CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A011800080001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 9, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
9 August 1968
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No. 0230/68
9 August 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Czechoslovakia-USSR: Political life is returning to
normal in Czechoslovakia. (Page 2)
Rumania: Bucharest's pique over exclusion from
Bratislava foreshadows tension with Moscow. (Page 3)
USSR: The Soviets are developing a huge, helicopter-
lik transport aircraft. (Page 5)
Malaysia- Philipines: Cooling-off period arranged.
Page 6
Japan-Ryukyus: Influential Komeikai organization on
Okinawa not expected to support leftist candidate for
chief executive. (Page 7)
North Korea - Mexico: Press representation (Page 8)
Ecuador: Velasco vacillates (Page 8)
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ESouth Vietnam: Enemy-initiated combat activity
dropped to an extremely low level on 7 August, as
Communist forces for the most part continued to
evade allied operations.
A number of light contacts were reported in the
I and III corps areas, but casualties were light.
Meanwhile, Communist forces appear to be going for-
ward with plans for attacks, particularly along the
southern coast of I Corps and in the III Corps area.
There are indications, however, that the enemy is
having a difficult time getting into an offensive
posture in some areas, due mainly to allied spoiling
operations.
Prisoners taken in several sectors have de-
scribed problems involving shortages of ammunition
and other equipment as well as heavy casualties in-
curred from frequent B-52 and other aircraft attacks
on enemy concentrations.
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Czechoslovakia-USSR: Political life is return-
ing to normal in Czec oslovakia.
A controversy is growing in Prague over the ab-
olition just before the Cierna talks of the party
post of Lt. Gen. Vaclav Prchlik. Reportedly against
the wishes of the party leadership, three local party
organizations in Prague have proposed him as a can-
didate for alternate central committee membership.
This is a clear challenge to Dubcek's leader-
ship. How it is met will not only have a bearing on
the future of the Czechoslovak liberals but probably
will influence the Soviet reaction. Prchlik had of-
fended Moscow because of his remarks about the way
the Warsaw Pact was being run. In the past few days
Defense Minister Dzur appeared to be defending him.
Dzur may now find himself under attack from Moscow,
as well as from the Prague leadership, which does
not wish to offend the Soviets needlessly.
The determination of the Dubcek leadership is
also being tested by recalcitrant liberal intellec-
tuals who helped push Novotny out of office. Only
24 hours after the party presidium said it expected
restraint on the part of the press, the leading
Prague literary weekly, Literarni Listy, came out
with an attack on Moscow's recent psychological war-
fare against Czechoslovak leaders.
To make matters worse, the article predicted
that liberals in the USSR and Poland would eventually
respond to democratization in Czechoslovakia, even
though the Czechs would not promote it. This is al-
most certain to raise hackles in Moscow and Warsaw
and, if repeated on any scale in Czechoslovakia,
could lead to new problems for the Dubnak regime in
relations with its erstwhile allies. 25X1`
9 Aug 68
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Rumania: Rumania's pique over its exclusion
from the meeting at Bratislava probably foreshadows
increased tension between Bucharest and Moscow.
The Rumanians may be embarking on a new tactic
to undermine the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact.
They apparently consider that decisions taken by the
Pact in their absence are not binding on them. They
also reserve the right to refuse to participate in
meetings to which they are invited. An editorial
published on 7 August appears to suggest this new
tactic by noting that the Rumanians intend to be
"faithful to their alliances," presumably their bi-
lateral ones, "whether or not the Warsaw Pact exists."
Bucharest has been excluded from the last four
summit gatherings of Soviet allies held since last
March. The editorial implied that. the Rumanians are
pleased that the Czechoslovak crisis has eased but
argued that the exclusion of Rumania from the high-
level decision-making process is "utterly incompat-
ible with the norms" of interparty relations and
the "principles of equality between parties and
countries." This point was reinforced by quoting
the words of Rumanian party and state chief Ceausescu,
who has said that discussions of problems "pertaining
to international bodies in whose founding Rumania
participated cannot be carried out by only some
countries."
Following the Rumanians' critical editorial,
the Czechoslovak press and Chairman Smrkovsky of the
Czechoslovak parliament seem bent, on assuring Bucha-
rest and Belgrade that there will be no more such
rump meetings. Smrkovsky told a Yugoslav corre-
spondent on 7 August that the Czechoslovak Communist
Party will insist that "those empty places around
the table of the socialist countries should be
filled." Smrkovsky's remarks and the conclusion of
a new Rumanian-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship,
cooperation, and mutual assistance, expected to be
signed during Ceausescu's visit to Prague in mid-
August, may further a c to an already delicate
situation. F7 I
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New Soviet
Helicopter-Like Transport
DIMENSIONS (Approx)
Fuselage length - 125 ft.
Fuselage diameter - 18 ft.
Rotor radius - 57 ft.
Wing span - 108 ft.
MI-10
Fuselage length - 108 ft.
Fuselage diameter - 10 ft.
Rotor radius - 57 ft.
Boeing 707
DIMENSIONS
Fuselage length - 139 ft.
Fuselage diameter - 12 ft.
Wing span - 131 ft.
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USSR: The Soviets are developing a large
helicopter-like transport aircraft that could signif-
icantly improve their military and civil airlift ca-
pability in the 1970s.
The craft is
twice as big as the Soviet MI-10, currently the
world's largest helicopter.
Preliminary analysis indicates that the new
transport can carry about 200 troops or from 25 to
40 tons of cargo up to 200 miles. It has a large
fuselage and rear-loading doors to accommodate bulky
loads including tanks or assault guns. It can oper-
ate from small unimproved fields inaccessible to all
but the smallest fixed-wing planes.
The craft also will have important civil uses
in the interior of the USSR where the road network
is poor. Its designer, Mikhail Mil, has stated that
helicopters larger than his MI-l0 are needed for
Soviet industry in Siberia. I (Photo/Draw-
inas)
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Malaysia-Philippines: Malaysia and the Philip-
pines have informally agreed to an indefinite cool-
ing-off period in the Sabah dispute.
during the conference of the Association of Sou east
Asian Nations, Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Razak
suggested this procedure. Philippine Foreign Secre-
tary Ramos agreed, stating he would recommend it to
President Marcos.
Although subsequent contradictory press state-
ments by the two ministers initially appeared likely
to undo the agreement, still later press remarks re-
emphasized the cooling-off period and called for a
resumption of talks "at a propitious time." The in-
cident illustrates both the inability of the two
governments to depart from their set positions and
the fragility of any arrangement on the Sabah issue.
It remains to be seen whether domestic politics
in Malaysia and the Philippines, particularly the
latter, can support this period of quiescence agreed
on by the ministers.
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Japan-Ryukyus: The Buddhist-based Komeito
party in Japan is considering abandoning its present
neutral stance toward the November election for chief
executive in Okinawa and throwing its support to the
candidate of the leftist opposition coalition.
Friction over the issue reportedly is develop-
ing between Komeito, a rapidly growing party repre-
senting the political interests of the Japanese Soka
Gakkai Buddhist lay organization, and its Okinawa
affiliate, the Komeikai. The Komeikai, at least for
the present, wants to continue a policy of "strict
neutrality."
Komeikai's refusal to join other opposition
parties in support of the leftist candidate may be
crucial to Junji Nishime, the candidate of the rul
ing Okinawa Liberal Democratic Party, who now is
given only an even chance of winning.
Komeikai's director, who exercises strong per-
sonal control over the organization's members, finds
the leftist candidate unappealing and favors Nishime.
Komeikai reportedly gave Nishime considerable sup-
port in his successful bid in 1965 for the Naha may-
oralty, the post he now holds. The Komeikai, many
of whose supporters are employed at US bases on
Okinawa, has tended to be fairly moderate on issues
involving-US interests.
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NOTES
North Korea - Mexico: Pyongyang is apparently
attempting to establish a presence in Mexico, using
the occasion of the forthcoming Olympic Games. The
press officer of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City,
acting on Pyongyang's behalf, reportedly requested
permission last month for the accreditation of a
North Korean press representative for the games this
October. He then attempted to sound out the Mexican
official on the possibility of the North Korean re-
maining "for a while" after the Olympics. Although
press accreditation may be granted, the Mexicans,
who have diplomatic relations with Seoul, are un-
likely to permit the North Korean presence to become
permanent.
Ecuador: President-elect Velasco has backed
off from his threat not to assume office on 1 Sep-
tember. He now says that if the new congress that
convenes on 10 August modifies the civil service
law to his satisfaction he will find it possible to
take power with the dignity the presidency demands.
Velasco followers in Congress believe their discus-
sions on a working agreement with Liberal and inde-
pendent congressmen will lead to an acceptable amend-
ment.
9 Aug 68
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