to 3,500 Polish Jews have been processed for emigration to Israel in the past year. These figures, however, represent intent and not actual departures. Although about 500 Polish Jews filed applications in April with the Dutch, who handle Israeli interests in Warsaw, and about 600 did so in May, actual departures totaled only 45 and 119. Most of the applications appear to be for "previsas," which entitle the applicants to ob- tain exit permits from Polish authorities. Despite an atmosphere of tension and anxiety among Polish Jews, many apparently are hesitant about actually leaving. The probability of loss of property through customs obstructionism is for some a barrier. Another is a four-year old Polish law requiring university graduates to practice their professions for a specific time or to compen- sate the government for the cost of their education, a penalty which for some could amount to the equiv- alent of $4,000-5,000. The Polish Foreign Ministry has been "extremely cooperative" in assisting with the emigration pro- gram, according to Dutch sources. For example, as a result of Dutch representations the regime's one- week time limitation for departure from Poland after exit permits were issued to prospective emigrants was recently extended to one month. At least for now, the regime appears to be im- plementing Gomulka's offer of June 1967 to permit emigration "to Israel" by all Polish Jews who wish to go. Not all of the emigrants who subsequently are processed by Jewish relief agencies in Vienna choose, however, to go to Israel. Some are proc- essed for entry to other countries, including the US. 6 Jun 68 4 Approved For Release 2003/0?(6fI_JPP79T00975A011300110001-3 Approved For Release 2003/02/2$E1JRL79T00975A011300110001-3 Belgium: Formation of a new coalition govern- ment may be announced within a few days. The major obstacles which have plagued earlier efforts to form a government after the elections on 31 May appear to have been overcome. Caretaker Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants announced recently that his Social Christians and the Socialists have agreed on a common approach to handling the divisive linguistic issues, including the future of the Uni- versity of Louvain. This precipitated the govern- ment crisis in early February. There is still some chance that snags will de- velop on other aspects of a government program, including the budget and general economic and for- eign policies. Although the two parties have dif- fered widely on these questions in the past, the spirit of compromise which marked their approach to the more emotional linguistic issues probably will prevail. It is likely that events in France and the student occupation of the University of Brussels have finally given a sense of urgency to government negotiations. It is uncertain whether Vanden Boeynants will assume the premiership of the new government. Al- though he is formateur, he is less acceptable to the Socialists than would be other Social Christian leaders. He has informally said that he would only head a coalition that includes the Liberals, the third major party. This the Socialists steadfastly oppose. Liberal support for the proposed linguistic legislation will be needed if the bills are to re- ceive the necessary two-thirds support in parlia- ment, since a Social Christian - Socialist coali- tion would have on1 28 of the 212 seats. 6 Jun 68 5 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02127 cj A ?P79T00975A011300110001-3 sEd Approved For Release 2003/2127`:~bk-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 Kachin Insurgents May Permit Communist Access to lower Burma CHINA BHUTAN I N I) 1 A I Operating Areas- r, of Kachin Independence Army IS, PAKISTAN L1.S t ) Naw Sengs I aIagm Followers: } t j Bas,sein`o Operating Areas of White Flag Communist Party 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/0 CQ FbP79T00975A011300110001-3 Approved For Release 2003/0,S&7 .a &&-1DP79T00975A011300110001-3 Burma: Leaders of the Kachin insurgents may permit Communists from China to travel through their territory into lower Burma, but they seem opposed to any further cooperation. Although no final decision has been reported, several leaders of the Kachin Independence Army were said last month to be considering a laissez- faire policy toward the Kachin Communist, Naw Seng. He recently returned to Burma after many years in Communist China and now leads pro-Peking Kachins who are allied with the White Flag Communist Party. Under the new policy, the Kachins would oppose Com- munist forces only if they attempted to occupy Kachin lands. They would not interfere with Commu- nists passing through a narrow corridor to the White Flag base area in lower Burma. For the past year, the Naw Seng group has at- tempted to gain Kachin cooperation. The Kachin in- surgent movement, however, is dedicated to the es- tablishment. of an autonomous state, and most of its leaders prefer to remain free of entanglements with other groups. Peking to date has been cautious in its efforts to provide material support for Communist insurgents in Burma, apparently extending only arms and train- ing on a small scale. Although the access of White .Flag Communists to the border area may be facili- tated, it seems unlikely that the Chinese will be willing to go much beyond their present level of support. (Map) 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/0 7": IA- DP79T00975A011300110001-3 SOUTHEASTERN NIGERIA Enugu ~OOnitsha . Umua h icy ,'Abih Port Harcourt, a a'~ FERNAND" P0 (SpJ _s?'. Approved For Release 2003/0 1j - DP79T00975A011300110001-3 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 SECRET Nigeria: Following the breakdown of the Kam- pala peace talks on 31 May, federal leader Gowon reaffirmed that Biafra must renounce secession or be "pushed to the wall." He left the door open, however, for further talks. The Biafrans walked out of the Kampala meeting after failing to get an immediate, uncondi- tional cease-fire. I Gowon indicated yesterday in a press conference that federal troops will complete the occupation of the Rivers State, hoping that the secessionists will then back down. If the Ibos continue their resist- ance, however, Gowon reaffirmed his intent to oc- cupy all of Biafra. al I(Map) 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/0Zjt9cIDP79T00975A011300110001-3 Approved For Release 2003/ZDP79T00975A011300110001-3 Algeria-Tunisia: New strains threaten the frag- ile cordiality recently built up between Tunis and Algiers. The latest incident to exacerbate relations was Tunisia's announcement on 4 June that former Algerian army chief of staff Tahar Z'Biri had ap- plied for political asylum in Tunisia. ITunisia would not be above using Z'Biri's presence to re- taliate for recent Algerian press attacks and diplo- matic slights, and as an instrument of counterpres-- sure. Last month Algerian newspapers distorted a statement made in the US by Tunisian President Bourguiba into a criticism of Algeria's acceptance of Soviet arms. Earlier this year they published a report that Tunisia was about to join CENTO. In each case the Algerian Foreign Ministry promptly demanded an explanation from Tunisia.. Z'Biri's presence in Tunisia represents in Algerian eyes a threat to its internal security. As such it will almost certainly revive Algerian fears that it is being "encircled by US imperial- ism and its lackeys," particularly as Bourguiba has just returned from the US. An additional cause for Algerian suspicions may be the apparent Moroccan support for Algerian opposition leader Belkacem Krim and the fact that Moroccan King Hassan recently conferred with Bou . uiba after the King's visit in the Middle East. 25X1 25X' Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2003 98 RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 25X1 25X1 Somali Republic: The General Confederation of Somali Labor hopes to mount a general strike in Mogadiscio and several other locations on 10 June. There are several labor confederations in So- malia. This one is affiliated with the Communist- dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. It has not been particularly effective and probably could not mount a serious strike on its own. Soviet- backed opponents of Prime Minister Egal, however, may be planning to use the strike to attack his government. The party has unsuccessfully attempted to mount antigovernment demonstrations in the past. The po- lice have been alerted, and the party president is even reported to be keeping President Abdirascid Ali Shermarke informed on these activities. The reported Soviet involvement could be in- dicative, however, of Soviet displeasure with Egal. The USSR, heavily involved in providing economic and military assistance to Somalia, has viewed with concern Egal's generally pro-Western policies since he became prime m' in 1967. 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 SECRET Approved For Release 2003 /) I RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 Cyprus: What are described as "full talks" will open in Nicosia on 24 June between represent- atives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The representatives held preliminary discussions in Beirut this week after weeks of haggling over a mu- tually agreeable site. The meeting marked the first open contact between the rival groups since Decem- ber 1963. Continuing discussions will allow some optimism that intercommunal peace may be maintained on the island, but the basic problems dividing Greek and Turkish Cypriot remain formidable. Bolivia: Nervousness has increased as a re- sult of the fourth terrorist bombing in three weeks in La Paz. On the evening of 3 June a bomb exploded just a block away from where President Barrientos was scheduled to meet with leaders of the teachers' strike. The police have no leads, and it is not known whether one group is responsible for all the recent bombings. Political tension has been inten- sified by disorders in Santa Cruz and the threat of an all-out teachers' strike. SECRET Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 25X1 Secret&pproved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3 Secret Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A011300110001-3