CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A012900130001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 21, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
~~
21 January 1969
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State Dept. review completed
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No. 0018/69
21 January-,1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. .(Page 1)
Czechoslovakia: Dubcek leadership faces severest
crisis since Soviet occupation. (Page 2)
Communist China: Leadership is trying to recon-
struct t e battered governing machinery. (Page 5)
Laos: Military situation is quiet as Communists
prepare new offensive. (Page 7)
India: The foodgrain supply probably will be ad-
equate again this year. (Page- 9)
South Korea: Opposition party is trying to arouse
t e pu lic against a third term for President Pak-
Chong-hue. (Page 10)
Okinawa: Planned anti-US demonstrations (Page 11)
Austria: Soviet pressure to recognize North
T
Vie
tnam (Page 11)
Chile: Proposal to buy F-5 jets
(Page 12 )
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~v ~~~ SOUTH VIETNAM
0
MILES
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C. Vietnam: Ground action picked up sharply over
the weekend as the Communists mounted a series of
mortar and rocket attacks and ground probes in widely
separated areas,
First reports indicate that 27 US and 116--South
Vietnamese soldiers were killed in the fighting. At
least six South Vietnamese civilians were killed and
64 were wounded in terrorist incidents. Although
the Communists did not commit any large main-force
units in-major ground .assaults, reported enemy losses
now stand at more than 60.0.dead--many of them to
allied air strikes and artillery counterfire.
Numerous reports have indicated that the Com-
munists would step up their attacks in late January.
This activity is doubtless intended to project an
image of Communist strength as the new US adminis-
tration takes office in Washington and the ex anded
peace talks et under wa in Paris. 25X1
the enemy ~nten s
to 0 ow up the current offensive phase with a major
push against Saigon and other key cities. No major
changes in the disposition of enemy main force units
have been noted northwest of Saigon, however, and
the Communists do not appear to be in a osition to
launch a major thrust against the-city. (Map) ~ 25X1
21 Jan 6 9 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Czechoslovakia: The Dubcek leadership is on
the brink of its greatest crisis since the Soviet
occupation.
President Ludvik Svoboda, who last night an-
nounced to the nation that a second Czechoslovak
youth had set himself ablaze, made an impassioned
plea to all Czechoslovaks to refrain from further
self-destructive acts and public demonstrations.
Svoboda indicated that such disorders could degen-
erate into riots which might claim "thousands of
innocent lives" and bring down the entire Dubcek
leadership in the -process. His remarks suggest
that the Soviets are running out of patience with
Dubcek's reluctance to take the necessary steps
to maintain order and to use force to squelch anti-
Soviet protests and marches.
Student demonstrations in Prague between 18-20
January ended a period of relative calm in Czech-
oslovakia. Thousands of disaffected youths yester-
day marched in the streets in memory of Jan Paluch,
a 21-year-old student whose self-immolation has
aroused the entire population. Paluch was protest-
ing censorship and the continued existence of an
illegal pro-Soviet publication, but his "martyrdom"
has sparked other protests and expanded the list
of grievances.
In attempting to assess Paluch's motives, the
US Embassy in Prague has indicated that a document
purported to be a party presidium directive on new
censorship provisions, dated 7 January, was cir-
culated in Prague. According to the 18-point
statement, the party intended to establish firm
control over the Czechoslovak news agency, radio
and television by forcing them to adhere to the
party line and by making sure that the "right
people" are appointed to top positions in the mass
media.
(continued
Central Intelligence bulletin
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In terms reminiscent of former hardline party
boss Novotny, the document also recommends that a
new press law minimize the possibility that pub-
lications and individual journalists will be able
to use legal means in order to circumvent newly
imposed restrictions. Under present circumstances,
however, it is unclear whether the leadership will
continue to push such measures.
The students, who have the support of the
workers and the intellectuals, reportedly will meet
with trade union officials later this week to co-
ordinate protest activities. Party and government
leaders have attempted to head off any further dem-
onstrations by expressing sympathy for Paluch and
by meeting student leaders, but these efforts have
thus far been unsuccessful. The death of a second
student might trigger riots and strikes that could
lead to a direct clash between some Czechoslovak
demonstx?atox?s and the Soviet occupation forces.
Tt was precisely such a situation that the party
presidium recentl warned could lead to "tragic
consequences."
21 Jan 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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LAST RECORDED PUBLIC APPEARANCES
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ELITE LEADERSHIP
Early October
6 October
28 November
29 November.
30 November
23 December
30 December
2 January
Last collective appearance (National Day Ceremony)
Chiang Ching (Madame Mao)
Chang Chun-chino (Cultural Revolution official)
Yeh Chun (Madame Lin Piao)
Wang Tung-hsing (probably Mao's bodyguard)
Lin Piao (Defense Minister)
Mao Tse-tung (Met with Australian Communist leader)
Yao Wen-yuan (Cultural Revolution official)
Kang Sheng (Cultural Revolution official)
Wen Yu cheng (Peking Garrison commander)
Chou En-lai (Premier)
Chen Po-ta (Cultural Revolution Group head)
Huang Yung sheng (Chief of Staff)
Wu Fa-hsien (Air Force commander)
Hsien Fu-chih (Security Minister)
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Communist~China-:Efforts to reconstruct the
battered governing machinery are going forward in
an atmosphere of political tension and uncertainty.
A party congress has been tentatively sched-
uled this spring to form a new central committee,
approve a new-:party constitution, and confirm de-
fense minister Lin Piao as Mao Tse-tung's succes-
sor. Intense political struggles are reported to
be taking place in advance of the congress both
in Peking and many provinces, however, and these
could force a postponement.
Adding to the air of uncertainty is the fail-
ure of top Chinese Communist leaders to appear to-
gether in public since a major party plenum held
last October. This failure of the elite to show
up during or after the plenum, or to make their
customary appearance on New Year's day, gives the
impression that political jockeying preceding the
ninth party congress may be affecting the position
of some national-level leaders.
Rumors are prevalent in Peking about ferment
in the leadership. These rumors, consisting mainly
of fanciful accounts of disorderly high-level meet-
ings, may have some factual basis in view of their
persistence. The fact that they are circulating
is a measure of the mounting confusion in the cap-
ital.
In the provinces, harsh Maoist social pro-
grams have been under way since last October. The
regime appears to be tampering again with rural
institutions in an attempt to make them more egal-
itarian, and is engaged in a crash effozt..to trans-
fer large numbers of urban dwellers to rural areas
to share work and hardships with peasants. These
measures are provoking considerable pubic dssat-
isfaction, The degree to which such utopian social
experiments are to be pushed is likely to be one
of the more divisive issues confronting the forth-
coming party congress.
(Chart)
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lAOS: Current Situation
~ N O R T N
V 1 ~`-,T N A M
,.,1
~,7
HAN01*~,
t
t
NaKhang~
~.?~..
Plaine des .~
James C`
'. ^.
i / ~~~~' ~? V~I~T~ANE
~,
?r ~.
r.r ~~..
X50 UTN
Saraud.ne
'r?VIETNAM
Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
f'
f'
Bah` ,
Tha~~eng
Bolovens
Plateau
/? `~';.~
v 25 so 7s inn Mae
h++ f
0 -.25,, rio 75 10n Kilometers
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Laos: The military situation is quiet as the
Communists prepare for the next round of their dry
season offensive.
Only :light skirmishing and patrol activity
has been reported over the past several days near
the Bolovens Plateau&-where the heaviest figh ting
of the two-month-,old Communist. offensive has taken
place. As many as three North Vietnamese battal-
ions are still dug in around Thateng? but the en-
emy has made no effort to bring additional pressure
on the base's tired defendersm Although heavy air
strikes and government guerrilla operations are
helping to keep the Communists at. bays it may be
that the North Vietnamese are not willing to run
the risk of another costly all-out assault.
In the north small numbers of Communist
troops have been probing ou;tl.ying government posi-
tions-defending the key guerrilla base at Na Khang.
The guerrillas have responded by trying to clear
the enemy from recent.l.y captured positions from
which mortar fire has been placed on the base's
airstrip. There is no word yet on how this small
counteroffensive is progressing? but another
spoiling operation has blunted a Communist push
against government positions located between Na
Khang and the Plaine des Jarres.
Meanwhilee the Pathet Lao mission in Vientiane
received some rough treatment over the weekend at
the hands of military authorities. Upset over the
embarrassing ease with which the Communists blew
up an ammunition dump outside the capital last
week? Vientiane commander General Rouprasith vented
his anger by having a grenade thrown into the
Pathet Lao compound and having several Pathet Lao
security troops severely beaten?
It is not clear whether Prime Minister Sou-
vanna has sanctioned these activitiese although
he apparently has formally asked the International
21 Jan 69
Central Intell%gence Bulletin
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Control Commission (ICC) to request the withdrawal
of the Pathet Lao from Vientiane. It seems Tikely,
however, that cooler heads will eventually prevail
and the harassments will be called off. ~'or their
part, the Pathet Lao? who have suffered similar
abuse in the past, have asked for increased pro-
tection from the ICC, but so far ive no evidence
of wanting to quit the capital.
~~R~r~
21 Jan 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin ~
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India: Despite a decline from the record har-
vest o~rthe crop year 1967-68, Tndia's foodgrain
supply probably will be adequate this year.
India's foodgrain production for the .crop year
ending next June probably will be about 95 million
tons, or roughly five million tons less than the
record set last year. The increased use of high-
yielding seeds, fertilizers and pesticides as well
as improved irrigation will offset to a considerable
degree the decreased rainfall experienced thus far
in this crop year.
The fall crop, normally over two thirds of the
total harvest, was only about 64 million tons, ..down
somewhat from the previous year. Growing conditions
continue to be unfavorable in many non-irrigated
areas in the Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh for
the spring crop, which probably will not exceed 30
million tons unless significantly more rain falls
in the next few weeks.
Despite the probable shortfall in this year's
crop, both private hoards and official stocks for
public distribution are relatively high. Moreover,
late last year India concluded an agreement for 2.3
million tons of PL 480 grain, of which 1.6 million
tons are still to be delivered.
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South Korea: The leading opposition party
is seeking to arouse the public against a third
term for President Pak Chong-hue.
Opposition leader Yu Chin-o announced on 17
January that his party members would resign their
seats in the National Assembly if the government
used its two-thirds majority to ram through leg-
islation removing constitutional barriers to Pak's
running again in 1971. Yu claimed that only a
handful of citizens would support the amendment.
He also lashed out at the Pak regime for "top-
level corruption" and for a press censorship which
he claimed is creating discontent and apprehension
in the country.
President Pak has not publicly declared that
he will seek a third term, but intense maneuvering
by his supporters has convinced many that he in-
tends to run again. In any showdown, the politi-
cal opposition would almost certainly hope to
rally the support of volatile student and intel-
lectual elements which form the hard core of ub-
lic opposition to the government. 25X1
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NOTES
~~
Okinawa: A leftist labor confederation is
the principal sponsor of a large-scale demonstration
planned for 4 February at. Kadena Air Base to pro-
test the presence of B-52s on Okinawa. Although
the rally, which will highlight a thrice-postponed
24-hour general strike, is intended to be nonvio-
lent, clashes with the police are likely if plans
to block access to the base are carried out, The
participation of "peace" organizations, including
radical students, adds to the chances of disorders.
The crash of a B-52 on Okinawa last November gen-
erated broad popular support for local cam ai ns
for removal of the bombers?
Austria: The Soviet Union and several other
Communist countries reportedly have urged Austria
to follow Sweden's lead in recognizing North Viet-
nam, claiming that this is a proper course of ac-
tign for all neutral countries. This advice, ac-
cording t? Austrian Foreign Minister Waldheim, has
so far been in a moderate key. He asserted, how-
ever, that Austria has no intention of recognizing
North Vietnam. There is no indication that-the
Communists have yet made similar approaches to
other European neutrals such as Finland and Swit-
zerland, but both governments have recently dis-
claimed ublicl an intention of recognizing
Hanoi.
(continued)
21 Jan 69
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Chilee This week the air force will explore
with Northrop Aviation a proposal to buy a number
of F-5 supersonic jet aircraft. .Presumably the
F-5s would eventually replace approximately 21
subsonic Hawker Hunters bought from the UK over
the past two years. Any such large purchase would
put an additional strain on Chile's already tight
budget, but military leaders are likely to push
for it. They are concerned that Chile is encircled
by military and military-backed governments, which
have recently purchased modern arms such s Peru'
Mirage fighters.
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21 Jan 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin 12
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Secret
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