CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A012600070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 25, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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No. 0322/68
25 November 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Czechoslovakia: Unity achieved at the central com-
mittee plenum is breaking down. (Page 2)
Balkans - Warsaw Pact: The political and military
situation is quiescent. (Page 3)
France: De Gaulle gambles that confidence in the
franc can be restored by other means than devalua-
tion. (Page 4)
Italy: Nomination of a Socialist to form a govern-
ment was designed to put pressure on the Christian
Democrats. (Page 6)
Japan: The current student strife has implications
reaching beyond campus issues. (Page 7)
South Korea: Friction between the government and
the opposition may spark National Assembly clashes.
(Page 8)
Turkey: Economic troubles may force a devaluation,
tighter import controls, or reduced domestic invest-
ment. (Page 9)
Mali: New junta moves to shift Mali toward the ranks
of the moderate African states. (Page 10)
West Berlin: Student disorders (Page 11)
Burma: Political prisoners (Page 11)
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THAILAND
Pakse
r-r~
III CORPS
Vung Tau
SOUTH VIETNAM
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Nha Trang
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C Vietnam: Ground action continued light and
scattered over the weekend.
There was no major Communist-initiated military
activity, and intensive allied sweep and patrol opera-
tions triggered only sporadic skirmishing. Several
contacts were reported in northwestern III Corps and
near My Tho city, which was lightly mortared. No
significant military activity was reported in the
Demilitarized Zone area.
Le Duc Tho has returned to Paris with renewed de-
mands that the US resume talks with or without Saigon.
His statement at the airport was an effort to increase
the propaganda pressure over this issue.
Lesser Hanoi spokesmen in Paris also began to
inject a new sense of urgency this past week into
the Communist call to get the negotiations moving,
but Hanoi is still not threatening any specific ac-
tion if its demands are not met.
Tho spent most of his six weeks away from Paris
in Hanoi, but he has had unusually lengthy talks in
Peking and Moscow during his return trip. His stops
included a day of discussions with top Chinese leaders
and a full five days in Moscow. Negotiating prior-
ities and policy were almost certainly the main
subject in both capitals. F77 I
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Czechoslovakia: The fleeting unity achieved at
the party central committee plenum last week is again
breaking down.
Party leaders fanned out through the country
over the weekend to explain the unpopular decisions
taken by the central committee. They were far from
speaking with one voice, however, and their comments
underscore the bitterness of the splits at top party
levels, which Slovak first secretary Husak has called
deep and dangerous.
Party first secretary Dubcek is trying to heal
the wounds. He indicated that he favors attempting
to stabilize the country on the basis of economic
reform, rather than on the basis of compromises af-
fecting the more controversial issues of individual
freedom and rights. Dubcek implied, however, that
social and political changes would accompany economic
reforms, which will be discussed by the central com-
mittee in December.
Other leaders, however, indicated they would put
emphasis on political issues before trying to move
on to reforms. Conservatives have called for elimi-
nation of extremists from the leadership and for a
purge of party dissenters. Moderates are espousing
popular acceptance of the "'new reality" and thus are
partly meeting Soviet demands.
Meanwhile, scientists, artists, and newsmen
have banded together in Prague to protest against
any retreat from liberalization. They have presented
the party leadership with an 11-point resolution and
plan to meet again on Tuesday, presumably after re-
ceiving a response.
Leaders of the recently concluded student strikes
believe they have accomplished their objectives, the
most important of which was to bridge the normal gap
between students and industrial workers. Their state-
ment implies that they are prepared to act in the fu-
ture if new restrictions should riot be to their lik-
ing.
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Balkans - Warsaw Pact: The political and mili-
tary situation in the Balkans is still quiescent.
Rumanian officials around the world are maintain-
ing a calm outlook, In Paris, for example, a Rumanian
diplomat said on 23 November that he had not noted any
concern in his embassy about the rumors of invasion.
Meanwhile,
150 officers representing the chiefs of staff of all
Warsaw Pact countries arrived in Bucharest on 22 No-
vember for talks that reportedly will end today. The
meeting coincides with reports that the Warsaw Pact
is preparing for a top-level meeting in December of
its Political Consultative Committee. Similar gath-
erings have been noted in the past in preparation for
such committee meetings.
The Warsaw Pact staff meeting now in progress may
also be discussing an exercise to be held in Rumania
during 1969, but there is no firm evidence that a pact
maneuver will take place in Rumania this year.
ungary and Bulgaria
report no evidence of an alert in these countries or
of any build-up near the Rumanian borders,
The situation also is calm in Yugoslavia, de-
spite rumors of growing tension. The rumors stem-
med from a British correspondents confusion over
public discussion in Yugoslavia of a proposed na-
tional defense law. Discussion of this legislation
has been going on since September. The draft law
prescribes the rights and duties of the Yugoslav
population under a general mobilization concept
that would take effect in response to an enemy at-
tack.
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C France: General De Gaulle's rejection of deval-
uation is a gamble that confidence in the franc can
be restored by other means,,
The French President apparently believes that the
credits granted last week at the Bonn meeting of ten
leading financial powers, West Germany's refusal to
revalue the mark, and his newly announced austerity
program at home will together dampen the wave of
speculation against the franc. Whether or not this
optimistic estimate will prove correct depends in part
on how effectively the French Government is able to
control wages and prices, The measures announced by
De Gaulle are only mildly deflationary, and more
stringent moves may be needed eventually.
De Gaulle's refusal to devalue the franc, com-
bined with austerity measures in Britain, should re-
move the immediate pressure on the pound sterling as
well as the short-term threat to other currencies,
including the dollar. The US Embassy in London notes,
however, that while a franc devaluation might have been
even worse for British trade than. the restrictive mea-
sures Paris has now taken, uncertainty in financial
markets always hurts sterling,
Initial reaction in the other European capitals
is decidedly mixed, According to press reports, there
is widespread official skepticism. that the measures
will be effective in the long :run, Moreover, there
is also a fear that a failure of De Gaulle's gamble
might later force France into a devaluation that
would compel others to follow.
The measures announced by De Gaulle are likely to
aggravate the domestic social climate and, in partic-
ular, to lead to renewed discontent among students and
workers, whose dissatisfaction touched off the upheaval
in May. Labor spokesmen have already protested De
Gaulle's condemnation of workers who struck during ]
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C the earlier crisis and have complained that they will
bear the brunt of the austerity measures. Moreover,
a new upsurge in student militancy is possible if the
announced budgetary cuts in education are severe enough
to deprive students of the new universities and facil-
ities promised them. In anticipation of a possible
renewal of protests and demonstrations, De Gaulle
made clear that public order would be maintained.
I I
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Italy: President Saragat's surprise nomina-
tion of a Socialist to form a new government was
probably intended to pressure the Christian Demo-
crats into settling their internal struggle over
party leadership.
All postwar Italian governments have hereto-
fore been led by the dominant Christian Democratic
Party. Although the nominee, 72-year-old president
of the Chamber of Deputies Allesandro Pertini, is
a generally respected figure, his chances of form-
ing a government appear to be practically nil.
The only coalition currently possible would
have to consist of the Christian Democrats, the
Socialists, and the small Republican Party. The
Christian Democrats, however, are highly unlikely
to acquiesce in a Socialist-led government and,
with the unanimous re-election of Mariano Rumor as
party secretary yesterday, they succeeded in at
least papering over the deep factionalism within
the party. This development would also seem to im-
ply that compromises have been reached between the
factions regarding the scope and priorities of such
urgently needed measures as educational reform and
labor legislation.
The party's previous delay in reaching such
an agreement probably accounts for Saragat's deci-
sion to try to force the issue by naming Pertini.
It now appears probable that Pertini will relinquish
his mandate within a minimum length of time, and
that Saragat will then nominate a Christian Demo-
crat to negotiate with the Socialists and Republi-
cans to form a new center-left government.
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Japan: The current student strife at Tokyo
University has implications reaching beyond strictly
campus issues.
The trouble began with student protests over
administration policies, but has developed into a
bitter power struggle between opposing factions of
the radical student confederation, Zengakuren. The
number of students involved, more than 20,000, has
been swelled by sympathizers from all parts of
Japan. Faculty members and politically neutral stu-
dents at the school have also been drawn in.
Mediation efforts by school authorities have
been unavailing. The overriding consideration among
the competing leftist groups is control of the stu-
dent body.
The outcome of the confrontation at Tokyo Uni-
versity, Japan's foremost institute of higher learn-
ing, could have a strong bearing on student protest
movements at other schools. Normal operations in
as many as 60 schools throughout Japan have been
disrupted this academic year by student excesses.
The government has been loath to use police
force to quell disturbances in view of the tradi-
tion of campus inviolability; instead, it has largely
acted to cordon off the violence. In those instances
where police have taken a direct hand, the problems
have only intensified. Nevertheless, the government
is coming under increasing pressure from the general
public to stabilize conditions on the school front.
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South Korea: Growing friction between the gov-
ernment and the major opposition party threatens to
produce another clash in the National Assembly.
The opposition New Democratic Party is angered
by the government's continued failure to implement
an agreement of November 1967 to conduct a biparti-
san investigation of the New Democrats' election
grievances. Until this agreement was reached, New
Democratic Party members had refused to take their
assembly seats in protest against alleged irregu-
larities in the elections of June 1967.
Although the government has ridden roughshod
over the National Assembly opposition before, there
is some indication that :Pak may be prepared to offer
concessions this time to prevent an open break.
Discussions between representatives of the two parties
reportedly are now under way.
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Turkey: An increasing trade deficit and a de-
cline in foreign aid may force the government to
devalue the lira, tighten controls on imports, or
reduce domestic investment.
The rapid growth of the Turkish economy in re-
cent years has entailed a faster increase of im-
ports than of exports. The resultant balance of
payments deficit has been covered by foreign aid
and by a series of emergency import restrictions.
This year, the balance of payments deficit has
been larger than anticipated, and a prospective
sharp reduction in foreign aid, resulting from a
cutback in US funds, will jeopardize future import
levels.
The government probably will want to postpone
a decision on countermeasures until after the na-
tional elections in October 1969. Devaluation or
tighter import restrictions would be inflationary
and politically unpopular, while cuts in investment
would slow economic growth.
Pressures for action, however, will increase
when the aid reduction begins to be felt. In addi-
tion, the consortium of Free World countries and
international agencies that furnishes most of Tur-
key's foreign aid can be expected to apply some
leverage when it meets on 17 December to review the
Turkish aid program. In any event, the balance of
payments may deteriorate so ra idly as to force the
government's hand.
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Mali: The new military junta is moving to es-
tablish a government that would shift Mali toward
the ranks of the moderate African states.
The young officers who overthrew Modibo Keita's
radical regime'last week have installed a provisional
administration in which moderate,, civilian elements
now wield strong influence? Its ranking member,
after its military president, is a politician who
long was the leading pro-Western dissenter in the
ousted regime. Another key member of the provisional
government is a competent pro-Western technician who
was the principal Malian architect of the economic
accords signed with France last year.
Junta leader Traore's first important policy
statement, contained in an address to the nation on
22 November, amounted to an abrupt reversal of
Keita's basic socialist commitment. It promised
,the elimination of marginal state enterprises--an
action promised by Mali in the accords with France,
but never implemented by Keita. Traore also pledged
to maintain the private sector, and appealed for
private foreign investment along with desperately
needed budgetary assistance.
Traore, and the civilians on whom he is cur-
rently relying heavily, have made it clear that they
are looking initially to Western sources, especially
France, to bail Mali out. At the same time, they
probably will try to preserve the important economic
assistance Mali has been getting from both the USSR
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West Berlin: Police authorities fear that radi-
cal elements will foment a violent demonstration today
during court proceedings against leftist student
leader Fritz Teufel0 On a similar occasion in early
November, rioters inflicted numerous casualties on
police before being subdued by tear gas and water
cannon. Student radical leaders apparently are seek-
ing direct confrontations with the police in hopes
that such clashes will gain publicity and new ad-
herents for their lagging campaign against the city
establishment. Police are likely to adhere to their
strategy of seeking to discourage violence by a su-
perior show of forced
Burma: Virtually all major non-Communist poli-
tical prisoners have now been freed with the release
of 62 individuals on 21 November. Most of the de-
tained Buddhist monks, however, and all of the hard-
core Communists apparently are still being held.
The policy of releasing political prisoners be-
gan about two years ago. Aside from this concession,
however, there has been no other relaxation of the
political controls imposed by the Ne Win regime. Al-
though Ne Win raised the possibility of broadened
civilian participation in the military government
in three major policy speeches in September, he has
given no indication of intent to loosen the military
reins since then.
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