CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A011400020001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 8, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
8 June 1968
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No. 0177/68
8 June 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Czechoslovakia: Extensive publicity on the Pact
exercises apparently has not allayed fears of So-
viet military intervention. (Page 3)
France: De Gaulle's broadcast unlikely to sway
many uncommitted voters. (Page 4)
Laos: The fighting is tapering off as the Commu-
nists move to the defensive. (Page 7)
India: New tribal unrest threatens eastern region.
Page 9)
Rumania - Saudi Arabia: Crude oil (Page 12)
Ni eg ria: Jets for Biafra (page 12)
Colombia: President resigns (Page 13)
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c South Vietnam: Several prominent South Viet-
namese have called for talks with the National Lib-
eration Front, and this may lead to a more open dis-
cussion of the subject in Saigon.
Former deputy premier Tran Van Tuyen has called
for a military conference between Saigon and the
Front to arrange a truce. In a letter printed in a
Saigon paper on 4 June, he suggested that a truce
could be followed by an international conference to
settle the war within a broader framework of peace
in Southeast Asia.
Tuyen stated that acknowledgment of the "po-
litical reality" that the Front possesses an army
and controls part of South Vietnam does not imply
recognition of its legitimacy.
These remarks closely followed similar state-
ments by Pham Quang Dan, a recently appointed cab-
inet minister who has been visiting the US. Dan
told US reporters and audiences that he favors in-
itiating talks with the Front on the question of a
cease-fire and, eventually, a coalition government.
Dan's remarks have caused consternation among other
members of the Saigon regime and could cost him his
cabinet post unless he recants. The government's
stand is that it will negotiate with Hanoi but
never with the Front as such.
South Vietnamese doubtless argue in private
about the wisdom of talking with the Front, but
the fact that the issue is being raised publicly
almost certainly reflects concern over the possible
direction of talks between the US and Hanoi. In
addition to their conviction that the South Viet-
namese must be primarily responsible for determin-
ing their own future, many local politicians have
long considered that a greater civilian voice in J
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the government is a prerequisite for ending the war
through negotiations.
With the exception of continued artillery at-
tacks on Saigon and ground assaults northeast of
the capital and near Khe Sanh, military action has
h
I
been l ,
g
t
rla,p) j
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2
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Czechoslovakia: Prague is publicizing the
forthcoming Warsaw Pact exercise but apparently has
not allayed fears that the USSR will use the exer-
cise to cover military intervention.
In a highly unusual move, the Ministry of De-
fense appointed a special spokesman, Major General
Cepicky, to handle publicity for the exercise, and
has been more forthcoming in providing information
than ever before. The statements Cepicky has thus
far issued, however, have been vague in certain re-
spects, particularly regarding the numbers and types
of Soviet troops which will be in Czechoslovakia.
Cepicky has tried to clarify what Minister of
Defense Dzur meant by "support" and "marker" units
associated with the exercise. He said that "sup-
port" troops consist primarily of communications
units. Some such Soviet forces are already in
Czechoslovakia. "Marker" units, he said, are com-
bat troops from motorized rifle units which will be
used to verify the "feasibility" of plans and de-
cisions. According to Dzur, these will be prima-
rily Czechoslovak troops.
Cepicky has explained that "it cannot be ex-
cluded" that "one or another tank company" will
participate. He has not specified nationality,
but yesterday he again denied that Soviet tanks are
in Czechoslovakia now.
Cepicky has acknowledged that a "minimum" num-
ber of troops from Czechoslovakia, the USSR,
Hungary, and Poland will take part in the exercise.
This seems to rule out East German forces. The
exercise will take place in the second half of
June, will last several days, and will be held
largely in military training areas in Czechoslovakia.
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C France: De Gaulle's radio-TV broad-
cast of 7 June is unlikely to sway many un-
committed voters to support the regime in the
parliamentary elections.
The interview was clearly intended as the
opening Gaullist salvo in the campaign preceding
the elections of 23 June. By painting in bleak
terms the prospects for France if the public fails
to return the Gaullists to power, De Gaulle sought
to win over those voters not presently committed to
either side. His strong emphasis on the menace to
France of the "totalitarian enterprise" of Commu-
nism, however, is unlikely to provide the Gaullist
camp with much effective electoral ammunition. In
reiterating the Communists theme, earlier sounded in
his broadcast of 30 May, De Gaulle appeared to be
pursuing a tactic of deliberately polarizing the
country's political forces. Such a polarization
would make it even more difficult for the govern-
ment to solve the basic economic and social prob-
lems plaguing France.
A second theme of the interview was a vaguely
outlined scheme of "participation," a favorite
Gaullist word ever since the government began tar-
dily to react to the crisis. De Gaulle emphasized
that participation, presumably intended to describe
a system in which workers and managers share in the
running of the businesses as well as in the profits,
was a far better solution to the present crisis
than either Communism or capitalism. De Gaulle
hopes such a system will bring labor and management
closer together and at the same time weaken the
hold of the unions on the workers. As in the past
when similar schemes have been proposed, union and
opposition political leaders responded negatively,
calling the proposal "paternalism" and "outrageous
social demagoguery."
(continued)
8 Jun 68 4
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I Meanwhile, violence continues to mark the ebb-
ing strike wave. Union leaders are bitter at police
actions yesterday at a large Renault plant near
Paris, where workers fought police all day for pos-
session.of the factory. The Renault incident, as
well as battles between war veterans and students
in Brittany and demonstrations in Paris by revolu-
tionary students, makes clear that grave dissatis-
faction still persists among certain segments of
the protest movement.
8 Jun 6 8 5
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LAOS: Current Situation
C
/ V I E T N A M
t...~ HANOI*
@NsKhang
Enemy threat subsides
Pl.aine des Jarres
Activity light
/ Activity light
y ,, ..",,Paksane
1 s~ -,,,_-,,VIENTIANE
r
l,?
?~1
Recaptured by
North Vietnamese ?1
troops, 4 June ..I__
m..o.eoo tr e
Muong f
T H A I L A N D
k-,,1
.BanHouei Mun
Sedo Recaptured by `-'SOUTH
Valley govt, forces
'Ban Sapat `?TNAM
11' ,
0 25 50 75 1170 Kilometers
90858 6-68 CIA
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Laos: The fighting continues to taper off as
Communist forces move to the defensive.
In the north, the enemy threat to the vital
government guerrilla base at Na Khang is subsiding.
Villagers report that the enemy sustained a substan-
tial number of casualties from heavy air strikes and
was forced to withdraw from the immediate area.
Government forces are now planning to attempt to
regain lost positions north of the base.
Activity in the Plaine des Jarres and Paksane
areas has been light. Government forces have en-
countered only small enemy patrols. Although inten-
sive air strikes may have discouraged an enemy build-
up in the Paksane area, it is possible that an al-
leged Communist "threat" in the area was exaggerated
by the regional military commander, General Koup-
rasith.
In the south, government forces have moved back
into Ban Houei Mun and Ban Sapat, an outpost some
ten miles east of Khong Sedone that had been over-
run two weeks ago. There was little or no Communist
resistance. North Vietnamese troops recaptured
Muong Phalane on 4 June, however. The airstrip
there had been occupied by government troops in
late May.
Although early rains have not yet become an
important military factor, the lessening of Commu-
nist activity over the past several weeks suggests
the enemy is already digging in for the government
wet-season counteroffensive. There have been no
indications that North Vietnamese troops are being
withdrawn from Laos, as they have in past rainy
seasons. The enemy probably will allow the govern-
ment to retake several minor positions, but is likely
to resist efforts to drive it from important areas,
such as the Se Done Valley, which it occupied
with considerable loss of men and materiel.
(Map)
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EASTERN INDIA
Bay of Bengal
C H I N A
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India: New unrest among both hill and plains
tribes in Assam State further threatens the stabil-
ity of the eastern region.
Long-standing demands from the moderate-led
All Parties Hill Leaders Conference have forced the
government to consider establishing a largely au-
tonomous hill state in Assam covering the Garo and
Khasi-Jaintia Hills districts. The cabinet's re-
cent failure to agree on such a proposal resulted
in the resignation from the Assam State Assembly of
all nine conference members,. The conference may
now launch a long-threatened "nonviolent action"
campaign in the hill areas, which could get out of
control. More extreme elements are ready to re-
place the present moderate leaders if an autonomous
hill state is not established soon.
Meanwhile, some elements among the plains
tribes, capitalizing on the government's willing-
ness to consider hill tribe demands, are urging
more autonomy for their own tribal areas. In a
manifestation of increased unrest among plains
tribes, a mob of 4,000 Boro tribesmen recently at-
tacked a police post in the Kokrajhar subdivision.
The government has long equivocated on the
hill leaders' demands. It has had to weigh the
effects of further fractionalizing India's states
against the need to forestall additional disruption
in the eastern region. The Naga and Mizo rebel-
lions continue to tie down some 70,000 Indian
troops and paramilitary personnel in the mountains
and jun les to the south and east of the Assam
Valley.
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NOTES
Ni eria: Biafra has purchased -]Fouaa
Magister jet fighters
Bia ra as
Une or two usable air ie s and coul have stock-
piled ample supplies of jet fuel before the refinery
was lost. Use of the Fougas will lift Biafran morale
and, if used effectively, could slow the federal
advance.
Rumania - Saudi Arabia: Bucharest has sent two
35,000-tn tankers aroundAfrica to take the first
deliveries of Saudi Arabian crude oil. Under the
barter agreement signed with the Saudis last Decem-
ber, Rumania is scheduled to take nine million tons
over the next four years in exchange for Rumanian
industrial equipment and other goods. About one
million tons of crude are to be shipped this year.
This will mark the first time that Rumania has im-
ported crude oil. It now needs additional crude if
it is to make full use of its refining capacity
which has outstripped domestic output. Refined
petroleum products sold in Western Europe are among
Rumania's largest ners of hard currency.
8 Jun 68 12
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to Bogota.
theless, if Congress accedes to his demands, he
may reconsider his decision. Vice President and
UN delegate Julio Turbay Ayala has been recalled
C Colombia: President Carlos Lleras Restrepo
announced his resignation precipitously yesterday
following the defeat by the Colombian Senate of a
controversial constitutional reform bill. Lleras
is a tough-minded realist who would not have taken
such a step without careful consideration. Never-
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