CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A011700050001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 23, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
5Q
23 July 1963
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No. 0215/68
23 July 1968
.Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONT.~NTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
USSR-Czechoslovakia: Prague may delay agreement to
tal on Czec soil until Soviet troops leave it.
(Page 2 )
Thailand: Deputy Prime Minister Praphat is maneu-
vering for next year's legislative elections. (Page 4)
West Germany: Bonn fears new tampering with access
to Berlin. (Page 5)
USSR-Nigeria: Arms agreement (Page 6)
USSR: Icebreaker (Page 6)
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 Approved For Release 2003/0~~1`:I~ ~DP79T00975A011700050001-6
~' VYetn ~~m.
S~::luth y~.etnam An increase in clround activity
tollc,wed the weekend s scattered terrorism.,
Four terrorist attacks, presumably marking the
anniversary ~f the Geneva Accords, were conducted
against. cirri lean targets on 21 July. These resulted
zn 12 South Vietnamese killed and 93 injured. The
most costly incident occurred in Saigon when an ex-
plosive charge detonated near a crowded theater, but.
grenade an d. bombing incidents were also reported in
the provincial capitals of Phu Cuong and Ben Tre.
As a zesult of an engagement which began two
days agog South Vietnamese troops reportedly have
surrounded an enemy battalion along the coast north
of Phan Thiet. Another enemy force estimated of_
battalion size lost 12 men in a probe on a US Marine
right defensive position near Khe Sanh. The probe
was repulsed after two hours., Early on 23 July
several installations near Da Nang were hit with
mortar and rocket fire:, killing six Americans, There
were also small-scale mortar attacks in II and III
~.orps
North Vietnam, I3anoi has played down the sig-
nificance of the Honolulu conference, taking the
Line that any major decisions must come di rectl.y o~:
of Washington.. The Communists may thus hope to keep
the door. open for US concessions ire answer to their
own reduced mi litany ar_ti.vity and hints of a more
flexible position on the role of the Liberation Front.
Hanoi's party newspaper Nhan Dan treated the
~~onference as a "tedious" ritual required by Presi-
dent Johnson to "fence his new decisions" on PreGi-
dent Thietx- It scored US stubbornness and concluded
fi:hat US officials had decided? in answer to the "new
ei.tuation'? in South Vietnam,. to "follow the beaten
track--to step up their war.," ;Map3
? ~_? u fl 6 8 Cerrtrul Intelligence Bz~lletin i_
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USSR-Czechoslovakia:: The Soviet decision to
talk with Dubcek~ and the party leadership on Czech
soil is a concession, brut so far Prague has made no
official response.
The TASS announcement yesterday set no date,
saying only that. the 5oTJ;~Let politburo expected to
meet with the Czechoslovak presidium in Czechoslo-
vakia., The Soviets, who have thus given up their
earlier insistence that tahe Czechoslovaks come to
them, still .insist on a full-scale confrontation.
Moscow probably hopes tlze~t a show of determination
and solidarity on the part of its 11-man politburo
may cause some of the Czechoslovaks to waver. The
Czechoslovak presidium?;~ 11 members comprise a fair
representation of liberc~l.s, moderates, and conserva-
tives
Czechoslovak offici~ils have consistently indi-
cated that Prague would t:a1k with the Soviets, but
Prague radio has added tk~~at all Soviet troops must
be gone first. It is possible that the Czechoslo-
vaks will delay respondir.~g to the Soviets' latest
proposal until they are satisfied on this score.
The Soviet proposa]~ arrived in Prague even as
the Czechoslovak leaders:h.ip was discussing its terms
for a series of bilateral meetings with the Soviets
and other Eastern European parties, apparently as
precursors to a Soviet -? Eastern European summit meet-
ing? Prague's presence at such atop-level gather-
ing was demanded by the leaders of the U5SR, East
Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria in a joint
letter sent to Prague on 15 duly.
At that time, the Czechoslovaks in effect re-
jected a summit gathering, saying that they agreed
to one in princi~?le, but only after thorough prep-
aration, It is possible that the Czechoslovak lead-
ership is attempting to buy time with such prepara-
tion, hoping to convene first its own party congress
2 3 Ju 1 6 $ ~~entrxl InN~~::l:~; ~~c~~ L.~r%le~in
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Con 9 September, This congress will be dominated by
liberals and moderates and can be expected to jetti-
son conservatives and to elect a more homogeneous
reform-minded leadership. Such a leadership prob-
ably would feel stronger in subsequent dealings with
the Soviets and other hostile Eastern European
parties.
Despite an apparent willingness to meet the
Czechoslovaks half way on talks, Moscow continues to
build a case for intervention. A Pravda editorial
yesterday lodged familiar charges against Prague.
Unlike such editorials in the past, this one failed
to express confidence in the ability of "healthy
elements" in Czechoslovakia to stem the tide of coun-
terrevolution .
According to sketchy news reports, the Soviets
also delivered a protest to the Dubcek regime yester-
day over allegedly growing Western influence--espe-
cially West German--in Czechoslovakia. Quoting
"informed Czechoslovak sources," Reuters reports the
Soviets have again demanded that Prague allow the
stationing of Soviet troops on the Czechoslovak -
West German border.
2 3 Jul 6 8 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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Thailand; Deputy :Prime Minister Praphat appears
to be playing ~~n .increasingly active role in prepa-
ration for next year's legislative elections.
Praphat apparently is managing an effort by the
ruling milatary regime to emasculate the Democratic
Party, the onl~T opposition group currently active
with significant. support in the country. He is pro-
moting an indeg~endent slate of candidates for the
Bangkok municipal elections in September to draw
conservative b~xt antigovernment votes from the Demo-
crats and clean- the way for agovernment-sponsored
ticket, The government hopes that a defeat in Bang-
kok, where Democratic support is strongest, will
virtually des tx:?ay the p,~.rty's electoral chances in
next year's cotxrYtrywide legislative elections.
Praphat"s machinations may also be designed to
further his own political ambitions. He not only
expects to get the credit for defeating the Demo-
crats in September, but he evidently is making plans
to pick up the pieces . Praphat recently assumed
control of a quasi.-government political group. He
has flatly told supporters that he intends to use
the group as a vehicle :Eor a countrywide political
organization, which pr~~:~umably will be responsive
to his direction.
The extent.: to which Praphat's plans dovetail
with the govern.ment's is not entirely clear. Al-
though a number of prel:Lminary steps have been taken
to organize a party for next year"s election, it is
clear that the differences within the ruling estab-
lishment have not yet ]aeen ironed out. Praphat's
actions may be i.n behalmE of those hard-line elements
in the government who fought against the constitu-
tion and are now apparently trying to ensure that
their faction. wil.1 dorn:itia e the new government.
23 Jul 68
Central dntelligence Bulletin
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West Germany: Officials in Bonn continue to
fear that East Germany will put additional restric-
tions on access to Berlin.
A Foreign Ministry representative has expressed
particular concern over barge traffic to the city.
Bonn recently prevented an East German barge from
crossing West Germany en route to the Netherlands
on grounds that West German vessels are not per-
mitted to transit East Germany to Czechoslovakia.
West German officials fear that the East Germans
may now interrupt barge traffic to Berlin in retal-
iation.
The Bonn official also noted that stories per-
sist about possible East German measures to restrict
inter-German mail and parcel post service. Also,
according to an editor of Der Spiegel, Soviet Am-
bassador to East Germany Abrasimov left for Moscow
on 17 July carrying a package of proposals for fur-
ther measures a ainst West Berlin
Some Christian Democratic leaders are having
second thoughts about the wisdom of proceeding with
some of the meetings scheduled to be held in Berlin,
including the party convention this fall. Meanwhile,
Bonn leaders are continuing their efforts to prevent
Latvian refugees from holding what could be a pro-
vocative meeting in Berlin between 26 July and 1
August.
2 3 Ju 1 6 8 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
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USSR-Nigeria: Moscow reaffirmed its support
for the Lagos government. in a communique on 21 July
ending a five-day visit of Nigeria's foreign minister.
Earlier this month, Lagos and Moscow signed anew
arms agreement covering 2~~~1
arm field cars an truc:cs wi z spare parts,
Moscow had already sold
Lagos quipment, in-
cluding jet fighters and patrol boats , and provided
training and technicians. 25X1
the nuclear-powered
icebreaker Lenin will k>e: under repair for another
one to three years. TYYC: Lenin, the world's first
nuclear-powered surfacE' ship, has been out of service
since 1965.
It has
frequently been under
tional ten years ago.
(Photo)
0
rE:pair since
Central Inte,~ligence Bailletin
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USSR:
it became opera-
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Secret
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