CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A012300120001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
51.
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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No. 0291/68
19 October 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Czechoslovakia-USSR: Czechoslovak National Assembly
approves Soviet status-of-forces agreement in stormy
session. (Page 3)
France: French Communists are divided on the Czech-
oslovak issue. (Page 6)
USSR: Prospects have dimmed for this year's grain
crop. (Page 7)
Thailand: Communist insurgents may be expanding
their operations into new areas. (Page 9)
Indonesia-Singapore: Djakarta is trying to hold down
popular reaction to the execution of the two marines,
but may invoke economic reprisals. (Page 10)
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Haiti: Duvalier reorganizing militia forces in antic-
ipation of future invasion attempts. (Page 12)
Rumania - Latin America: Rumania seeking new markets
and expanded political contacts in Latin America. (Page 13)
Guinea-USSR: Agreement near on Soviet assistance in
developing Guinea's bauxite reserves. (Page 15)
Italy - Congo (Kinshasa): Italy reviewing its air
training program in Congo (Kinshasa). (Page 16)
Tanzania - Communist China: TanZam railroad (Page 17)
Sikkim-India: Flood damage (Page 17)
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'Qu+ Nhon
? Nha Trang
CAM
RANH
SOUTH VIETNAM
0 100
--.L-
MILES
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[South Vietnam: The most successful operation
against the Viet Cong infrastructure yet conducted
by the government appears to be under way in Quang
Duc Province.
The 99 persons, 70 civilian and 29 military,
who have been arrested by the Vietnamese security
services since 24 August reportedly include 17 pro-
vincial-level cadre, 24 members of the Gia Nghia
city committee, and at least 15 district, village,
and hamlet cadre. As a group, these appear to be the
highest ranking and most important members of the
infrastructure thus far neutralized in a single op-
eration. Their capture should be a significant loss
to the Communists' provincial apparatus.
Quang Duc, with fewer than 32,000 people, is
the least populated and probably the most isolated
province in the country. At least two thirds of
Quang Duc's inhabitants are montagnards, its economy
is largely self-contained, and national politics
have traditionally had no impact on the province.
In the other highland provinces, where much the
same situation prevails, the Communists usually have
a simple infrastructure in which military and polit-
ical roles are often carried out by relatively few
persons. Although many of those thus far arrested
in Quang Duc held several positions in the infra-
structure, the over-all Communist organization ap-
pears to be fairly extensive.
Local officials in IV Corps apparently do not
believe that the formation of Communist "liberation
committees" throughout much of the delta is partic-
ularly significant and do not see any necessity for
countering the Communists' efforts.
Some officials in Vinh Long Province either
profess to have no knowledge of the Communists'
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Eobjectives in forming the committees, or see them
merely in terms of their immediate functions, such
as tax-collecting, population-control bodies. Those
who do recognize that the committees could constitute
a formal governmental structure which could at some
future time claim jurisdiction over large areas dis-
count any possibility that the Communists will be
successful. The people, the officials believe, would
reject the Communist system.
These attitudes are apparently typical also of
other areas of IV Corps, where local officials gen-
erally tend to downgrade the impact and potential
effectiveness of the committees, seeing in them no
more of a threat than any past Communist administra-
tive organizations have posed. These officials ap-
pear to think of the war solely in terms of a mili-
tary struggle in which the Comm ill eventually
be defeated. F77 I
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[Czechoslovakia-USSR: The Czechoslovak National
Assembly's ratification yesterday of the status-of-
forces agreement with the Soviets was reached in a
stormy session punctuated by speeches and resolutions
opposing the treaty.
Premier Cernik presented an elaborate rationali-
zation for the treaty. He asked for approval of it
in the interests of Communism and of Czechoslovakia,
and emphasized that it was necessary to strengthen
ties with the Warsaw Pact. Cernik said that the
treaty specified that the majority of Soviet troops
and all of the other Warsaw Pact forces will leave
the country.in stages within two months after rati-
fication by both sides. Moscow Radio yesterday re-
ported that the presidium of the Soviet parliament
met and approved the treaty, which theoretically
means that the bulk of the occupation forces will be
out of Czechoslovakia by mid-December.
As described by Cernik, the agreement appears
similar to treaties that the Soviets have with Poland
and Hungary. The forces remaining in Czechoslovakia
will be billeted in military areas and "will not in-
terfere" in internal Czechoslovak affairs. "Repre-
sentatives" of the Soviet forces, however, will re-
main in Prague and Bratislava, probably in a liaison
capacity.
According to Cernik, the treaty "respects" Czech-
oslovak sovereignty and guarantees the security and
living standards of the population. The agreements
also spells out the legal provisions affecting both
the Czechoslovak population and the Soviet troops,
and provides that the Soviets will pay for all goods
and services--primarily through the delivery of So-
viet products to Czechoslovakia.
Cernik'.s description of the agreement is similar
to the text issued by the Soviet news agency TASS
last night. Many of the specific articles in the
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TASS version, however, appear to lend themselves to
various .interpretations, and some of them will require
additional negotiations between Prague and Moscow.
There is also speculation in Prague that the Czech-
oslovaks and Soviets have made other agreements which
were not mentioned in the TASS version. According to
these rumors, approximately 70,000 Soviet troops will
remain in the country, stationed primarily in north-
ern Bohemia and near the major cities of Prague, Brati-
slava, and Brno. The Czechoslovak Army allegedly will
be reduced in exchange for improved technical equip-
ment, and the Soviets have presumably agreed to re-
move their secret police and military intelligence
units when the bulk of regular forces depart. In ad-
dition, the Soviets are said to have agreed to pay
Prague nearly $2 million for occupation damages to
date.
The Soviets, however, are also rumored to have
imposed additional controls on Czechoslovak political
life. They are prohibiting mass public celebrations
on the 50th anniversary of the First Republic on 28
October, while forcing Dubcek and his colleagues to
allow pro-Soviet conservatives to meet openly in prep-
aration for an anniversary "celebration" of the Oc-
tober Revolution on 7 November.
Moscow is also said to be insisting that the
Czechoslovak party central committee postpone its
meeting until after 27 October. The Soviets are prob-
ably hoping that the dissension among top Czechoslovak
leaders over the treaty will intensify while conserv-
ative elements, who are being encouraged by the Rus-
sians, have additional time to strengthen their posi-
tion.
Soviet forces have apparently begun to withdraw
from Czechoslovakia. A Western attache reported on
18 October that some Soviet troops in western Czech-
oslovakia were moving toward Poland, possibly on the 3
19 Oct 68 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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way back to the USSR. F
DIA 25X1 a large Soviet convoy moved
from southern East Germany to the Berlin area during
the morning of 18 October.
Other reports on 17 and 18 October indicated
that there was heavy Soviet and East German military
traffic on the autobahn south of Berlin. These re-
ports suggest that East German forces deployed in areas
of southern East Germany near the Czechoslovak border
may be returning to garrison.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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France: Various groups within the French Com-
munist Party are taking issue with their politburo's
attitudes toward the Soviet intervention in Czecho-
slovakia.
The secretary general of the party, Waldeck
Rochet, is under pressure from both the Soviet Union
and pro-Soviet French Communists to modify the party's
official position on the Czechoslovak crisis. Some
observers estimate that over 30 percent of the rank
and file strongly disapprove of the politburo's de-
nunciation last August of Soviet actions. According
to a high French Ministry of Interior official, the
Soviet Embassy has been unusually active in encour-
aging these dissidents, among whom are one or two
members of the politburo.
Rochet is also under attack from a group of
party intellectuals, headed by politburo member Roger
Garaudy, and supported by many young Communists who
consider the party's policy on Czechoslovakia too
mild. They are calling for a thoroughgoing "liber-
alization" which would include an open split with
Moscow. A small number of these "liberals" have
resigned in protest.
The French party's central committee will meet
on 20 and 21 October, probably to deal with the tur-
moil in the party over the Czechoslovak affair. With
the solid backing of all but two or three members of
the politburo, Rochet will probably be able to re-
sist demands for change from both sides. He appar-
ently wants to avoid any pro-Soviet statement which
would do further damage to the party's domestic po-
litical position. At the same time he is opposed
to any action which would lead to an open rupture
with the Soviets. He is probably hoping that "nor-
malization" of Soviet-Czech relations will decrease
tension within the party.
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USSR: Unfavorable weather and transport prob-
lems last month have dimmed prospects for a grain
crop as large as in 1967.
In mid-August, estimates indicated that total
grain production in 1968 would be slightly above
both last year's relatively favorable harvest--122
million tons--and the average for the years 1964-
66--120 million tons.
Frequent rains and some snow and frost, however,
have hampered late season harvesting in some areas--
mainly the new land areas of Kazakhstan and West Si-
beria. In addition, a shortage of trucks reportedly
has delayed moving the grain from fields to elevators.
In past years, the Soviets have avoided trans-
port bottlenecks by temporarily requisitioning mili-
tary vehicles to augment the truck inventory of the
agricultural enterprises. This year, however, the
partial mobilization of the armed forces during the
Czechoslovak crisis led the army to requisition a
large number of trucks from the agricultural sector.
The truck shortage, together with the inclement
weather, probably caused not only above average
losses of grain but some reduction in the quality of
the grain harvested. F77 I
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Thai Communists Seen Expanding Insurgenc North
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Thailand: Communist insurgents may be expanding
their operations into new areas in north-central. Thai-
land.
Widely separated incidents have occurred during
the past month in the heretofore quiet provinces of
Loei, Phit n 1 } aradit.
the Communists view this
area, which links the insurgent strongholds in the
north and northeast, as especially important in their
over-all strategy. There have been numerous reports
that Communists are recruiting in the villages, but
this is the first indication of active armed insur-
gency in the area.
The new activity in the north-central area may
be aided by personnel normally engaged in the north-
east, where armed insurgency remains at a low level.
The Communists in the northeast are known to have
contributed some assets to the insurgent campaign in
the north earlier this year and, judging from their
tactical successes there, may well have decided to
provide some personnel to recruit and proselytize in
the north-central area.
The bulk of insurgent forces remains in the
northeast, however.
(Map)
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Indonesia-Singapore: Indonesian authorities are
trying to avert further extreme public reactions to
Singapore's recent execution of two Indonesian marines.
Yesterday's emotional, highly publicized funeral
in Djakarta, however, has increased the immediate
danger of violence.
the cabinet has directed the trade minister to study
possible economic sanctions against Singapore. Ship-
ments to Singapore, which have substantially benefit-
ted its economy, have been halted for the time being.
The Indonesian Embassy in Singapore may be reduced
to a consulate general.
Although the Djakarta authorities expect to keep
approved demonstrations within reasonable bounds, spon-
taneous demonstrations--some accompanied by violence--
have already occurred.
Some officials are concerned that hotheaded ac-
tions could be mounted against Singapore from nearby
islands occupied by the Indonesian Navy, over which
Djakarta has little control.
Singapore officials privately have expressed con-
fidence in their ability to maintain internal order
and to cope with Indonesian reprisals. They say that
the decision to proceed with the execution was dic-
tated primarily by a desire to avoid "knuckling under
to a large neighbor." They also believe that it is
better to stand up to Indonesia now, while British
and US forces are still in the area.
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Haiti: A reorganization of militia forces in
northern Haiti probably reflects President Duvalier's
uneasiness about his ability to cope with future in-
vasion attempts.
Some militia units have been disarmed and new
leaders installed. Duvalier evidently was dissatis-
fied with the militia's ineptness during the invasion
last May, when there were reports of disorganization
and instances of cowardice.
His action may also be related to the nationwide
military alert instituted on 12 September, which is
still in effect. The government claims to have reli-
able information that an exile force is en route to
Venezuela to train for an invasion of Haiti through
the Dominican Republic.
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Rumania - Latin America: Rumania, in its search
for new markets and widened political contacts, has
intensified its efforts in Latin America.
Bucharest's foreign minister, Corneliu Manescu,
is making an official tour to several of the more
important Latin American countries, including Mexico,
Brazil, and Argentina, in an effort to strengthen
bilateral relations. His visit follows that of a
Rumanian economic delegation to a number of Latin
American countries.
That delegation, headed by Deputy Premier Radul-
escu, concluded several economic agreements with
countries whose commercial exchanges with Rumania
have been negligible. Rumania probably hopes these
will eventually lead to new markets for its chemical,
petroleum, and agricultural equipment.
An agreement signed in Bogota calls for a goal
of $10 million in trade over the next two years.
Agreement also was reached on the establishment of
permanent trade missions in both Colombia and Mexico.
Agreements establishing joint commissions. to seek ways
to expand trade were signed with Colombia, Chile, and
Venezuela.
The Rumanian economic delegation apparently made
no further progress toward implementing the "agreement
of intention" signed in Caracas in May with the gov-
ernment-owned Venezuelan Petroleum Company. This
agreement calls for the exchange over a ten-year pe-
riod of 11 million tons of Venezuelan crude oil for
$125 million worth of Rumanian goods and services.
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Soviets to Help Guinea Exploit Bauxite Reserves
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Guinea-USSR: Negotiations are in an advanced
stage on an agreement for Soviet assistance in ex-
ploiting bauxite reserves in southwest Guinea.
agreement
has been reached in principle tor the oviets to pro-
vide the technicians and equipment necessary to mine
bauxite deposits near the town of Kindia. Conakry
officials claim that the project could result in an
annual export to the Soviet Union of two million met-
ric tons of bauxite by 1971 or 1972. A Soviet dele-
gation is scheduled to arrive in Conakry in November
for final negotiations.
Guinea apparently views the proposed project as
a means of repaying its debts to the USSR and other
East European Communist countries. The first million
tons of bauxite mined each year would be applied
against Guinea's current debt of slightly over $70
million to the Soviets. The second million tons would
cover the costs incurred by the Soviets in construct-
ing and operating the mining facilities at Kindia.
Production in excess of two million tons would be
used to pay debt obligations to other Communist coun-
tries.
The Guineans expect that construction will begin
in 1969 and hope that exports of bauxite can commence
in 1971. They anticipate that the Soviets will agree
to consolidate and reschedule Guinea's debt to allow
a moratorium on payments until 1971.
The Soviets have been interested in Guinean baux-
ite for some time. They once discussed with the Guin-
eans the possibility of acquiring bauxite from exten-
sive high-grade deposits in the Boke region, now to
be developed by a consortium of Western companies.
Moscow probably hopes not only to facilitate Guinea's
payment of its debts but also to increase Soviet pres-
ence and.'influence. Conakry is currently following
a more moderate course than previously in its rela-
tions with the West.
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Italy - Congo (Kinshasa): Italy-reportedly is
reviewing its air training program in the Congo
(Kinshasa).
An Italian Foreign Ministry official has told
the US Embassy in Rome that the program, now four
years old, is being reviewed with an eye toward re-
casting it after 1969. Meanwhile, the Italian train-
ing mission director in the Congo has stated that
his government has already decided to curtail the
program. He said that a small advisory group--per-
haps ten men--might remain in the Congo but that re-
negotiation of the agreement along present lines was
out of the question.
Italy's decision, if it has not already been
made, will be influenced by its long-standing desire
to cooperate with US efforts to bolster an independ-
ent Congo and by its commercial hopes in the Congo.
The Italians failed in their efforts to sell jet
trainers to Kinshasa, however, and Rome is unhappy
about Congolese reliance on other powers for the de-
velopment of the air force.
The Congolese have come a long way toward self-
sufficiency in training and will have more than 50
pilots and six qualified flight instructors by the
end of next year.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Tanzania - Communist China: A Tanzanian mis-
sion-is expected to visit Communist China in November
in connection with carrying out the agreement under
which Peking will build the TanZam railroad. The
team reportedly will arrange for importing Chinese
commodities worth about $60 million under credits
extended by Peking. Proceeds from the sale of these
commodities are to Pay for some of the local costs
of the project.
* * *
Sikkim-India: Floods and landslides have cut
off Sikkim from India, its principal source of food.
Supplies are said to be adequate for only two weeks.
Floods have also seriously damaged the northern area
of West Bengal, where special state elections sched-
uled for November have had to be postponed until
next February.
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