CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013100080001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 18, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/03/28: CIA-RDP79T00975A01310(5M -9
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intellz~ence Bulletin
Secret
18 February 1969
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013100080001-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13100080001-7
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No. 0042/69
18 February 1969
Central Intellzgence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Western European Union: London's efforts to expand
po ilit tica consultations have led to serious trouble
with the French. (Page 2)
Malaysia: Sarawak's Communist movement may be
shifting its focus to armed struggle. (Page 4)
Surinam: Minister-President Pengel is maneuvering
to ma stain his leadership. (Page 6)
Peru-US: Fishing boat incident (Page 7)
Somali Republic: Conflict over police commander
Page 7
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SECRET
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CVietnam: No significant new ground actions
were reported in the first hours following the
allies' 24-hour Tet cease-fire, which ended at
6 PM 17 February, Saigon time.
Enemy activity had increased markedly during
the allied truce period, after several days of
light and scattered action. Nearly 200 Communist-
initiated incidents, mostly small attacks against
allied military positions and patrols, resulted
in 16 allied killed (eight US) against 151 Com-
munists killed.
In the only major action of the day, up to
500 North Vietnamese attacked a US Marine fire sup-
port base in the A Shau Valley, but were beaten
back with losses of 37 killed, after killing four
Marines. 7_ I (Map) J
18 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Western European Union: Recent British ef-
forts to expand political consultation within the
Western European Union (WEU) are threatening to
develop into a major dispute with French President
de Gaulle.
The French have announced that they will not
take part in any meetings of the seven-nation body
until further notice. The decision comes on the
heels of a WEU permanent representatives' council
session on 14 February, which the British proposed
in an effort to promote consultation on Middle
East issues. The French, who refused to attend
the meeting, claimed that it could not legally be
held without unanimous approval, but the other
WEU members all decided to attend on grounds that
consultation did not require unanimity.
Over the weekend, Paris accused WEU Secretary
General Deeckhoutte of overstepping his authority
and canceled its participation in today's permanent
representatives' council session, scheduled to lay
the groundwork for a WEU assembly meeting at the
end of the week.
The French cabinet, at a regularly scheduled
meeting tomorrow, will discuss the WEU crisis,
which many French officials claim results from new
efforts to get Britain into the Common Market by
the back door. It is still not certain whether
De Gaulle will decide to pull his government out
of the union altogether. At a WEU ministerial
meeting on 6-7 February the French did not attempt
to veto further political consultation among the
members, possibly out of fear of being isolated.
De Gaulle, however, may have felt the need to make
an issue out of the recent British maneuvers in
order to demonstrate French strength on the eve of
President Nixon's European tour and the upcoming
Franco-German summit.
(continued)
18 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
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The British appear to have had some success
in lining up German support for the idea of in-
creased political cooperation between the UK and
the continent. In Bonn last week, Prime Minister
Wilson secured German approval of a communique
which emphasized that European political unity
was inconceivable without Britain. The Germans
also reportedly told the British that they would
be willing to support expanded consultation within
WEU as long as it conformed to WEU rules.
I I
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Malaysia: The Communist movement in Sarawak
State may be shifting its focus from parliamentary
tactics to armed struggle, but major terrorism in
the near future is unlikely.
On the basis of recent information, especially
captured documents and prisoner interrogations, the
Malaysian security officials believe that the Sa-
rawak Communist Organization, which is largely
Chinese, has decided to adopt a modified form of
Mao's rural-based revolution in Sarawak and is
currently attempting to consolidate and reorganize
its forces. A few armed incidents in the east
Malaysian state during recent months have further
convinced the authorities that there has been a
policy change.
Heretofore, the Sarawak Communists had empha-
sized infiltration of legal parties, particularly
the largely Chinese Sarawak United People's Party.
They also had confined their military efforts
mainly to Indonesian Kalimantan, where they sought
to establish a liberated area from which eventually
to launch an armed struggle against Sarawak. Some
of these Indonesia-based armed units have now crossed
into Sarawak, and others are reportedly regrouping
near the border.
the Communists have only an estimate
armed men, of which 170 are believed to be in Sa-
rawak.
Another aspect of the Communists' over-all
policy line is proselyting among indigenous tribal
groups. These efforts have apparently been more
successful than the authorities had realized until
very recently. The government now fears that se-
curity measures aimed at these groups might be in-
terpreted as ethnically motivated and could trigger
communal disorders.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Problems of morale, organization, and logis-
tics, however, appear to preclude an effective in-
surgent effort for some time. The strength of the
Sarawak Communist Organization has declined in re-
cent, years as the result of Indonesian and Malaysian
military pressure and Malaysian intelligence suc-
cesses, which led to the arrest of many of its mem-
bers. The organization may encounter further dif-
ficulty because the United People's Party is at-
temtin to purge Communists from its membership.
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Surinam: Political tensions are continuing
to rise an Minister-President Pengel is maneuvering
to maintain his leadership.
Pengel's mishandling of last month's student-
teacher strikes brought criticism from several
cabinet members that pointed up serious strains
between him and his advisers. The education minis-
ter refused to accept the blame for the strikes
and said he would turn in his resignation "only
if all of us resign." Pengel responded on 13 Feb-
ruary by announcing that the entire cabinet had
resigned. He probably hopes to use the mass res-
ignations as a practical device to get rid of dis-
sident ministers and to draw public attention away
from continuing teacher and worker grievances.
Pengel is a "strong man" and a master at po-
litical bargaining. His chances of putting to-
gether a new government by negotiating with po-
litical leaders are probably better than if he
were to call for new elections and attempt to get
a fresh mandate from the people. If the present
negotiations fail to produce a working majority,
new elections will be held. In that case, the
leftist Nationalist Republic Party, whose support
for the worker demands has recently brought it
increased prestige, would, for the first time, be
a serious contender for representation. 25X1
18 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Peru-US: The Peruvian Government seems to be
trying to minimize the importance of last week's
fishing boat incident. The nationalistic press in
Lima, meanwhile, is accusing "certain sectors" in
the US of playing 'up the incident to worsen ten-
sions produced by the oil company nationalization
case. Peru's next: move in that case is still un-
clear, but the recall of Peru's ambassador to the
Organization of American States could be part of a
plan to bring the nationalization issue before that
body. F7 I
Somali Republic: Prime Minister Egal has
placed national police commander Abscir on four
months' leave rather than accept his resignation
tendered last week when a presidential decree
transferred authority over police assignments to
Interior Minister Yassin. The compromise has
averted a serious morale problem in the police
force that would have affected its ability to
maintain order during the current election campaign.
The conflict between the two, however, remains
basically unresolved; Egal apparently still intends
to get rid of Abscir, who continues to insist that
the police force must be free from political in-
terference.
18 Feb 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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