CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CIA-RDP79T00975A011700040001-7
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T
Document Page Count:
15
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 22, 2003
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1
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Publication Date:
July 22, 1968
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REPORT
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
22 July 1968
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No. 0214/68
22 July 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Czechoslovakia-USSR: Prague stalls on setting up
meeting with Soviets. (Page 1)
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 3)
Malaysia-Philippines: Malaysia's naval move may
further strain the Sabah situation. (Page 4)
India: Mrs. Gandhi faces what could be her most
difficult political test. (Page 5)
Nigeria: Federal and Biafran representatives agree
on agenda for peace negotiations. (Page 6)
Morocco-Algeria: Tension along the disputed border
has again risen. (Page 7)
Bolivia: "Che" Guevara diary leak boils into polit-
ical crisis . (Page 8)
USSR-Venezuela: Soviets arranging to haul oil to
Western Europe. (Page 9)
Colombia-Czechoslovakia: Expanding ties (Page 10)
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C Czechoslovakia-USSR: Prague leaders are stall-
ing on the timing and locale of a meeting with their
Soviet counterparts pending the removal of Soviet
troops from Czechoslovakia.
The withdrawal reportedly continued at a lei-
surely pace over the weekend, but some troops re-
mained in the country beyond the Sunday deadline
announced earlier by the Czechoslovaks. Prague
radio reported that Soviet signal units were dis-
assembling their equipment and beginning to leave
on Saturday.
On 20 July Prague radio said that plans for a
meeting of Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders at Kosice
in eastern Slovakia had been "abandoned," and termed
the Soviet proposal for a gathering in the USSR "un-
acceptable."
Czechoslovak agreement in principle to talks
with Moscow is clear from the resolution adopted
by the party central committee on 19 July. The
document calls for "maximum effort" to bring about
such "negotiations" as soon as possible, but it also
instructs party leaders that the principles under-
lying Czechoslovakia's course are not negotiable.
In a speech yesterday Czechoslovak President Svoboda
also held out hopes for talks.
Some Czechoslovak leaders apparently believe
reports of discord within the Soviet leadership
and among its four allies in Eastern Europe over
future tactics in the crisis.
there
was no conciliatory proposal in the Soviet letter
inviting the Czechoslovaks to a meeting, but Prague
is ready to make limited concessions in order to
keep the Soviets from hardening their position.
These would include an end to criticism of the
Warsaw Pact command structure, a moratorium on in-
dependent moves in foreign policy, and restraint
on linking the Soviets with earlier repressions in
Czechoslovakia.
(continued)
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On 21 July the Soviet army newspaper Red Star
quoted an alleged Czechoslovak report that "several
more" arms caches of US origin were discovered in
Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Interior Minister
quickly denied this report, and characterized a
previously discovered arms cache in western Bohemia
a "provocation."
Yesterday, Pravda again described the "counter-
revolutionary" threat to Czechoslovakia, but
took pains to deny that the joint letter from Warsaw
last week constituted an ultimatum. Moscow has not
yet commented in public on Czechoslovakia's refusal
to meet in the USSR, suggesting that it may be keep-
ing open some limited room for maneuver on the timing,
locale, and composition of the delegations.
East German propagandists are now directly at-
tacking Dubcek's leadership. Rumania and Yugoslavia
continue to give Prague vocal support, but apparently
Ceausescu and Tito have delayed going to Prague at
Czechoslovak request.
The French party yesterday withdrew its pro-
posal for a European Communist conference on Czech-
oslovakia, following the return of party leader
Waldeck-Rochet from talks in Prague. The Czechoslo-
vak leadership reportedly had been "negative" to-
ward the proposal. The official announcement said
that the proposal was being withdrawn because of the
"possibility" of bilateral talks between the Czech-
oslovaks and "some" of the powers which met in War-
saw a week ago.
Yesterday the Czechoslovak party daily Rude
Pravo rejected Soviet allegations of US involvement
En -the crisis, concluding that in the present spirit
of US-Soviet detente there is no logic to the thesis
that the US has an interest in provoking Moscow by
fomenting "counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia.
This editorial may have been designed in part to
dampen fears raised by rumors of a Soviet deal with
the US over the future of Czechoslovakia.
I
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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25 50 75 100 Mdes
F'4
D 25 50 75 160 Kilometers
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C Vietnam:
North Vietnam: The Vietnamese Communists have
reinforced the impression of a significant tactical
shift in their position concerning the role of the
National Liberation Front in a political settlement.
Last week Hanoi issued a Foreign Ministry mem-
orandum which dropped earlier insistence that a set-
tlement must be "in accordance with the program" of
the Front. In Paris, chief negotiator Xuan Thuy
continues to blur the change in public without actu-
ally denying it.
North Vietnamese propaganda during the weekend,
however, seems to underline the point. A broadcast
on 20 July said a settlement should be in accordance
with the "spirit" of the Front program. Similar
language was used in one part of the memorandum.
The radio quoted the chief Front representative in
Hanoi as saying a settlement should be "in keeping"
with the Front program.
Even Ho Chi Minh's appeal on the anniversary
of the Geneva Accords contains a hint of such a
shift by giving special prominence to the new front
organization, the Alliance, and only a nod to the
Liberation Front.
South Vietnam: Ground action continued light
and sporadic over the weekend.
Most contacts resulted from allied initiatives.
There was an increase in Communist heavy weapons at-
tacks, however, particularly in western Kontum Prov-
ince and in III Corps. One of the rocket attacks
struck the Nha Be petroleum facility just south of
Saigon.
In northwestern III Corps, captured documents
suggest the recently-arrived 32nd North Vietnamese
Regiment has been assigned to the 7th Division.
(Map )]
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Malaysia-Philippines: Malaysia's precautionary
naval deployment against an allegedly imminent Phil-
ippine infiltration of Sabah may further strain re-
lations between the two nations.
Malaysian authorities, although somewhat dubious
of an intelligence report that 200 Filipinos will
infiltrate on approximately 23 July, have nevertheless
sent a frigate, five minesweepers, and four patrol
craft to Sabah waters. Britain, which still has a
number of officers serving with the Malaysian Navy,
has asked the Malaysians to inform the squadron and
ship commanders to be absolutely certain that no ac-
tion is taken except within Malaysian territorial
waters.
Although increasing its defensive capability
in the area, Malaysia is simultaneously pursuing
efforts to ease its badly strained relations with
Manila.
I Ma aysia as
so far not retaliated for Manila's announced decision
to withdraw all, but one of its representatives in
Kuala Lumpur.
The Philippine Government has not yet commented
on the Malaysian naval deployment, presumably being
unaware of the move. A Philippine naval contingent
has been patrolling areas adjacent to Malaysian waters
for some weeks. Other than the Malaysian report,
there is no firm evidence of a Philippine infiltra-
tion plan although numerous rumors to this effect
have been reported.
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India: Prime Minister Indira Gandhi will prob-
ably face her most difficult political test to date
in the session of Parliament opening today.
The Soviets' notice that they will sell arms
to Pakistan has touched off a storm of protest and
indignation in India. New Delhi's reaction has been
to protest. the move through official channels and to
orchestrate the strong public response at home. The
Indians may hope, in this way, to limit the scope and
quantity of arms the Pakistanis receive.
With Parliament in session, the focus will now
shift to sharp criticism of the government's foreign
policy and Mrs. Gandhi in particular. The prime
minister's close identification with India's policy
toward the USSR makes her a natural target for the
highly aroused opposition parties. As the minister
in charge of foreign affairs, she will have to bear
the brunt of the assault, despite her weakness as a
parliamentary performer.
There are also considerable forces within the
ruling Congress Party who have long looked to the
day when Mrs. Gandhi's handling of a major controversy
could be used to displace her. Other conservative
elements probably welcome the failure of what they
regard as her pro-Soviet policy.
Nevertheless, the issue of Soviet arms to Paki-
stan is not likely to cause a concerted move within
Congress to oust Mrs. Gandhi unless she falters badly.
Her problem will be to avoid condemning the Soviet
action less vigorously than public opinion expects
without repudiating her past policies. Despite her
alienation from some powerful party bosses, Mrs.
Gandhi remains a formidable foe for her detractors,
especially since the Congress parliamentary majority
is so slender that withdrawal of her immediate fol-
lowers could prevent formation of a Congress govern-
ment under an alternate leader.
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Nigeia.- Federal, and Biafran representatives
have agreed on an agenda for peace negotiations to
take place soon in Addis Ababa.
The two sides are, meeting under the auspices of
the Organization of African Unity's Consultative
Committee on Nigeria, which has been deliberating
in Niamey since 15 July. Federal leader Gowon and
Biafran leader Ojukwu paid separate visits to Niamey,
and both reiterated their firm conditions for peace
talks and a cease-fire.
Ojukwu, however, has probably won the most
points by suddenly agreeing to talk. He has thus
put the onus on Lagos for continuing the fighting
and hopes that international pressures will force
Gowon to agree to an immediate cease-fire.
Gowon, however, is unlikely to yield to such
pressure, as he would be in serious trouble with his
top civilians and army commanders, who view Biafra's
renunciation of secession as the only acceptable end
to the crisis. Although prospects have improved that
relief supplies might start flowing in the near fu-
ture, chances for an early cease-fire and a final
political settlement have not significantly improved.
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Morocco-Algeria: Tension along the disputed
border has again risen.
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the Algerian Army has been very active recently
along Morocco's southeastern border, that it has at-
tempted to occupy Moroccan posts north of Tindouf
as well as the south bank of the Oued Draa water-
course, and that it has also attempted to outflank
Moroccan outposts in what is unquestioned Moroccan
territory.
the t for any eventuality and
in direct contact with Algiers regarding the
problem.
The long-disputed area was the scene of a two-
week border war in 1963, when an armistice commis-
sion--including Mali and Ethiopia in addition to
Morocco and Algeria--established a demilitarized
zone. An ad hoc commission set up by the Organiza-
tion of African Unity to find a solution to the dis-
pute recommended in February 1967 that the two
parties settle the problem bilaterally.
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Bolivia: A political crisis has developed in
the wake of official accusations of treason against
the minister of government, who now admits that he
passed "Che" Guevara's diary to the Cubans.
The major opposition groups are submerging
their political differences and working together in
efforts to oust President Barrientos. These groups
on 20 July sparked street demonstrations which re-
sulted in one national guardsman dead and four
wounded. The armed forces have moved into key gov-
ernment buildings in preparation for further dis-
orders.
Barrientos thus far has the backing of the
armed forces but there is evidence of differences
among the military over 'what steps to take. Barrien-
tos reportedly wants to form an all-military cabi-
net, but commanding general of the armed forces
Ovando believes that this would only solidify oppo-
sition to the military and the government. There
are also unsubstantiated rumors that some junior of-
ficers are talking of a coup.
Barrientos reportedly believes that if the sit-
uation can be kept in hand, the peak of danger will
have passed by today and he may then decide whether
to retain his present cabinet or to reorganize it.
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USSR-Venezuela: The USSR is arranging to haul
petroleum for Western oil companies from Venezuela
to Western Europe.
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Subsidiaries of two US oil firms in Venezuela
are to use Soviet tankers to carry crude oil and
products to the companies' West European customers.
Other Western petroleum firms are also expected to
become involved as cheaper tanker rates make the
use of Soviet vessels attractive. The arrangement
would allow Soviet vessels currently returning in
ballast from Cuba to earn foreign exchange by haul-
ing the Western petroleum, in effect subsidizing So-
viet oil shipments to Cuba.
the Venezuelan
government's acquiescence in the plan and noted that
it comes when the Leoni government is taking initia-
tives to expand commercial ties with Eastern Europe.
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NOTE
Colombia-Czechoslovakia: In line with a policy
of expanding ties adop tEad by both Colombia and Czech-
oslovakia, the two countries have agreed to raise
their representation from the consular to the dip-
lomatic level. Trade between the two last year
amounted to about $1.5 million each way, the most
balanced exchange between Colombia and any of its
bilateral trading partners. Prague's agreement is
consistent with its desire to pursue a more active
foreign policy, particularly with western nations.
For example, the Czechoslovaks have recently estab-
blished relations with Venezuela, and are contem-
plating closer ties with Peru.
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