CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A012300050001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 11, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
:
49,
State Department review completed
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No. 0284/68
11 October 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Czechoslovakia-USSR: The Soviets seem intent on
whittling away Dubcek's support. (Page 2)
USSR: Computers able to use Western software are
being designed. (Page 3)
Mexico: Most student leaders now favor nonviolent
tactics. . (Page 4)
UN-Korea: North Korea may seek a hearing at this
year's UN debate on Korea. (Page 5)
Indonesia: The Communist Party finds it difficult
to regroup. (Page 6)
Philippines: Businessmen move toward trade with
European Communist countries. (Page 7)
Equatorial Guinea: A new state faces an uncertain
future. (Page 9
Rumania: Warsaw Pact maneuvers (Page 10)
Guinea: Peace Corps request (Page 10)
Uruguay: Terrorists (Page 10)
Sudan-Czechoslovakia: Economic assistance (Page 11)
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Can TAQ.
SOUTH VIETNAM
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I South Vietnam: Ground action was light on
9-10 October, but an increasing number of reports
from a variety of sources are beginning to predict
another offensive.
Details vary, but the date is usually given as
late October or early November to coincide with the
US elections. Saigon and
nearby towns and cities in Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, and
Binh Long provinces are possible targets. Allied
forces continue to uncover enemy munitions caches in
positions relatively close to Saigon, and both pris-
oners and captured documents refer to Viet Cong plans
to open up "corridors" to the capital cit from the
west.
11 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Czechoslovakia-USSR: The Soviets seem intent
on whittling away Du ce 's popular support by grad-
ually eliminating his maneuverability.
The US Embassy points out that while Dubcek did
not totally capitulate during his visit to Moscow on
3-4 October, the Soviets have forced another back-
ward step and reduced his ability to frustrate their
aims. The embassy believes Prague risks open con-
demnation, if not severe reprisals, if it fails to
carry through on its new commitments, such as the
imposition of tighter controls on mass media.
As a consequence, the previously firm pledge of
Czechoslovak leaders to continue Dubcek's liberaliza-
tion program has been weakened. The embassy also
believes that the absence of any reference in the
recent Czechoslovak presidium communique to the 14th
Czechoslovak party congress or to the new draft na-
tional party statutes probably means that these pro-
jects have been shelved. It interprets the language
used in the Czechoslovak presidium's denial of im-
minent leadership shifts as suggesting that Prague
suspects Soviet sources of spreading at least some
of these rumors.
Moscow, meanwhile, is likely to see the Czech-
oslovak presidium statement--which in part modifies
the Moscow communique--as an effort by Prague to
weaken some of its promises. In deference to Moscow,
Czechoslovak leaders have said that orthodox party
members would receive preference in personnel ap-
pointments, but they added a condition of their own,
that such persons would also have to have the "con-
fidence of the people." This phrase probably will
be interpreted in Prague to refer to liberals loyal
to Dubcek.
The Soviets seem to be waiting for Prague to
make other moves. This may account for the lack of
Moscow commentary on the presidium's communique and
the lull in anti-Czechoslovak propaganda in the So-
viet press.
11 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR: Shortcomings in the development of com-
puter operating systems and programs (software) for
civilian use apparently have led the Soviets to de-
sign a new series of computers able to use Western
software.
Itnira generation computers
i g e p in a Soviet Union will be compati-
ble with the IBM-360 series. Prototypes of two such
models are expected to be completed early in 1969.
This compatibility will enable the Soviets to
use computer software available in the West, saving
time and resources. economic
arguments had won out over strong nationalistic
sentiments favoring the development of Soviet soft-
ware.
Software development for civilian use always
has been a weak point in Soviet computer technology.
None of the previous models of Soviet computers was
provided with standardized programs comparable to.
those common it the West.
The Soviets' interest in importing computer
software is relatively new, but they have bought some
computer hardware from the West. Their attempts to
import the production technology necessary to close
the gap between Soviet and Western computer systems
have been frustrated by international COCOM and US
controls.
11 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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Mexico: Only small radical groups are threat-
ening disruptive action during the Olympics beginning
tomorrow, and security remains tight throughout Mex-
ico City.
Trotskyists and other fringe groups are reported
to be forming clandestine bands for sabotage attempts,
but student leaders are promising only a "nonviolent
surprise" on the eve of the games.
Although the student strike leaders are pushing
the line that the absence of street demonstrations is
a result of their own decision, it is clear that the
harsh crackdown and mass arrests last week have taken
a significant toll. Unable to launch the spectacular
marches that they managed before, students are con-
centrating on organizing for the future, and now say
they will pursue their political demands peacefully
in a "constitutional struggle."
Because of the bitterness that has developed out
of the crisis, small incidents could still set off
violent clashes involving even relatively moderate
students. F__ I
11 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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UN-Korea: North Korea may be trying to seat a
representative during this year's UN debate on the
Korean question.
Several delegations are pressing for early con-
sideration in the UN's political committee of a draft
resolution extending to both North and South Korea an
unconditional invitation to be heard during the dis-
cussions. In the past, the committee has required
each country to accept the UN's jurisdiction on Ko-
rean matters before being seated, a condition North
Korea has rejected.
Proponents of the draft resolution intend to
press for a decision at the first meeting of the pol-
itical committee on 17 or 18 October. They apparently
are confident that they can get the resolution through
if it is handled as a procedural matter. The margin
of victory for conditional invitations has diminished
year by year and was down to 11 last year.
11 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Indonesia: Remnants of the Indonesian Communist
Party are finding it difficult to regroup following
the collapse of their terrorist campaign in East Java
earlier this year.
I a planning
conference origins y scheduled in Central Java in
late September has been postponed until early Novem-
ber because of difficulties encountered in getting
senior cadres together. The purpose of the confer-
ence is to select a new politburo, prepare a self-
criticism paper, and establish future party tactics.
Preparatory talks held in West Java in mid-Sep-
tember indicated, however, that reconciling opposing
views within the party ranks will be difficult.
Many East Java party functionaries are urging pre-
parations for further terrorist activity despite the
party's disarray, while those from Sumatra and West
Java want more emphasis on political reorganization
and training.
Although the party is likely to retain its
general pro-Peking orientation, it will probably con-
centrate for the near future on party rebuilding and
political training instead of attempting another
round of violent tactics. The continuing success of
government anti-Communist operations, as well as the
disarray among the party leadership, should preclude
any effective resurgence of Communist activity for
some time. F77 I
11 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Philippines: Businessmen are taking steps to
open direct trade relations with European Communist
countries.
A trade mission sponsored by the Philippine
Chamber of Commerce was scheduled to leave on 8
October for a four-week tour of several Eastern
European countries and the USSR to make business
contacts and to try to conclude some trade contracts.
President Marcos has expressed interest in trade
with Communist countries, but any trade arrangements
resulting from the current mission will probably be
channeled through unofficial Philippine trade organiza-
tions. Such trade would, however, require government
approval.
Thus far Philippine trade with Communist coun-
tries has been negligible and almost exclusively via
third countries. A shipment of lumber and coconut
oil to Yugoslavia last month was the first direct
Philippine export to any Communist country.
11 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
FERNANDO PO I.
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
PROVINCE OF FERNANDO PO
SAO TOME 1.
(Portugal) .rya Sao Tome
G
ANNOBON 1.
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
PROVINCE OF FERNANDO PO
PRINCIPE I.
(Portugal)
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92163 10.68
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E uatorial Guinea: An uncertain and probably
difficult future faces Equatorial Guinea, a small
West African territory which is to receive its in-
dependence from Spain tomorrow.
The new state combines two provinces that are
economically and culturally disparate and geographi-
cally separate. Its new leader sets out with an un-
tested and controversial federal structure, inex-
perienced officials, and an economy which will be
heavily dependent, at least for the foreseeable
future, on foreign assistance. Although Spain has
indicated willingness to continue assistance to
Equatorial Guinea, the agreements governing future
Spanish-Guinean relations have not yet been negotiated.
President-elect Francisco Macias Nguema, who
served as vice president of Guinea's autonomous
government for four years, has been characterized
as strong-willed, emotional, and erratic. He was
until recently a vocal critic of both the federal
structure of government and of close ties with
Spain. During the closing weeks of his election
campaign, however, he promised to work within the
limits of the independence constitution, dismissing
his previous position as "eminently political."
11 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Rumania: Marshal Yakubovsky, during his recent
visit to Rumania, got Bucharest's agreement to par-
ticipate in Warsaw Pact maneuvers outside Rumania,
according to a Rumanian diplomat in Paris. Top Ru-
manian officials have vehemently denied that maneu-
vers would be held in Rumania or that they would
permit Warsaw Pact troops to be stationed there.
the maneuvers will take
place in Bulgaria but not before next year. The Ru-
manians have tried to avoid a commitment of this
kind but may have agreed to take part in maneuvers
sometime in the future.
Guinea: President Toure has formally requested
the US to re-establish a Peace Corps program in
Guinea. Toure may hope by this action to improve
relations with Washington and to pave the way for
increased US economic assistance, although he prob-
ably does not expect the US aid program to return
to pre-1966 levels. The Peace Corps was expelled
and Guinean-US relations reached their nadir in No-
vember 1966, when Guinea charged the US with respon-
sibility for Ghana's detention of a Guinean delega-
tion which was transiting Ghana in a P-an American
Airways plane.
Uruguay: Police have scored their first success
against the Tupamaros, an extreme leftist terrorist
group that has operated with impunity in the Monte-
video area for at least two years. Seven of the
group--two of them key members--were apprehended on
8 October. Although their loss will be a serious
blow, the Tupamaros are efficient and highly compart-
mentalized, and it seems unlikely that the organiza-
tion has been completely put out of action. 1 :1
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Sudan-Czechoslovakia: Despite the Soviet in-
vasion, Czechoslovakia may still provide substantial
economic assistance to the Sudan. In late 1967,
Prague offered to lend-the Sudanese Government up to
$30 million for construction of a fertilizer plant,
a sugar refinery, and a tannery. Although no pro-
gress has been made on these projects, a Czechoslovak
official reportedly has recently assured the Sudanese
of Prague's continuing interest in providing assist-
ance.
The Sudanese Government is especially anxious
to get funds for a fertilizer plant, estimated to
cost some $17 million. In the absence of public or
private Western offers to undertake the project,
Khartoum will robabl ursue the Czechoslovak offer.
11 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The United States Intelligence Board on 10 Oct-
tober 1968 approved the following national intelli-
gence estimate:
NIE 27.1-68 "Spain: The Coming Struggle for
Power"
11 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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