CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013100120001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 24, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
24 February 1969
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No. 0047/69
24 February 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Laos: The Communists still threaten government
positions, but there are few signs of a major push.
(Page 5)
Berlin: The Communists have initiated last-minute
approaches to try to induce West Germany to move
its presidential election from Berlin. (Page 6)
.Western Europe: Britain seeks to present an image
of itself as a champion of a united Europe with
close ties to the US. (Page 8)
Pakistan: The scramble to assume national leader-
ship has begun. (Page 10)
Nigeria: Interdiction of airlift (Page 12)
Peru: Free elections demanded (Page 12)
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[Vietnam: Communist attacks tapered off some-
what onebruary after the heavy action on 22-
23 February. Numerous indicators, however, suggest
an enemy intention to sustain a period of offensive
activity in many areas of the country.
The Communists probably believe that the ef-
fort of the last few days is unlikely to have the
kind of lasting. impact on South Vietnam and the US
which they are hoping to achieve.
Action on 24 February: Preliminary reports
indicate that Communist-initiated military action
was sharply reduced on the second day of the of-
fensive. Attacks on 24 February, however, included
several new shellings of allied military installa-
tions and South Vietnamese towns. The situation
in and immediately around Saigon was reported.quiet
but several attacks took place in nearby areas of
III Corps.
Enemy activity in Bien Hoa Province, to the
east of the capital, was centered for the most part
in the area of the Long Binh Army Post. Other in-
cidents were reported in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia
provinces, including harassing shellings of the
provincial capitals and some scattered district
towns.
The largest number of attacks on 24 February
occurred in the IV Corps provinces south of Saigon
where at least 30 attacks had been reported by 6 AM
24 February Saigon time. None of these attacks,
however, involved enemy main force units or full-
scale ground assaults on allied strong points or
population centers.
Developments on 23 February: The Communist
post-Tet offensive was launched with scores of
simultaneous hit-and-run attacks during the early 3
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Demilitarized Zone
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SOUTH VIETNAM
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C morning hours of 23 February Saigon time. Most of
these consisted of brief periods of rocket and mor-
tar fire, sometimes accompanied by light ground
probes and terrorist raids. In a few instances,
notably in the outlying provinces around Saigon,
Communist ground forces up to battalion strength
launched limited follow-up ground attacks. There
were over 130 attacks in the delta provinces of
IV Corps during the night of 22-23 February.
Many population centers throughout the coun-
try were struck, including provincial capitals.
About a dozen enemy rockets fell on Saigon for the
first time since the full US bombing halt last No-
vember. The main enemy effort, however, even in
urban areas, was against military and government
installations, including bases, field positions,
special forces camps, and civil and military out-
posts. Friendly casualties and damage to allied
installations appear from first reports to be rel-
atively light. (Map) ]
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LAOS: Current Situation
Government-held location
Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
ttopeiaj
1 09
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C H I N A
Na Khan
Pmine des.
T H A I L A N D
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Laos: The Communists are still threatening
government positions in widely separated areas of
the country, but so far there are few signs that a
major push is in the works.
Although they have not chanced any ground as-
saults in recent weeks, North Vietnamese are still
dug in around the government base at Thateng in
southern Laos. Government efforts to relieve the
pressure against the garrison have met with some
early success, although the tactical situation there
is basically unchanged. The government defenders,
whose numbers have been substantially reduced through
casualties and'withdrawals, are getting increasingly
restive over their plight.
The Communists, meanwhile, are still maintain-
ing pressure against other government positions in
the Bolovens Plateau area, including the provincial
capitals of Attopeu and Saravane. Recent enemy troop
movements suggest that the base at Paksong, some 15
miles southwest of Thateng, may be the Communists'
next major target in this area.
A few minor :bases in northern Laos have changed
hands, otherwise the military situation there con-
tinues to be quiet. The anticipated enemy push
against the key base at Na Khang has still not mate-
rialized, although there are fresh reports of enemy
ground reconnaissance around the base's defensive
perimeter. In addition, substantial numbers of
North Vietnamese troops, some of whom have only been
in Laos for a few months and have not yet seen ac-
tion, are still located in the northeast.
The Pathet Lao, meanwhile, continue to make
plans to step up activity in Vientiane Province. Re-
ports of small numbers of advanced Pathet Lao guer-
rillas filtering into isolated villages and increased
terrorism suggest the Communists hope to re-estab-
lish their presence in areas north of the capital
from which they were driven several years ago. The
Communists may also ho a to increase terrorism in
the capital itself. (Map)
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Berlin: The Communists have initiated a series
of last-minute consultations in an effort to induce
the West Germans to move their presidential election
from Berlin.
East German party boss Ulbricht proposed in a
letter delivered on 21 February that Bonn change the
venue of the election in return for a lessening of
tensions and for the issuance of passes at Easter-
time that would permit West Berliners to visit their
relatives on the other side of the wall. On 22 Feb-
ruary the chief of the West Berlin Communist Party
issued a statement saying he was "convinced" that
the East Germans would react positively if the elec-
tion were shifted.
West German Chancellor Kiesinger met twice with
Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin over the weekend. In
the second meeting yesterday, Tsarapkin reportedly
endorsed Ulbricht's proposal of 21 February and Mos-
cow would probably welcome a compromise acceptable
to East Germany. During a talk with West Berlin
Mayor Schuetz on 31 January, the Soviet ambassador
to East Germany had linked a change in the site of
the election with Easter passes.
Despite signs of wavering in Bonn, the pressures
for holding to its decision on the site of the presi-
dential election remain strong. Bonn's prestige has
become heavily engaged, and with the campaign for
the Bundestag election in September already getting
under way, Kiesinger can ill afford to appear as
yielding to Communist pressure. In Bonn's view, a
compromise at this stage must grant more substantial
benefits for West Berlin than the East German offer
of 21 February provides.
The East Germans may be willing to negotiate
with the West Berlin Senat about more permanent
pass arrangements to sweeten their part of the deal.
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The Senat met yesterday to consider a reply to Ul-
bricht, and exploratory talks between the East Ger-
mans and the Senat reportedly will be held during
the :next few days.. Serious negotiations are un-
likely, however, until Bonn and Moscow have sorted
out their positions.
There are no firm indications of major troop
moves that might be connected with the joint Soviet/
East German exerci.ses.around Berlin which Moscow
announced would take place in early March.
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Western Europe: London's strategy in the
Anglo-French dispute apparently is to portray Brit-
ain as the champion of a Europe united on the prin-
ciples of the European Communities and with close
ties to the US.
The French admit that in the conversation be-
tween De Gaulle and British Ambassador Soames in
early February they brought up the possibility of
bilateral talks with the British on the "political
and economic future of Europe." The British have
stated publicly, however, that Paris was informed
such talks would be possible only if the French
understood Britain's rejection of De Gaulle's views
on NATO and its continued desire to enter the Com-
munities. British Foreign Secretary Stewart has
said further that if General de Gaulle believes
there is a better way to European unity than en-
largment of the Common Market, he must convince
not only the UK but France's five Common Market
partners as well. London clearly wants to show
that France, not Britain, threatens the balance
between large and small states which the Community
system is designed to maintain.
The British position could, however, be weak-
ened by harsh criticism expected in Parliament this
week of the government's handling of the Anglo-
French dispute. There are elements in Britain that
have been sympathetic to the idea of a "deal" with
De Gaulle. In this regard, suspicions still arise
on the Continent over London's aims.
The Germans, meanwhile, have told the British
that they still intend to participate in a scheduled
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meeting of the WEU permanent representatives on
26 February unless the French agree to attend a
meeting of WEU ministers that Bonn has proposed
for 5 March. Paris has previously stated it would
not return to WEU sessions unless France's partners
accepted its views on the necessity of unanimous
consent to the holding of such meetings.
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Pakistan: The political situation remains
very fluid, and the scramble to assume national
leadership has begun.
The enthusiasm generated by President Ayub
Khan's decision to step down after presiding over
constitutional reforms and new elections appears
tempered by the opposition's appreciation that it
must now share responsibility with Ayub. Public
statements by the major opposition leaders have
been moderate in tone, and even Ayub's declared
enemies have publicly refrained from gloating.
Former foreign minister Bhutto arrived in
East Pakistan yesterday and met with East Pakistan
opposition leaders. Asghar Khan, the moderate
former air force commander, has proposed formation
of a United National Party that apparently would
be a coalition of several major parties. He also
appears to be making a bid for East Pakistani sup-
port.
Ayub still plans to convene a conference to
decide on mutually acceptable constitutional
changes. The meeting could get under way this
week after the popular East Pakistani leader Muj-
ibur Rahman--now unconditionally freed from con-
spiracy charges--arrives in West Pakistan and has
a chance to meet with other opposition leaders.
Now that Ayub has removed himself from contention,
it may be even more difficult for the splintered
opposition to develop a consensus. Although the
opposition demands a sovereign parliament, Ayub
apparently favors retention of a strong presiden-
tial system.
The situation in East Pakistan is still cha-
otic. Dacca has been celebrating Ayub's promised
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departure and the release of Mujibur Rahman. De-
structive violence stemming from separatist senti-
ments broke out again over the weekend in Dacca
and some smaller cities. Now that Ayub as the
symbol of West Pakistani authority has been beaten,
it seems likely that clashes will occur between
moderates and radicals. I
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Nigeria: Federal leader Gowon, under intense
pressure to interdict Biafra's one operating
and relief supply airstrip, is
examining several courses, including t e pos-
sibility of acquiring Soviet surface-to-air missiles
from the UAR. Such missiles would have to be op-
erated by either Soviet or UAR personnel, both un-
likely possibilities at present. Gowon is expected
actively to pursue the acquisition of additional
capability against the airlift, such as more air-
craft, transport aircraft fitted as "gunships," or
antiaircraft guns.
Peru: At a rally on 21 February, opposition
party leader Haya de la Torre publicly demanded
free elections. The rally, one held annually to
celebrate the party leader's birthday, went off
without incident, although the crowd was somewhat
smaller than expected. Haya's speech was generally
moderate in tone and obviously designed to avoid
provoking the military government.
students are now
p anning to step up their opposition to the gov-
ernment.
24 Feb 69
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